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Viewing cable 07TELAVIV2398, ISRAEL MEDIA REACTION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07TELAVIV2398 2007-08-06 09:57 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Tel Aviv
VZCZCXYZ0022
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTV #2398/01 2180957
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060957Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2640
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/CNO WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 2551
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 9265
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 2621
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 3354
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 2583
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0556
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 3315
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0188
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0653
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 7248
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 4670
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 9583
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 3747
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 5690
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 7576
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/COMSIXTHFLT  PRIORITY
UNCLAS TEL AVIV 002398 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/IPA, NEA/PPD 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESS OFFICE, SIT ROOM 
NSC FOR NEA STAFF 
 
SECDEF WASHDC FOR USDP/ASD-PA/ASD-ISA 
HQ USAF FOR XOXX 
DA WASHDC FOR SASA 
JOINT STAFF WASHDC FOR PA 
CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL FOR POLAD/USIA ADVISOR 
COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE FOR PAO/POLAD 
COMSIXTHFLT FOR 019 
 
JERUSALEM ALSO ICD 
LONDON ALSO FOR HKANONA AND POL 
PARIS ALSO FOR POL 
ROME FOR MFO 
 
SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR IS
 
SUBJECT: ISRAEL MEDIA REACTION 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
SUBJECTS COVERED IN THIS REPORT: 
-------------------------------- 
 
Mideast 
 
------------------------- 
Key Stories in the Media: 
------------------------- 
 
Please note: Op Eds only August 6, 2007 
 
-------- 
Mideast: 
-------- 
 
Summary: 
-------- 
 
Palestinian affairs correspondent Danny Rubinstein wrote in the 
independent, left-leaning Ha'aretz: "In other words, all the current 
political activity is liable to turn out to be nothing but bunk. 
Ultimately, the opinion of many Palestinians will turn out to be 
right: If Hamas isn't in the game, there is no game." 
 
Defense commentator Amos Gilboa wrote in the popular, pluralist 
Maariv: "Therefore at the end of the day Israel cannot rely on Saudi 
Arabia to help with making arrangements with the Palestinians, 
certainly not on the strategic regional level." 
 
Diplomatic correspondent Aluf Benn wrote in the independent, 
left-leaning Ha'aretz: "In the past few days Jerusalem was busy 
lowering expectations, and Olmert's bureau said the leaders were not 
seeking to formulate an 'agreement of principles,' but rather 
'agreed-on principles' -- which is the same thing, but less 
frightening.  The bureau cautioned diplomatic correspondents not to 
get their hopes up." 
 
Contributor Yoram Meital, a specialist in Middle East affairs at 
Ben-Gurion University, wrote in the mass circulation, pluralist 
Yediot Aharonot: "The weakest point in the latest moves lies in the 
assumption that a political agreement on the future of the West Bank 
can be promoted with Abu Mazen and the Fayad government irrespective 
of what is happening in the Gaza Strip [under Hamas].... However, 
the national and political approach shared by the Palestinian 
public, including all of its factions, rules out such a 
separation." 
 
The independent, left-leaning Ha'aretz editorialized: " The question 
of when the Winograd Committee's report on the Second Lebanon War 
will be published has become a question of how relevant the report 
will be.... [It] must be published either in another few months - or 
not at all.  Otherwise, it will mainly be useful for history 
lessons." 
 
Block Quotes: 
------------- 
 
I. "If Hamas isn't in the Game" 
 
Palestinian affairs correspondent Danny Rubinstein wrote in the 
independent, left-leaning Ha'aretz (08/06): "The Olmert government 
in Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, headed by 
Mahmoud Abbas, are in the midst of renewed political activity, 
encouraged by intensive American efforts.... Although there still 
are many problems in the field ... there certainly has been 
progress.... However, there is no doubt that Hamas is more capable 
of sabotaging Abbas' policy than it is of ruling.  As long as the 
Hamas leadership has a hope of holding on in Gaza and of influence 
in the West Bank, there will be relative quiet.  But when Hamas 
loses hope and it becomes clear that Abbas is far from achieving the 
minimum that the Palestinians are demanding, then the terrorism and 
violence almost certainly will be renewed.  In other words, all the 
current political activity is liable to turn out to be nothing but 
bunk.  Ultimately, the opinion of many Palestinians will turn out to 
be right: If Hamas isn't in the game, there is no game." 
 
II. "More Islamic than Western" 
 
Defense commentator Amos Gilboa wrote in the popular, pluralist 
Maariv (08/06): "If there is a prominent line in Israeli foreign 
policy since the Second Lebanon War, it is the special role assigned 
to Saudi Arabia in the Palestinian issue in particular, and in the 
'moderate' Arab arena in general.... The Saudi influence should not 
be discounted, and it would be foolish not to understand that a 
country with one quarter of the proven oil reserves in the world, 
which is the leading oil exporter in the world, has what to say in 
the Arab world, and not only there.  But it is necessary to 
understand the limitations and weaknesses of Saudi Arabia, and its 
problem with Israel.... Saudi Arabia may be a 'moderate' country, by 
being pro-American, but no more than this.  It is an Islamic Sunni 
state of the extremist variety ... which still upholds the laws of 
Islam.... Saudi Arabia will be the last to recognize Israel as the 
state of the Jewish people.... Needless to say, Saudi Arabia 
constitutes the largest human reserve of extremist Islamic 
terrorism.... Saudi Arabia has never been a leading country in the 
Arab world.... It will always prefer to embrace Iran than to clash 
with it, and will certainly not do so with the Jews!....Therefore at 
the end of the day Israel cannot rely on Saudi Arabia to help with 
making arrangements with the Palestinians, certainly not on the 
strategic regional level." 
 
III. "Don't get hopes up" 
 
Diplomatic correspondent Aluf Benn wrote in the independent, 
left-leaning Ha'aretz (08/05): "Seven years after the failed Camp 
David summit, and six and a half years after negotiations ended with 
the Taba talks, Israel has started talking with the Palestinians on 
a peace agreement again.... U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
gave the parties their homework during her visit last week: to reach 
an agreed-on diplomatic formula by November's Washington summit and 
to continue confidence-building gestures.... In the past few days 
Jerusalem was busy lowering expectations, and Olmert's bureau said 
the leaders were not seeking to formulate an 'agreement of 
principles,' but rather 'agreed-on principles' -- which is the same 
thing, but less frightening.  The bureau cautioned diplomatic 
correspondents not to get their hopes up.  Nevertheless, Rice heard 
a different tune this week in Jerusalem and Ramallah.  Olmert agreed 
to a proposal raised a year ago by Rice and Livni to talk to Abbas 
and Palestinian moderates.... And Salam Fayad's appointment as prime 
minister has given Washington hope that something has changed for 
the better among the Palestinians.  Experience teaches that the real 
bargaining will begin only in the days and hours running up to the 
summit, when Olmert and Abbas are already on their way to 
Washington." 
 
IV. "Not Without Gaza" 
 
Contributor Yoram Meital, a specialist in Middle East affairs at 
Ben-Gurion University, wrote in the mass circulation, pluralist 
Yediot Aharonot(08/06): "The meeting scheduled today between Ehud 
Olmert and Mahmoud Abbas will be added to the wave of diplomatic 
efforts to promote the peace process between Israel and the 
Palestinians.  State leaders from the West, from Israel and from 
Arab states link these efforts to the 'window of opportunity' that 
opened up after the violent takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas.... 
The weakest point in the latest moves lies in the assumption that a 
political agreement on the future of the West Bank can be promotQ 
with Abu Mazen and the Fayad government irrespective of what is 
happening in the Gaza Strip [under Hamas].... Can the West Bank 
really be divided from the Gaza Strip?  Should a political agreement 
be promoted with a Palestinian leadership that commands limited 
public support, while blatantly disregarding Hamas, which rode to 
victory  on popular support  in the last election?  There is no 
doubt that over the years, a different reality has developed in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  However, the national and political 
approach shared by the Palestinian public, including all of its 
factions, rules out such a separation.  The chances are also slim 
that gestures and channeling funds to the residents of the West Bank 
and 'drying up' the Gazans will lead to a change of consciousness, 
in which the Palestinians will settle for a 'mini-state' in part of 
the West Bank, which will be led by non-elected governments." 
 
V. "Will Winograd be Relevant?" 
 
The independent, left-leaning Ha'aretz editorialized (08/06): "The 
question of when the Winograd Committee's report on the Second 
Lebanon War will be published has become a question of how relevant 
the report will be.... The current government has no interest in 
prompt publication of the final Winograd report.... We must not 
forget the purpose for which the committee was established.  It is 
not conducting a criminal investigation, which has rigid rules, nor 
is it probing allegations that could lead to criminal charges, since 
itQranted immunity to everyone who appeared before it.  The 
committee's report is supposed to provide an understanding of what 
happened and to enable conclusions to be drawn.  A committee of this 
type cannot be turned into a commission of inquiry halfway 
through.... The attempt to impose obligations on the committee that 
exist neither in the law nor in its letter of appointment is liable 
to make its conclusions irrelevant.  The final report must be 
published either in another few months - or not at all.  Otherwise, 
it will mainly be useful for history lessons." 
JONES