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Viewing cable 07TOKYO3614, DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/07/07

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TOKYO3614 2007-08-07 22:33 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO4030
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3614/01 2192233
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 072233Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6233
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA//J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 4866
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 2439
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 6041
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 1478
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 3209
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8253
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4317
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 5320
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 003614 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/07/07 
Part-2 
Index: 
(1) Prime Minister's office making every effort to adjust policy to 
suit DPJ on Antiterrorism Law, tax reform 
 
 
(2) Efforts to move primary balance into black likely to suffer 
setback: Cabinet Office revises mid-term outlook, by lowering 
estimate for nominal growth rate 
 
(3) Seiron (Opinion) column: Ruling and opposition parties should 
not destroy Japan's international prestige by locking horns in vain 
 
(4) Calls for Abe's resignation at LDP meeting 
 
(5) CEFP starts discussing fiscal 2008 budget; Prime Minister 
underscores his determination to continue with structural reforms; 3 
percent cut in public projects confirmed   9 
 
ARTICLES: 
(1) Prime Minister's office making every effort to adjust policy to 
suit DPJ on Antiterrorism Law, tax reform 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
August 7, 2007 
 
In the aftermath of the ruling coalition's crushing defeat by the 
Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ or Minshuto) in the July House of 
Councillors election, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is making every 
effort to adjust his administration's policies to suit that party. 
In order for the government to swiftly enact bills, cooperation from 
the opposition camp is absolutely essential now that the opposition 
has control of the Upper House. The prime minister aims to produce 
"results" by accepting the views of the DPJ on such key agenda items 
as the extension of the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law and 
reform of the Public Service Law. On specifics, though, there is a 
great difference between both sides' views. It remains to be seen to 
what extent the DPJ, which has underscored it is now taking a 
confrontational stance and wants Abe to dissolve the House of 
Representatives, will respond to the ruling camp's approach. 
 
In an interview with the Nikkei yesterday, State Minister in Charge 
of Administrative Reform Yoshimi Watanabe indicated he has no 
intention of drastically changing the already revised Public Service 
Law. But he implied his willingness to reflect the DPJ's assertions 
in a bill on reforming the civil service system to be submitted to 
the regular Diet session next year, saying: "Many DPJ members are 
calling for introducing a political-appointee system. Such calls are 
worth listening to." Watanabe said that there is room for the LDP to 
discuss the DPJ's request for restricting officials at independent 
administrative corporations from finding employment in the private 
sector after retirement, if the regulations are transitory. 
 
After the election, the prime minister has reiterated at press 
conferences and on other occasions his eagerness to cooperate with 
the DPJ, saying: "When we should be listening to the DPJ , we must 
do so." 
 
On the issue of extending the Antiterrorism Law, DPJ President Ozawa 
has expressed his opposition to the government's bill, so the ruling 
camp has made a policy switch to allow insertion of the condition of 
"prior Diet approval," (which the DPJ wants). Although the DPJ now 
controls the Upper House, views are split in the party on whether to 
extend the law. By making a concession, the ruling camp aims to 
 
TOKYO 00003614  002 OF 007 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/07/07 
Part-2 
Index: 
(1) Prime Minister's office making every effort to adjust policy to 
suit DPJ on Antiterrorism Law, tax reform 
 
loosen opposition to the bill in that party. 
 
Discussion will start in the fall on a sweeping reform of the tax 
system, so the government and the ruling coalition cannot afford to 
put off addressing this issue. With the aim of enacting related 
bills in the regular Diet session next year, they intend to call on 
the DPJ to set up a consultative council for both sides to discuss 
tax reform and social insurance issues. 
 
On all of these issues, however, both camps will inevitably find 
difficulty in making compromises. Regarding the consumption tax - a 
focus in the tax-revision process, the prime minister has indicated 
the possibility of raising the tax rate, but the DPJ has upheld its 
call for keeping the current rate unchanged. On social security 
policy, as well, the prime minister is obsessed with a premium 
formula, while the DPJ is calling for a formula to finance basic 
pensions with tax money. As it stands, both sides stand squarely 
against each other on two key issues. 
 
By showing a certain level of concession, the ruling camp is 
maneuvering to draw the DPJ into policy talks, but many in the Prime 
Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) and the LDP take the view 
that "Ozawa is unlikely to easily make any concession because his 
ultimate goal is to grab political power." The main opposition 
party, which has obtained the Upper House' presidency and Steering 
Committee chairmanship for the first time since its establishment, 
is viewed certain to take a high-handed approach in handling Diet 
affairs. DPJ's future moves will determine whether things will move 
as desired by the prime minister. 
 
(2) Efforts to move primary balance into black likely to suffer 
setback: Cabinet Office revises mid-term outlook, by lowering 
estimate for nominal growth rate 
 
NIKKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
August 7, 2007 
 
The Cabinet Office yesterday released a new mid-term economic 
outlook report, which estimated the growth rate of the Japanese 
economy and the trend of prices up to fiscal 2011. The report 
revised down the outlook for improvement in the primary balance 
combining the payment balances of the central and local governments. 
It estimated that the ratio of the primary balance to the nominal 
GDP would move into the black in fiscal 2011 and incorporated a 
severe view toward the feasibility of financial recapitalization, 
compared with the outlook issued January this year (which estimated 
the 0.2 PERCENT  surplus). The report warned of the feasibility of 
the government goal of moving the primary balance into the black by 
fiscal 2011. 
 
The new outlook revealed this time is a revised version of the 
"Course and Strategy," medium-term guidelines for the management of 
the economy, which the government adopted in January. This is the 
first time that the government has revised the mid-term outlook in 
the summer. The Cabinet Office reported on the revised outlook at a 
meeting of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy on Aug. 6 in 
order to have it reflected in the compilation of the fiscal 2008 
budget. 
 
TOKYO 00003614  003 OF 007 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/07/07 
Part-2 
Index: 
(1) Prime Minister's office making every effort to adjust policy to 
suit DPJ on Antiterrorism Law, tax reform 
 
 
Surpluses in the primary balance mean that expenses for 
administrative services can be covered with tax revenues and 
revenues from sources other than taxes for the year. In compiling 
the outlook this time, the Cabinet Office revised the New Economic 
Growth Scenario aimed at moving payments balance into the black by 
fiscal 2011 without a tax hike. As a result, the ratio of the margin 
of surpluses to the nominal GDP has been revised down by 0.2 points 
close to 0 PERCENT  indicating that equilibrium has been achieved in 
balance of payments. The major reason for this estimate is that 
estimated tax revenues have decreased as a result of a lowered 
projection for a nominal growth rate. 
 
The precondition for this scenario is cutting expenditures by a 
total of 14.3 trillion yen over five years from fiscal 2007 through 
ΒΆ2011. The scope of this reduction is the upper limit of the 
five-year plan (between 11.4 trillion yen and 14.3 trillion yen), 
which the government incorporated in the big-boned economic 
guidelines with the aim of achieving a unified reform of revenues 
and expenditures. 
 
The estimate is based on the assumption that the government goal 
could be narrowly achieved if a maximum spending cut were carried 
out. The report also included a case in which the primary balance 
moves into the red by 0.4 PERCENT  because the margin of spending 
cuts remains within the lower limit of 11.4 trillion yen. The new 
mid-term economic outlook report is also aimed at checking pressure 
seeking an increase in expenditures, because "If efforts to reduce 
expenditures are relaxed, the consumption tax must be raised," as 
one Cabinet Office official put it. 
 
(3) Seiron (Opinion) column: Ruling and opposition parties should 
not destroy Japan's international prestige by locking horns in vain 
 
SANKEI (Page 13) (Abridged) 
August 7, 2007 
 
Hiroshi Nakanishi, professor at Kyoto University 
 
In the recent Upper House election, the ruling parties suffered a 
crushing defeat, while the major opposition Democratic Party of 
Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) became the largest force in the chamber. 
Japanese politics is now undergoing a major test. Will the ruling 
and opposition parties take this opportunity to promote political 
reform or will they become inward-looking and be preoccupied with 
confronting each other, making Japan's presence in the international 
community even more insignificant? 
 
Why was the ruling bloc heavily defeated? Some point to the weakened 
local organizations of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 
the wake of the so-called Koizumi structural reforms, for instance, 
the privatization of the postal services and the curtailment of 
public works projects. This may be in part true. But it seems 
difficult for the LDP to go back to where it used to be, namely, to 
a time when it was backed by strong local organizations. Six years 
ago in the LDP presidential election, former Prime Minister Koizumi 
won unexpectedly by a wide margin over former Prime Minister 
Hashimoto. This victory was attributable to the LDP's local chapters 
 
TOKYO 00003614  004 OF 007 
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 08/07/07 
Part-2 
Index: 
(1) Prime Minister's office making every effort to adjust policy to 
suit DPJ on Antiterrorism Law, tax reform 
 
that did not want to suffer a massive defeat as they had in 1998 
under the Hashimoto administration. In the 2001 Upper House 
election, as they expected, the LDP won, widening support among 
unaffiliated voters thanks to Koizumi's popularity at the time. 
However, in the 2004 Upper House election, when Koizumi was not as 
popular as he had been before, the positions of the LDP and the DPJ 
in terms of votes they respectively garnered from the proportional 
representation segment were reversed. In other words, the LDP then 
became a party that was unable to win in the Upper House election if 
it relied solely on organized votes, as it had done before the 
so-called Koizumi reforms began. This fact has been simply confirmed 
by the LDP's defeat this time. 
 
Poor handling of government eroded public confidence 
 
No doubt, Prime Minister Abe is enthusiastic about reforming the 
basic structure of the state, including the Constitution, the 
education system, and foreign and security affairs. When his 
administration came into being, this attitude of Abe was given 
support by one group but it alarmed another group. In between these 
two groups were the unaffiliated voters, most of whom assumed a 
wait-and-see attitude toward Abe. However, the way Abe proceeded to 
handle the government caused public confidence in him to drop. He 
emphasized the need to reform the existing systems, but all he did 
in actuality was in a way to treat the symptoms instead of resolving 
the basic problems. His selection of cabinet members also can be 
seen in this light. What is worse, he was poor at managing state 
affairs in a logical manner. Take a look at educational reform. Abe 
was able to amend the Basic Education Law, an item he had inherited 
from his predecessor. This was a good thing, but he at the same time 
established an education revitalization council with the cabinet's 
initiative. In my view, one logical way of doing things would be to 
launch an education revitalization council after revising the Basic 
Education Law or to revise the law in line with recommendations from 
the council. 
 
Another problem was that the prime minister's words were too light. 
Abe described the election campaign this time as "a crucial battle" 
and asked voters, "Who do you choose, Mr. Ozawa or me?" These words 
lacked the weightiness one would expect from a prime minister. In 
addition, Abe tended to turn around his policy stance in response to 
public reactions as evidenced by the white-collar exemption problem 
and pension fiasco. This tendency had a negative effect on public 
opinion. 
 
DPJ put to the test over the extension of the antiterrorism law 
 
Now then, let us take a look at the DPJ.  Japan is moving toward a 
two-party system. The more Japan moves in that direction, the more 
likely it will be that the ruling bloc will continue to hold a 
majority in the Lower House and the opposition bloc will dominate 
the Upper House. The occurrence of this sort of situation, however, 
is not anticipated by the Constitution. If in such a situation, both 
sides confront each other head-on, Japan's politics will stall. What 
the LDP and the DPJ should do under such a situation is to create a 
mechanism for them to strike a compromise in accepting the other 
side's assertions if necessary. 
 
 
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Doing so is desirable particularly for the DPJ. The sentient public 
will be paying attention as to whether the DPJ is capable of 
properly judging when to assert itself and when to yield. 
 
The question of extending the Antiterrorism Special Measures law, 
which expires in November, in this sense will be the acid test for 
the DPJ. Given that the DPJ has been opposed to extending the law 
until recently, it is understandable that the DPJ cannot accept the 
extension unconditionally. But it is true that the DPJ at one time 
favored establishing such a law. The DPJ has been opposed to the 
extension to date, but I think its opposition is not something 
absolute since it has raised opposition with conditions attached. I 
therefore think it is possible for the DPJ to agree on the extension 
of the law if revisions are made to the bill. 
 
Under the law, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has refueled 
vessels from the United States and 10 other countries in the Indian 
Ocean. The MSDF's refueling operations have been widely praised. If 
these operations are suspended because of a domestic political 
showdown, one can imagine how seriously Japan's prestige will be 
damaged in the international community? If the DPJ wants to put an 
end to the law, it is responsible for presenting a basic security 
bill as it has asserted before ending the law and reveal how Japan 
will take part in peace-building in Afghanistan. 
 
(4) Calls for Abe's resignation at LDP meeting 
 
YOMIURI ONLINE 
August 7, 2007 13:48 pm 
 
During an LDP meeting this afternoon at which Prime Minister Abe was 
present, others in attendance urged him to resign from office. 
 
Former Defense Minister Gen Nakatani (Tanigaki faction) said that 
"the prime minister should step down." Chief Deputy Chairman of the 
LDP Policy Research Council Kenji Kosaka (Tsushima faction) also 
offered criticism, saying: "Rather than proclaiming that he will 
remain in office, (Abe) should seek opinions at a Joint Plenary 
Meeting of Party Members of both Houses of the Diet." 
 
Prior to this meeting, at a Joint Plenary Meeting of Party Members 
of both Houses of the Diet, the prime minister said: "I know that 
many people are saying that I (should) take responsibility and 
resign. Although there may be a long difficult road ahead, I must 
push ahead with reforms in order to fulfill my responsibilities." 
 
(5) CEFP starts discussing fiscal 2008 budget; Prime Minister 
underscores his determination to continue with structural reforms; 3 
percent cut in public projects confirmed 
 
NIKKEI (Page 3) (Full) 
August 7, 2008 
 
The government yesterday held the first meeting of the Council on 
Economic and Fiscal Policy since the Upper House election. 
Participants have started discussing the fiscal 2008 budget. They 
confirmed a general budgetary outline, including a 3 PERCENT  cut in 
public projects. Prime Minister Abe is determined to compile budget 
 
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request guidelines before the end of the week. However, following 
its defeat in the Upper House election, the ruling camp intends to 
increase pressure, as can be seen in their call for a special 
framework aimed at expanding outlays. Problems have begun to appear 
in the feasibility of the government scenario of balancing economic 
growth and restoring soundness to the country's fiscal situation. 
The prime minister-led management of economic and fiscal policy is 
becoming uncertain. 
 
Ruling camp demanding separate framework aimed at increased 
expenditures 
 
The prime minister during the meeting stressed his determination to 
continue with the structural reform policy, noting, "The election 
results are harsh for us. I would like to fulfill my responsibility 
by properly implementing reform. Regarding the fiscal 2008 budget as 
well, he hinted at his persistence to achieve fiscal soundness, 
noting, "I would like to see both the central and local governments 
come up with austere budget estimates, by cutting spending to a 
maximum." 
 
Private-sector members of the CEFP, including Fujio Mitarai, 
chairman of Canon, indirectly supported the prime minister at the 
meeting yesterday. Participants almost unanimously approved the 
overall picture of the government-envisaged budget for next fiscal 
year. 
 
Abe was quick to act. He called in LDP Policy Research Council 
Chairman Shoichi Nakagawa to the Kantei and ordered him to compile 
the fiscal 2008 budget in line with the outcome of the discussion 
pursued by the panel. He apparently followed the method taken by 
former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who characterized the CEFP 
as a reform engine. Abe presumably intends to contain criticism by 
those close to him, which erupted following the result of the Upper 
House election. 
 
However, the panel's penetrative powers have weakened, compared with 
the era of the Koizumi administration during which it fought and 
brought the forces of resistance into submission. Following the 
defeat of the ruling camp, intensive deliberations on such issues as 
reform of the tax system, which had been slated for late this month, 
have been put off. Such being the situation, once budget estimate 
caps are approved on the 9th, it will be impossible for the panel to 
hold a meeting until after the cabinet is reshuffled, which is 
expected to take place on Aug. 27. Since it functions on the 
strength of the prime minister's leadership, there is an undeniable 
concern that the panel has been reduced to a mere skeleton. 
 
Judging that it would easier to deal with the government, the ruling 
camp is also looking for an opportunity to resist. The LDP will 
enter full-fledged budget deliberations on the 7th. However, a mood 
of seeking additional budgetary allocations to local governments is 
permeating through the party, because of the major shock it 
experienced in the defeat in single-seat constituencies, where it 
gained only six seats and lost 23. At the CEFP meeting on the 6th, 
too, Finance Minister Omi, who is supposed to keep a watchful eye 
over a possible budget increase, said, "Since some local governments 
are experiencing harsh financial situations, I would like to give 
 
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consideration to them." 
 
The government indicated its consideration to the ruling parties by 
incorporating a framework for key request items, including a budget 
for regional revitalization. This is a mechanism allowing all 
ministries to earmark additional budgetary amounts at the stage of 
submitting estimated requests, though their budget requests have a 
ceiling. The total amounts requested will be finalized under the 
caps, based on year-end screening to be carried out by the Finance 
Ministry. 
 
However, this does not mean an increase in the final appropriation 
of budgetary funds. As a matter of fact, the Finance Ministry is 
making a final adjustment with the lower half of the 17 trillion yen 
level in mind. The ministry has no intention of changing the caps on 
general-account expenditures. Ruling party members are criticizing 
the amounts set by the Finance Ministry as insufficient. Some ruling 
party members have called for setting a special framework aside from 
the ceilings in order to make sure an increase in a budget for local 
governments. An explosive mood is building. 
 
SCHIEFFER