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DE RUCNDT #0635/01 2142259
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 022259Z AUG 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2382
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0845
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0844
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1566
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1807
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0919
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0823
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8307

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 000635 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL UNSC KUNR
SUBJECT: UNSC EXPANSION: DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
 
REF: STATE 100029 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  On July 19, the UNGA,s Open-Ended 
Working Group on UNSC Expansion discussed the two recent 
reports on the issue prepared by facilitators appointed by 
UNGA President Khalifa.  Although the debate on Security 
Council reform and expansion gained some momentum in the wake 
of these reports of April 19 and June 26, serious divergences 
among UN members over the nature, scope, and size of any UNSC 
expansion persist.  The new element in the UNGA debate is the 
possibility of an "interim" phase to Council expansion, as 
suggested in the facilitators, reports.  This phase would 
temporarily increase the membership until a pre-appointed 
review period, perhaps ten or fifteen years down the road, at 
which time more permanent changes in the size and composition 
of the Council would be decided.   The G-4 were divided in 
their response to the facilitators, reports, with both India 
and Germany commenting on the type and size of an acceptable 
interim solution, while Japan and Brazil reiterated their 
previous positions and criticized the reports for excluding 
the full range of UNSC reform options, including the 
immediate addition of new permanent members.  Opponents of 
the G-4, including the Uniting for Consensus Group (which 
includes Pakistan, Algeria, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, 
Kenya, South Korea, Italy, and Spain), wholeheartedly 
endorsed the facilitators, report, claiming that it 
represented the only viable way forward, and were largely in 
favor of moving quickly to intergovernmental negotiations. 
The decision on how to proceed with negotiations now rests 
with UNGA President Khalifa, who has expressed her desire for 
the preparation of concrete proposals during the 61st session 
for negotiation during the 62nd session.  End Summary 
 
 
The Facilitators, Report: Adding the Possibility of an 
Interim Expansion 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) On July 19, General Assembly (GA) President Khalifa 
convened a meeting of the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) on 
the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in 
the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters 
Related to the Security Council.  The meeting was designed to 
provide an opportunity for UN members to respond to 
Khalifa,s facilitators, reports released in April and June 
on UNSC expansion and to establish an UNGA process for 
dealing with UNSC reform for the rest of the 61st session. 
The sharp, negative exchanges that emerged during the May 3-4 
UNGA debate on UNSC expansion were even more pointed during 
the debate on July 19, as member states appeared increasingly 
anxious now that specific options for negotiation are being 
discussed.  Intergovernmental negotiations on concrete 
proposals are unlikely to occur prior to the 62nd session, 
however, as all of the main groups would like to see the main 
points of their original proposals retained in any negotiated 
text. 
 
¶3.  (U) Per reftel, the U.S. representative reaffirmed U.S. 
support for a reform of the UN as a whole to enable it to 
address more effectively the new challenges facing us in the 
21st century.  The U.S. expressed support for a "modest" UNSC 
expansion and for Japan,s permanent membership and advised 
that the U.S. remained "open to considering proposals that 
include a modest increase in membership as well as 
 interim, options, as suggested in the facilitators, 
report." 
 
¶4.  (U) The facilitators, reports of 19 April and 26 June 
outlined four different expansion options: 
 
-- Option 1: Extended-term, non-permanent seats that could be 
allocated for the full duration of the intermediary 
arrangement, up to the review conference, to be held at a 
date in the future. 
 
-- Option 2: Extended-term, non-permanent seats for a longer 
period than the existing non-permanent seats with the 
possibility of re-election 
 
-- Option 3: Extended-term, non-permanent seats for a longer 
period than the existing non-permanent seats without the 
possibility of re-election 
 
-- Option 4: Regular two-year term, non-permanent seats with 
 
the possibility of immediate re-election. 
 
¶5.  (U) The reports fail to identify the following key 
variables in any interim phase, opting instead to leave these 
decisions to later intergovernmental negotiations: 
 
-- The number of new non-permanent seats 
 
-- The basis for selection, e.g. allocation by regions, 
election at-large, or allocation to developed/developing 
countries 
 
-- The timing and format of the review of the interim phase 
 
¶6.  (U) The facilitators, approach calls for the "widest 
possible political acceptance" of any proposed expansion 
model, beyond the UN Charter requirement of a two-thirds 
majority.  The facilitators, report is available at 
www.un.org/ga/president/61/letters/SCR-Report -26June07.pdf 
 
¶7.  (U) UN Member States generally opposed the interim 
options 2 and 3 for creating a third tier of membership, 
which might increase Council divisions and further downgrade 
the status of the regular two-year non-permanent seats. 
Option 4 was not included in the 26 June report, but the 
facilitators reassured its supporters that the option was 
still on the table, as the two reports should be considered 
jointly.  The reports add that any of these options can be 
combined with enlargement of regular, non-permanent, two-year 
seats. 
 
 
G-4 Split, Africa Goes It Alone 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) The G-4 (India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany) are split 
on their views on an interim phase.  India and Germany, while 
reiterating the G-4 proposal of expansion in both the 
permanent and non-permanent categories, expressed willingness 
to accept the extended seats, as described in Option 1, as an 
alternative to permanent seats.  Japan and Brazil, on the 
other hand, stood firm on the need for new permanent seats, 
expressing disappointment that this option was not included 
in the facilitators, reports.  With regard to the way 
forward, Japan and Brazil recommended that "interested 
groups" submit concrete proposals for negotiation, while 
Germany assigned that task to President Khalifa. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) India and Germany appear to support the 
facilitators, approach for two reasons.  First, they believe 
that delegations that had co-sponsored the G-4 resolution in 
2005 have lost their enthusiasm for the expansion debate. 
The Germans blame this diminishing support on the lack of 
cohesion among the G-4 (which they primarily attribute to 
Japanese courtship of U.S. support).  Others attribute it to 
a general sense of fatigue after more than a decade of 
debates on this topic.  Second, unlike the Japanese and 
Brazilians, the Indians and the Germans appear unwilling to 
re-introduce the G-4 proposal as a basis for forthcoming 
negotiations, understanding that it will receive a lukewarm 
reception and/or be seen as disrupting President Khalifa,s 
new process.  Therefore, the only viable option for obtaining 
a Council seat with any semblance of permanency, while not 
appearing to disrupt the current process, would be to support 
Interim Option 1. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Diminished prospects for African support have also 
added to G-4 disunity.  During the May 3-4 debate, the G-4 
sought African support for their proposal as the key to 
achieving the two-thirds majority in the UNGA required for 
passage.  They had hoped that the facilitators, report, 
which eliminated as unrealistic the African position of 
eleven new UNSC members, including six new permanent members 
(two from Africa) with a veto, would break the African 
consensus position and allow at least some Africans to choose 
the G-4 model.  However, African Union let stand its previous 
position in support of the twenty-six member UNSC at its July 
Summit.  Ugandan PR Butagira, speaking on behalf of the 
African Group, merely reaffirmed the long-held African 
position and complained that at this "important stage Africa 
is expected to make concessions while other groups maintain 
their positions."  Egypt, Mauritius, and South Africa all 
spoke in support of the African position, though South Africa 
also held that the African position and an intermediary phase 
 
 
were not mutually exclusive.  Panama, Italy, and Pakistan 
also voiced their support for the African cause, perhaps out 
of the (misplaced) fear that the G-4 might lure some of the 
Africans to its side. 
 
UFC Cheering on the Facilitators 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (U) The Uniting for Consensus (UFC) group of G-4 
opponents (led by Pakistan, Italy, and South Korea) expressed 
support for Option 4, which would create non-permanent 
two-year seats with the possibility of re-election.  The UFC 
countries were clearly pleased both by Khalifa,s decision to 
continue consultations on the basis of the April report and 
by the contents of the June report, which reiterated that the 
creation of new permanent seats was not a viable option. 
However, they continued to worry that the G-4 would 
capitalize on the new momentum without accepting the lack of 
support for new permanent seats.  Pakistani Acting PR Farukh 
Amil underlined this sentiment, stating that "there should be 
an assurance...that no unilateral moves...such as tabling of 
draft resolutions, will be resorted to by any one while the 
negotiating process is underway." 
 
¶12.  (U) With regard to the next step, the majority of UFC 
countries (Pakistan, Spain, Indonesia, Romania, Costa Rica) 
suggested that the facilitators, reports of 19 April and 26 
June should act as the basis for intergovernmental 
negotiations.  However, the facilitators themselves responded 
that their reports were not intended for that purpose and 
that any text should come from the member states.  In 
addition, Italy and South Korea were the only countries to 
explicitly reject the call for intergovernmental 
negotiations.  Perhaps noting the popularity of the 
facilitators, Option 1 and fearing that the extended seats 
might eventually become permanent seats, both countries 
stressed that member states were not ready for compromise and 
more clarity was needed on the framework for negotiations. 
 
P-5 Positions 
---------------- 
 
¶13.  (U) China and Russia expressed concern that the 
established groups were seeking to capitalize on the 
facilitators, reports and advance their own Council 
expansion proposals.  Both the Chinese and the Russian 
statements stressed that, although none of the old models for 
expansion had garnered the required support, the wide 
disparity of views among the membership and the large number 
of concrete issues still unresolved precluded the launch of 
negotiations based on an interim phase.  Russia then 
underlined that any expansion could not exceed a "reasonable" 
level, defining "reasonable" as around five additional 
members, and China voiced its support for enhanced 
representation of African countries. 
 
¶14. (U) France and the UK were much more willing to move 
forward with negotiations and stressed the need for concrete 
developments in the 62nd session.  France, a G-4 co-sponsor 
in 2005, had noted during the May debate that none of the 
previous resolutions had garnered the necessary support.  The 
French reiterated this position during July,s debate, 
underlining that the interim approach has the advantage of 
broad support.  The UK now appears to be the G-4,s biggest 
supporter, as they confirmed their continued support for the 
G-4, as well as for a permanent seat for Africa. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Privately, UKUN officers have been more skeptical 
about the benefits of expansion than their national 
statements.   They remain concerned about any discussion that 
calls attention to the "special status" of permanent members. 
 
 
 
KHALILZAD