VZCZCXRO9278
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0633/01 2141320
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021320Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5588
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0745
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME 0049
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000633 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
AIDAC 
 
USAID/DCHA FOR MHESS, GGOTTLIEB, SBRADLEY 
DCHA/OFDA FOR KLUU, AFERRARA, ACONVERY, DLILLIE, AMALLEY 
DCHA/FFP FOR WHAMMINK, JDWORKEN 
NAIROBI/ECARO FOR JMYER; FFP FOR NESTES 
STATE FOR AF/C, AFR/WA, AF/EPS, EB, CRS, AND PRM 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
ROME FOR RNEWBERG, HSPANOS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PGOV PHUM SOCI PREF PREL CD
 
SUBJECT:  CHAD - UN OCHA WEAKNESSES 
 
Refs:  A) Ndjamena 06 01396   B) Ndjamena 0619   C) Ndjamena 0625 
 
NDJAMENA 00000633  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) effort to coordinate humanitarian activities in eastern Chad 
is falling short of expectations and promises made to donors earlier 
in 2007.  To improve its performance, OCHA HQ needs to take eastern 
Chad's requirements more seriously, immediately deploy to the field 
at least two experienced humanitarian officers, improve support to 
field offices, and lead on an urgent basis a process to plan for the 
post-rains period.  End summary. 
 
PROMISES BUT NOT ENOUGH ACTION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) During a visit by USAID/OFDA to eastern Chad in November 
2006 (ref A), it became clear that OCHA needed to beef up its 
presence in eastern Chad and take on its coordination role, 
especially in light of increasing numbers of internally displaced 
people (IDPs).  At that time it had a newly opened sub-office in 
Abeche temporarily staffed by a national officer from Ndjamena and 
not much else.  Subsequent OFDA visits in January and May 2007 found 
OCHA had not made much progress, either in establishing and staffing 
the offices or in leading the humanitarian community's effort to 
assist the IDPs. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) As of July 2007 and OFDA's latest visit to eastern Chad 
(refs B and C), OCHA still has not fully taken on its 
responsibilities in Chad.  Earlier excuses of difficulties in 
recruitment and funding are no longer valid, especially as OFDA 
recently provided a second tranche of funding, bringing the total to 
$1 million for FY 07. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Upon prodding by OFDA early in 2007, and the provision of 
funding, OCHA appeared to recognize the problem and agreed to send 
some experienced staff to the region, fully staff Abeche, open two 
additional offices in the east, and take its coordination role 
seriously.  OCHA did send an experienced field officer to eastern 
Chad, but his limited four-month term ran out in July and he left 
the country with no replacement. 
 
STAFFING 
-------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) While the Ndjamena office is near permanent strength 
(eight of ten), the field offices are woefully understaffed 
according to OCHA's own staffing chart. Currently, the Abeche office 
is staffed with a permanent head of office, two secondees from the 
UK Department for International Development (DfID), one UN Volunteer 
(UNV), a driver and a cleaner (six of 14 planned).  The Goz Beida 
office has one DfID secondee and a cleaner (two of five), and the 
Farchana office does not yet exist.  The three staff provided by 
DfID are on short-term one-time contracts. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) OCHA says it is very difficult to find francophones 
willing to come to Chad, as well as qualified Chadians.  That may be 
the case, but other organizations that complained of the same 
problem, have managed to deploy full teams.  OCHA itself has 
deployed numerous francophones in other countries in the region, 
including Kenya and Somalia.  The problem is more likely linked to 
poor recruiting in Geneva and unwillingness of permanent OCHA staff 
to work in Chad. 
 
SUPPORT 
------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Support for OCHA's Chad field operations, from OCHA Geneva 
and from OCHA Ndjamena, is lacking.  Almost a year after opening the 
Abeche office it has no photocopier, one printer (shared by the four 
staff), one vehicle, an improperly installed generator and little 
else.  A construction project for a staff guesthouse next door has 
stalled due to lack of support from Ndjamena. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The reason, the head of the Abeche office said, is because 
 
NDJAMENA 00000633  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
unlike operational agencies such as UNICEF, OCHA depends on the UN 
Development Program (UNDP) for its administrative support in 
country.  Since eastern Chad is on UN security phase four, UNDP can 
not travel to Abeche, so providing support to OCHA in Abeche (where 
there is no UNDP office) is not a priority for UNDP.  In addition, 
UNDP's procedures are more suitable for a development organization 
with a longer term approach. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Support is also lacking from OCHA headquarters in Geneva, 
including the area of staffing as noted.  This may be because of 
OCHA's structure, where it relies on other agencies for 
administrative services, and partly because it has simply not 
prioritized action in Chad.  It may also be due to the fact that 
OCHA has limited central budgetary support and relies on direct 
program and project funding. 
 
ACTIVITIES 
---------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) OCHA spends too much time on activities such as producing 
detailed minutes of meetings and ensuring that annual appeals are 
produced, but little on the nitty-gritty of field level humanitarian 
coordination.  Illustrative of this point, there is not even a set 
of NGO pigeon-hole mailboxes in the Abeche office, and during a 
recent work day (when OFDA rep was using their office) not a single 
non-OCHA staff member entered the office.  Even accounting for 
increased use of email, given OCHA's information sharing role it 
would be expected that NGOs representatives would visit. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) OFDA reps in the field that have attended the regular 
OCHA coordination meetings in Abeche say that these are poorly 
attended and consist of little more than NGOs going around the room 
saying what they're doing.  There is no real discussion of issues, 
no seeking common positions and no decisions are made. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) OCHA does get good marks for the maps and up-to-date 
contact lists it produces on a regular basis, thanks to one of the 
DfID secondees in Abeche and an OCHA map officer in Ndjamena. 
 
LEADERSHIP 
---------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Leadership in the OCHA office is lacking.  The 
Ndjamena-based country director is well-meaning, but appears to 
spend most of her time preparing appeals, sharing minutes with the 
diplomatic community in the capital and supporting the UNDP resident 
coordinator, who might not appreciate the importance of the field 
component of OCHA's work.  There does not appear to be much effort 
put into facilitating real communication within the field and 
providing leadership to determine the overall strategic direction of 
the response. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) It also does not seem that OCHA has much of a field 
orientation.  The Abeche head of office made his first trip to Goz 
Beida in four months during OFDA rep's visit in July.  The country 
director rarely travels to the east, and when she does, it is 
usually to accompany high level visitors.  When OFDA reps traveled 
to Farchana for three days in July they invited the new DfID 
secondee, slated to work there, to join the trip, but the Abeche 
head of office wanted her to stay and help him finish typing up 
meeting minutes.  She thus lost an opportunity to see the Farchana 
area, learn about its issues and get acquainted with some of OCHA's 
donors. 
 
SOLUTION 
-------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) OCHA should immediately deploy permanent, experienced, 
action-oriented IDP advisors in both Abeche and Ndjamena.  One to 
advise the UN country team on IDPs, one to do the same in Abeche 
where the action is.   It should also redouble its efforts to fully 
staff its offices, finalize the construction of the Goz Beida 
office, establish effective support systems and start construction 
of the Farchana office. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Simultaneously, it needs to take on the task of leading 
 
NDJAMENA 00000633  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
the humanitarian community in planning for the post-rains period 
scenarios (for IDP return, status quo or more displacement).  OCHA 
can do this by hosting a forum in Abeche to solidify the consensus 
on IDP assistance strategy, get the GOC on board and come up with a 
simple unified plan to share with donors and other actors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶17.  (SBU) What OCHA Chad needs is another dose of shock therapy, 
similar to one provided by OFDA earlier in the year.  In OFDA rep's 
opinion, OCHA is providing secretariat support to the humanitarian 
coordinator in the capital at the expense of coordination and 
leadership in the east where its needed. 
 
¶18.  (SBU) This is a golden opportunity for OCHA since 
(exceptionally) the other humanitarian organizations, including UN 
agencies and even the ICRC are clamoring for OCHA leadership.  OCHA 
would have no need for its usual challenge of carving out its niche; 
in eastern Chad it exists, is empty, and is waiting for OCHA to fill 
it. 
 
TAMLYN