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Viewing cable 07PANAMA1408, PANAMA: WANTED FELON/TERRORIST CLOSER TO SECURING

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07PANAMA1408 2007-08-21 17:58 2011-05-31 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Panama
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #1408/01 2331758
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211758Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1020
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 001408 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC PASS TO USTR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2017 
TAGS: PREL PTER KCRM KJUS ETRD PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: WANTED FELON/TERRORIST CLOSER TO SECURING 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENCY? 
 
REF: (A) PANAMA 1346 (B) PANAMA 1309 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William A. Eaton.  Reasons:  1.4 (b), (c) and 
 (d). 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1.  (C)  "President Torrijos and (1st VP and FM) Samuel Lewis 
informed (National Assembly President) Elias Castillo and 
(National Assembly President aspirant) Deputy Pedro Miguel 
Gonzalez on August 14 at the Decameron resort that Torrijos 
would back Gonzalez to be the next President of the National 
Assembly,"  governing Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) 
legislative majority leader Leandro Avila told POLCOUNS on 
August 17.  (Note: Gonzalez is wanted in the U.S. for the 
1991 murder of U.S. serviceman Zak Hernandez and is 
ineligible for a U.S. visa on terrorism grounds.)  Confirming 
Panama City broadsheet La Estrella's August 16 story that 
Gonzalez would be the PRD's nominee to be President of the 
National Assembly, Castillo told POLCOUNS on August 16, 
"There is no question that Pedro Miguel has the votes," 
Castillo said.  Stating that he had asked Lewis if Gonzalez's 
election would have a negative impact on U.S.-Panamanian 
bilateral relations, Castillo asserted that Lewis responded, 
"The Americans could be handled," and, "It would not be a 
problem." 
 
2.  (C) These assertions contrast with separate assurances 
given to then-Charge by Lewis and Minister of the Presidency 
Ubaldino Real that Torrijos would "take care" of this problem 
and that Gonzalez would not be the next President of the 
Assembly.  Both indicated that the Embassy should not be 
surprised to read press reports indicating that Gonzalez 
would get the top spot in the Assembly.  They explained that 
Torrijos would ensure that Gonzalez steps down as a candidate 
but only after he appeared as the virtual winner.  Torrijos 
could not afford to be seen as succumbing to American 
pressure and needed to give Gonzalez an elegant way out.  In 
consultation with the Department, post has accepted these 
assurances after having made it clear to both Lewis and Real 
the consequences of Gonzalez's elevation that would not bode 
well for the U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA) and 
our bilateral relations.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Torrijos and Lewis Greenlight Gonzalez 
-------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) On August 14, President Martin Torrijos and First VP 
and FM Samuel Lewis called current President of the National 
Assembly Elias Castillo and Pedro Miguel Gonzalez to a 
meeting at the Decameron resort in Panama's interior, PRD 
Majority Leader Leandro Avila explained to POLCOUNS on August 
17.  At that meeting, Torrijos stated that he would support 
Gonzalez to be the next President of the National Assembly. 
Avila indicated that he was irate at the "undemocratic" 
fashion in which the PRD was making this decision.  Avila 
also explained that Gonzalez was Torrijos' primary liaison 
with PRD deputies, not the majority leader (Avila) as was 
normally the case.  Furthermore, Avila said he was concerned 
about negative impact that Gonzalez's election and presidency 
would have.  "How can we have a National Assembly President 
who is afraid of traveling for fear of being arrested?" Avila 
asked. 
 
4.  (C)  Avila laid out the following chain of events.  Avila 
explained that Gonzalez's chances of becoming National 
Assembly President rose after Castillo failed to secure 
support to amend the legislature's by-laws to enable 
Castillo's election for a third term.  (Note:  Current 
National Assembly rules permit its president to hold a 
maximum of two one-year terms.)  On Monday, August 13, Avila 
said that fellow PRD National Assembly Deputy Hector Aleman 
told him that since Castillo was no longer an option that 
Aleman's name had been "crossed out" too.  Aleman said that 
would only leave two candidates standing:  Deputy Raul 
Rodriguez and Gonzalez.  Avila asserted that Aleman explained 
that Raul Rodriguez was not "trustworthy," thought he "was 
above the rest," and had "his own agenda," so therefore 
Gonzalez would be the better option.  According to Avila, on 
Tuesday, August 14, Torrijos and Lewis, accompanied by Panama 
Province Governor Gladys Bandiera, met with Castillo and 
Gonzalez at the Decameron resort.  Torrijos indicated he 
would back Gonzalez, Avila asserted, and it was decided that 
Gonzalez would host a breakfast on Wednesday, August 15 with 
all PRD National Assembly Deputies to lobby for his 
candidacy.  On Wednesday, August 15, thirty-two PRD deputies 
attended Gonzalez's breakfast.  (Note:  Castillo told 
POLCOUNS on August 16 that he was the organizer of this 
meeting and that thirty-five PRD deputies attended.) 
According to Avila, seven or eight PRD deputies lauded 
Gonzalez's political experience.  "The whole show became 
almost like a launching of Gonzalez's campaign to become 
National Assembly President."  Panama City broadsheet La 
Estrella reported in its Thursday, August 16 edition that 
Gonzalez would be the PRD's nomination for President of the 
National Assembly. 
 
5.  (C) Asked what his reading of this sequence of events 
was, Avila said, "Torrijos supports Pedro Miguel, but does 
not want to do it directly.  Instead, Torrijos wants to make 
it look like Gonzalez's candidacy was an initiative of the 
PRD's National Assembly deputies."  Avila also asserted, "If 
we had done our internal elections democratically and without 
Torrijos' intervention, it would be a different story, but 
Torrijos does not let us do that."  "I fear that Torrijos 
believes that he can manage the risk that Gonzalez's election 
would entail for ratification of the U.S.-Panama Trade 
Promotion Agreement (TPA)," Avila said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Castillo: Gonzalez PRD Nat'l Assembly Presidency Nominee 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
6.  (C) On August 16, the same day as La Estrella's story, 
National Assembly President Elias Castillo granted POLCOUNS a 
long-standing request for an appointment.  "There is no 
question that Pedro Miguel has the votes," Castillo said. 
Stating that he had asked Lewis if Gonzalez's election would 
have a negative impact on U.S.-Panamanian bilateral 
relations, Castillo asserted that Lewis responded, "The 
Americans could be handled," and, "It would not be a 
problem."  Furthermore, Castillo asserted that at the August 
15 meeting with PRD deputies, no PRD deputies voiced any 
concerns about the impact that Gonzalez's election would have 
on U.S.-Panamanian bilateral relations. During the meeting, 
Castillo received a call from Lewis and told him that he 
needed to see Lewis urgently regarding a "personnel matter." 
 
------------------------------------- 
Torrijos to Ask Gonzalez to Step Down 
------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (C) Minister of the Presidency Ubaldino Real told to 
Charge on August 17 that Torrijos would ask Gonzalez to step 
aside.  Real explained that Torrijos did not want to be 
perceived to be seen to be caving in to the "gringos."  "Sit 
tight, and you will see that this matter will soon be 
resolved," Real told Charge.  This conversation followed a 
telcon between then-Charge and Lewis, in which Lewis 
regretted that the Embassy meeting with Castillo had 
complicated Torrijos' task.  Lewis asked that Embassy say 
nothing else and repeated assurances that Torrijos would ask 
Gonzalez to step down. 
 
------------ 
U.S. Message 
------------ 
 
8.  (C) Post's message to GOP counterparts has been 
consistent.  While underscoring that ultimately it is 
Panama's sovereign decision who it elects as its National 
Assembly President, GOP officials should be cognizant of the 
negative impact that the election of Gonzalez would have on 
 
the bilateral relationship.  Gonzalez's problems are of a 
judicial, not a political, nature.  Notions that Gonzalez 
could reach an "understanding" with the USG once elected 
President of the National Assembly are foolhardy; if he wants 
to address this issue, Gonzalez should surrender to U.S. 
justice.  As a practical matter, Panama should consider how 
the election of somebody the U.S. considers a felon, wanted 
for the murder of a U.S. serviceman, would play in this 
post-9/11 era when the U.S. has thousands of troops deployed 
worldwide in the global war against terrorism.  Finally, 
Gonzalez's election could have a negative impact on efforts 
to secure U.S. Congressional approval for the TPA. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (C) Post is concerned about Torrijos' ability to manage 
the growing momentum to install Gonzalez as President of the 
National Assembly.  While remaining hopeful that Torrijos 
will deliver on his assurances that Gonzalez will step down 
as a candidate, post is also aware that both Torrijos and 
Lewis need the support of Gonzalez's wing in the PRD.  Lewis' 
diplomatic responsibilities are colliding with his political 
aspirations.  Torrijos has a long-standing relationship with 
Gonzalez and his family.  Gonzalez's father was one of 
Torrijos' political mentors, and Gonzalez is one of Torrijos' 
most trusted acolytes in the National Assembly.  Avila noted 
that it was interesting that the PRD had not yet set the date 
for its National Executive Committee (CEN) meeting to bless 
the decision to make Gonzalez its nomination for National 
Assembly President.  (Note:  The PRD's 45 members dominate 
the 75 member National Assembly.  The PRD's nomination will 
be the chamber's next President.)  That meeting will need to 
happen some time between now and September 1 when the next 
session of the National Assembly is inaugurated.  Castillo, 
whose efforts to clear the way for his own re-election to a 
third consecutive term were stymied by Gonzalez, is spoiling 
for a fight with Gonzalez.  Aleman, who is out of favor with 
Torrijos, is most likely looking for ways to elbow his way to 
the head of the race for National Assembly President by 
pushing Gonzalez out of the way.  Real's message that 
Torrijos would soon ask Gonzalez to step aside is welcome 
news, but post remain vigilant as the matter continues to 
evolve. 
 
10.  (C) While Post has accepted Torrijos' assurances, post 
will examine possible ways to respond should Gonzalez indeed 
be elected, possibly for starters to include boycotting the 
September 1 opening of the National Assembly and issuing a 
press statement that lays out the reason for such an action. 
Given the Torrijos Administration's confidence that its close 
relationships with Washington (including with POTUS and the 
Secretary) provide it ample maneuver space in the bilateral 
relationship, post believes that it is important for both 
post and Washington to hit the GOP hard together so that 
neither Torrijos nor Lewis can perceive any daylight between 
the Embassy and Washington. 
EATON