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Viewing cable 07QUITO1794, GOVERNMENT PRESSURE LEADS TO VOLUNTARY PRICE RESTRAINTS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07QUITO1794 2007-08-09 16:01 2011-05-02 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Quito
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHQT #1794/01 2211601
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 091601Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7524
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6804
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 2627
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ AUG 0671
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 1825
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 2634
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
UNCLAS QUITO 001794 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR MMALLOY AND MEWENS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN EAGR PGOV EC
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT PRESSURE LEADS TO VOLUNTARY PRICE RESTRAINTS 
 
Reftel: Quito 1655 
 
1.  (SBU) Summary: With rising food prices, the GOE warned the 
private sector to lower prices or face mandatory controls.  The 
private sector agreed to voluntarily fix prices for rice, flour, and 
sugar, while other sectors are seeking ways to reduce prices through 
cheaper packaging and lower quality.  The price increases appeared 
to be largely due to increases in international commodity prices. 
End summary. 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR AGREES TO VOLUNTARY PRICE FIXING 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
2.  (U) Prices have been increasing in Ecuador for basic consumption 
products such as rice, milk, vegetable oil, flour, and fruit and 
vegetables.  The GOE has alleged speculators were raising prices as 
a plot against the state and warned the private sector to lower 
prices or it would impose price controls.  The GOE's threat was to 
fix prices by publishing an official price list in the media and 
penalizing those that did not abide by it. 
 
3.  (U) The private sector strongly opposed the imposition of 
mandatory price controls, and conceded to negotiate with the GOE and 
lower prices voluntarily.  On July 23, the GOE and private sector 
agreed on fixed prices for an unspecified period (but with no GOE 
enforcement) on rice, sugar and flour.  For flour, the fixed price 
is actually higher than the previous market price - it increased 
from $20 up to $26 per 50 kilogram sack.  The GOE and private sector 
were not able to reach agreement on fixed prices for other basic 
products such as milk and vegetable oil, although vegetable oil 
producers agreed to implement a plan to cut costs and keep retail 
prices low by selling cooking oil in plastic bags (bagged "popular 
oil" is now being sold in open air markets). 
 
4.  (SBU) Rice, flour, and sugar producers appeared relieved that 
formal price controls were avoided.  Edison Romero, Financial 
Manager of the California Bakery chain, believes his chain can abide 
by the fixed flour price for now, but is afraid that if wheat prices 
continue to rise his company will have to increase its bread prices 
by 13%.  Jose Malo, President of the National Association of 
Producers of Fats and Oils, hopes that selling consumable oil in 
bags will allow the industry to reduce or maintain prices.  He noted 
that the industry anticipates that 200,000 liters of consumable 
"popular oil" will be produced monthly.  Other industries hope to 
follow this lead and find ways to cut packaging costs rather than 
fixing prices.  Galo Izurieta, Deputy General Manager of Quito 
Pasteurizers, and member of the National Dairy Production 
Association, told us that his group is seeking agreement with the 
GOE on cheaper packaging, lower quality (less pasteurized than the 
popular "ultra pasteurized" milk) and other strategies to cut costs 
and keep prices low, in lieu of price controls.  Former Minister of 
Economy Ricardo Patino suggested developing very basic communal 
stores called "solidariatos", which would offer lower prices on most 
basic consumption products by offering unpackaged bulk items and 
possibly slightly lower quality products. 
 
RISING INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PRICES LARGELY RESPONSIBLE 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
5.  (U) Commodity prices are rising worldwide.  In Ecuador's case, 
its heavy reliance on imported inputs leads to highly volatile input 
prices for basic consumption goods.  For example, in Ecuador, 85% of 
the cost of flour is attributable to the international price of 
wheat.  The cost of a ton of wheat rose from $239 to $310 over the 
last year, significantly affecting Ecuador's flour prices. 
Similarly, domestic vegetable oil prices responded to international 
price increases in raw materials for oils, such as soybean, corn, 
and sunflower, which have been increasing since 2006.  Domestic meat 
and dairy producers have also been affected by rising international 
agricultural prices, since the majority of feed products are based 
on imported corn and soybean. 
 
6.  (U) On the other hand, domestic fruit and vegetable prices are 
largely independent from international prices, and mainly respond to 
climate changes or seasonal factors.  Only out of season fruit and 
vegetables should be experiencing price increases, so the rapid 
increase in fruit and vegetable prices might be influenced by 
speculation or inflationary expectations. 
 
7.  (U) Over the past year producer prices (7% increase) have 
increased faster than consumer prices (2.2% increase), so some of 
the producer price inflation could be putting pressure on consumer 
prices. 
PAST ATTEMPTS AT PRICE CONTROLS FAILED 
-------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (U) Enrique Ampuero, Director of the National Institute of 
Agricultural Research in the 1970s, commented that price control 
schemes had not worked in the past as they had created scarcity of 
various agricultural products as producers exited unprofitable 
sectors.  The Febres Cordero government (1984-1988) published an 
official price list mandating fixed prices, with high fines for 
producers who charged prices above list.  Those price controls 
resulted in shortages of certain goods, low quality products, black 
markets and contraband.  In 1993, Ecuador introduced a price band 
system for major commodities to dampen swings in international 
commodity prices.  The World Bank estimated that Ecuador's price 
stabilization policies resulted in price variability that was 10 
times world price variability. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9.  (SBU) Although overall price inflation remains low, given the 
September Constituent Assembly election the GOE evidently felt 
compelled to take some sort of action to moderate food prices. 
Indeed, some producers claim the GOE asked them to maintain lower 
prices until the elections.  The GOE's strategy of negotiating 
voluntary fixed prices with producers is more practical than 
mandatory price controls (as it essentially attempted to do with the 
banking sector - reftel).  Hopefully it will not attempt to maintain 
the voluntary controls for an extended period of time or seek to 
impose mandatory controls down the road.  To date, the Ecuadorian 
media have provided little coverage of the supply disruption caused 
by price controls in Venezuela, but if the GOE shows additional 
inclination to pursue price restrictions, we could expect the 
Ecuadorian media to give more play to the consequences of price 
controls. 
 
BROWN