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Viewing cable 07TOKYO3929, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/24/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO3929 2007-08-24 08:24 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO8877
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3929/01 2360824
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240824Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6879
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 5202
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 2771
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 6392
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 1793
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 3519
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8584
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4648
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5593
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 003929 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/24/07 
 
 
Index: 
 
(1) What economic strategy will Japan take in APEC summit? 
 
(2) Ronten (point at issue) -- WTO trade talks: WTO is a lifeline 
for Japanese economy 
 
(3) Daring prediction - 2007 reversal of power in Upper House (4): 
Diplomacy, security policy 
 
(4) DPJ in action (Part 1): Ozawa determined to bring about change 
of government in straightforward manner, sealing off option of 
political realignment plan 
 
(5) Koichi Kato, former LDP secretary general, says Abe's decision 
to stay in office without public support creates political vacuum 
 
(6) Facts about civilian control (Section 4): Thinking of SDF as 
Japan's new garrison-SDF in transformation (Part 2): Backing to US 
military called assistance with Iraqi reconstruction 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) What economic strategy will Japan take in APEC summit? 
 
SANKEI (Page 13) (Full) 
August 24, 2007 
 
The annual summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
will be held in Sydney, Australia, in early September, in which 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will also participate. Excluding the ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum (ARF), in 
which security issues are exclusively discussed, APEC is the sole 
arena for discussion in the region. APEC also brings together the 
United States and China, both of which have influence over the 
economies in the region. Attention is now being focused on what 
economic strategy Japan, which ranks with these two powers, will 
take in the APEC summit. 
 
APEC was launched in 1989 at the proposal of Australia, with 12 
members - Japan, the US, Canada, South Korea, Australia, New 
Zealand, and the six ASEAN member countries (at that time). 
 
APEC declared that it would liberalize trade and investment in the 
region and contribute to world economic growth, instead of aiming at 
forming a closed trade bloc of its member countries. The forum also 
aimed to maintain and further develop the current multinational free 
trade system under the World Trade Organization for areas outside 
the region, in a bid to create an open economic zone. 
 
APEC is now composed of 21 countries and regions. China joined in 
1991, and Russia and Vietnam were also added in 1998, though they 
were socialist countries. Its members' combined gross domestic 
product (GDP) accounts for 60 PERCENT  of the entire world's. It 
population makes up 40 PERCENT  of that of the whole world. As it 
stands, APEC has grown into a giant economic zone. 
 
Its members are called not "states" but "economies." Taiwan and Hong 
Kong are members of APEC, showing its nature of placing emphasis on 
economic affairs, unlike other international forums. 
 
Initially, the forum called only ministerial meetings, but a summit 
 
TOKYO 00003929  002 OF 011 
 
 
was held in 1993 for the first time at the proposal of US President 
Clinton. Since then, APEC has held a summit and a ministerial 
meeting every fall. 
 
The Bogor Declaration in 1994 set the goal of completely 
liberalizing trade and investment in the region by 2010 for 
industrialized countries and by 2020 for developing countries. 
However, countries have begun to pour their efforts into 
negotiations on concluding bilateral free trade agreements (FTA) on 
the heels of changes in the economic situation and have eventually 
become less interested in the goal of pursuing trade liberalization 
among the APEC members. 
 
The US has advocated a concept of forming an APEC-wide Free Trade 
Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), but it is quite difficult to 
realize a free trade zone based on common rules in the Asia-Pacific 
region, which is featured by diversification. China, which has been 
stepping up efforts to conclude FTAs with ASEAN countries, proposed 
an economic-zone initiative involving the 10 ASEAN countries plus 
three (Japan, China, and South Korea), apparently showing its 
eagerness to take the initiative in managing the Asian economy while 
excluding the US from the framework. 
 
APEC has proposed promoting multilateral trade liberalization, 
centering on WTO negotiations. On this challenge, too, it is now 
unlikely to see a settlement of the Doha Round of global trade talks 
under the WTO by the end of this year. APEC was launched, with 
economic issues as its main theme, but no conspicuous achievements 
have been produced in the economic area. In recent meetings of APEC, 
North Korea and security issues have been taken up as major themes, 
and its weakening identity is being pointed out. 
 
How will Prime Minister Abe be involved in the US-proposed FTAAP 
concept, in order to hold in check moves by China, with which Japan 
is struggling for leadership in negotiations on future options for 
the ASEAN plus three and the East Asia summit? Attention is being 
focused on what economic strategy the prime minister will take. The 
issue of global warming, which will be high on the agenda for the 
Lake Toya Summit next year, is also expected to take center stage in 
the APEC summit. Another focus is on what views on the issue of 
global warming will be compiled under the framework of APEC summit 
joined by the US and China - two major greenhouse gas emitters. 
 
(2) Ronten (point at issue) -- WTO trade talks: WTO is a lifeline 
for Japanese economy 
 
MAINICHI (Page 8) (Full) 
August 24, 2007 
 
Akira Kotera, professor of international economic law at University 
of Tokyo 
 
Japan needs to prepare an environment for developing countries to be 
able to act in concert as agreement is expected to be reached even 
in the area of agricultural goods. 
 
Since the beginning of the 21st century Japan has signed one 
bilateral economic partnership agreement (EPA) after another, 
starting with the one with Singapore. But the EPA is concluded in 
accordance with the rules set by the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The importance of the WTO, which underpins the international 
economic order, is unshakable even now. 
 
TOKYO 00003929  003 OF 011 
 
 
 
The WTO agreements and the EPAs are likened to "laws" and 
"contracts" respectively. The WTO (and its predecessor General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), a body pursuing free and 
indiscriminate trade, has brought economic prosperity to Japan. We 
must not forget the fact that the dispute settlement mechanism under 
the WTO has played a major part in dealing with recent trade 
disputes. It is safe to say that the fate of the Japanese economy 
hinges on the reliability of the WTO. The Doha round -- the fourth 
round of major trade talks since the start of GATT -- must be 
finalized successfully so as to ensure the reliability of the WTO. 
 
The Doha round has taken up the liberalization of agricultural goods 
and developing countries' industrial products, which had been rarely 
discussed in the past three rounds of trade talks. The Doha round 
began in 2001, but it has remained unable to reach agreement on a 
new formula for liberalization despite the deadline for the 
agreement set at the end of 2004. Even at present chances are slim 
that agreement will be reached. Major factors that have made trade 
talks difficult include agricultural products, which are under 
strong protectionist pressure, and industrial products. Naturally, 
the talks have faced difficulties because they have concerned the 
strongholds of protectionism. 
 
Even so, the talks are advancing at a steady pace toward reaching an 
accord as evidenced by draft agreements prepared in July by the 
negotiation chair regarding agricultural and industrial goods 
respectively. Major points at issue in the negotiations are export 
subsidies, domestic subsidies for farmers (such as income security), 
and tariff cuts. The key to a success of the negotiations lies with 
the United States, which has been strongly calling for tariff cuts 
on agricultural goods and developing countries' industrial goods. At 
the initial stage of the negotiations, least developed countries 
indicated their attitude to resist free trade talks, but at present, 
the so-called group of four (G-4) -- the US, the European Union 
(EU), India, and Brazil -- and the so-called group of six (G-4) -- 
the G-4 plus Japan and Australia -- have taken the lead over the 
negotiations. The process toward an agreement has been improved 
now. 
 
What should Japan do at this stage? When will the US, which holds a 
key to a success of the Doha round, make a move toward completing 
the negotiations? The situation over the US presidential election in 
2008 and moves of the US House and Senate also hold a key. Once 
there is a sign that the US is moving to complete the Doha round of 
trade talks, Japan is probably expected to pave the way for each 
country, particularly developing countries, to be able to act in 
concert. Japan should do as it did in December 2005. Specifically, 
Japan assumed a development initiative and removed tariffs imposed 
on least developing countries' products. This initiative made a 
significant contribution to the formation of agreement at the WTO 
meeting in Hong Kong held immediately after this initiative was 
announced. 
 
The issue that has caught the public's attention in Japan is the 
issue of tariff cuts on agricultural products. The Japanese 
government has indicated opposition to cutting tariffs, but the gaps 
in views between supporters and opponents have been narrowed as the 
process for completing the trade talks has been progressing. The 
current stalemate in the negotiations would not be resolved even 
through the Japanese government turned around its current position, 
but Japan, premised on broad tariff cuts on agricultural goods at 
 
TOKYO 00003929  004 OF 011 
 
 
home, must study in earnest the way agricultural administration 
should be in the future and make preparations for that. 
 
Akira Kotera: Born in 1952; graduated from University of Tokyo's Law 
Faculty; and after serving as professor at Tokyo Metropolitan 
University, now serves as professor at University of Tokyo; and also 
serves as a faculty fellow at the Research Institute of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (RIETI). 
 
(3) Daring prediction - 2007 reversal of power in Upper House (4): 
Diplomacy, security policy 
 
Tokyo Shimbun (Page 2) (Full) 
August 24, 2007 
 
By Shohei Yoshida 
 
Question:  A focal issue at the extraordinary Diet session in the 
fall is a bill to extend the antiterrorism special measures law, 
which is required to continue the Self-Defense Force's (SDF) Indian 
Ocean refueling mission for foreign ships.  What are some possible 
developments? 
 
Answer:  There is no doubt that the government and the ruling 
parties will call on the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to hold 
negotiations to revise the bill.  However, because it is difficult 
for them to reach an agreement, the bill is expected to be voted 
down at the Upper House in the end. 
 
A Turning Point 
 
Q:  Why are they not expected to reach the agreement? 
 
A:  The SDF is carrying out the refueling mission to support 
antiterrorism operations in Afghanistan.  DPJ President Ichiro Ozawa 
has been expressing opposition, claiming that the SDF should not be 
sent to the Indian Ocean because "the United Nations did not 
approve" the antiterrorism operation. 
 
The DPJ's position is that the SDF should not be dispatched for a 
mission that is not based on a UN request.  Because the SDF dispatch 
poses a fundamental issue related to the basic principles of the 
dispatch, neither Ozawa nor the government can reach a compromise. 
 
Q:  Even if the Upper House rejects the bill, the bill will be 
enacted if the ruling parties pass it again at the Lower House by a 
two-thirds majority. 
 
A:  Theoretically speaking, that is true.  But many Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) lawmakers think that doing so will be 
difficult in reality.  They are worried that they might invite a 
sharp public reaction if they give the impression that they rammed 
through the bill by exercising numerical strength.  Because the LDP 
suffered such a crushing defeat in the election, they have to be 
careful. 
 
Q:  If the Diet fails to revise the antiterrorism special measures 
law to extend the refueling mission, the Maritime SDF will have to 
pull out from the Indian Ocean. 
 
A:  Before the Upper House election, it was unimaginable that the 
SDF will pull out.  But it is beginning to seem real.  The LDP 
 
TOKYO 00003929  005 OF 011 
 
 
leadership has indicated that the party "may naturally need to think 
about a possible case where the law expires," and the LDP may not be 
just bluffing the opposition bloc by saying this. 
 
Q: Are there any steps to break the situation? 
 
A:  Some officials of the government and the ruling parties are 
indeed seeking the enactment of a new, alternative law that is 
acceptable to the DPJ.   However, given the fact that the 
antiterrorism special measures law will expire on November 1, that 
is difficult time wise. 
 
Q:  What will be affected if the Maritime SDF pulls out? 
 
A:  The United States has repeatedly expressed a concern to Japan 
that "the absence of the Japanese mission will pose a big problem." 
If Japan backs out despite the concern, there will be an inevitable 
impact on Japan-US relations. 
 
Since the 1996 Japan-US joint declaration on the Japan-US security 
treaty, the bilateral alliance has been strengthened.  The 
integration (of the two countries) was accelerated particularly 
under the "Koizumi-Bush relationship," and it was thought to be 
Japan's natural course of action to carry out joint activities with 
the US military on the Indian Ocean and even in Iraq.  Thus, the end 
of the refueling mission may serve as a turning point. 
 
Discord 
 
Q:  Are there any other causes for concern in the Japan-US 
relationship? 
 
A:  There is a possibility of a standstill in the transformation of 
the US Forces Japan (USFJ), which includes the planned relocation of 
Futenma Air Station that was agreed upon by the Japanese and US 
governments.  In the recent Diet session, the DPJ opposed a bill on 
special measures for USFJ transformation.  Also, many local 
governments holding a relocation site are expressing reluctance. 
Therefore, it will not be possible to promote the transformation 
plan in a high-handed manner. 
 
Q:  The United States was hoping that the Japanese Government will 
revise its constitutional interpretation on the exercising of the 
right to collective self-defense, so that Japan will be able to use 
the missile defense (MD) system to intercept missiles that were 
fired at the United States.  What will become of this issue? 
 
A:  The DPJ is not opposed to introducing the MD system.  However, 
it is against revising the constitutional interpretation.  The 
ruling New Komeito as well is becoming increasingly opposed to the 
revision after the Upper House election.  Thus, the prime minister 
will not be able to respond to the US hope in this field as well. 
 
Q:  What will become of the issue of Japanese nationals abducted by 
North Korean agents?  The Abe administration regards it as the 
top-priority issue. 
 
A:  Although the abduction issue is a bilateral issue between Japan 
and North Korea, Tokyo was hoping for US support to break an 
impasse.  The SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean or Iraq is not 
unrelated with Japan's hope for US cooperation in the abduction 
issue.  If the relationship with the United States is strained by 
 
TOKYO 00003929  006 OF 011 
 
 
the SDF's overseas dispatch issue when Washington's backing is 
needed for the abduction issue, Japan may run the risk of being up 
against the wall on all sides. 
 
A Stalemate 
 
Q:  Is it even more difficult now to resolve the abduction issue? 
 
A:  To begin with, Washington has recently shifted to a dialogue 
line with North Korea, and US-North Korea negotiations have also 
started.  It is conceivable that the United States will prioritize 
the nuclear issue and pay less attention to the abduction issue. 
 
In addition, the Japan-North Korea relationship is in a stalemate in 
contrast to the US-North Korea relationship.  North Korea has 
regarded Prime Minister Abe as an enemy.  Some speculate that 
Pyongyang will take a wait-and-see stance for the time being 
concerning the abduction issue, knowing that the Abe administration 
has become feeble because of the crushing defeat in the Upper House 
election. 
 
The Japan-North Korea working group of the six-party talks is soon 
expected to hold a meeting.  Under the current environment, however, 
a drastic breakthrough in the abduction issue is unlikely. 
 
(4) DPJ in action (Part 1): Ozawa determined to bring about change 
of government in straightforward manner, sealing off option of 
political realignment plan 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Abridged) 
August 24, 2007 
 
"Why does it need party discussion? I thought it has already been 
settled." 
 
This comment came from Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 
President Ichiro Ozawa in a meeting with Financial Committee Chair 
Kenji Yamaoka at a Tokyo office on the weekend just before the 
mid-August Bon holiday break. Yamaoka had just suggested opening the 
party's security research council, which has been dormant, to 
discuss measures to deal with the question of extending the 
Antiterrorism Special Measures Law, which would be a highlight in 
the extraordinary Diet session in the fall. 
 
The DPJ has opposed the law's extension three times in the past. 
Ozawa, who believes there is no need to change the party's position, 
also conveyed his opposition to the extension to US Ambassador to 
Japan Thomas Schieffer on August 8. 
 
But discontent was simmering in the party. Some junior members 
voiced the need to have a venue for discussion. Feared that if this 
situation persisted, Ozawa might be again criticized as dictatorial, 
Yamaoka said to Ozawa: "I think the party will eventually settle on 
opposing the extension, but some are still not convinced. So we need 
a venue to persuade them." 
 
Ozawa finally agreed to hold a council meeting, though he had no 
intention of making compromises. The panel's preparatory meeting 
took place on August 21. Ozawa, who had just ended his summer 
vacation, told the meeting: "I did not express my personal view to 
Mr. Schieffer; I simply explained what the party had decided." 
 
 
TOKYO 00003929  007 OF 011 
 
 
Opposing the extension is defined as the first step of the DPJ's 
basic strategy for pressuring the Abe administration and taking the 
helm of government in the next general election following Lower 
House dissolution. At the same time, Ozawa has sealed off his 
long-cherished political realignment plan. 
 
Two months ago, Ozawa was visited by Hirohisa Fujii, who won a Lower 
House seat as a result of Hiroyuki Nagahama's decision to run in the 
July Upper House election. Fujii told Ozawa: "I will not run in the 
next race. I will do my best until then." 
 
After leaving the Liberal Democratic Party in 1993, Fujii has 
consistently supported Ozawa who has since launched the Japan 
Renewal Party, New Frontier Party, Liberal Party, and DPJ. Ozawa 
aides, including Fujii who reportedly knows what's on Ozawa's mind 
as if by telepathy, repeatedly made contacts with veteran LDP 
lawmakers critical of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. 
 
Before the July Upper House election, Fujii and others put together 
this scenario: If the LDP suffered a crushing defeat in the 
election, Abe would resign, and an LDP presidential election would 
follow. If Taro Aso became Abe's successor, the DPJ would wrest 
power from the LDP, for example, by voting for Sadakazu Tanigaki in 
the Diet tally for the prime minister, in collaboration with the 
non-mainstream faction in the LDP. 
 
But as the DPJ's landslide victory came in sight toward the end of 
the election campaign, Fujii and others came to believe that a 
defeated LDP would not hold a presidential election and that Abe 
would remain in his post - a prediction that became a reality. Ozawa 
as a result decided to aim at the reins of government in a 
straightforward manner, sealing off the option of political 
realignment. 
 
On July 31, Ozawa made his first public appearance after the 
election to visit Rengo (Japanese Trade Union Confederation) 
headquarters in Tokyo. 
 
Ozawa, thanking Rengo for its assistance during the campaign, told 
Rengo General Secretary Nobuaki Koga: "The race has just begun. 
Please work out the schedule so that I can visit (local districts) 
in the fall, as I promised. If a general election was held at this 
point, the LDP would simply lose more seats, so Prime Minister Abe 
will not dissolve the Lower House so easily." 
 
For the July Upper House election, Ozawa personally hunted for 
promising candidates and stumped in single-seat constituencies. "My 
efforts paid off," Ozawa said to himself on July 28. 
 
Armed with the same approach, Ozawa has begun making moves for the 
next Lower House election. He will begin picking candidates for 
nearly 100 single-seat constituencies and kick off a stumping tour 
along with Rengo executives. 
 
On August 6, Ozawa met with Rengo President Tsuyoshi Takagi at DPJ 
headquarters. Takagi said to Ozawa: "The DPJ must enhance its local 
chapters. The right to dissolve the Lower House rests with the other 
side." In response, Ozawa said: "The LDP has yet to determine why it 
suffered the crushing defeat in the previous race. Its mind is still 
blank. Parties will present their bills to the Diet in the fall 
extraordinary session and that will help people determine if any of 
them deserve the reins of government. The DPJ's ability to replace 
 
TOKYO 00003929  008 OF 011 
 
 
the LDP will be tested by the public." 
 
Ozawa thinks that although chances are slim for Lower House 
dissolution before the end of the year, talk of dissolution will 
gain ground next March or later when Diet deliberation on the FY2008 
budget is in the final stage. 
 
(5) Koichi Kato, former LDP secretary general, says Abe's decision 
to stay in office without public support creates political vacuum 
 
NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full) 
August 24, 2007 
 
-- Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said the House of Councillors election 
would be an occasion for voters to choose between him and Minshuto 
(Democratic Party of Japan) President Ichiro Ozawa. 
 
Kato: He meant in his remarks that the election would give voters 
the chance to choose the party they feel should hold the reins of 
government. Therefore, he was saying he should step down from the 
premiership (should the party suffer a setback). Since the prime 
minister positioned the election as a midterm test for his 
administration, he should not have said that his reforms were 
appreciated. 
 
-- What is your view on the prime minister's announcement of his 
decision to stay on in office before the results of the Upper House 
election came out? 
 
Kato: It is not good that he gave the impression that he had decided 
to remain in office regardless of the outcome of the poll. His 
staying on in office are neither good for him nor the party. 
 
When Mr. Abe began to come under fire, some party lawmakers called 
on him to quit. It was difficult to urge him to step down, but 
someone has to say it. His decision to remain in office without 
public support creates a critical political vacuum in effect. The 
government is not functioning at all now. 
 
-- The prime minister will be shuffling the cabinet on Aug. 27. 
 
Kato: Shuffling the cabinet means that the prime minister did 
nothing wrong. The party will fall back into silence for the time 
being, but the issue remains unresolved. As soon as the cabinet is 
shuffled, party members will express their displeasure. 
 
-- Party members are interested mainly in appointments. 
 
Kato: Not recognizing that the LDP might sink like the Titanic, a 
number of members are talking about cabinet posts they wish to 
assume. Their careers are in danger. The ship may go down in two to 
three months. 
 
-- What if a censure motion against the prime minister is adopted in 
the Upper House? 
 
Kato: If the prime minister manages the economy well, if he has a 
flexible foreign policy, and if he enjoys popularity, he will be 
able to overcome it. Nobody knows what will happen. 
 
-- Do you think the LDP will be able to fight the next Lower House 
election under the leadership of Prime Minister Abe? 
 
TOKYO 00003929  009 OF 011 
 
 
 
Kato: It's impossible. There would be a strong voter backlash, with 
people feeling that the prime minister had ignored the result of the 
Upper House race. The number of Lower House seats we will secure may 
all far below 200 seats. 
 
-- When do you think the Lower House will be dissolved for a general 
election? 
 
Kato: There will be no immediate suicidal dissolution of the Lower 
House because cabinet ministers will not go along with such a 
decision. I think the Lower House will probably be dissolved solved 
later this year or after next year's regular Diet session at the 
latest. Comparing the Lower House to a company, employees usually do 
not discuss the decisions of their president, but if their company 
is in a crisis, they will discuss it. We need such now. 
 
(6) Facts about civilian control (Section 4): Thinking of SDF as 
Japan's new garrison-SDF in transformation (Part 2): Backing to US 
military called assistance with Iraqi reconstruction 
 
TOKYO (Top play) (Full) 
August 20, 2007 
 
On the morning of March 20 this year, the ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party held a joint meeting of its defense-related divisions at its 
headquarters. In the meeting, officials from the government briefed 
LDP lawmakers. Just as they ended their set of briefings, former LDP 
Secretary General Koichi Kato's angry voice reverberated: "How long 
 
SIPDIS 
are you going to continue? How can you explain that to the people?" 
 
The government was asking for the ruling party's approval of its 
draft bill revising the Iraq Special Measures Law-short for the Law 
Concerning Special Measures to Implement Humanitarian and 
Reconstruction Assistance and Security Assistance in Iraq. The 
legislation was intended to extend the Air Self-Defense Force's 
airlift mission in Iraq for another two years. "We need more time to 
help with Iraqi reconstruction," Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Kyoji Yanagisawa said. However, he did not account for why the 
ASDF's Iraq mission should be extended for two years instead of 
one. 
 
In the joint meeting, there were many government bureaucrats sitting 
in as briefers. They outnumbered the LDP lawmakers assembled there. 
There were vacant seats galore. No one but Kato voiced opposition to 
the idea of extending the ASDF's Iraq mission. The joint meeting was 
held with former LDP Secretary General Taku Yamasaki presiding. 
"There are many people supporting a two-year extension of the law," 
Yamasaki said in the meeting. "I'm sorry for Mr. Kato," Yamasaki 
went on. "But," he added, "I'd like you to understand." With this, 
the LDP gave the go-ahead. 
 
Kato likened the LDP to an "ostrich" that retreats to safe ground. 
"The LDP has now caved in to the government's evasive logic," Kato 
said. Yamasaki, however, was aware of the government's strong 
stance. "The government wants to continue the ASDF's activities in 
Iraq as a token of the alliance between Japan and the United 
States," Yamasaki said. "The government would have in a fix if the 
law was not extended-that's why I gave my consent," he added. 
 
That is the way the government and the ruling party are. They passed 
the Iraq legislation and sent the Self-Defense Forces to Iraq. The 
 
TOKYO 00003929  010 OF 011 
 
 
SDF's Iraq mission has undergone a sea change since the Ground 
Self-Defense Force wound up its humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance in Iraq and pulled out of that country in July last 
year. 
 
The government formulated a master plan for Japan's SDF dispatch to 
Iraq. The masterplan is based on the Iraq Special Measures Law. It 
expressly stipulates the SDF's activities "centering on humanitarian 
and reconstruction assistance activities." According to the master 
plan, the SDF is to engage in "security assistance activities" to 
back up US troops "as far as the SDF is not hindered from carrying 
out its humanitarian and reconstruction activities." 
 
The ASDF, currently working in Iraq, bases its transport planes in 
Kuwait. The Kuwait-based ASDF transports make four regular flights a 
week to and from Iraq. The government has not disclosed anything 
about what the ASDF is airlifting. However, more than 80 PERCENT  of 
the ASDF transports' payloads are US servicemen or US military 
supplies. 
 
Those US troops are mostly engaged in maintaining public security. 
The master plan has therefore become a dead letter. On July 10, the 
government extended the masterplan for another year. However, the 
ASDF's activities "centering on humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance activities" remain the same. 
 
"We discussed whether to retouch the master plan," a senior official 
of the Cabinet Secretariat said. "As a result," this official 
asserted, "we judged that there was no need to change the master 
plan because there has been no particular change in the SDF's 
activities." The problem is that the ASDF's airlifts in Iraq are 
mostly for the US military there. "Quantity doesn't matter much," 
the official said. "The ASDF's activities there are based on Japan's 
policy of high priority," he explained. "That's why," he added. With 
such a 'so-what' attitude, the official reiterated the same 
explanations. 
 
The government has kept the master plan intact with no change. Asked 
why, a senior official of the Defense Ministry cited Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe's reply that was given before the Diet on May 14. In that 
Diet reply, Abe stated as follows: "The Multinational Force's 
soldiers are also engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance activities." Bearing this Diet reply in mind, the Defense 
Ministry official raised a question about the idea of revising the 
master plan. "The government has so far explained the SDF's Iraq 
mission in its Diet replies," the defense official said. "If the 
government should change the master plan," he went on, "then I 
wonder what will happen to all that the government has explained in 
those Diet replies." In other words, this defense official meant to 
say that the government cannot modify the master plan in order to 
retain its coherence with what it has said in the past. 
 
"For the ASDF," Yamasaki recounted, "there's no doubt that their 
primary task is to back up the US military." He also said: "The ASDF 
is to airlift personnel and supplies for the United Nations. That is 
to say, the ASDF is working there in the name of humanitarian and 
reconstruction assistance. That's the kind of farfetched logic. 
Also, the opposition parties have not seriously pursued the 
government in the Diet." In this way, Yamasaki sighed over the 
Diet's failure to play the role of civilian control. 
 
The Defense Ministry has no plans to recall the ASDF detachment. One 
 
TOKYO 00003929  011 OF 011 
 
 
of its senior officials even said: "It's a symbol of the alliance 
between Japan and the United States. Some people say Japan should 
not extend its Iraq mission. But we've never thought of that option 
from the start." 
 
In the beginning, the government had the SDF dispatch plan. 
Meanwhile, the Diet does not function to check the government. The 
facts about the SDF's Iraq dispatch-which is intended to back up the 
United States-have never been made public. SDF activities that have 
no public support will leave nothing but stress for the dispatched 
personnel. 
 
MESERVE