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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1289, INAUSPICIOUS RESUMPTION OF AMIS CEASEFIRE COMMISSION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1289 2007-08-17 10:13 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2933
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1289/01 2291013
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 171013Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8227
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001289 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU
 
SUBJECT:  INAUSPICIOUS RESUMPTION OF AMIS CEASEFIRE    COMMISSION 
ACTIVITIES 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) After a nearly three week hiatus of Ceasefire Commission 
(CFC) meetings, proceedings in the First Chamber were dominated by 
continued SLA-Minawi protests regarding cuts in Monthly Subsistence 
Allowance (MSA).  The rebel reps walked out of the CFC before its 
conclusion.  There was no discussion of substantive ceasefire 
violations or CFC security-related tasks, such as janjaweed 
disarmament oversight.  The Deputy Force Commander (DFC) provided 
CFC participants a back brief of his meeting earlier in the week 
with Minni Minawi.  AMIS cancelled the second set of CFC meetings on 
account of a VIP visit; non-signatory reps did not show up for CFC 
Second Chamber meetings. 
 
------------------- 
MINAWI STRIKE ENDS? 
------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Despite Minni Minawi's pledge that his representatives 
would participate in AMIS CFC and patrolling activities, his two El 
Fasher CFC reps immediately disrupted First Chamber discussions by 
launching into a tirade about the disparity between AMIS military 
observers (Milobs) and signatory representatives.  The core of their 
disgruntlement remains the reduction in their MSA.  Having said 
their piece, the SLA-Minawi reps walked out of the meeting before 
its conclusion. 
 
3. (SBU) Before the rebel reps departed, however, the UN CFC 
representative clarified that as of January 1, the UN will not pay 
MSA.  S/CRS Field Officers reiterated that point privately with 
SLA-Minawi reps in subsequent meetings. 
 
4. (SBU) Nearly a week following Minawi's statement that his forces 
would resume their duties, AMIS Operations noted that only a few 
rebel representatives had returned to their posts in sectors; AMIS 
also indicated it expected joint patrols to begin again next week. 
(Note: In a separate meeting with S/CRS Field Officers, SLA-Minawi 
CFC representative Adam Ali War presented an official letter 
declaring that all faction reps would return to their "duty 
stations" and that the issue of MSA would be raised only at 
"appropriate levels."  End Note.) 
 
---------------------------------------- 
MINAWI SEEKS TO MEND RELATIONS WITH AMIS 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) AMIS Deputy Force Commander Rurangwa, who chaired the 
meeting in Force Commander Agwai's absence, backbriefed CFC 
participants on his August 8 meeting with Minni Minawi (AMIS minutes 
sent by email to Post).  The DFC highlighted four main points. 
First, Minawi's agreement that MSA is a political issue and should 
no longer be discussed at the CFC.  Second, Minawi offered to give 
feedback to the DFC on whether and when his reps would collect their 
MSA for March and April (the first two months at the new, reduced 
rate).  Third, Minawi assured AMIS that his faction posed no threat 
to AMIS, contrary to statements made by some of his commanders in 
early August.  Fourth, Minawi informed AMIS that he instructed his 
commander in Labado to return AMIS' 13 vehicles confiscated on 30 
May, though no specifics of how or when were mentioned.  (Note: In 
August 16 discussions with the SLA-Minawi CFC rep, he speculated to 
S/CRS Field Officers that the field commander ultimately responsible 
for turning over the Labado vehicles, Jumah Hagar, would be unlikely 
to do so given that his forces have been fighting Arab militia units 
and needed the additional trucks.  End Note.) 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6. (SBU) Despite numerous armed clashes over the past month 
throughout Darfur, no specific cases were addressed.  Additionally, 
no Declaration of Commitment (JEM-PW or SLA-Free Will) factions 
participated, further underlining the recent difficulties of the 
CFC.  S/CRS Field Officers will encourage the new Force Commander, 
upon his return to El Fasher, to strengthen the mechanism and 
enhance its credibility. 
 
7. (SBU) The issue of MSA will continue to be a thorn in the side of 
AMIS, negatively impacting both ceasefire investigations and 
patrolling activities.  Several SLA-Minawi reps have conveyed to 
S/CRS Field Officers that they do not believe AMIS when it says that 
MSA reductions were mandated by donors (and the AU has never 
provided written records to that effect, despite numerous requests 
from both signatories and international observers). 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001289  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
POWERS