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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 001921 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: MOMENT OF TRUTH FOR THE PLC 
 
REF: MANAGUA 1880 
 
Classified By: Amb. Paul Trivelli, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Nicaragua's Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) stands 
at a pivotal juncture.  An upcoming vote (date TBD) on the 
issue of Citizens' Councils in the National Assembly will 
auger whether former President and convicted felon Arnoldo 
Aleman's power over the party is waning.  At stake too are 
the prospects for a strategic alliance between the liberal 
parties in Nicaragua.  Post believes that Aleman continues to 
hold sway over PLC fortunes, and if the PLC backs down on the 
issue of the Citizens' Councils, this fear will be confirmed. 
 We also discount rumors that a new leader will emerge in the 
PLC to take Aleman's place and worry that none of the mooted 
PLC challengers has what it takes to be a capable and honest 
leader.  End Summary. 
 
Which PLC Thug do You Prefer? 
----------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The hottest political question in Nicaragua at the 
moment is whether the two major liberal parties -- the PLC 
and Nicaragua's Liberal Alliance (ALN) -- can work together 
in opposition to thwart President Daniel Ortega's efforts to 
consolidate his power.  The main objective of this strategic 
alliance would be to win the November 2008 Municipal 
elections.  Most political commentators agree that only a 
united liberal opposition can defeat the Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) and claim a majority of the country's 
mayors' offices. 
 
¶3.  (C) Of course, behind all the talk about opposition 
liberal cohesion is the big question:  just how much control 
does Arnoldo Aleman continue to exert over the PLC?  Eduardo 
Montealegre and other ALN leaders have made clear to us that 
they won't work with Aleman or a PLC that is intent on 
perpetuating the Aleman-Ortega power-sharing and corruption 
Pacto.  "The ALN is founded on opposition to the Pacto," 
argues ALN Chief Financial Officer and strategist Kitty 
Monterrey, and ALN's supporters would not countenance an 
alliance with Aleman. 
 
¶4.  (C) Rumors of leadership challenges and internal splits 
within the PLC abound, and pundits tout Enrique Quinonez, PLC 
bancada leader Maximino Rodriguez, and Wilfredo Navarez as 
the strongest candidates for new PLC leadership.  All three 
have been quick to publicly dismiss these conjectures; 
however, in private, Quinonez has gone so far as to ask for 
U.S. support in developing his own power base.  "Don't worry 
about Aleman," Quinonez told us, "because his power will fade 
with time."  In private conversations with poloffs, Rodriguez 
and Navarez have been more cautious, but all three evidently 
are intent on maintaining and improving their positions 
within the PLC. 
 
Citizens' Councils are Central Issue 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) The coming weeks of legislative maneuvering in the 
National Assembly will be indicative as to the future 
direction of the PLC, Aleman's continued sway, and the 
prospects for a strategic alliance between the PLC and ALN. 
Especially telling will be the effort underway in the 
National Assembly to amend the statutory basis for the 
creation of Citizens' Councils.  The Citizens' Councils 
(CPCs; Consejos del Poder Ciudadano) are widely acknowledged 
as a tool by which Ortega and his wife Rosario Murillo plan 
to strengthen their personal control over the FSLN and usurp 
the power of official state institutions at every level of 
government (septel). 
 
¶6.  (C) Anger over the CPCs has been an internal rallying 
point for those PLC members who feel that their 
anti-Sandinista identity has been undermined by the 
Ortega-Aleman Pacto.  PLC mayors in particular have been 
vocal in their opposition to the CPCs, which they believe 
will directly threaten their authority and budgets.  The July 
2007 PLC Party Congress was very clear in its final 
conclusion document that opposing the CPCs was a central 
 
MANAGUA 00001921  002 OF 003 
 
 
objective of the party. 
 
¶7.  (C) Three opposition parties -- the PLC, the ALN and the 
Movimiento Revolutionario Sandinista (MRS) -- have tabled 
legislative amendments that would remove from the Ley 290 the 
enabling language for the CPCs and would clearly define 
ministerial responsibilities with respect to advisory citizen 
groups.  National Assembly Deputy Carlos Noguera, drafter of 
the PLC's Ley 290 amendment, explained to us on August 8 that 
the various amendments would be reconciled by the Assembly's 
Judicial Committee.  He also assured us that, because the PLC 
and ALN have a majority of the votes on the Committee, the 
Committee will endorse legislative changes to remove the word 
"consejos" from the statute book. 
 
Is "El Gordo's" Grip Weakening? 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Various PLC leaders -- including Rodriguez and 
Noguera -- have told us in separate meetings over the past 
few weeks that there was no way that the PLC could back down 
on the CPC issue.  They argue that, when the issue returns to 
the full Assembly (sometime this fall, unless Pacto 
legislative shenanigans stop it), no PLC Deputy would dare to 
anger the PLC political base by siding with the Sandinistas 
on CPCs.  "It would be political suicide," Rodriguez opined. 
 
¶9.  (C) But other PLC leaders are hedging.  Both Quinonez and 
Navarez argue that there is no guarantee as to how Aleman's 
marionettes will vote.  Since, according to Quinonez and 
Navarez, Aleman can directly pull the strings of 7 or 8 
Deputies, the final vote tally may be very close.  To many 
observers, therefore, the CPC issue presents the PLC with a 
moment of truth, a critical juncture in which the party will 
show whether Aleman remains the PLC's decisive voice. 
 
¶10.  (C) The CPC issue is also important as a possible lever 
to promote wider collaboration between the Nicaragua's 
opposition parties.  As recently as August 6, Nicaragua's 
Liberal Alliance (ALN) party leader Eduardo Montealegre told 
the Ambassador (reftel) that working with the PLC on stopping 
the CPCs was the best chance for promoting down-stream 
cooperation.  Even though Montealegre doubted the sincerity 
of prominent PLC members' statements in favor of a common 
legislative agenda, he indicated to us his belief that 
fighting the CPCs was an issue around which the liberal 
parties could unite. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) We agree with those, including Montealegre, who see 
the CPC issue as an obvious focus for liberal unity.  Any PLC 
backtracking on its stated intention to fight the CPCs will 
demonstrate that Aleman continues to be firmly in charge of 
the party and will deal a serious blow to those Nicaraguans 
who hope to promote a strategic alliance between the ALN and 
PLC.  PLC supporters express a genuine desire to fight the 
Sandinistas over the CPCs.  However, we discount the 
suggestions that Aleman's grip on the PLC is weakening; he 
will use all the resources at his disposal to protect his 
Pacto with the FSLN, even if this means quashing the PLC's 
rank-and-file wishes on the CPCs.  After all, Aleman's 
strength is not rooted in the party base any longer.  His 
power stems from his control of Supreme Court Judges, 
Electoral Council Magistrates, the Comptroller General and 
the Prosecutor General, i.e., an array of government offices 
that can make the lives of any political opponent miserable 
indeed.  Aleman's grip on these levers is not about to loosen 
any time soon. 
 
¶12.  (C) For this reason, we believe that if there is a vote 
in the National Assembly on the Ley 290, this vote will prove 
to be an existential moment for the PLC.  If PLC politicians 
can't break away from Aleman to fight the creation of the 
CPCs -- new FSLN-controlled bodies that are likely to 
directly threaten the authority of democratic institutions -- 
how will they muster the gumption to break with Aleman and 
forge a strategic alliance with the ALN? 
 
¶13.  (C) This Embassy will continue to promote the 
development of democratic institutions in Nicaragua and 
encourage the evolution towards a political system devoid of 
 
MANAGUA 00001921  003 OF 003 
 
 
corruption.  However, we discount rumors over internal PLC 
splits, and various leader-in-waiting scenarios, as little 
more than dubious conjecture and chatter from within the 
political class.  Perhaps even more distressing is the fact 
that, even if Aleman's power is waning, we see few promising 
candidates for effective and honest leadership in the current 
crop of PLC hopefuls, who look more like actors from central 
casting for the Sopranos than future national leaders.  End 
Comment. 
TRIVELLI