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Viewing cable 07KABUL2684, PRESIDENT KARZAI MOVES SUB-NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL2684 2007-08-13 04:33 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO8322
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2684/01 2250433
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 130433Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9667
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 002684 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT 
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KARZAI MOVES SUB-NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION 
FROM MOI TO NEW INDEPENDENT OFFICE 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) President Karzai has decided to move the Ministry of 
Interior's civil administration division -- responsible for 
governors, district administrators, mayors, and civil 
registry functions -- to a new Independent Office for 
Sub-National Governance under the Office of the President. 
This welcome reform removes the police-dominated MOI as an 
extra layer between the Presidency and sub-national 
officials, giving Karzai direct oversight over -- and 
accountability for -- governors and provincial councils and 
is designed to help unify policies and reform efforts at the 
provincial level, increase central government outreach to the 
provinces, encourage better coordination among sub-national 
officials, and increase accountability.  The success of the 
effort depends on strong leadership of the new Office.  An 
announcement is pending on who will hold the post.  The 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) will remain with the 
MRRD.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION MOVES FROM MOI TO THE PALACE 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
2. (SBU) President Karzai decided at a minister-level meeting 
on July 21 to move the Ministry of Interior's civil 
administration division -- i.e. oversight of governors, 
district administrators, and mayors, as well as civil 
registry functions -- to a new Independent Office for 
Sub-National Governance under the Office of the President. 
The MOI will focus exclusively on police (and 
counter-narcotics), with no role in sub-national civil 
administration.  According to UNAMA, President Karzai tasked 
a group of advisors to prepare the staffing pattern for the 
new Independent Office and an implementation plan for 
approval at the next cabinet meeting after the Peace Jirga, 
to be followed by a decree formalizing the change. 
 
3. (SBU) MOI Deputy Minister for Civil Administration Abdul 
Malik Sediqi told Pol Counselor that the new Independent 
Office will have the same status as other IRoA independent 
commissions, including the Civil Service Commission or Human 
Rights Commission.  It will be led by a minister-level 
official who will report directly to the President (but, as 
part of the Palace, will not require parliamentary review) 
and two deputies for management and policy.  Sediqi claimed 
the reform had been his idea and indicated he hoped to be 
named as head of the new office.  (Note: Faruk Wardak, DG for 
the Office of Administrative 
Affairs in the Palace has shared with us that, while the 
President has confidence in Sediqi as an administrator, he 
will not be asked to lead the office.  End Note) 
 
4. (SBU) The scope of the change is enormous.  Eighty percent 
of the MOI Civil Administration Division's 10,000 employees 
working across Afghanistan will shift from the MOI to the new 
Independent Office.  It will thus have authority over the 
elected and appointed government officials at the provincial 
and district level, as well as the lead on sub-national 
governance policies, which could help increase coordination 
with the provincial representatives of the various line 
ministries.  Sediqi claims adminstrative authority for the 
provincial councils (which now lies with Wardak's office) 
will be moved to the new Office.  While the decisions are not 
final, other responsibilities may include not only oversight 
of sub-national officials, but also most civilian 
registration functions like birth and marriage certificates, 
and national ID cards.  Some unspecified registry functions 
are also likely to shift to the Central Statistical Office. 
 
SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND THE MOI:  FREE AT LAST 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5. (SBU) Chief of Staff Omar Daudzai told Pol Counselor in 
June that MOI reform has been a subject of discussion for 
three years.  He acknowledged the Ministry's dual 
 
KABUL 00002684  002 OF 003 
 
 
responsibility for civil administration and police is "huge, 
too much for one ministry."  Sub-national governance 
oversight languished in part because MOI senior officials 
fixated on police reform, which draws the bulk of donor 
funds.  Daudzai also acknowleged tensions between Minister 
Zarar and Sediqi.  Two years ago, donors began avoiding the 
Civil Affairs Division rather than work with the ineffective 
and corrupt Afghanistan Stabilization Program (ASP) which had 
been established to manage international donor assistance for 
governance.  This contributed to a growing rift between 
Sediqi and Minister Zarar.  ASP is little changed, now run by 
Minister Zarar's brother-in-law. 
 
6. (SBU) The Civil Affairs Division remained marginalized 
even as sub-national governance reform became a priority. 
Other parts of the Afghan Government have moved in to fill 
the vaccuum, building a political base and drawing funds from 
donors interested in supporting sub-national 
governance as they do so.  Faruk Wardak's Office of 
Administrative Affairs (OAA) took administrative authority 
over Provincial Councils from the MOI, as formalized in the 
PC Law amended in March, but may give up that role to the new 
Independent Office.  The NSC is developing an outreach 
program to traditional leaders funded by the Government of 
Norway.  There are hints of a tug of war between Chief of 
Staff Daudzai, the NSC, and Farook Wardak's office over how 
much involvement each will have in sub-national governance. 
 
7.  (SBU) At this point, the MOI does little more than rubber 
stamp presidential appointees and leave the 34 Provincial 
Governors -- over whom Sediqi and Zarar have little control 
-- to fend for themselves.  This leads to the isolation of 
some officials while others invest time, energy, and 
resources building an independent power based both in the 
province and within the goverment.  In a meeting with PolOffs 
in June, Deputy Minister Sediqi blamed the lack of 
international attention -- and money -- for his moribund 
division, but he acknowledged the Division's weak performance 
and the need for a shake-up.  The Administration Division's 
own strategic plan -- candid to a fault -- reads like a 
description of how to build a ministry from scratch, 
including diagnosing a need for "attitudinal adjustment of 
senior leaders" among its many suggestions for reform. 
 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS REMAIN WITH MRRD 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
8. (SBU) The new Independent Office will become the central 
authority over GOA entities at the provincial and district 
levels, but the most significant GOA entity at the 
community/village level remains the Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD).  MRRD's National 
Solidarity Program has successfully established 17,000 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) and is expanding to 
cover 23,000 communities, as well as developing District 
Development Assemblies (DDAs).  CDCs are designed to 
gradually increase support for the government at the 
grass-roots level, where they compete with and emerge out of 
traditional tribal structures.  In Kabul, CDCs are viewed as 
the political territory of Minister of Education Hanif Atmar, 
who began the program when he led MRRD.  Following the 
reform, CDCs will be the only GOA 
sub-national institutions that do not report directly to 
the Palace. 
 
USG POISED TO SUPPORT THE REFORM 
-------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) Consolidating authority over sub-national governance 
into a central focal point in the Palace is a first step in 
centralizing reform efforts and introducing accounatability. 
We have underlined  -- to Daudzai, Wardak, and Sediqi 
directly -- our support for the move.  We have shared our 
willingness to support with resources a plan that chooses 
high quality local officials (governors in particular), 
invests in them and rewards performance, holds them 
 
KABUL 00002684  003 OF 003 
 
 
accountable, and keeps them in place long enough to make a 
difference.  We are also prepared to invest in the new office 
to allow it to be accoutable itself.  We are beginning 
discussions on how USAID's sub-national governance program, 
which had planned to help the MOI develop its "common 
functions," will shift its capacity development work to the 
new Independent Office. 
WOOD