VZCZCXRO6401
PP RUEHBZ RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0695/01 2332255
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 212255Z AUG 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2499
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1452
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 1213
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 1536
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0870
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0323
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 000695 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: CHAD/CAR: UN URGES COUNCIL TO "TRUST BUT VERIFY" 
PEACEKEEPING PLANS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 116973 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000695  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At August 21 consultations, United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
Assistant-Secretary-General Annabi advised the Security 
Council to "trust but verify" plans for peacekeeping in 
eastern Chad and northeastern Central African Republic (CAR), 
given Chadian President Deby's acceptance in principle to the 
French and European Union forces that would comprise the 
military component of the proposed operation.  Annabi 
reported that the EU Council of Ministers would finalize the 
proposal in its September 17 meeting, necessitating Security 
Council action beforehand in the forms of a Presidential 
Statement as a political signal to the EU to continue 
planning (circulated by the French delegation and contained 
in paragraph 10) and a resolution (to be circulated in draft 
by the end of August).  Annabi deferred discussions of costs 
and troop numbers of the follow-on operation, in which the UN 
would assume military control from the EU, saying only that 
the cost estimates would be small compared to that of the 
hybrid operation in Darfur.  Annabi said the UN did not see a 
need to include formed police units as part of its police 
deployment at this time and seemed relieved to avoid command 
and control issues that formed units would likely trigger. 
Members were generally supportive of the proposed operation 
and expressed willingness to engage constructively in an 
August 22 Experts Meeting on the PRST so that it could be 
adopted by the August 25 departure for the region of a joint 
UN-EU assessment team.  END SUMMARY. 
 
ANNABI OUTLINES REVISED PEACEKEEPING CONCEPT 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) At August 21 Security Council consultations, United 
Nations (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 
Assistant-Secretary-General (A/SYG) Annabi outlined the three 
key features of the revised concept for Chad and CAR 
peacekeeping, per the August 10 Secretary-General's (SYG) 
Report (S/2007/488), versus the SYG's February 23 Report 
(S/2007/97).  The first was that the military component of 
the operation would be provided by the European Union (EU) 
for the first 12 months, vice the UN, based on discussions 
between French FM Kouchner and Chadian President Deby, in 
which Deby agreed "in principle" to such a concept.  The 
second was that the force would have no direct involvement in 
cross-border activities with Sudan.  The third was that 
Chadian gendarmes would be mentored, trained, equipped, paid 
and monitored by the UN but would fall under national 
authority. 
 
¶3. (SBU) A/SYG Annabi went on to describe the three pillars 
of the proposed deployment.  The first such pillar would be a 
multidimensional UN presence (including inter alia political 
affairs officers, civil affairs officers and human rights 
officers), to be based in large part in a forward 
headquarters in Abeche, eastern Chad, with field offices in 
Iriba, Farchana and Goz Beida.  The second pillar would be a 
police component comprised of UN-trained Chadian gendarmes 
mandated to maintain law and order in and around the 12 
refugee camps, IDP concentrations and civilian populations at 
risk in eastern Chad, with six "jurisdictions" in Abeche, 
Bahai, Guereda, Iriba, Farchana and Goz Beida.  The final 
pillar would be an EU military force mandated to assist in 
protecting civilians at risk and to facilitate the provision 
of humanitarian assistance.  Annabi expected the concept of 
operations for this pillar to be finalized by the EU by 
mid-September, after which the force would deploy for an 
initial 12-month period, with follow-on arrangements to be 
decided by a joint EU-UN assessment at the six-month mark. 
 
¶4. (SBU) A/SYG foresaw coordination of the EU-UN operation 
with the UN Country Team in Chad in the areas of assisting in 
the protection of civilians at risk; of selecting, training 
and advising Chadian law enforcement elements; of liaising 
with relevant national military and judicial organs; of 
facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance; of 
liaising with the Government of Chad and with UNHCR to 
re-locate refugee camps in close proximity to the Darfur 
border; of protecting UN personnel, facilities and equipment 
and ensuring their freedom of movement; of liaising with the 
Sudanese Government, the African Union (AU), the AU Mission 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000695  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
in the Sudan (AMIS), the UN-AU Mission in the Sudan (UNAMID), 
the UN Peace-building Office in CAR (BONUCA) and the 
Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CENSAD); and of 
promoting reconciliation and cohesion.  Annabi noted that a 
Special Representative of the SYG would be appointed as 
overall Head of Mission and that the UN team based in 
N'djamena would serve as the nucleus of the operation. 
 
¶5. (SBU) On timelines, A/SYG Annabi reported the EU Council 
of Ministers would meet September 17 to consider the 
arrangements, necessitating coordinated efforts among the UN, 
EU and Government of Chad.  Annabi noted that in addition to 
weekly UN-EU video conferences on the proposed Chad/CAR 
operation, a joint EU-UN information-gathering mission would 
go to N'Djamena, Abeche and Birao from August 25 to September 
1 to inform the "Crisis Management Concept" to be presented 
to the EU Ministers on September 17.  Once the EU approved 
the military component, Annabi explained that the SYG would 
submit another report to the Security Council containing 
specific recommendations on EU troop numbers and structure 
and strength of the UN component of the operation, in order 
to inform a draft resolution.  In response to a question from 
Ambassador Wolff, Annabi deferred discussion of cost 
estimates to the forthcoming SYG report, saying that the cost 
for the initial UN component (SRSG and office, 350 
international police) would be limited but would increase 
"dramatically" if/when the UN absorbed the military component 
from the EU.  Still, Annabi assured, the price tag would be 
small compared to that of UNAMID in neighboring Darfur.  Also 
in response to Ambassador Wolff's question, Annabi said the 
UN did not see a need to include formed police units as part 
of its police deployment at this time, adding however that 
had they been necessary, they would have fallen under UN 
command and control. 
 
¶6. (SBU) A/SYG Annabi acknowledged that more work remained to 
be done with Chadian President Deby to ensure his support for 
the hand-over of the military part of the operation to the UN 
after the initial 12-month deployment but advised the Council 
to "trust but verify," meaning, he said, trust the EU and FM 
Kouchner but verify that Deby's agreement in principle 
translates to realization of the plan.  Annabi hoped that 
some EU elements would transition to the UN force after 12 
months to give "immediate credibility" to the operation. 
Annabi added the faster the follow-on deployment could be 
clarified, the better it would be for the UN, not least in 
identifying troop- and police-contributors.  He noted that 
Deby had opposed from the outset any deployment at the border 
with Sudan, but Annabi was optimistic that the presence would 
nonetheless have a stabilizing effect where deployed in 
eastern Chad. 
 
MEMBERS EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR PROPOSED PLAN AND PRST 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶7. (SBU) Members were generally supportive of the proposed 
operation.  French Permanent Representative (PR) Ripert 
detailed the extent of French engagement with the Governments 
of Chad, CAR and Sudan on improving the security situation in 
the region, which resulted in "unanimous support of all 
governments concerned."  He urged the Council to seize this 
opportunity to act and accordingly circulated a draft 
Presidential Statement (PRST), which he hoped could be 
adopted by the time a joint UN-EU assessment team would 
depart for the region on August 25.  Ripert added that his 
delegation would submit by the end of August a draft 
resolution based on the three pillars A/SYG Annabi had 
outlined (NOTE: French Poloff told USUN on August 21 that the 
French Mission hoped the draft resolution would be adopted by 
September 14, ahead of the September 17 EU Council Ministers' 
meeting.  END NOTE).  The Belgian delegate advised that any 
draft resolution be clear on the requirement for coordination 
structures between the UN and the EU, on command and control, 
and on logistical coordination between all components of the 
operation.  The Slovakian delegate was firm that the force be 
given Chapter VII mandate authority to protect civilians at 
risk. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Several delegations, including South Africa and 
Indonesia, spoke to the need for the force to support the 
political processes in Chad and CAR, despite A/SYG Annabi's 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000695  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
reminder that President Deby had opposed any involvement of 
the proposed force in the internal dimension of the Chadian 
problem and that to do otherwise could jeopardize Deby's 
agreement to the deployment.  Russian Deputy PR Dolgov, 
supported by the Qatari representative, urged solicitation of 
the Sudanese Government's opinion on Chad/CAR deployment so 
as to foster cooperation on strengthening the border regime 
and movement of refugees.  A/SYG Annabi responded that the UN 
had been working transparently with Sudan since the outset 
and that an upcoming visit by SYG Ban to Sudan, Chad and 
Libya would reinforce this spirit.  The Chinese and Qatari 
delegates similarly urged Annabi to secure Chadian consent 
for any deployment. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Members expressed willingness to engage 
constructively in an August 22 Experts Meeting on the PRST so 
that it could be adopted by the time a joint UN-EU assessment 
team would depart for the region on August 25. 
 
¶10. (U) Begin draft PRST text: 
 
The Security Council reiterates its concern about the 
prevailing insecurity along the borders between the Sudan, 
Chad and the Central African Republic and about the threat 
which this poses to the civilian population and the conduct 
of humanitarian operations. 
 
Following the adoption of resolution 1769 (2007), the 
Security Council welcomes the report of the Secretary-General 
dated 10 August 2007 (S/2007/488), which proposes a revised 
concept of operations aimed at contributing to the protection 
of refugees, internally displaced persons and civilian 
populations at risk in eastern Chad and the north-eastern 
Central African Republic. 
 
The Security Council expresses its readiness to authorize the 
establishment of the proposed multidimensional presence in 
eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic, 
on the basis of the recommendations contained in the 
Secretary-General's report.  The Council takes note of the 
 
SIPDIS 
Secretary-General's observations and proposals relating to 
 
SIPDIS 
military elements for the protection of the multidimensional 
presence.  It welcomes the readiness of the European Union, 
expressed at the meeting of the Council of the European Union 
on 23 and 24 July 2007, to consider the establishment of an 
operation in support of the United Nations presence in 
eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic. 
 
The Security Council encourages the Secretary-General and the 
European Union, as far as they are concerned and in 
consultation with the Governments of Chad and the Central 
African Republic, to proceed with preparations for this 
multidimensional presence.  It requests the Secretary-General 
to study, in consultations with the Governments of Chad and 
the Central African Republic, the follow-on arrangements for 
this multidimensional presence after a period of 12 months, 
in particular on the basis of a joint assessment of 
requirements to be conducted by the United Nations 
Organization and the European Union six months after its 
deployment. 
 
The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to 
continue to keep it closely informed of the preparations for 
the multidimensional presence. 
 
¶11. (U) End draft PRST text. 
 
¶12. (SBU) COMMENT. An issue that will require consistent 
follow-up once deployment begins is that of accountability 
for UN-trained Chadian gendarmes.  Annabi assured that the UN 
would conclude a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the 
Government of Chad on the responsibilities and modalities of 
the revised peacekeeping concept to ensure the type of 
"quality control" over the gendarmes that UNHCR (which 
currently trains gendarmes in the refugee camps) lacks. 
Annabi saw the oversight role of UN civilian police and 
rotation of gendarmes as direct means of verifying the 
gendarmes' conformity with UN performance standards. 
Nonetheless, we should ensure that any MOU signed is clear on 
this point so as to avoid problems in the future.  END 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000695  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
COMMENT. 
KHALILZAD