VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1526/01 2331133
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 211133Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0043
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001526 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR LEDDY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR THE 
WEEK ENDING AUGUST 17 
 
 
This is CWC-72-07. 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶1.  (U) Del reps, along with UK rep Karen Wolstenholme, met 
on August 16 with a group of senior Verification staff to 
discuss planning/follow-up on Iraq's initial declaration. 
Verification chief Horst Reeps was well prepared with an 
agenda and copies of CW and industry declaration general 
status and follow-up actions from the Amman workshop in 
December 2006 (all E-mailed to Washington).  In short, Reeps 
believes that in order to continue forward progress, the best 
course of action is to schedule a follow-up workshop, in 
order to provide a concrete target for capitals to work 
toward.  The week of September 17 was proposed, with the 
understanding that this would be taken back for an initial 
reaction from Washington, London and Baghdad.  The stated 
Technical Secretariat goal for the next workshop would be a 
100% complete initial declaration that the U.S. and UK deemed 
acceptable. 
 
¶2.  (U) Regarding certain specific questions provided by 
Washington: 
-- There has been no communication between the TS and Iraqi 
experts since the December meeting. 
-- Reeps anticipates the Director General would make an 
initial statement about the unique security situation 
immediately following Iraqi accession (i.e. at the beginning 
of the 60-day window before the initial declaration is due). 
The TS proposed that further delay could be accompanied by 
"other forms" of verification, e.g. photos and/or video 
footage that coalition forces provide. 
-- The TS provided a response on the comments provided by the 
U.S./UK (E-mailed to Washington). 
 
¶3.  (U)  Reeps believes he could assemble a TS team in about 
48 hours, and tasked the External Relations Division to start 
looking into visa and other requirements for another Amman 
workshop.  (Note: If the U.S., TS and others settle on a date 
independent of a third reading of the CWC by the Iraqi 
Parliament, the TS ability to rapidly assemble the team 
becomes somewhat less important.)  Reeps requested the U.S. 
and UK also begin working actively in capital and with 
Baghdad and Amman to: 
 
-- Make initial inquiries about support in Amman. 
-- Assemble a tentative team to participate in a follow-up 
workshop. 
-- Assess how much progress, if any, the Iraqis have made 
since the last workshop. 
-- Begin pushing for the same level of expertise (same people 
as at the December meeting, if possible) to attend a 
September follow-up in Amman. 
-- Based on progress reports, encourage Iraqi experts to 
complete the last session's "homework" prior to attending a 
follow-up. 
-- Obtain, if possible, an electronic copy of where the 
Iraqis currently stand on their declaration to share with the 
TS. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶4.  (U) The TS was pleasantly surprised in December at the 
progress the Iraqi delegation had made since the previous 
workshop.  They also found that the experts in December were 
able to get answers from Baghdad on several issues while 
still in Amman.  Although this might occur again, del reps 
noted that this type of progress and responsiveness should 
not be assumed, and asked what the TS envisioned in a 
worst-case scenario of the Iraqis turning up having made no 
further progress on the declarations and being unable to 
reach counterparts in Baghdad from Amman. 
 
¶5.  (U) Reeps indicated at that point it would be nice for 
the U.S. and UK to "fill in the blanks."  The TS also 
highlighted their desire to have footage/photos wherever 
possible - particularly of former production facilities like 
Al Muthanna - in order to: 
 
-- Provide some visual of the state of Iraq's former program 
for member states that might be inclined to ask probing 
questions. 
-- Act as a sort of stop-gap measure in lieu of actual 
inspections. 
 
¶6.  (U) In a subsequent discussion with the UK rep, the joint 
concerns expressed were: 
-- How willing and able the U.S. and UK would be to share 
photos/videos. 
-- How realistic it is to anticipate making any contact with 
the Iraqi experts in Baghdad in time for a September meeting. 
 
-- What will happen if experts turn up to the meeting with 
nothing more than the product of the last workshop. 
 
 
----------------- 
CURRENT TS BUDGET 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) Director of Administration Ron Nelson noted that the 
TS currently is facing a difficult budgetary situation, as it 
 
SIPDIS 
has not received payments of 2007 assessed contributions from 
the U.S., Japan and Mexico.  At the current rate of 
expenditure of six million Euros a month, and without 
payments of assessed contributions, Nelson said that 
discretionary purchases by the TS would cease in 
September/October, resulting in reductions of operations and 
suspension of further recruitment. 
 
------------------------------------ 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER - LATE DECLARATIONS 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (U) As reported earlier, the July 10 consultation on this 
issue resulted in the facilitator (Larry Denyer, U.S.) 
revising the previous facilitator's draft decision to 
incorporate the strong opinions expressed by delegations and 
to try to preserve as much of the heart of the decision as 
possible.  A later meeting with the South African delegate 
(who brought many of the major points forward in the July 10 
consultation) was very positive, including an offer of 
assistance, if needed, in brokering an agreement with some of 
the interested (and difficult) States Parties within his 
regional group and the NAM - i.e., Iran, India, etc.  Given 
this positive step, the facilitator instructed the TS to 
distribute the new facilitator's draft decision text (along 
with a red-line version) to delegations, which was done on 
July 27. 
 
¶9. (U) This week, the facilitator met with representatives of 
the Japanese and New Zealand delegations to get their 
reactions to the new draft.  Both felt that the new draft 
retained the heart of the previous decision language, while 
at the same time giving due consideration to the significant 
concerns of some delegations.  This was particularly 
reassuring to hear from the New Zealand delegate, as she was 
also vocal in opposition to the previous draft during the 
July 10 consultation.  Both delegations committed to getting 
a thorough review from their capitals in advance of the next 
consultation on September 4.  The facilitator will meet with 
the delegation of India during the week of August 27 and has 
also made similar offers to meet to the delegations of Canada 
and China and is awaiting their response. 
 
--------------------------------- 
RECOMMENDATION ON INDUSTRY ISSUES 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) Del rep had a discussion with Kiwako Tanaka (Japan) 
who stated that Merel Jonker (Netherlands), her 
co-facilitator on the transfer discrepancies issue, would be 
moving to a new assignment at the end of September.  Tanaka 
sounded as though she would not want to continue the 
facilitation with Jonker's departure.  However, it is also 
fair to say that any realistic progress on this issue has 
been accomplished by specific steps taken by the TS.  With 
the facilitation on late declarations finishing up in the 
 
next few weeks, there would be no facilitations in the 
industry cluster. 
 
¶11.  (U) The delegation has two recommendations for 
Washington's consideration.  First, the del urges the U.S. 
focus on working with the TS on the concrete industry issues 
that matter, such as the DG's note on modifying the OCPF site 
selection mechanism, and possible tweaking of OCPF 
declaration format/content in light of the Canadian paper. 
On this and other issues, the most productive way to proceed 
is working with key TS personnel, such as Industry Inspection 
chief Bill Kane and others.  Del sees little reason for 
facilitators or consultations.  (Note: we will need to have 
discussions on risk assessment chaired by Ambassador Dastis 
of Spain.  But those are not consultations aimed at achieving 
some type of a recommendation or proposal from Dastis.  End 
Note.)  Until the RevCon, the exercise should be del 
recommendations and Washington requests to address specific, 
practical issues with the TS, such as sampling and analysis. 
 
¶12.  (U) Second, the del believes the real opportunity to 
revitalize the industry cluster is clearly the RevCon.  And 
this depends on what kind of a RevCon Washington wants.  If 
the decision is to have a "do no harm" RevCon, then the U.S. 
can lay out a refusal to (for example) re-open Schedules, and 
other red-lines.  The U.S. can combine that by saying that we 
should deal with any industry issues on an ad hoc basis as 
they arise.  However, if the Washington decision is made for 
a more ambitious agenda, the RevCon would be the place for 
the U.S. to lay out where it wants the industry cluster to 
focus attention in the next five years. 
 
¶13.  (U) Del is pleased to see that Washington is initiating 
discussions on what outcome is desired at the RevCon, and 
will be providing input.  The industry cluster may benefit 
most from such a deliberation.  If the conscious decision is 
made for a "do no harm" RevCon, and case-by-case handling of 
industry issues, that is certainly an acceptable outcome. 
Del simply wants to ensure that this is the result of a 
thorough deliberation, and not just a policy adopted by 
default. 
 
------------------ 
PRC VIEWS ON EC-50 
------------------ 
 
¶14.  (U) Del rep met with PRC Deputy PermRep Li Hong on 
August 18 to discuss key issues for the upcoming EC.  With 
regard to Article XI, where Li is the facilitator, he stated 
that Iran, Cuba and some other NAM delegations were pushing 
him hard to move ahead on an Article XI action plan.  Del rep 
reiterated Ambassador Javits' point that we can only have an 
action plan if all delegations are in agreement on what we 
want to accomplish.  That clearly is not yet the case 
regarding Article XI.  Li was patently not enthusiastic about 
pushing the action plan issue, and was supportive of the idea 
that this would be a more appropriate topic for work in the 
run-up to the RevCon.  It would be better in that forum to 
see the extent to which there was any kind of political 
consensus. 
 
¶15. (U) Del rep reiterated that Ambassador Javits had pushed 
for the earlier Article XI co-facilitation to focus on 
concrete steps, and if Li were to make that the goal of his 
consultation, it would get greater U.S. support (obviously 
depending on the concrete steps under consideration).  Li 
again was very supportive, and said that he would try to 
focus his 3-4 consultations before the Conference of States 
Parties in that direction.  He also said he was considering 
making a pitch for States Parties to provide voluntary 
contributions that could be ear-marked for Article XI 
projects.  Li flatly said that he could not keep Iran and 
others from raising the action plan, but said that pushing it 
toward the RevCon would make his immediate task easier. 
 
¶16.  (U) On export controls, Li stated that Iran has pressed 
him hard to have his consultation address this issue, 
reiterating that he could not keep Iran from raising any 
particular topic.  Del rep reiterated U.S. objections and 
 
concerns, and said if Iran wants to discuss this matter in 
consultations, the U.S. and other WEOG delegations had our 
responses ready. 
 
¶17.  (U) On the DG's announcement of a modification to the 
OCPF selection methodology, del rep raised the Cuban request 
to have this included on the EC-50 agenda.  Li's "energetic" 
response made it clear that the Cuban request was at China's 
instigation.  Li said that the DG's change would have a 
substantial increase in the number of OCPF inspections in 
China, and was a matter of grave concern in Beijing.  When 
asked if the PRC would challenge the DG's modification, Li 
said that was indeed the case.  Del rep emphasized that the 
U.S. view is that this action was completely within the DG's 
authority. 
 
¶18.  (U) Del rep added that when the last modification had 
taken place, the EC-27 report language stated that the DG 
would be looking for inputs from member states on the impact 
of that particular change in methodology.  Certainly, we 
would anticipate that the DG would welcome SP inputs this 
time around as well.  If that was what China meant by 
"challenging" the DG, certainly all SPs would want to compare 
notes of the impact of the change to see if it had the 
desired result.  Li merely reiterated that as the impact on 
China would indeed be substantial (he declined to give a 
number on projected additional OCPF inspections), it was 
important to fully discuss the issue at the EC. 
 
¶19.  (U) Turning to the number of OCPF inspections in the 
proposed 2008 Budget, del rep stated that the U.S. wanted to 
see even a nominal increase in OCPF inspections in 2008, 
which was particularly important in the run-up to the RevCon. 
 Li flatly said that, particularly due to the DG's change in 
the site selection methodology, Beijing could not accept even 
one additional OCPF inspection in 2008. 
 
¶20.  (U) Li then raised the issue of zero nominal growth 
budgets.  He asserted that there is now a discussion among 
some delegations (and not just NAM delegations) about whether 
we have hit the limit with regard to ZNG budgets and whether 
the 2009 budget would have to contain some type of increase. 
Part of this is due to the view that the TS has now gotten 
rid of any excess fat.  Part of it is attributable to the 
view that the OPCW exists to handle a variety of tasks, not 
just to serve as a showcase of budgetary restraint.  Del rep 
said that if other delegations or the TS have proposals for 
additional expenditures or projects, the U.S. would simply 
ask for a thorough assessment of whether they are appropriate 
for the OPCW and provided value for money. 
 
------------------------------- 
WITHDRAWAL OF AMCIT APPLICATION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (U) Del rep was informed by Ron Nelson, head of 
administration, that Jonathan Tucker, an Amcit who had 
applied for a P-4 position in the Verification Branch, had 
withdrawn his application.  Tucker is extremely capable and 
experienced and looked likely to get the position.  Indeed, 
Nelson said that DG Pfirter had informally indicated support 
for Tucker.  Unfortunately, Tucker grew frustrated by the 
various administrative requirements connected with the TS 
hiring procedure, and the lengthy wait this generated.  Del 
rep understands Nelson has raised the Tucker case with the 
Human Resources branch, and also indicated his personal 
frustration at how Tucker (and presumably other applicants) 
are being handled. 
 
¶22.  (U) The key problem was the fact that HR did not stay in 
contact with Tucker to keep him informed that his application 
was indeed being processed and that he was still under 
serious consideration for the job.  While it does not appear 
to be the case that Tucker requested an update and was given 
no response, Tucker clearly had gone several months without 
any word from HR.  Nelson noted that while all applicants 
cannot be given constant updates on the status of their 
application, certainly the key candidates sought by the TS 
should be kept apprised of their situation.  One of the other 
 
frustrations expressed by Tucker was the fact that he had 
been given a one-week notification of the scheduling of his 
interview.  Nelson said that HR would give applicants more 
preparation time. 
 
¶23.  (U) Nelson emphasized to del rep that he will be 
discussing with his HR staff improvements in their treatment 
of applicants, particularly those who make the short list. 
He concedes that Tucker certainly did not get the feeling 
that he was sought by the OPCW, and that such a process will 
make it more difficult to get the best quality personnel for 
TS positions. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶24.  (U) Ito sends. 
Schofer