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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 PARIS 003402 
 
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TAGS: SOCI PTER PGOV EUN FR PINR ECON
SUBJECT: MUSLIM OUTREACH -- SENIOR ADVISOR FARAH PANDITH'S 
MEETINGS IN PARIS JULY 25 - 26 
 
PARIS 00003402  001.2 OF 008 
 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  Please handle accordingly. 
 
¶1.  (SBU) In meetings in Paris July 25 - 26 with a wide range 
of figures from France's large and diverse Muslim community 
and France,s new government, EUR Senior Advisor Farah 
Pandith underlined U.S. interest in respectful dialogue and 
exchange of ideas with France's Muslim population, the 
largest in Europe.  In their meetings with her, civil 
servants, elected officials, ordinary citizens, community 
activists, religious leaders and intellectuals focused on the 
French "Republican model" for immigrant minority integration, 
whether or not this model can work to solve the social 
problems of France's immigrant-origin (largely Muslim) 
underclass, and whether or not President Sarkozy's proposed 
reforms to state-religion relations in France are likely to 
make any difference in the economic prospects of the 
country's largely Arab and Black Muslim minority. 
Interlocutors all cited the potential for radicalization of a 
small, but potentially dangerous, fraction of Muslim youth. 
Some of S/A Pandith's civil society interlocutors were 
concerned about the lack of any authoritative "voice of 
moderation" able to counsel ordinary, middle-class Europeans 
(who happen to be Muslim) on matters of religious practice 
and cultural identity in their new social environment.  Asked 
if they had considered the possibility of a "learning center" 
for reformed, European, contemporary Islam, most of S/A 
Pandith's civil society interlocutors responded 
enthusiastically, while others (and in particular some 
government officials) worried that it would soon fall prey to 
factionalism among "national communities" or infiltration by 
radicals.  Nonetheless, as it has for many years, discussion 
of such a center continues, and post will continue to follow 
the issue.  Muslim outreach is an MSP priority for post; S/A 
Pandith's round of meetings greatly advanced post's Muslim 
engagement efforts.  Targeted program funding -- in the 
tradition of SEED programs -- for grants of various kinds 
would be a welcome addition to post's efforts to complement 
Washington-based outreach in this critical field of public 
opinion.  END SUMMARY. 
 
FRANCE'S MUSLIM COMMUNITY 
------------------------- 
¶2.  (SBU) There are about five million ethnically Muslim 
people in France (out of a total population of nearly 64 
million.) Both in absolute size and in proportion to the 
total population (between 8 and 9 percent), France has the 
largest Muslim population of any country in Europe.  Over 70 
percent of the Muslims in France have their roots in the 
Maghreb, primarily Algeria, but also Morocco, reflecting the 
dominant pattern of migration to France in recent decades -- 
from colonies/former colonies to the mother country.  More 
recently, a steady stream of immigrants, also Muslim, have 
come from the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, such as 
Senegal and Mali.  France is also home to relatively small 
communities of Muslims from Turkey and Iran, and communities 
from countries in the sub-continent and the far east.  Some 
of Paris' predominantly Muslim neighborhoods are microcosms 
of the Muslim world's diversity. 
 
¶3.  (U) Given that the French "Republican model," with its 
constitutional injunction against distinguishing among 
citizens on the basis of race or religion, precludes the 
state from collecting census data on religious affiliation, 
there are no truly accurate statistics on the size of 
France's Muslim population.  Some estimates put France's 
Muslim population at 6 or 7 million, and beyond.  Vast 
diversity prevails among France's Muslims with regard to 
inward religiosity, outward piety and the extent to which a 
social and cultural identity as "a Muslim" is central to 
their self-conception.  "French first" is the general rule, 
and French Muslims often express frustration at the 
mainstream community's persistent identification of them as 
"immigrants," "foreigners," "Arabs," "Muslims," etc.  About 3 
million of France's Muslims are French citizens.  Though 
two-thirds observe Ramadan, only about one fifth are 
considered continuously observant. 
 
GOALS AND PARTICIPANTS 
---------------------- 
¶4.  (SBU) In her July 25 - 26 meetings with officials from 
 
PARIS 00003402  002.2 OF 008 
 
 
the Prime Minister's office, Foreign Ministry, and Interior 
Ministry, and with politicians, religious leaders, academics, 
businessmen and community activists, S/A Pandith outlined the 
two overarching goals of U.S. engagement with Europe's 
Muslims:  countering the widespread conviction that the U.S. 
is somehow "at war" with Islam, and initiating a constructive 
dialogue about Muslim integration in European societies aimed 
at sharing America's best practices with regard to providing 
equal opportunity to disadvantaged, racially distinct 
minorities. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) During her two days of meetings in Paris S/A 
Pandith met with: 
 
French government officials: 
 
-- Prime Minister's Office: Laurence Marion, Civil Rights and 
Public Liberties Advisor to the Prime Minister 
 
-- Foreign Ministry: Justin Vaisse, Special Advisor for 
Transatlantic Relations; Yves Oudin, Deputy Director for 
North America; Denis Fromaget, Special Assistant for 
Religious Affairs 
 
-- Interior Ministry: Christophe Chaboud, Director, 
Coordination Unit for the Fight Against Terrorism; Anthony 
Bernardi, Chief of the Foreigners and Minorities Section of 
France's Internal Intelligence Services (RG), Fabienne Duthe, 
Extremism and Counter-Terrorism specialist of France,s 
Intelligence Service (DST) 
 
Politicians: 
 
-- Najat Azmy, political activist and official of the 
National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity. 
(Azmy has led numerous campaigns against discrimination in 
her home area of Pas-de-Calais.) 
 
-- Chafia Mentalecheta, one of the EU delegates to the 
European Agency of Fundamental Rights in Vienna.  (She aimed 
to run in the last legislative elections under the Socialist 
Party (PS) banner, but resigned from the Party in frustration 
at the short shrift given to minorities in the PS, and ran as 
an independent.) 
 
-- Faycal Douhane, former IV grantee, a PS spokesperson, and 
General Secretary of the Association of Mayors of the Paris 
Region.  (In 1997 Douhane founded the Club Averroes, an 
association dedicated to promoting diversity in the French 
media and to fight discrimination.) 
 
-- Ali Zahi, City Councilman in Paris suburb of Bondy and the 
International Relations and Communications Director for the 
Mayor of nearby Clichy-sous-Bois.  (Clichy-sous-Bois is the 
suburb where the urban unrest of November 2005 began.) 
 
Academics and Journalists: 
 
-- Said Branine, Chief Editor of France's leading, 
mainstream, Muslim website www.Oumma.com (http://oumma.com/) 
 
-- Omero Marongiu, sociologist, specialist on "Muslim 
Brotherhood" in France.  (Marongiu, a convert to Islam, is 
employed by a number of mosques as their legal counselor; he 
is also a consultant for social projects for the city of 
Roubaix, where Muslims may soon be a majority of the 
population.) 
 
-- Moussa Khedimellah, sociologist, specialist on Tabligh and 
Salafism in France (Kedimellah, with Marongiu, worked for the 
Ministry of the Interior on sensitivity-building training 
modules for police and prison guards.) 
 
-- Nourdin Mabil, Antione Menuisier, and Chou Sin, all 
journalists and all leading lights of Bondyblog, a news and 
commentary website from the viewpoint of suburban youth. 
(Menuisier, who works for the Swiss news weekly L'Hebdo, 
during the unrest of November 2005, pioneered, through 
Bondyblog, coverage of the events through cell phone video 
clips and other reports "from the street," as opposed to 
 
PARIS 00003402  003.2 OF 008 
 
 
"from the mainstream media behind the police.") 
 
-- Aziz Zemouri, journalist at Le Figaro.  (Zemouri is the 
author of Marianne and Allah, a book that explores the birth 
of the French Council of Muslim Faith (CFCM), a 
government-sponsored representative committee of Muslim 
institutions in light of France's much vaunted separation of 
church and state and integration of Muslims into French 
society according to the "Republican model." 
 
-- Hassina Ambolet, Deputy Mayor, Bondy 
 
Community and Business Leaders: 
 
-- Adda Bekkouch, chairman of the Movement for Active 
Citizenship (MCA).  (Bekkouch, known as a gadfly in his 
political opinions, regularly excoriates the left for failing 
to act on discrimination and minority issues.  According to 
Bekkouch, though the left "initiates the debate," it has been 
the right that "takes the plunge," for example, giving the 
vote to women, independence to Algeria, and, now, greater 
minority representation in government.) 
 
--Eduardo Rihan Cypel, Chief of Staff to Mayor of Bondy 
 
-- Said Hammouche, CEO of APC recruitment, the first minority 
placement agency in France (Hammouche was born in Bondy, and 
created his agency, which is quite successful, to offer the 
French minorities an opportunity to hone job-landing skills 
and facilitate their recruitment by employers) 
 
Leaders of Religious and Representative Institutions: 
 
-- Abderahmane Kebir, Director for International Relations of 
the Great Mosque of Paris 
 
-- Mohamed Timol, chief administrator of the CFCM 
 
-- Haydar Demiryurek, Secretary General of the CFCM and 
President of the French-Turkish Community's Representative 
Committee (CCFTM) 
 
GOVERNMENT STANDS BY THE "REPUBLICAN MODEL" 
------------------------------------------- 
¶6.  (SBU) Hardly surprisingly, the government officials that 
met with S/A Pandith defended France's "Republican model" of 
minority integration.  The "Republican model" of integration 
posits that equal opportunity and integration will ensue if 
the state remains assiduously blind to race, creed and 
national origin as it strives to secure individual rights. 
The "Republican model's" emphasis on individual citizens and 
their equality flies in the face of the social reality of 
group identities and the economic inequality of, for example, 
much higher school dropout and unemployment rates among 
immigrant, mostly Muslim, youth.  Because the bulk of 
France's urban underclass poor are Muslims, discussion of the 
integration of this disadvantaged minority invariably brings 
up France's way of separating church and state.  President 
Sarkozy has suggested modifying the relationship between 
state and religion to harness the community-building capacity 
of faith-based organizations, while also -- in connection 
with Islam -- reducing the potential spread of political 
fundamentalism. 
 
WHILE FLOATING REFORM PROPOSALS 
------------------------------- 
¶7.  (SBU) Laurence Marion of the Prime Minister's office 
focused on two key government initiatives: modifying the laws 
that define religious organizations so as to "expand their 
presence in the community" and provide for 
government-subsidized training of Imams.  Both of these 
initiatives have been championed by President Sarkozy and are 
part of his effort to engender "debate without taboos" about 
the place of religion in a France that Sarkozy sees as 
leaving behind a long history of antagonism between the 
Republic and the Catholic church.  Marion discussed, at 
length, the 1905 law that is the cornerstone of the legal 
status of religious organizations in France; she said that 
that law relegated religion to the personal, private sphere. 
Marion said the government was considering proposals to 
 
PARIS 00003402  004.2 OF 008 
 
 
loosen the law's limitation of "religious associations" 
(associations cultuelles) to worship activities only.  This 
would allow religious associations (such as mosques) to 
expand their social and charitable community-building 
activities.  In addition, Marion said the government was 
considering modifications to the law that would allow local 
associations (as opposed to recognized, organized religions) 
to build places of worship.  The runaway growth of 
unregulated prayer-rooms and "basement mosques" is part of 
what Sarkozy would like to see reined in by what he has 
called a "public" (that is, officially recognized and 
supported) French Islam. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Marion went on to detail another key pillar of, 
possible, Sarkozy administration reform of France's current 
framework for state-religion relations:  government-funded 
training of religious leaders, possibly even the 
establishment of a study center for that purpose.  The first 
option would involve providing curriculum materials and 
subsidies to ensure that foreign-born Imams were familiar 
with "Republican values," French government institutions and 
the French language.  This training would be mandatory. and 
there would be some sort of state-administered verification 
that Imams had assimilated the training to passing standards. 
 A second, more ambitious -- though still highly notional -- 
option, according to Marion, would include facilitating the 
creation of a state-sponsored theological institute of sorts, 
that would be capable of offering courses on Muslim theology, 
non-fundamentalist in outlook, and compatible with "liberal," 
Western values, among them religious pluralism. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Marion underlined that the Sarkozy administration 
was keen on finding ways "to support faith-based groups," 
while at the same time, "not radically departing from the 
tenets of the 1905 law."  In connection with the problem of 
how to pay for the proposed Imam training and theological 
institute, Marion said that the government would need to 
"find creative solutions."  As an example of a funding 
mechanism, Marion cited the Foundation for Muslim Works in 
France, created in 2005, as a possible means of channeling 
resources to Muslim projects in a way that could be 
considered analogous to how state funds are channeled into 
the historic preservation of Catholic churches. 
 
FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS EXPRESS 
UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. MUSLIM OUTREACH GOALS 
------------------------------------------- 
¶10.  (SBU) Foreign Ministry officials Justin Vaisse, Yves 
Oudin, and Denis Fromaget, in their defense of the 
"Republican model," stressed that the "problems faced by 
Arabs and Blacks" in France have much more to do with 
ethnicity and education than with religion.  Vaisse said that 
the French "Republican model" did not recognize race as a 
proper "political distinction," and observed that France was 
more inclined to address the evident social realities of 
poverty and marginalization on a "geographical basis."  He 
cited, as an example of that, the Priority Educational Zones 
(ZEPs), that benefit from considerable special funding and 
other programs, to the benefit of their predominantly 
immigrant populations. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Vaisse, Oudin and Fromaget expressed understanding 
of U.S. Muslim outreach goals.  Vaisse (who will be a fellow 
at the Brookings Institution in Washington beginning in 
September) called the goal of refuting the notion that the 
U.S. is at war with Islam and of enhancing communication and 
cooperation with Europe on Muslim integration an "accurate 
approach."  He added that outreach along those lines could be 
"enlarged to reflect the reality that it's not just the U.S., 
but the West in general, that is perceived by many to be at 
war with Islam."  Vaisse however, then went on to emphasize 
the "cultural specificity" of Islam in Europe and cautioned 
against assuming that a standardized approach could be 
applied across European national borders.  As an example of 
the cultural differences among Europe's Muslims, Vaisse 
recalled a conference he recently attended in Berlin at which 
French and German representatives had difficulty establishing 
common ground for a discussion of how to reconcile religious 
and political identity, because both are approached so 
differently by French and Germans.  For example, citizenship 
 
PARIS 00003402  005.2 OF 008 
 
 
and self-identification as French are, overall, much more 
easily accessible to foreigners than in Germany. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) In addition, Vaisse bemoaned what he called the 
"negative influence" of foreign, itinerant Imams.  Alluding 
to the French government's bind between keeping itself sealed 
off from the religious activities of citizens and its 
responsibility to monitor potential radicalization that could 
lead to terrorists acts, Vaisse lamented the "negative" 
influence of itinerant Imams who, he said, frequently operate 
with foreign funding and tended to be fundamentalist, as 
opposed to moderate, in their doctrinal outlook. 
 
GOVERNMENT AND MUSLIM COMMUNITY 
WORRIED BY RADICALIZATION 
------------------------- 
¶13.  (SBU) All interlocutors stressed that the potential 
radicals may be few in number, but that these few could still 
wreak havoc by mounting terrorist attacks or fomenting 
violent unrest.  Violence would be bad for civil peace and 
for France in general, and it would aggravate religious 
prejudice against Muslims.  The danger of angry, frustrated 
youths turning to religion, and becoming radicalized under 
the influence of fundamentalist Imams or other zealots, was 
evoked by Ministry of the Interior intelligence professionals 
and by sociologists and other representatives of civil 
society.  The Interior Ministry's Chaboud and Bernardi 
stressed that fundamentalist extremism was a problem only in 
a tiny fraction of France,s roughly 1,800 mosques (fewer 
than 100 of which are linked to Salafist or radical Turkish 
influences).  However, echoing the comments of their MFA 
colleagues, Interior's counter-terrorism experts also cited 
itinerant, charismatic preachers as the most serious 
"radicalization" threat because their constant movement makes 
it difficult to monitor the effect they may have on malleable 
followers.  (Note: Since 2003, French security forces have 
expelled 21 radical imams for preaching jihad or expressing 
opinions that contravene France,s hate crime legislation. 
END NOTE.)  Similarly, the worry that "desperate" suburban 
youth might fall prey to radicalization was specifically 
mentioned by Grand Mosque official Abderahmane Kebir, 
sociologist Moussa Khedimellah and web-based editorialist 
Said Branine. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) The government counter-terrorism professionals and 
the sociologists S/A Pandith met with both emphasized that 
the radicalization process has changed recently.  Contrary to 
the usual pattern in the past -- radicalization beginning 
with religious "conversion" -- today many "radicalization 
cases" bypass religious extremism and move straight to 
political extremism, ever more frequently via 
"self-radicalization" through contacts made on the internet, 
via networks formed among childhood friends, prison inmates, 
or around charismatic, advocates of jihad who do not claim to 
be religious leaders.  Khedimellah observed that the motors 
of radicalization among poor, suburban youths and better off, 
and more well-educated, "middle-class radicals" were quite 
different.  "Escape to a different life" by volunteering to 
go off to "resistance fighter" training camps seems to often 
motivate the poor, whereas, according to Khedimellah, 
middle-class radicals are more "ideologically motivated" -- 
by identification with the Palestinians and by anti-Semitism, 
for example.  Khedimellah said that, since the beginning of 
the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, about 100 individuals per 
year have departed France as recruits to Jihadist ranks. 
 
MOST FRENCH MUSLIMS ALSO SUPPORT THE "REPUBLICAN MODEL" 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
¶15.  (SBU) Throughout S/A Pandith's numerous exchanges with 
civil society representatives and political figures, the 
message came through loud and clear that French Muslims 
support France's "Republican model," earnestly wishing it 
would deliver on its promise of "liberty, equality and 
brotherhood" for all.  Equally consistently, they warned that 
failure to diminish the prejudice experienced by suburban 
youths and improve job opportunities for them would lead to 
another round of the sort of urban unrest that shook France 
in the fall of 2005.  Journalist Assiz Zemouri and politician 
Chafia Mentalecheta were among those who -- even as they 
excoriated France and French society for "marginalizing 
 
PARIS 00003402  006.2 OF 008 
 
 
without a future" the suburban immigrant poor -- also made a 
point of underlining their pride in their own achievements 
and their gratitude to the "Republican model" for the 
educational and professional opportunities that had been 
extended to them.  The power of the promise of equality under 
France's "Republican model" should not be underestimated. 
The controversy that continues to swirl around Sarkozy's 
proposals of affirmative action and official recognition of 
"communitarian" identities, among Muslims and others in 
France, is evidence of the "Republican model's" deep roots in 
the French character, a character aspired to and shared by 
most immigrants to France, including most Muslim immigrants. 
Again and again in S/A Pandith's conversations with French 
Muslims, the observation recurred about how travel "back" to 
Algeria, Morocco etc. made them intensely aware, in 
Mentalecheta's phrase, of how "French we are." 
 
¶16.  (SBU) One odd twist in the thread of discussion about 
the "Republican model" was provided by Mohamed Timol, an 
official of Paris' Grand Mosque, who is a leading member of 
the (tiny) Muslim community that traces its roots to 19th 
century immigrants from India to the French territory of 
Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean.  Timol remarked that one 
effect of the "Republican model" and its "refusal" of 
communitarian identities was to protect communities like his 
own from dominance by the much larger "national" communities 
-- Algerian, Moroccan, etc. -- that are still the main 
building blocks of the larger, Muslim community. 
 
INTRIGUED BY THE IDEA OF IDENTITY 
AS EUROPEAN MUSLIMS... 
---------------------- 
¶17.  (SBU) The primary focus of the range of interlocutors 
canvassed during the visit was the pros and cons of the 
"Republican model," whether or not the model is part of the 
solution for the social problems of France's immigrant 
(largely Muslim) underclass, and whether or not Sarkozy's 
proposed reforms to state-religion relations are likely to 
make any difference in the lives of those who, above all, 
need jobs.  However, when the subject of Europe and a broader 
identity as European Muslims came up, S/A Pandith's civil 
society interlocutors found the idea intriguing, though 
somewhat novel to them.  Europe's Muslims share a common 
experience, both as immigrants and as the first, large Muslim 
population to live in modern Europe.  Awareness of that could 
be gathering currency among Europe's Muslims, possibly 
generating a broader identity as European Muslims.  Civil 
society interlocutors greeted this as something that could be 
very positive, even though it was still quite an unfamiliar 
notion.  Haydar Demiryurek, for example, an official of the 
CFCM and leading member of the France's Turkish Muslim 
community said that he hoped a European Muslim identity could 
overcome the country-of-origin national divisions that, he 
said, still deeply divide Europe's Muslims. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) Another approach to the question of a growing 
Muslim identity came up in the meeting with sociologists 
Marongiu and Khedimellah.  They said they had observed a new 
"dynamic" in social identity -- growing self-identification 
as "Muslims" going hand-in-hand with growing use of the 
religious identifier, "the Muslims" by the mainstream 
majority (as opposed to the heretofore more common ethnic and 
racial terms of "the Arabs and the Blacks").  Marongiu and 
Khedimellah also remarked that there is a resurgence of 
interest in Muslim heritage and "cultural" Muslim identity 
among France's immigrants of Muslim extraction.  The net 
result of this could be a growing self-awareness as members 
of a Muslim minority in France, and beyond France, in Europe. 
 
...AND THE IDEA OF A "EUROPEAN MUSLIM LEARNING CENTER" 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
¶20.  (SBU) Discussion of the possibility of an identity 
common to European Muslims led to inquiring if there was a 
need for a Europe-wide, authoritative "voice of moderation" 
able to provide information to ordinary, middle-class 
Europeans (who happen to be Muslim) on matters of religious 
practice and Muslim history, science, art, culture and 
identity.  S/A Pandith's suggestion of a "learning center" in 
the heart of Europe for modern, European, contemporary Islam 
was enthusiastically greeted by many of her civil society 
 
PARIS 00003402  007.2 OF 008 
 
 
interlocutors.  The imperative to insure transparency within 
the organization to prevent its radicalization was discussed. 
 Some stated their worry that it would soon fall prey to 
factionalism among "national communities" or infiltration by 
radicals.  Additional concerns included potential dismissal 
of the center by Muslims as yet another state-sponsored 
attempt to guide their religion and criticism that such a 
center was superfluous because it would have no impact on the 
Muslim community's social ad economic problems. There was 
general agreement, however, that if the experience of 
immigration to Europe and the experience of being a minority 
religious community were to engender a version of Islam 
suited to contemporary, decidedly secular, Europe, then some 
sort of center for religious studies that could 
authoritatively propose interpretations of the Koran and 
modes of religious observance might find constructive, 
widespread use among moderate European Muslims.  The need for 
instruction in local languages was also mentioned as a 
critical component.  As Said Branine, who heads up the 
website Oumma.com, observed about the queries about 
religiously correct behavior and ritual practice that users 
post to the site, "a lot of these questions just don't come 
up" in traditional Muslim countries.  Thus, there is a need 
to fill the vacuum so radical ideology does not. 
 
FRENCH-LANGUAGE WEBSITES REFLECT EVOLUTION OF 
FRENCH MUSLIM COMMUNITY 
----------------------- 
¶21.  (SBU) "Muslim websites" -- ranging from the obscurantist 
and hate-mongering to the rational and conciliating -- abound 
in France.  Websites are among the most influential resources 
used by French Muslims, especially youth, in search of 
guidance "balancing their identities" as Muslims (religious 
and/or cultural) and patriotic French citizens and 
contemporary kids shaped by popular mass culture, etc. 
Oumma.com (http://www.oumma.com) is probably the most widely 
used, and reform-oriented in its religious outlook.  As 
Branine put it (quoting from his website's own homepage) 
"France's Muslims need a rational perspective -- that is both 
appreciative and critical -- of their religion and their 
culture."  Oumma.com claims about six million hits per month, 
and a big spike in users during Ramadan, showing that its 
guidance with regard to religious practice is heeded as 
authoritative by many.  Oumma.com reflects the outlook of the 
professional elite of immigrant Muslim background that was 
educated in France's public school system -- and speaks and 
thinks -- in French.  Oumma.com's Francophone, indeed, 
Cartesian, outlook testifies to the truth of that commonplace 
about the immigrant experience everywhere that full 
assimilation of the new country's language is the most 
powerful engine of integration. 
 
¶22.  (SBU) A/S Pandith's visit to Bondyblog -- to which the 
site gave considerable coverage 
(http://yahoo.bondyblog.fr/news/ 
sommet-usa-bondy-blog-a-la-sabliere) -- provided insight into 
a more youth-oriented use of the internet.  Bondyblog does 
provide news and commentary tuned to the sensibility of 
youthful members of France's immigrant community.  The 
anti-American, chip-on-the-shoulder attitude so common among 
immigrant youth was very much in evidence in the -- otherwise 
fulsomely laudatory -- coverage of S/A Pandith's visit in its 
evocation of disagreement with key aspects of U.S. foreign 
policy.  The Bondybloggers were clearly thrilled to receive a 
U.S. representative concerned about Muslim issues, and also 
conflicted by their reprobation of many U.S. policies.  As 
one poignantly put it, "Look at us -- our dress our habits 
our music.  We are American.  If you put us in America no one 
would know we were French.  But we have fallen out of love 
with America" -- over Iraq, Guantanamo/Abu Ghraib, and what 
is felt as different standards applied Israelis and 
Palestinians.  In France, among young French Muslims in 
particular, the depth of the anti-Americanism generated by 
distorted perceptions about the U.S. and the U.S. role in the 
world should not be underestimated.  These misperceptions are 
insistently fueled by widely-watched French-language, "Arab" 
television stations. 
 
SUPPORTING MUSLIM OUTREACH 
-------------------------- 
 
PARIS 00003402  008.2 OF 008 
 
 
¶23.  (SBU) Anti-Americanism in France, particularly with 
regard to U.S. foreign policies, and especially among 
France's Muslims, persists.  As came through loud and clear 
in S/A Pandith's exchanges in Paris, France abounds with 
thoughtful, articulate voices -- of individuals who happen to 
be Muslim -- willing to question distortions about America's 
role in the world.  Particularly during the past two years, 
outreach to France's Muslims has been the unifying theme of 
post's minority/diversity/women's issues Public Diplomacy 
programming.  The impact of France's predominantly Muslim 
underclass on social peace, and government efforts to better 
the situation of this population, have been a reporting 
priority of the Political Section, as has continuous advocacy 
of U.S. policies in the Middle East about which, French 
Muslims in particular, harbor such suspicions.  Some 
SEED-style funding for post's outreach programs would allow 
for grants aimed at amplifying voices of moderation and for 
creating an action network of like-minded Europeans.  Indeed, 
a relatively small investment in France of between $100,000 - 
$200,000 directed to minority youth NGOs could have a highly 
positive impact on youth opinion in the immigrant community. 
 
¶24.  (U) Senior Advisor Pandith cleared this message. 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
PEKALA