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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1368, AMIS CEASEFIRE COMMISSION STILL HAMPERED BY SLA/MM

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1368 2007-08-30 14:32 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO4546
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1368/01 2421432
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301432Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8350
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001368 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT:  AMIS CEASEFIRE COMMISSION STILL HAMPERED BY SLA/MM 
NO-SHOWS OVER MSA, LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE DONE 
 
REF: Khartoum 1289 
 
Sontag/Small/Goosey Email 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Although the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Minawi 
representatives attended the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) meetings at 
the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) headquarters in El Fasher, 
the majority of their representatives in the sectors stayed off the 
job, despite instructions to return to work.  Although much of the 
discussions in both chambers was spent bickering over the monthly 
subsistence allowance (MSA), the report on the Labado incident was 
adopted and the CFC members the Kalma IDP Camp incursion.  S/CRS 
Fieldoffs again stressed to the SLA/Minawi head representative that 
the no-shows in the face of Minawi's promise that they would return 
reflects negatively on movement.  End summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
WHO'S IN CHARGE OF THE NO-SHOWS? 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Despite Minni Minawi's pledge that his representatives 
would participate in AMIS CFC and patrolling activities, the vast 
majority of the SLA/Minawi representatives did not show up for work 
this week.  The SLA/Minawi representatives in El Fasher attended, 
along with a few in one of the eight sectors.  In addition to 
Minawi's promise that they would return to work, the senior CFC 
representative had also issued a directive to the other 
representatives to return to work (Ref A).  However, some field 
representatives responded to AMIS that they only follow orders from 
SLA/Minawi General Commander Jumah Hagar, not from their senior CFC 
representative.  One field representative said his local commander 
had directed him not to resume his duties before August 31, when he 
expected the MSA issue to be resolved. 
 
3. (SBU) S/CRS Fieldoffs met with the senior SLA/Minawi CFC 
representative, Adam Ali War, several times in the past week to 
encourage him to get the other representatives back to work.  S/CRS 
Fieldoffs pointed out two key negative consequences for SLA/Minawi 
as a result of the continuing no-show:  It raises doubts as to how 
much control Minawi has over his own people and portrays the 
representatives as more interested in money than in the work of the 
CFC. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
HAVE AN MSA CONFERENCE, AND PUT IT TO BED 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) S/CRS Fieldoffs also encouraged Ali War to have Minawi 
follow through on his proposal to have a conference with AMIS, the 
MSA donors, and SLA/Minawi to clear the air about the MSA reduction. 
 A conference might emphasize that the MSA is an allowance, not a 
salary; that it will stay reduced until December; and that it will 
stop when the UN takes over.  A conference might put the issue to 
rest, as well as demonstrate (as most CFC members and observers have 
been saying all along) that the MSA reduction is a political issue 
that should not be discussed in the CFC forum. 
 
------------------ 
RELATED COMPLAINTS 
------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) The SLA/Minawi representatives also complained about a lack 
of communication and transportation support, although the Chairman 
reminded them that AMIS itself is lacking such resources.  The 
non-signatory factions (NSF) in the Second Chamber made similar 
complaints (Note: In addition, they also complained about no longer 
being provided with water by PA&E.  Ref B.  We were also asked for 
help with tents and mattresses.  End Note.). 
 
----------------------- 
SUBSTANTIVE CFC MATTERS 
----------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) The First Chamber voted to forward a report to the Joint 
Commission on the Um Zeifa Road Traffic Accident (RTA) that occurred 
near Labado, South Darfur in May.  In that unfortunate incident, a 
negligent AMIS APC driver collided with an SLA/Minawi vehicle, 
killing its driver.  The SLA/Minawi members then shot and wounded 
several AMIS troop, and seized thirteen vehicles and several 
weapons.  The report found that the AMIS driver was negligent and 
AMIS should pay compensation but that the SLA/Minawi troops then 
violated ceasefire rules. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001368  002 OF 002 
 
 
7. (SBU) On the evening of August 20, the Sudanese Government raided 
the Kalma IDP Camp in South Darfur, allegedly searching for the 
perpetrators of an attack on a police station the previous week in 
which one Sudanese officer was killed.  The police claim they 
arrested 19 persons and seized five weapons from the camp.  Several 
rebel leaders have condemned the raid on the IDP camp in the press, 
and it was raised at the CFC as well.  The Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) representative blamed both the Government and 
SLA/Minawi, claiming the only armed people in the IDP camp were 
Janjaweed collaborators and that the Government was trying to close 
down or drive IDPs away from the camp.  He also hoped for the CFC to 
visit the camp, and, surprisingly, said that AMIS should take over 
more IDP camp security.  The Chairman responded that the Sector 
Commander would look into the matter. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8. (SBU) The continued absence of the SLA/Minawi representatives in 
the field is still a problem.  A meeting among SLA/Minawi, the 
donors, and AMIS about the MSA could at least put that particular 
issue to rest.  However, the continued absence, despite Minawi and 
the SLA/Minawi senior representative's directives, highlight the 
limits of Minawi's control over his own faction, as well as an 
unclear chain of command within the movement.  End comment. 
 
FERNANDEZ