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INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL//J2/J3/J5// PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 001880 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR KDEM NU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S AUGUST 6 MEETING WITH EDUARDO 
MONTEALEGRE 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) The Ambassador met with Eduardo Montealegre leader of 
Nicaragua's Liberal Alliance (ALN) at Montealegre,s request 
on August 6.  Montealegre expressed his doubts about the 
possibilities of forming a strategic liberal alliance with 
Liberal Constitutional Party of Nicaragua (PLC) before the 
2008 municipal elections.  He suggested that the best way 
forward was to work with the PLC one issue at a time.  First 
and foremost, on Montealegre's list is working with the PLC 
to fight the Ortega government's efforts to establish 
Citizens, Councils (CPCs - Consejos del Poder Ciudadano). 
Montealegre complained about the lack of financial resources 
to support democratic change in Nicaragua, and openly 
wondered how much longer he should continue to invest 
personally in the party.  That said, he did not categorically 
dismiss the possibility that he might stand as a candidate 
for the mayoral job in Managua.  End Summary. 
 
A Strategic Alliance with the PLC? 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Montealegre suggested that reaching a common 
legislative agenda with the PLC is going to be very hard. 
Aleman is clearly not interested, in Montealegre's opinion. 
Montealegre discounted the supposed willingness voiced by 
certain PLC leaders, for example Maximino Rodriguez or 
Enrique Quinonez, to work with the ALN.  Montealegre also 
doubts the power of lower level PLC politicians -- for 
example PLC mayors -- to effect change, since most of them 
are none too clean themselves, and Aleman can use his control 
of the Comptroller's Office to put pressure on them. 
 
¶3.  (C) Furthermore, Montealegre opined that in his view 
there was no goodwill in the PLC to work on a strategic 
liberal alliance with the ALN.  Montealegre told the 
Ambassador that the PLC thus far has shown no interest in 
discussing the nitty-gritty details of a common legislative 
agenda.  Therefore, Montealegre believes that the only way to 
move forward in developing liberal unity in Nicaragua is to 
work with the PLC on one specific issue at a time.  The first 
such issue needs to be fighting the Ortega government's 
efforts to establish Consejos del Poder Ciudadano. 
 
¶4.  (C) Montealegre also doubts that it will be easy to 
create a common slate of candidates for the municipal 
elections next year.  A full blown primary would be difficult 
to organize, expensive, and not necessary.  The ALN and PLC 
are evenly matched in only about 27 municipalities, and in 
the others municipalities it should be easy to decide which 
party should take the lead.  Montealegre argued that the ALN 
and PLC would do better to follow the Mexican PRI example of 
internal weighted polls to pick common candidates in those 
municipalities where neither party enjoys a significant 
advantage. 
 
Threats to Nicaraguan Democracy 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) The CPCs pose a real threat to democracy, according 
to Montealegre.  Rosario Murillo is seeking to use these 
Consejos first and foremost to secure control over the FSLN; 
but clearly the larger intent is to use the CPCs to 
circumvent municipal authorities.  Even if the Assembly gets 
rid of the Ley 290, Ortega/Murillo will continue to develop 
the Consejos as overtly partisan organizations.  Montealegre 
discounts that Ortega is primarily seeking to establish the 
CPC,s in order to offset a possible loss of Presidential 
power if the Ley Marco is repealed.  According to 
Montealegre, Ortega does not have much to fear if the Ley 
Marco is set aside; unlike President Bolanos who controlled 
only 5 Assembly votes, Ortega, with his 47 votes, will lose 
little power if the withdrawal of the Ley Marco comes to pass. 
 
¶6.  (C) Montealegre told us that the Assembly leadership's 
decision to move the Bolanos Davis case to the Supreme Court 
embodied a deal between Aleman and the FSLN to protect Aleman 
from an Assembly vote that could have gone against him, 
highlighting divisions within the PLC.  Moving the case to 
the Supreme Court puts the Bolanos Davis case squarely in the 
hands of the Pacto.  Having circumvented the will of the 
Assembly on this case, by referring it to the Court, the 
Pacto may try to utilize the same tactic for other issues. 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Continued funding for the democratic forces in 
Nicaragua is a real challenge, Montealegre told the 
Ambassador.  He argues that he's not talking about a lot of 
money - $100k a month is all that is needed - but if young 
entrepreneurs and others with a stake in protecting 
Nicaraguan democracy are not willing to contribute to the 
effort, he wonders how long he personally should continue to 
do so.  Montealegre also fears that the Sandinistas will try 
to attack his assets, and so he has transferred much of his 
wealth to his wife.  "I'd rather be ripped-off by my wife 
than by the FSLN," he joked.  The private sector has not yet 
reacted to Ortega's politics because, so far, Ortega has not 
threatened them.  The private sector would only react, 
Montealegre opined, as they did during the Somoza regime, 
when Ortega begins to directly to compete with them and 
impinge on their profit making. 
 
¶8.  (C) Montealegre also voiced his concerns about the recent 
suicide of the wife of the Director of the Central Bank.  The 
Central Bank Director has been one of the few rallying points 
for economic pragmatism, and Montealegre feared what the 
effect of this tragedy will be.  If there was no foul play, 
the man will likely be devastated and distracted for some 
time.  If there was foul play, and the Pacto has connived to 
cover it up, then the Pacto will now own the Central Bank too. 
 
Mr. Mayor? 
---------- 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador asked whether rumors are true that 
Montealegre is thinking about standing as the mayoral 
candidate in Managua in the municipal elections next year. 
Montealegre said that he had not yet made this difficult 
decision.  On one hand, the mayor's job is an important 
political platform in Nicaragua, especially since 25 percent 
of the nation's voters live in Managua.  On the other hand, 
if he won, the pressures of the job would distract him from 
other political work, and there is a strong possibility that 
the Pacto would intentionally obstruct all of his efforts in 
order to discredit his leadership.  Montealegre also fears 
that the PLC is pushing the Managua candidacy on him with the 
full intent to double cross him:  Aleman would name a deputy 
mayoral candidate and them right before the elections would 
reinvigorate the CENI accusations, seeking to discredit 
Montealegre, forcing him to renounce his candidacy, and thus 
allowing the PLC deputy mayoral candidate to move up into the 
lead slot. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Montealegre has not yet lost the political bug, and 
has not decided against running for Mayor of Managua next 
year.  However, his financial fatigue of supporting the ALN 
is almost surely genuine. 
 
¶11.  (C) Comment continued.  We agree with Montealegre that 
the fight in the Assembly over the Consejos del Poder 
Ciudadano will be a critical.  If the PLC and ALN can 
successfully work together to fight the Ortega government on 
this issue, the prospects for a strategic liberal alliance 
before the November 2008 elections will be strengthened.  If 
the PLC and ALN can not hold together in an effort to change 
the Ley 290 and remove the enabling language for the CPCs, it 
is hard to imagine how they could form a wider alliance to 
defeat the FSLN in the municipal elections. 
TRIVELLI