VZCZCXRO5892
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHSB #0714/01 2211307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091307Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1769
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0232
RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 2205
RUEHLG/AMEMBASSY LILONGWE 1848
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0946
RUEHMR/AMEMBASSY MASERU 0133
RUEHMB/AMEMBASSY MBABANE 0518
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0189
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 5316
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0078
RUEHWD/AMEMBASSY WINDHOEK 1586
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 0557
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 0116
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 0514

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000714 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR S. HILL 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN 
USAID FOR L. DOBBINS AND E. LOKEN 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR EAID ECON PGOV PHUM WFP ZI
SUBJECT: WORSENING HUNGER, DWINDLING HARVESTS 
 
REF: HARARE 00712 
 
HARARE 00000714  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. Recent international NGO estimates indicate 4.1 million 
Zimbabweans will need food aid between November 2007 and 
April 2008, out of a total population estimated at 9-10 
million.  The UN World Food Program (WFP) plans to assist 3.3 
million Zimbabweans, and C-SAFE, a consortium of US-sponsored 
NGOs, will provide food for at least 800,000.  International 
NGOs, including WFP, have reported limited political bias in 
food aid distribution and monitor the process to ensure 
transparency.  The government's own food distribution program 
through the Grain Marketing Board is widely recognized as a 
political exercise to reward government supporters and punish 
opponents. 
 
------------------------ 
PROJECTING POOR HARVESTS 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. The national requirement of about 1.8-1.9 million metric 
tons (mt) of grain was not met by April-May 2007 harvests of 
799,000 mt of maize and 126,000 mt of millet and sorghum. 
USAID and farmers groups previously estimated winter 
(October) wheat harvests would range from 78,000 mt to 
135,000 mt, but the government-controlled Herald newspaper 
recently warned that farmers may harvest only 40,000 mt or 
less.  Given the uncertanties in both population and crop 
estimates, WFP anticipates that slightly more than 1 million 
tons of food imports and food aid will be required in the 
coming months. 
 
-------------------- 
AFFECTED POPULATIONS 
-------------------- 
 
¶3. WFP's food distribution program in June 2007 was already 
reaching some 300,000 Zimbabweans a month, focusing on 
HIV/AIDS affected households and school children in 
high-density urban areas.  The latest (June-July) crop and 
food supply assessment mission by UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and WFP estimated a much higher number -- 
some 3.3 million -- will need food aid by November of this 
year.  Subsequent upward revisions for the November-March 
"hungry season" indicate that at least 4.1 million people 
could face severe hunger before April 2008.  WFP plans to 
provide food to 3.3 million of that number, and the 
US-sponsored Consortium for the Southern Africa Food Security 
Emergency (C-SAFE, comprising Catholic Relief Services, CARE, 
and World Vision) plans to provide food to at least 800,000 
people.  (Note: In the past five years, USAID has delivered 
more than 700,000 mt of food aid valued at more than US$400 
million to Zimbabwe, making the US the largest donor of food 
assistance to Zimbabwe.  WFP has received more than US$170 
million from the US in FY 2007.  Other donors to the WFP's 
Zimbabwe program include the U.K., European Union, Canada, 
Japan, Ireland, Sweden, African Development Bank, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and New Zealand.  End note.) 
 
¶4. The worst-affected provinces are in the drought-ravaged 
south of the country, including Matabeleland South, 
Matabeleland North, and Midlands.  Food shortages are also 
severe in Manicaland and Masvingo. 
 
---------------------- 
IMPORTS ON THE HORIZON 
---------------------- 
 
 
HARARE 00000714  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶5. The Zimbabwe government contracted with Malawi to purchase 
400,000 mt of maize, or about 40,000 mt a month for ten 
months beginning May 2007, according to WFP.  Of this number, 
116,000 mt were received as of August 3.  Unconfirmed reports 
also indicate Zimbabwe has contracted to purchase 200,000 mt 
of maize from Tanzania, and perhaps additional maize from 
Zambia.  Informal markets and cross-border trade are expected 
to bring in at least 61,000 mt of various grains. 
 
------------------------- 
FILLING THE GAP: FOOD AID 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. Assuming these purchases are completed as planned, 
Zimbabwe will require at least 442,000 mt of food aid 
including 352,000 mt of cereals and grain in the coming 
months, according to USAID and WFP estimates, and additional 
non-cereal food assistance will be needed.  Pledges have been 
received for slightly more than half of this amount as of 
August 1. 
--------------------------------------- 
SELECTION BIASES: BOTH SUBTLE AND OVERT 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. WFP works with international and local NGOs in compiling 
lists of beneficiaries before food aid is brought to the 
distribution sites, and in monitoring the distribution 
process to try to ensure honesty and transparency.  ZANU-PF 
has pressured some NGOs to alter food recipient lists to 
favor party supporters (see Reftel), and food aid has been 
denied MDC supporters in Matabeleland South, Manicaland, and 
Mashonaland West, according to the Zimbabwe Peace Project 
(ZPP).  In addition, a senior official of the National 
Association of NGOs (NANGO) reported that some local NGOs 
have had "sporadic" confrontations with security forces bent 
on impounding relief shipments destined for drought-stricken 
areas.  Also, NGOs are required to have food distribution 
sites approved by the government well before the aid is 
delivered.  This enables government representatives to visit 
the sites before the food-delivery dates, often to praise 
"the government's generosity" in making the food available to 
needy residents. 
 
¶8. Politicization of the government's own food distribution 
program through the Grain Marketing Board is explicit and 
undisguised.  For example, the Zimbabwe Election Support 
Network (ZESN) in February reported that the president of the 
Council of Chiefs had threatened to withhold food from 
villagers who supported the opposition in Chiredzi South 
by-elections last February.  ZESN reported similar threats by 
the Chief before the rural district council elections of 
October 2006, when he warned that villagers who failed to 
support ZANU-PF would be expelled. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
ZIMBABWE'S RESPONSE TO THE FOOD CRISIS 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. The Zimbabwe government has refused until now to make a 
formal appeal for food aid and, at the national level, has 
only grudgingly acknowledged any need for foreign assistance. 
 Information Minister Ndlovu said in mid-July that US food 
donations would be accepted only as reparations for damage 
done to the people of Zimbabwe.  "It is just a gimmick," 
Ndlovu said, "to soothe themselves of their guilt."  Despite 
the negative rhetoric, however, some regional officials and 
local NGOs have expressed gratitude for the generosity of the 
US and other food donors. 
 
DHANANI