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Viewing cable 07MOSCOW3837, EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: SECURITY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07MOSCOW3837 2007-08-06 08:45 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Moscow
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #3837/01 2180845
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 060845Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2698
RHMFIUU/USCBP WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ BICE WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS MOSCOW 003837 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/MHAMES/LRITTER 
USDOC FOR 3150/USFCS/OIO/CEENIS/MCOSTA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BEXP ETRD ETTC RS
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: PRE-LICENSE CHECK: SECURITY 
COMPANY FAKEL OST LTD., BALASHIKHA, MOSCOW REGION, 
RUSSIA, D375526 
 
REFTEL: USDOC 06129 
 
1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided 
below is prohibited by Section 12C of the Export 
Administration Act. 
 
2. Reftel requested a Pre-license check to determine 
the legitimacy and reliability of the end-user, 
Security Company Fakel Ost Ltd., Balashikha, Moscow 
Region, Russia. The company is listed on BIS license 
application D375526 as the ultimate consignee of ten 
thermal-eye X200XP thermal imagers. These items are 
controlled for national security and nuclear non- 
proliferation reasons under ECCN 6A003. The licensee 
is L3 Communications Infrared Products, 13532 North 
Central Expressway, Dallas, TX 75243. 
 
3. On July 31, 2007, Export Control Attache Donald 
Pearce and FSN Natalya Shipitsina conducted a pre- 
license check at the offices of Security Company Fakel 
Ost (SCFO) Ltd., 253, Nosovikhinskoe Shosse, 
Balashikha, Moscow Region, Russia. The export control 
team met with Aleksandr Pushkarsky, General Director 
and Nikolay Konyukhov, Deputy General Director for 
Security of the Savik Company. 
 
4. The Savik Company founded SCFO in 2003 to provide 
armed security services for the warehouse facility in 
Balashikha.  Savik is a Russian and German joint 
venture specializing in motor oil distribution.  Savik 
is expanding its business to include warehousing 
services for other clients, to include a high-value 
storage facility currently under construction.  SCFO 
is tasked with providing 24-hour security to the 
facilities.  SCFO currently employs 42, and is 
planning on tripling its staff over the next year to 
cover the new facilities. 
 
5. The Savik facility is located on a four-hectare 
(10-acre) area of land bordering on undeveloped land 
on two sides, and railroad tracks on the rear 
exposure.  The tall grass and trees in these areas 
provides concealment for potential intruders to 
conduct surveillance and evade capture upon escape. 
SCFO has detected several intrusions from these areas 
over the past year.  Currently the company is 
deploying one Thermal Imaging camera and a night- 
vision device, but wishes to expand its operational 
capabilities. 
 
6. The Thermal imaging cameras will be used only at 
the Savik facility.  The company will train 10 of its 
patrol officers to use the cameras.  The duty officer 
will issue the cameras to the incoming shift, and 
account for their return at the end of tour. 
Currently SCFO guards only the Savik facilities, but 
may someday expand to provide security to other 
warehouses or industrial organizations.  SCFO is aware 
of its responsibilities regarding the safeguarding and 
appropriate end use of the thermal imagers. 
 
7. The team was shown the duty officer's post, and was 
allowed to view the security procedure for accessing 
the safe. When not in use the cameras will be stored 
in a locked cabinet within the firearms storage safe 
in the security headquarters building.  The building 
is manned at all times, and has an electronic security 
system with closed-circuit video.  The safe alarm is 
directly connected to the local Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (Russian acronym MVD) Militsiya post. NOTE: 
The MVD Militsiya is the primary law enforcement 
organization of the Russian Federation, and provides 
local police services. END NOTE.  In order to access 
the safe, the duty officer must first call the MVD 
duty officer to advise that the safe will be accessed. 
Failure to do so will result in an armed Militsiya 
response. The team was also shown a Thermal Eye X200XP 
thermal imaging camera, serial number 01579.  The 
camera was stored in the locked cabinet within the 
safe. 
 
8. Recommendations: Post recommends Security Company 
Fakel Ost Ltd., Balashikha, Moscow Region, Russia, as 
a reliable recipient of sensitive U.S. origin 
commodities. It is requested that post be notified of 
final disposition of the application, and of any 
 
 
shipments for this organization in order to conduct 
appropriate FCS follow-up and statistical reporting. 
(FCS MOSCOW/SBOZEK/DPEARCE) 
BURNS