VZCZCXRO2948
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #2796/01 2531527
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101527Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7783
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 6264
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7097
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 ADDIS ABABA 002796 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AF/S AND AF/SPG 
 
NSC FOR PITTMAN 
 
ROME PLEASE PASS TO A/S FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPKO UN SO SU AU
 
SUBJECT: A/S Frazer's Meeting with AU Commission Chair Alpha Oumar 
Konare 
 
1.(U):  This cable is from U.S. Mission to the African Union (USAU) 
Ambassador Dr. Cindy L. Courville. 
 
¶2. (U):  SUMMARY 
 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi E. Frazer 
met with AU Commission Chair Professor Alpha Oumar Konare on 
September 7, 2007 at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
Their discussions focused on Darfur and on Somalia. 
 
END SUMMARY 
 
 
¶3. (U):  PARTICIPANTS 
 
AU 
 
Professor Alpha Oumar Konare, AU Commission Chair 
Mr. Kayumbu Mazimhaka, AU Commission Deputy Chair 
Amb. Said Djinnit, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security 
Professor C.A.L. Johnson, Secretary to the AU Commission Amb. John 
Shinkaye, Chief of Staff of the AU Commission Chair's Cabinet 
 
USG 
 
A/S Frazer 
Amb. Cindy Courville, USAU 
Daphne Titus, USAU 
Berouk Mesfin, USAU 
Lauren Landis, AF/SPG 
 
DARFUR 
 
¶4. (SBU)::  The meeting began with A/S Frazer saying that she felt 
significant progress was made on Sudan. She felt comfortable with 
the UN resolution and with the fact that peace talks are moving 
forward. She emphasized the need to adopt an approach to the peace 
process which included talking to all parties, bringing in the IDPs, 
and making sure that Abdul Wahid does not stand outside the process, 
is not marginalized and is effectively brought in. 
 
¶5. (SBU):  On the Government of Sudan's (GoS) acceptance of the UNSC 
resolution, A/S Frazer indicated that the GoS was moving forward 
because of the stringent sanctions applied by the USG. Although she 
would like the sanctions lifted as soon as possible, A/S Frazer 
underlined the importance of keeping the pressure on the GoS. She 
also stressed that the ball was now in the court of the UN and the 
AU. 
 
¶6. (SBU):  Chairperson Konare appreciated A/S Frazer's assessment 
and set out to explain the developments of the past few weeks. He 
said that although he understood the errors committed by the GoS, he 
felt that it was not necessary to impose sanctions as there has been 
a change in behavior on the part of the GoS. He asserted that the 
best way forward was to play a card of confidence. Chairperson 
Konare said that the political groundwork ought to be done and 
maintained, and that, at the same time, all partners and African 
Heads of States ought to take a firm stand. He said that the African 
Heads of State took such a firm stand in 2006 when they refused the 
AU presidency to Sudan. It was reinforced, according to Chairperson 
Konare, by the Arab League in general and King Abdullah of Saudi 
Arabia in particular, the latter putting tremendous political 
pressure on Sudan. 
 
¶7. (SBU):  Chairperson Konare reiterated his position that it was 
important to have faith in the GoS, but at the same time, necessary 
to show resolve and vigilance towards the GoS and the rebel 
movements. He hopes the USG will play this card of confidence, and 
also told French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner in July to keep 
playing this card. Chairperson Konare mentioned that he thought the 
Gordon Brown/Nicolas Sarkosy offensive did not reflect the situation 
on the ground. He disputed the prevailing notion of Sudan being a 
burning house, although he acknowledged that there were problems 
that needed to be addressed and actions that should even be 
condemned. 
 
¶8. (SBU):  Chairperson Konare pointed out that if the Darfur problem 
is not resolved quickly, it could spill over and create unmanageable 
consequences, not only for Sudan but also for the whole of Africa. 
He said that he has clearly told the Sudanese that the AU was 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002796  002 OF 005 
 
 
fighting for one Sudan, a democratic Sudan that accepts diversity. 
He declared that the independence of the South was not a solution, 
and noted that the late John Garang understood the risks of 
independence. He further said that the AU has repeatedly told the 
various neighbours of Sudan not to play the game of destabilizing 
Sudan. Chairperson Konare clearly stated that destabilizing Sudan 
would result in destabilizing the Great Lakes region, the Horn of 
Africa and even the Sahel. 
 
¶9. (SBU):  In reference to the upcoming UNGA, Chairperson Konare 
asserted that the Darfur meeting scheduled for September 21 in New 
York will provide a forum to facilitate evaluation of the political 
process and the implementation of the UN resolution, and also help 
speed up the process. He said that the meeting will have senior 
level participants, and organized under AU/UN auspices, as well as 
bring in humanitarian and human rights organizations working in 
Darfur. The GoS would be invited; the USG and the EU could 
participate as observers. He said that listening to all the parties 
involved was of primary importance. He further said that an agreed 
calendar listing dates for the implementation of resolutions and 
decisions must be created. 
 
¶10. (SBU):  As far as Darfur is concerned, Chairperson Konare feels 
that, despite obvious weaknesses in management and logistics, the AU 
is searching for a formula that will enable it to move forward as 
quickly as possible. He said that waiting for the perfect or ideal 
situation was simply imprudent. The important thing for him was for 
relevant parties to analyze the existing possibilities for 
deployment. He hoped, as in his statements in Khartoum, to rely on 
the African troops at hand that can be deployed quickly. Then, it 
would be possible to bring in the UN to help in the domains where no 
African troops have volunteered and, at the same time, avoid the 
creation of a crisis of confidence on the part of the GoS. 
 
¶11. (SBU):  Chairperson Konare emphasized that it was crucial to 
strike an agreement between the rebel movements and the GoS. Such an 
agreement could create a solid basis to move forward. Chairperson 
Konare added that Abdul Wahid has failed to clearly articulate what 
he wants, and has only himself to blame for failing to negotiate and 
obtain guarantees from the GoS. 
 
¶12. (SBU):  First, A/S Frazer raised concern about the delay in the 
UN appointment of the Rwandan the Deputy Force Commander. She said 
that the USG had done vetting and would like to see the appointment 
confirmed. Secondly, she also raised concern that the mission should 
not exclusively be composed of African troops, highlighting the 
participation of a Chinese engineering company. She felt that 
accepting a sequencing of deployment in Sudan that involved going to 
the limits of African forces before infilling with non-African 
troops was neither feasible nor effective, and would undermine 
efforts to recruit for  Somalia, where the participation of African 
peacekeepers is even more critical. 
 
¶13. (SBU):  In response, Chairperson Konare emphasized the 
importance of avoiding a crisis of confidence with the GoS. He then 
stated that the AU has received no evidence whatsoever of improper 
conduct against Rwandan Deputy Force Commander Major General Karenzi 
Karake. Konare also said that the Deputy Force Commander still has 
the confidence of the AU, and that he had already instructed 
Commissioner Djinnit to tell the Deputy Force Commander to 
immediately proceed to his post. If some negative evidence is 
forthcoming in the future, the AU will take the appropriate 
measures. He stressed the fact that the Rwandan troops are the most 
exemplary in all the engagements they participate in, that he did 
not wish to create confusion in their ranks, and that he especially 
did not want to create the impression of defiance towards President 
Kagame without reason. 
 
¶14. (SBU):  During the discussion of African troops, Chairperson 
Konare underscored the need for a common understanding. He said 
that, frankly speaking, there were a lot of difficulties during the 
negotiations with the GoS. Thus, a compromise was warranted, in the 
sense that African troops will deploy first to fill required 
billets.  If there are not enough African troops available to fill 
the required billets, then non-African troops would be called in. At 
this point, A/S Frazer commented that the resolution only used the 
term predominantly African. Chairperson Konare replied that such 
language represented a UN game. He has repeatedly told UN 
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Guehemo that the 
UN should take care of management, logistics and other technical 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002796  003 OF 005 
 
 
aspects of the hybrid. 
 
¶15. (SBU):  A/S Frazer again noted that in no text, whether UN 
Security Council resolutions or PSC communiques, was it mentioned 
that the Darfur mission will only be filled by African troops. She 
added that doing it in sequence could create a problem, and that the 
force should not be all-African. A/S underlined that all relevant 
written documents only state that the force will be predominantly 
African, and states such as Nepal and Bangladesh are willing and 
able to send troops. 
 
¶16. (SBU):  Commissioner Djinnit and Deputy Chairperson Mazimhaka 
then explained to Chairperson Konare that while most of the force 
would be African, it may be necessary to deploy non-African troops 
in the early phase of the deployment before December 31, such as the 
Chinese engineers and the Nepalese.  They emphasized to Chairperson 
Konare that the overall balnce in the end will result in a 
predominance of African troops.  Chairperson Konare pointed out that 
that he was not a military planner, and accepted the explanation 
provided by Djinnit and Mazimhaka.  Chairperson Konare underlined 
that the AU values the support of both the UN and USG and that all 
three working together could only increase the efficiency of the 
mission in Darfur. He said that the AU had absolutely no reason to 
support the GoS. He said that, at no time, did he change his stance 
on the matter. He affirmed the need to avoid misunderstandings and 
to continue having discussions, and declared that the AU cannot move 
forward without the support of the USG. Chairperson Konare said that 
is essential to maintain a common front in order to resolve the 
Darfur problem. Otherwise, the GoS will be able to play on the lack 
of a common front. 
 
¶17. (SBU):  Chairperson Konare said that it was not easy for the UN 
and the AU to arrive at a common understanding. The AU always tried 
to move forward with what it has at its disposal, and then make 
adjustments. Konare reiterated the importance of not perpetually 
giving the impression that the GoS cannot be trusted even if there 
are credible reasons to doubt its sincerity. He drew attention to 
the large amount of incentives the USG offered to the GoS in 
previous years; offers that were not taken up by the GoS and that 
are no longer on the table as a result. Maintaining the common front 
was, for Chairperson Konare, the only way to force the GoS not to 
spoil the present window of opportunity. Despite, the track record 
of the GoS, Chairperson Konare believes that compromise is sometimes 
needed to go forward as the situation can change completely, for 
instance, if the rebel movements and the GoS reach a deal. 
 
SOMALIA 
 
¶18. (SBU):  Chairperson Konare stated that Somalia was clearly a big 
problem. He mentioned the meeting of Somali opposition forces 
organized by the Eritrean Government on September 6. Chairperson 
Konare was convinced that the date for the meeting was not innocent 
as there was a meeting of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission 
on the same day. He said that it was the anti-Ethiopian feeling that 
united the forces gathered in Asmara, the same anti-Ethiopian 
feeling displayed by President Isaias. Chairperson Konare said that 
this sentiment is dangerous and could lead to war if all concerned 
parties including the AU and USG are not cautious. He said that he 
did not have all the facts about the conclusion of the Somali 
reconciliation conference in Mogadishu. Yet, he believed that the 
conference did not reach its goal as testified by what was underway 
in Asmara. He said that there are many things that need correction, 
and that broadening the dialogue with some of the forces sitting in 
Asmara. He declared that African troops ought to be quickly sent to 
Somalia, thus ensuring the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops. 
 
¶19. (SBU):  He also said that a worrying factor was the weakness of 
the present Somali Government and undue foreign interference. 
Chairperson Konare is convinced that only a strong and 
representative government, which takes care of the people's problems 
and has its own capable army, can bring a solution to the actual 
Somali conflict. The two ways of having a representative government 
were, according to him, either having elections or establishing an 
all-inclusive dialogue. He said he was surprised to hear the Somali 
Government talk of holding elections within two years. Holding such 
elections in the absence of real political parties, of freedom of 
press and uncompromised businessmen would only give power to the 
Islamists who totally hold sway over the Somali social fabric. 
 
¶20. (SBU):  Chairperson Konare said that it was easier and less 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002796  004 OF 005 
 
 
costly to help set up a strong government with its own army rather 
than end up sending 10,000 or 30,000 African troops. He added that 
UN troops would not be a solution and even doubted if the UN would 
step in Somalia any time soon. Instead, he recommended that the UN 
and AU work hand in hand to ensure the redeployment of the Ethiopian 
troops. If the Ethiopian troops do not withdraw fast, Chairperson 
Konare predicted dire implications for Ethiopia. He said that, for 
Ethiopia, withdrawing from Somalia would enable it to solve the 
trouble in the Ogaden and to contain the potential Islamist threat 
within its own borders. 
 
¶21. (SBU):  Chairperson Konare informed A/S Frazer that he had 
appointed a new representative for Somalia that will be based in 
Mogadishu in order to take part in the political process. He 
considered that the present Somali Government has left the AU aside 
on the political front, and believed that if the AU is not brought 
on board the situation in Somalia will not improve at all, with the 
dynamics set in Asmara getting the upper hand. A/S Frazer completely 
agreed with the analysis of Chairperson Konare and said that the 
focus should be on bringing in African troops. The USG is ready to 
provide USD 2-3 million to finance any contingent that is ready to 
go in. It will complete the training of the Burundian battalion by 
mid-October. The French did not train the Burundians well according 
to A/S Frazer, and the USG provided them training with the proper 
equipment. 
 
¶22. (SBU):  Chairperson Konare highlighted once again the urgency of 
getting African troops because he is greatly preoccupied by the 
political situation in Burundi which was rather volatile and getting 
sticky, and also of the possibility that there could be a coup. He 
said that Commissioner Djinnit went to Burundi to advice Burundian 
President Nkurunziza to manage the political situation as serenely 
as possible. He said that the priority for Nigeria was Darfur and 
not Somalia. As to the possibility that South Africa would provide 
equipment, Chairperson Konare voiced his concern that South Africa's 
internal situation was not conducive. Commissioner Djinnit informed 
the meeting's participants that South Africa had initially made a 
general commitment to provide support in finance, logistics, and 
that he would pursue the matter with South African Foreign Minister 
Zuma. A/S Frazer inquired if Chapter 8 could be used to assist 
African troops to go in. Commissioner Djinnit replied that there was 
such a possibility, and that Chairperson Konare had sent a letter to 
the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon asking for the UN's assistance 
in finance and logistics. Chairperson Konare added that the UN ought 
to recognize that it has a responsibility to make sure that there is 
peace and a strong government in Somalia. 
 
¶23. (SBU):  A/S Frazer noted that the national reconciliation 
conference had actually issued a good communiqu and seems to try to 
reach out to all entities and groups. She raised the significance of 
having the AU speak out more on the extremist elements. A/S Frazer 
also said that Eritrea was playing the spoiler and that it was not 
acceptable. Chairperson Konare reiterated the importance of getting 
Ethiopian troops out, thus denying the anti-Ethiopian opposition of 
a pretext not to join in the dialogue. And, he said that the 
appointment of a new representative for Somalia based in Mogadishu 
was to increase the AU's evaluation, approval or censure of 
different groups. He agreed that Eritrea was acting as a 
troublemaker in Somalia, and also in Darfur. Nevertheless, he 
alluded to the support that Eritrea, which is too weak to act alone, 
receives from close allies of the US such as Qatar. 
 
OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES 
 
¶24.  (SBU):  Chairperson Konare then called the attention of A/S 
Frazer to a number of regional issues that the USG should be 
attentive to. The first issue was that of Sudan and Somalia. The 
second issue was the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
And the third issue was the deteriorating situation in the Sahel. 
Chairperson Konare said that he did not need to say more on the 
first issue, as it was sufficiently covered in the meeting. As to 
the second issue, that of the Democratic Republic of Congo, he 
recommended that President Kabila should be pressed not to put down 
the rebellion of General Nkunda militarily and rather seek dialogue 
and negotiation. He also identified the Interhamwe as the primary 
obstacle for a lasting peace in the country and emphasized the dire 
need to get rid of the threat from this force. A/S Frazer responded 
to this issue by saying that she has spoken to Presidents Museveni, 
Kabila and Kagame that they have all kept open their lines of 
communication, and that there will be soon a Tripartite Plus meeting 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002796  005 OF 005 
 
 
in Kampala, Uganda. She acknowledged the need for a more aggressive 
joint operation to push back negative forces. 
 
¶25. (SBU):  Turning to the third issue, that of the Sahel, 
Chairperson Konare explained that drug trafficking was destabilizing 
the Sahel's fragile African states. The drug trafficking route going 
through the coast and Mauritania was responsible for destabilizing 
Mauritania, the north of Niger, the north of Mali, Chad, Darfur, and 
Algeria where a deadly suicide bomb attack occurred just yesterday. 
He raised the instability in Niger as a case in point. The Prime 
Minister's government was recently voted out of office, and the 
Tuareg are engaged in a rebellion in the north of the country. 
Furthermore, Niger has oil-related problems with Libya, and 
uranium-related problems with the French nuclear engineering group 
Areva. He said that he recently sent Commissioner Djinnit to urge 
Niger's President Tandja, who seems to have opted to crush the 
Tuareg rebellion militarily, to exercise maximum restraint. He also 
noted that Niger's destabilization could spill over and touch Chad, 
Darfur and Mali, citing the recent incident involving suspected 
Tuareg rebels who abducted Malian soldiers and took them off to 
Niger. Chairperson Konare was also concerned that a coup d'etat 
could be staged in Niger. 
 
¶26. (SBU):  Chairperson Konare especially criticized the 
Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative launched by the USG. He 
complained that the initiative bypassed state authorities and dealt 
directly with local communities. He also questioned the rationale of 
the initiative citing the example of Morocco where Islamists are 
expected to make gains in the upcoming elections. A/S Frazer 
responded by saying that the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism 
Initiative aimed at countering extremist influences in the Sahel and 
at assisting governments to better control their borders by focusing 
on military training of state authorities while supporting NGO 
activities that assist local communites via USAID programs. She also 
pointed out the problem the USG has in dealing with rebel groups 
such as the ONLF and the Tuareg rebellion, which are domestically 
based but still entertain links to extremist groups such as Al 
Qaeda. 
 
¶27. (SBU):  A/S Frazer concluded the meeting by offering to 
follow-up with Chairperson Konare on strategizing about how best to 
deal with Africa's many insurgencies and to ensure that the TSCTP is 
effective in countering the terror threat in the Sahel. 
 
¶28. (U:)  Assistant Secretary Frazer has cleared this message. 
 
YAMAMOTO