VZCZCXYZ0024
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #1944/01 2321709
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201709Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1047
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001944 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR V. ALVARADO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON KDEM NU
SUBJECT: ORTEGA RAMPS-UP CITIZEN COUNCILS 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 1083 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 1588 
     ¶C. MANAGUA 1782 
     ¶D. MANAGUA 1783 
     ¶E. MANAGUA 1921 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4b,d. 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Legal reforms pushed through the National 
Assembly early in the year have enabled President Daniel 
Ortega to put in play his "direct democracy" gambit through 
Citizen Councils (CPC).  Under the control of the First Lady, 
Rosario Murillo, Ortega plans to have nearly 17,000 CPCs 
(with nearly one million members) in place at the 
neighborhood, district, departmental, and national level to 
oversee State institutions by September 14.  Political 
opponents and civil society have sharply criticized the CPCs, 
claiming they are illegal, partisan, and pose a threat to 
freedom of expression.  Once united, National Assembly 
efforts to muster enough votes to strike the CPCs from the 
law, have largely disintegrated.  At this point, the 
structure, role, and potential long-term success of Ortega's 
CPC experiment are far from clear.  The ultimate power and 
influence of the CPC structure will likely be determined by 
Ortega's ability channel formal and informal State programs 
through it, creating a national patronage system.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
CPC Background and Structure 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2.  (U) After taking power on January 10, 2007, President 
Daniel Ortega -- using the Sandinista National Liberation 
Front's (FSLN) 37 seats and those of Liberal Constitutional 
Party members loyal to Arnoldo Aleman, and taking advantage 
of the relative inexperience of the Nicarguan Liberal 
Alliance (ALN) deputies -- pushed through reforms to Law 290 
(Organization, Competence, and Procedures of the Executive 
Power) in late January.  Specifically, Ortega modified 
Article 11 to read "The President of the Republic can, by 
Decree, create Secretaries and Councils that s/he deems 
convenient for the better development of the Government and 
(the President) will determine the organization and 
functioning of these (Secretaries and Councils)."  Further, 
Article 11 states that "These referred to Councils...will act 
as instances for intersectoral coordination, participation, 
and consultation." 
 
¶3.  (U) Following the passage of Law 290 reforms, Ortega's 
first move was to appoint his wife, Rosario Murillo, as head 
of the newly created Council of Communication and Citizenry 
(Consejo de Comunicacion y Cuidadana), making her the 
architect for the development of a national network of 
Citizens' Councils (Consejos de Poder Cuidadano - CPCs). 
 
¶4.  (U) Inspired by Venezuela's Community Councils and Cuba's 
Defense Committees for the Revolution, the CPCs are the 
mechanism by which Ortega and Murillo have promised to bring 
"direct democracy" to the Nicaraguan people.  A pyramid 
structure, CPCs are being formed at the neighborhood, 
district, municipal, departmental, and national levels. 
According to Elias Chevez, substitute Sandinista National 
Assembly deputy and CPC coordinator in Managua, the 
neighborhood CPCs consist of a committe of 16 elected 
members. 
 
¶5.  (U) Each committee member is responsible for overseeing a 
different sector of State services, including security, 
women's issues, youth, employment, health, education, 
environment, transportation, culture, sports, and elderly 
care.  In the case of education and medical care, 
neighborhood level cabinet members -- or their 
representatives -- will be physically located at the school 
or clinic to oversee the teachers, doctors, administrators, 
etc.  Since schools, clinics, and hospitals in urban areas 
are shared among a dozen or more neighborhoods, multiple 
neighborhood cabinets will be overseeing single institutions. 
 It is not clear how these multiple representatives will be 
coordinated. 
 
¶6.  (U) District CPCs will be drawn from neighborhood 
committees, municipal CPCS from district CPCs, and so on up 
to the national CPC.  Only the neighborhood CPCs have 
16-member committees.  According to Chevez, the other levels 
in the structure may have up to 100 members drawn in a 
yet-to-be-determined proportion from the level below.  (For 
example, if there are 100 neighborhood committees in a 
district, 5 representatives from each of the 16 sectors - 80 
people - would form the district CPC.) 
 
¶7.  (U) On top of the CPC structure will be a national 
cabinet formed from departmental representatives and headed 
by Ortega.  According to Chevez, the national committee will 
function as a watchdog over Ortega's cabinet, verifying 
through an upward flow of information from the neighborhoods 
through the CPC structure, if and how well the ministries are 
delivering mandated services.  It is unclear how much, if 
any, direct influence or control the national CPCs will have 
over the ministries. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) While the CPC cabinet structure appears 
standardized, individual CPCs seem to have a great deal of 
operational latitude.  For example, in Leon, the CPC 
announced that it would begin reviewing the city's budget 
after July 19, while a neighborhood CPC in Managua announced 
the formation of a voluntary police unit.  (NOTE:  When asked 
whether the CPCs have had any impact on police activities, 
Police Commissioner Aminta Granera remarked that she has 
"heard nothing" -- believed to imply that she has not 
received orders from Ortega instructing her to work with the 
CPCs -- and that "there could be conflict if CPC activities 
interfere with police procedures."  END NOTE.) 
 
¶9.  (U) On July 19, Murillo announced that 6,334 CPCs out of 
a planned total of 16,957 CPCs (representing nearly one 
million members) had already been formed and that the 
remaining 9,000-plus would be in place by September 14.  In 
Managua alone, there will be an estimated 12,800 members, 
representing 800 neighborhoods.  In Leon and Boaco, an 
estimated 517 and 300 CPCs, respectively, will be created. 
Chinandega will have some 600 members. 
 
 
CPCs - Likely Focal Point for Government Programs 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶10.  (U) In a July 7 speech -- and on several occasions since 
-- Murillo announced that the CPCs will locally administer 
the government program Zero Hunger (reftel C).  Although the 
Ministry of Forestry and Agriculture (MAGFOR) will run the 
program, Murillo declared that CPCs would monitor the 
application review and selection process and distribute the 
program's allotments.  Murillo anticipated that the CPCs 
would also administer the Zero Usury program -- a 
low-interest micro-credit lending program for women -- that 
she intends to have up and running later this year. 
 
¶11.  (U) The CPCs may also play a role in facilitating youth 
employment.  On July 13, the government announced that it 
would assist upwards of 2,000 men and women under the age of 
30 find jobs - primarily in the maquilla sector.  As part of 
the application process, applicants must provide a letter of 
reference and complete an interview.  According to press 
reports, applicants claimed that a reference letter from an 
FSLN member - preferably the local FSLN party secretary - was 
instrumental to passing on to the interview phase and that 
interviewers specifically asked about party affiliations. 
The sub-director of the program, Benita Arvizu, corroborate 
this when she told the press "the letter from the party 
secretary or the (local) youth director is indispensable 
because in some way we will coordinate with the (CPC) youth 
directors in each neighborhood." 
 
¶12.  (U) Ortega recently announced that he may use the CPC 
structure to name FSLN candidates for the 2008 municipal 
elections, suspending internal elections.  His announcement 
drew sharp criticism from Sandinistas who claim Ortega is 
violating the FSLN's party statutes.  It appears that 
Ortega's announcement may have pushed some Sandinistas 
concerned about the CPCs, but previously too nervous to speak 
out, to become more vocal in their opposition to the CPCs. 
 
Civil Society, Opposition Parties Push Back 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶13.  (U) Opposition political parties and civil society 
organizations are increasingly concerned about the CPCs. They 
argue three main points:  First, the Consejos violate Law 290 
reforms; second, the CPCs are partisan; and third, the CPCs 
are a purposeful mechanism to suffocate civil society 
organizations. 
 
¶14.  (U) While modifications to Law 290 allow Ortega to 
establish counsels, the law states that "To these said 
Councils cannot be transferred any functions or faculties of 
the Ministries of State or of any other Power of State and 
they cannot exercise any executive function" (reftel A).  As 
such, opposition legislators agrue that Ortega's intention to 
establish a "national cabinet" of CPC representatives at the 
ministerial level, violates the law.  Prior to his public 
announcement on July 7 to create a national cabinet, Ortega 
had repeatedly asserted his intention to make the Ministries 
accountable to the citizens' councils. 
 
¶15.  (C) In July, National Assembly Deputies from the 
Sandinista Renovationist Movement (MRS), Nicaraguan Liberal 
Alliance (ALN), and Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) vowed 
to vote together on a resolution to declare the CPCs illegal 
when the issue comes up for vote in mid-August.  As a member 
of the National Assembly's Executive Council, PLC vice 
president Wilfredo Navarro told poloffs that he would put the 
CPC issue on the legislative agenda, but he, along with PLC 
presidential hopeful Enrique Quinonez, as well as a number of 
PLC mayors voiced concerns in private that as many as 6 or 7 
PLC deputies loyal to former Nicaraguan President Arnoldo 
Aleman are likely to vote against any measure to curb CPC 
power (reftel E). 
 
¶16.  (U) The FSLN does not control a majority in the National 
Assembly, but the potential opposition block totals only 50 
votes (ALN-22, PLC-25, MRS-3).  A minimum of 22 PLC votes 
would be necessary to reach the 47-vote minimum required to 
pass the resolution.  In other words, only 3 or 4 PLC 
defections from the anti-CPC forces in the Assembly would 
give Ortega the votes he needs. 
 
Members Only, Thank You 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶17.  (U) Despite Murillo's assurances that the CPCs are open 
to people of all political stripes, there have been 
widespread complaints that non-FSLN citizens are being 
excluded.  Most indications show that the CPC election 
process is controlled by the FSLN.  The local CPC commissions 
created to manage the local elections are overseen by local 
FSLN party secretaries and FSLN offices and resources are 
being used to set-up and host the elections.  Residents 
complain there is little or no prior announcement of election 
details and that CPC members are exclusively Sandinista.  In 
defense, a CPC member in Managua reported that trucks mounted 
with loudspeakers drive through neighborhoods the day before 
and the day of CPC elections, broadcasting election details. 
 
¶18.  (U) Thus far, CPCs have been operating out of local FSLN 
party offices, a fact readily admitted by FSLN leaders who 
claim that using party infrastructure is the only viable 
solution since these volunteer committees do not have 
operating budgets.  To date, Ortega has not announced plans 
to create independent offices for the CPCs. 
 
Civil Society Won't Take it Laying Down 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶19.  (U) As the structure and scope of the CPCs has 
crystallized over the past few weeks, opposition from civil 
society groups has hardened.  On June 28, the Nicaraguan 
Network for Democracy and Development and the office of the 
Civil Coordinator -- a network of over 600 civil society NGOs 
-- staged a march in opposition to the CPCs.  March leaders 
stressed the importance of having a free and open space for 
public participation and underlined the existence of 
legislation facilitating participation - the Law of Citizen 
Participation and the Municipal Law, both of which have 
created non-partisan legal structures for civil participation 
down to the local level. 
 
¶20.  (C) In addition to the civil coordinator, the Nicaraguan 
Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH) is coordinating a 
coalition of 20 civil society organizations opposed to the 
CPCs.  Among the leading members of the coalition are the 
Movement for Nicaragua (MpN), the Autonomous Women's Movement 
(MAM), the Violeta Chamorro Foundation, and the Network of 
Women Against Violence.  Coalition members meet each week to 
discuss tactics, plan events, and develop a common framework 
to oppose what they see as a growing infringement on 
democracy and freedom of expression. 
 
¶21.  (C) MAM, one of the most outspoken and passionate 
members of the coalition, has historically been 
pro-Sandinista.  However, the NGO's leadership has become 
concerned with Ortega's aggressive rhetoric and 
centralization of power, a sentiment echoed by CENIDH, a 
human rights organization also traditionally Sandinista.  MAM 
and CENIDH represent a growing number of Sandinista civil 
society organizations struggling to find common ground with 
Ortega's polemic behavior. 
 
¶22.  (U) In its first public event, on July 17, two days 
before the 28th anniversary of the Sandinista revolution, the 
coalition held a press conference demanding the dismantling 
of the CPCs on grounds that they violate existing laws and 
violate the human rights of Nicaraguans.  Coalition members 
told poloff that Ortega's anti-democratic actions only serve 
to further galvanize civil society opposition and that the 
coalition will continue to oppose Ortega issue by issue. 
 
Government Labels Opposition as "Conspirators" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶23.  (SBU) In response to the coalition's July 17 press 
conference, FSLN National Assembly deputy Gustavo Porras, 
warned that the FSLN would "take to the streets" and "close 
the National Assembly" if Article 11 was struck from Law 290. 
 In his July 19 speech, Ortega lashed out, saying that those 
who oppose the CPCs "have committed a crime against the 
people" and that "the people don't ask for revenge, but they 
ask for justice" (reftel D).  Ortega went on to label his 
political opponents as "conspirators" for attempting to 
legally block the CPCs and, specifically, his plan to use the 
CPCs to implement his Zero Hunger program.  Cleverly, Ortega 
declared that those opposed to the CPCs and Zero Hunger were 
also opposed to the Nicaraguan people. 
 
¶24.  (SBU) Ortega has used the coalition's criticism of the 
CPCs to bolster his attacks on NGOs, citing their opposition 
as evidence that NGOs represent special interest groups and 
do not speak for the people.  As he has done on previous 
occasions (reftel B), Ortega accused NGOs -- among them the 
Civil Coordinator's office -- of being "conspirators" funded 
by the U.S. government. 
 
Atlantic Coast - CPCs are not Welcome 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶25.  (C) During a recent two-day visit to the Atlantic Coast, 
the Ambassador heard the governors and regional council 
leaders in the Autonomous Northern and Southern Regions state 
their strong opposition to the CPCs.  Leaders see the CPCs as 
a direct violation of the Law of Autonomy and another attempt 
by leaders from the Pacific to "meddle" in the affairs of the 
Atlantic Coast.  Declaring their rightful authority as 
directly elected leaders under the Law of Autonomy, they 
characterized the attempted imposition of CPCs as 
"inappropriate" and "intrusive".  While leaders were not 
opposed to the establishment of civic organizations nor to 
working closely with them to improve the lives of the coastal 
peoples, they were not disposed to receiving orders from such 
groups. 
 
Comment - Controlling Access to State Services 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶26.  (C) While much remains unclear about the ultimate 
structure, role, and eventual impact of the CPCs on 
Nicaraguan society, they appear to be a party-centric 
structure, tightly controlled by the FSLN down to the 
neighborhood level.  Established under the auspices of making 
all levels of government more directly accountable to the 
people, we think it is clear that CPCs will be used to 
control access to government services and to super-impose a 
"civil society" structure loyal to Ortega that will suffocate 
freedom of expression. 
 
¶27.  (C) The impact of the CPCs are likely be limited in 
Managua and larger urban centers, but they may wield 
considerable leverage in rural areas where access to public 
resources can be more easily controlled and where Ortega may 
focus the majority of his government programs -- like Zero 
Hunger.  Tight control and distribution of services and 
resources based on party affiliates could have dramatic 
implications in the 2008 municipal elections because they can 
easily influence voting behavior.  If the CPCs gain 
sufficient traction in rural areas, rural voters -- the 
majority of whom are Liberal -- may feel they have little 
choice but to vote for Sandinista candidates in order to get 
access to needed services.  Following the Venezuelen model, 
we agree with those critics who believe the CPCs may be the 
first step in a process to reform the Constitution to enable 
Ortega to remain in power at the end of his 5-year term in 
office. 
 
¶28.  (C) It appears the National Assembly may fail to unite 
to stop the CPCs.  If so, the threat to democracy posed by 
the CPCs will depend on Ortega's ability to channel formal 
and informal programs, like Zero Hunger, through them.  If 
CPCs evolve into a "one-stop shop" for government services, 
regulating access to the array of State-provided goods and 
services, they are likely to become a powerful 
anti-democratic force.  Right now, we are faced with the 
frightening reality that the fate of Ortega's CPC project 
lies with a few votes in the National Assembly, votes that 
Arnoldo Aleman firmly controls. 
TRIVELLI