VZCZCXRO8075
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1337/01 2351344
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 231344Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8304
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0217
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001337 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU SU LY ER CD CH
SUBJECT: DARFUR: USG CAN SET THE STAGE FOR SUCCESSFUL UN/AU 
PROCESS 
 
REF: A. KHARTOUM 00208 
 
     ¶B. KHARTOUM 01043 
     ¶C. KHARTOUM 01006 
     ¶D. KHARTOUM 01230 
     ¶E. KHARTOUM 01190 
     ¶F. KHARTOUM 01181 
     ¶G. KHARTOUM 01172 
     ¶H. KHARTOUM 01187 
 
KHARTOUM 00001337  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The United Nations and African Union have developed 
a timetable for the Darfur political process that culminates 
in negotiations between the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
non-signatories and the Sudanese Government in early October. 
 However, unrealistic expectations of the outcome of these 
negotiations, enduring rivalries within the fractured rebel 
movements, and inadequate representation of the movements' 
armed wings in the peace process risk derailing the talks. 
UN and AU officials in Khartoum emphasize that the focus of 
the negotiations should be on addressing the reasonable 
grievances of the DPA non-signatories and brokering an 
agreement that will address the most pressing issue affecting 
Darfur: security.  While the negotiations are unlikely to 
lead to a definitive resolution of the Darfur conflict, an 
agreement that accounts for the core grievances of the DPA 
non-signatories and leads to a sustainable cessation of 
hostilities--guaranteed by the deployment of the UN/AU hybrid 
peacekeeping force--would pave the way for reconciliation in 
the long-term.  See para. 11 for specific actions that the 
USG can take to shore up the UN/AU peace process and lay the 
foundation for a successful outcome from the negotiations. 
End summary. 
 
--------------------- 
UN/AU's Fall Timeline 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) UN and AU officials have outlined a plan for the 
Darfur peace process for August and September, culminating in 
the start of negotiations in early October.  For the 
remainder of August, the UN/AU will concentrate on finalizing 
a date and venue for the talks.  After UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki Moon and AU Chairman Alpha Omar Konare issue the 
invitations in early September, the UN/AU will begin to 
"shuttle" between the Darfur rebel factions and the Sudanese 
government to narrow positions on the key issues outlined in 
the Arusha communique (power sharing, wealth sharing, 
security arrangements, land, and humanitarian issues). 
Simultaneously, the UN and AU will develop a precise agenda 
for the negotiations, define a timeframe to underscore the 
talks will not be open-ended, and articulate precise roles 
for the international community and regional governments 
(Chad, Libya, and Eritrea) in the negotiations. 
 
------------------------- 
Fractured Rebel Movements 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Without an initial effort, led by the UN and AU, to 
consolidate some of the rebel factions and improve internal 
communication between the political leaders and the military 
commanders in the field, it is difficult to see how the UN 
and AU will facilitate a common negotiating platform among 
the rebels during September's "shuttle diplomacy" 
phase--particularly among the armed factions that effect the 
security situation.  Since early 2006, reports from Darfur 
indicate that the commanders of the armed movements--who, 
with the exception of the Sudanese government, have the 
greatest direct influence on the security environment in 
Darfur--are frustrated with the region's political leaders 
(Ref. A).  Since May, the USG has advocated for an effort to 
bring more cohesion among the rebel factions as a 
precondition for successful negotiations.  Participants at an 
AU-sponsored conference in late June--which included 
representatives from the National Congress Party (NCP), the 
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM), the AU, the UN, the U.S., the UK, 
the Netherlands, and Canada--reiterated the necessity of 
repairing the breech between the political and military wings 
of the rebel movements (Ref. B).  Until recently, Pekka 
 
KHARTOUM 00001337  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
Haavisto, the Senior Advisor to UN Special Envoy Jan 
Eliasson, and Sam Ibok, AU co-chair of the Joint Mediation 
Support Team (JMST), identified the rift between the rebels' 
political leadership and the commanders in the field as an 
immediate priority (Ref. C). 
 
¶4. (SBU) During an August 19 briefing for Western diplomats 
in Khartoum, Haavisto acknowledged rebel leaders contend that 
October negotiations are unfeasible and that they need time 
(and assistance) to foster unity and better internal 
organization within the movements.  Reversing his previous 
stance, however, Haavisto said that "we should not give them 
the luxury of time--they should come (to the negotiations) as 
they are."  By contrast, former SLM humanitarian coordinator 
Suleiman Jamous, a respected and unifying figure for many of 
the rebel factions, warned in a recent media interview that a 
lack of organization within the movements prior to 
negotiations could lead to further factionalism.  "It is 
better to work towards unity for the SLA at least before 
ending the peace talks with any sort of agreement," Jamous 
told Reuters in late July. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Rift Hinders Development of Negotiating Platform 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5. (SBU) During an August 7 briefing in Khartoum, Eliasson 
applauded the collegiality of the various factions throughout 
the Arusha discussions (Ref. D): "They are all cousins and 
schoolmates and were all one group comfortable together."  UN 
and AU officials in Khartoum admit, however, that the 
discussions were general and that the commanders around 
Abdullah Yehia--the only formidable armed faction 
represented--did not participate, in protest of Jamous' 
continued detention.  First-hand accounts of the Arusha 
meeting indicate that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA) led by Ahmed 
Ibrahim Diraige largely drove the agenda, with mixed buy-in 
from participants like Abdullah Yehia--who commands the 
largest, best-armed faction in Darfur.  While JEM and the 
SFDA remain the most sophisticated and well-prepared among 
the factions, it is less clear that they can change the 
security dynamic on the ground.  While Yehia and others may 
accede to general principles, such as those presented in the 
Arusha communique, such acquiescence will not be sustainable 
in the long-term without addressing the fundamental 
structural problems between the political and military wings 
of the movements.  Recent reports, corroborated by Ibok, 
indicate that even the traditionally cohesive JEM is on the 
verge of splintering.  Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda--who led the 
JEM delegation at Arusha--is now threatening to split from 
JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim and join a powerful JEM commander 
to form a new movement. 
 
¶6. (SBU) While a positive first step, Ibok (please strictly 
protect) acknowledged in an August 21 conversation with 
Poloff that the most contentious issues were not included in 
the Arusha communique: self-determination and autonomy for 
Darfur outside the timeline set by the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) and retention of forces rather than 
re-integration into the national military.  According to 
Ibok, the movements do not consider Darfur as bound by the 
CPA or the National Interim Constitution and have little 
understanding that the end state of the current negotiations 
are only valid until 2009.  In addition, persisting rivalries 
among the rebels will cripple discussions on power sharing. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
IDPs, Civil Society Share Goal of Security 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) The UN and AU continue to seek to involve civil 
society and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the 
negotiating process.  A common theme among these groups is 
the need for stability and freedom of movement (Ref. E).  Yet 
the situation on the ground remains complex, and the 
discussion lacks any comprehensive analysis.  Because IDPs 
perceive many traditional leaders as ineffectual, NGOs in the 
camps have organized groups of "new sheikhs" to coordinate 
assistance and provide organization (Ref. F), making it 
difficult to determine who represents which constituency. 
The Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) has 
completed a first round of consultations with IDPs in Darfur; 
 
KHARTOUM 00001337  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
the preliminary findings are being used to inform the UN/AU 
strategy for the negotiating process.  UN civil affairs 
efforts to produce "IDP profiles" also remain preliminary 
(Ref. F).  While many Darfur watchers note the absence of 
independent civil society organizations in the region, 
initiatives to involve civil society in a peace process 
abound, with little linkage to political developments at the 
national and international level (Ref. G).  During interviews 
with Emboff in late July, IDPs listed security, individual 
compensation, and reconstruction and development as their 
priorities, in descending order of importance (Ref. F).  In 
recent conversations with Poloff, both a senior AU official 
and a mid-level UN official in Khartoum underscored that the 
upcoming negotiations must focus on improving the security 
environment, which would then lay the foundation for 
addressing IDPs and civil society's other concerns. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Abdulwahid's Continued Obstruction 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) SLM leader Abdulwahid al Nur has been adept at 
capitalizing on the complex sentiments of the IDP camps.  In 
discussions with the UN and AU, Abdulwahid has proposed a 
series of meetings of his SLM faction that conflict with the 
UN/AU timeline.  According to a UN official in El Fasher, 
Abdulwahid is "bargaining with the misery of the IDPs" (Ref. 
H).  His support, however, may be more tenuous than is 
generally perceived.  During his mid-August visit to Sudan, 
Eliasson traveled to several IDP camps to highlight the 
consequences of Abdulwahid's continued absence from the UN/AU 
political process.  "Eliasson told them that if Abdulwahid is 
not at the talks, the camps' voices will not be heard," Ibok 
told Poloff on August 21.  According to a UN official, a 
panicked Abdulwahid called Eliasson a day after his visit to 
the camps and for the first time expressed an interest in 
participating in a UN/AU-sponsored meeting.  He later 
rescinded this offer, and the UN/AU plan to continue attemps 
to cut into Abdulwahid's base.  During his August 21-29 visit 
to Sudan, AU Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim plans to visit 
Zalingei, the locus of Abdulwahid' support, and deliver a 
message similar to Eliasson's.  The UN and AU have also 
encouraged Diraige and SLM faction leader Ahmed Abdulshafie 
to conduct their own outreach in the camps. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The UN/AU continue to call on the international 
community to "turn up" the pressure on Abdulwahid, a request 
they have made for several months without proposing specific 
actions (Ref. C).  However, on August 18, a senior AU 
official provided Poloff with the most strident call yet: If 
Abdulwahid does not indicate his intention to attend the 
October negotiations, France should "kick him out," and he 
should not be allowed to seek refuge elsewhere in Europe. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Effective Contact Group Essential 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) While the UN and AU continue to consult the 
international community on the road ahead, foreign 
governments' most important role will be in exerting leverage 
on the parties to compromise once negotiations begin, 
according to representatives from both organizations.  Recent 
discussions with UN and AU officials in Khartoum underscore 
the necessity of an effective contact group that can target 
pressure on both the rebels and the Sudanese government to 
forge a peace agreement.  While the "Tripoli Format" (Chad, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, China, France, Russia, UK, U.S., 
Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, EU, and the Arab League) 
remains too unwieldy to be effective, a sub-group composed of 
members with leverage on the rebels, the Sudanese government, 
and regional actors could support the UN/AU mediators and 
back-brief the larger group throughout the negotiations.  The 
UN and AU concede that Chad, Libya, and Eritrea will play an 
influential role in the negotiating process.  A senior AU 
official suggested, however, that a contact group composed of 
the U.S., EU, France, and China might balance this influence. 
 The U.S. is seen by most rebel groups and much of the 
international community as the guarantor of a final agreement 
(Ref. B), while the EU and France could exert necessary 
leverage on regional actors and rebel leaders with ties to 
Europe, such as Abdulwahid.  Given Beijing's oft-repeated 
emphasis on a political process to complement the UN/AU 
 
KHARTOUM 00001337  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
hybrid, China could be a moderating influence on the Sudanese 
government.  The senior AU official underlined the importance 
of U.S. leadership in forming such a contact group, noting 
the helpful role that S/E Natsios played during the Tripoli 
II summit in rallying countries behind the UN and AU. 
 
------------------------------------- 
USG Support for the Political Process 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The USG can take several specific actions in the 
near future to shore-up the UN/AU peace process and lay the 
strongest foundation possible for the negotiations: 
 
-- Publicly outline realistic expectations for the outcome of 
the negotiations.  A U.S. statement--preferably with the 
explicit backing of several international partners--should 
call for an agreement that addresses the reasonable 
grievances of the DPA non-signatories and includes a 
cessation of hostilities.  In conjunction with the deployment 
of an effective UN/AU hybrid peace-keeping force, such an 
agreement would pave the way for a stable Darfur and provide 
an enabling environment for reconciliation, reconstruction, 
and development. 
 
-- Make a declaration of support for the CPA and its interim 
arrangements, with explicit reference to their relevance for 
Darfur.  Such a declaration would highlight our view that the 
CPA is the way forward for the whole of Sudan and would 
strengthen the UN/AU's hand with the rebel groups. 
 
-- Encourage the UN and AU to develop a strategy for 
repairing the rift between the political and military 
elements of the rebel movements.  Underscore that the 
development of rebel negotiating positions--including the 
input of armed factions with direct influence on the security 
environment--is predicated on greater cohesion and 
organization within the rebel factions. 
 
-- In consultation with the UN, AU, and European partners, 
develop a set of triggers for action against rebel groups 
that obstruct the peace process.  While the UN/AU have called 
for triggers in the past (Ref. C), we must bring specificity 
to this threat in order to make it credible.  The most 
obvious benchmark would be participation in the October 
negotiations. 
 
-- Build support among the governments of the "Tripoli 
Format" for an effective sub-group to target leverage on the 
rebel movements, the Sudanese government, and the regional 
actors during the negotiations and to monitor the 
implementation of the agreement. 
 
¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
POWERS