VZCZCXRO0759
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDM #0797/01 2190855
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 070855Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3983
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 7016
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3359
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4698
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0520
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0290
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1256
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5256
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0272
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1929
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1458
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0064
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0604
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1319
RUEHDI/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0133
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0432
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 2893
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0397
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0583
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0873
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0016
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 7827
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH 2675
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0296
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 6402
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNFB/DIR FBI WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 DAMASCUS 000797 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ATHENS FOR DHS 
DEPT FOR INL/HSTC 
DEPT PASS NPC PORTSMOUTH 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 
TAGS: ASEC CVIS CPAS KFRD KCRM SY IZ IR
SUBJECT:  CONSULAR OPERATIONS IN A STATE SPONSOR OF 
TERRORISM - EMBASSY DAMASCUS 
 
 
DAMASCUS 00000797  001.3 OF 009 
 
REFS: 
 
A) 06 DAMASCUS 5454 
B) DAMASCUS 001 
C) DAMASCUS 005 
D) DAMASCUS 012 
E) DAMASCUS 765 
F) DAMASCUS 306 
G) DAMASCUS 617 
H) DAMASCUS 773 
I) DAMASCUS 272 
J) 06 DAMASCUS 3193 
K) DAMASCUS 274 
 
NOTE:  THIS TELEGRAM REPLACES DAMASCUS 796, DTG 070646Z 
AUG 07 WHICH WAS TRANSMITTED WITH ERRORS. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Consular Operations at Embassy 
Damascus are impacted by the fact that the Syrian Arab 
Republic is a State Sponsor of Terrorism, as well as 
by our growing Iraqi workload.  This cable focuses on 
the salient features of conducting consular work in 
this special environment.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Syria has been on the State Sponsor of 
Terrorism list for longer then any other country, 
having been named at the list's inception in 1979. 
This dubious distinction presents many difficulties 
for completing even basic consular functions. 
Furthermore, the Consular Section provides services to 
an increasing number of Iraqi applicants who present a 
separate set of challenges. 
 
------------------------- 
American Citizen Services 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The lack of positive bilateral relations is 
an obstacle to our American Citizen Services 
operations.  We have not received consular 
notification of an arrest in 20 years.  Each piece of 
information on arrested Americans comes from the grape 
vine, as often someone who knows someone who saw 
someone being taken away calls us because they met 
someone once who had the same problem.  When 
requesting consular access, we must submit a 
diplomatic note, to which a reply only comes, if at 
all, after weeks or months, and usually does not grant 
us access.  Many of our arrested AmCits are jailed and 
released without us ever having been able to visit. 
Charges against the same detainee can change day to 
day, and sometimes a prisoner is held without any 
charges being filed at any point. 
 
¶4. (SBU) One such case is that of a young woman who 
was held for a week with no charges after her 
employer's former in-laws accused her of "terrorist 
 
DAMASCUS 00000797  002.3 OF 009 
 
 
links" (refs A, B, and C.) When we were finally 
notified by her employer of the AmCit's detention, 
ConOff got access by standing on the jail doorstep 
until she got a promise of access the next day if 
ConOff would only leave and stop making a scene.  Once 
access was obtained, we were able to get the young 
AmCit out of the country in fewer than 24 hours. 
 
¶5. (SBU) We also have all too frequent occasions to 
whisk women out of the country when dealing with 
domestic disputes.  Domestic violence is common and 
tolerated to a certain extent under Syrian law.  AmCit 
women married to Syrians cannot leave the country 
without the consent of their husbands or that of one 
of his male blood relatives.  The control mechanism 
for this consent is the Immigration Service's exit 
stamp, which is obtained in advance at an Immigration 
Office. 
 
¶6. (SBU) For AmCit women married to Syrians who have 
only entered Syria within the previous two weeks, the 
exit stamp is not necessary.  However, the woman's 
husband can place a travel ban on her.  Sometimes we 
race the clock to get the woman out of Syria before 
the travel ban goes into effect. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In an interesting twist, we had three LPR 
wives, with or without status, abandoned by their 
AmCit husbands with their AmCit children last fall. 
Feeling that they could use the border difficulties to 
their advantage, each husband had dropped off his wife 
and children and either made off with their documents 
or significantly mutilated them.  We were able to 
return two of the three women to the US with their 
AmCit children on repatriation loans (to accompany the 
minor), and even provided a returning residency visa 
(SB-1) for one who had lost her status because her 
husband told her he would kill her if she returned to 
the States.  The third woman had funds and eventually 
returned on her own.  In each case, we found legal aid 
information on the internet so that they could get pro 
bono help upon arrival. (See ref D.) 
 
¶8. (SBU) In custody cases, the age at which a child 
must be returned from the mother's custody to the 
father's is notionally according to Shari'aa law, but 
in practice the ages applied in Syria actually favor 
the mother more than in neighboring countries.  Girls 
return to their father at age 15, boys at age 13.  The 
theory is that after those ages, children need the 
stronger discipline provided by their fathers. 
Although a mother may have custody of her children, 
she cannot take them out of Syria, however, without 
the written consent of the father or of one of his 
male blood relatives.  In a case where the father is 
deceased, normal travel can be very complicated for 
children whose mother has little contact with her in- 
 
DAMASCUS 00000797  003.2 OF 009 
 
 
laws. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In exceptional circumstances, such as extreme 
abuse by the father, a 16-year old boy can be asked if 
he wants to go back to his mother.  However, a 16-year 
old girl would not be allowed to choose. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Fortunately, we have had relatively few 
death cases in recent years.  Under Islamic practice 
and Syrian law, burial must take place within three 
days of death, but customarily, it actually takes 
place within one day.  That means that no cremation 
facilities are available for non-Moslems and cold 
storage facilities are extremely limited. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Due to the number of AmCits of dual 
nationality who are "persons of interest," we have 
frequent "hits" in the ACS plus system for U.S. 
Marshall's warrants.  For each hit, we must coordinate 
with the RSO to contact U.S. law enforcement quickly 
to see if there is an active warrant that would 
prevent issuance of a service, or if we are only 
supposed to provide information on the AmCit's travel 
plans.  There is no extradition agreement between 
Syria and the US. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Having a ticket to travel is not enough to 
be able to leave Syria.  AmCits occasionally are 
stopped at Immigration on their way out of Syria and 
asked to visit a branch of police intelligence for 
questioning.  We tell AmCits to let us know before 
they go in to the office, and after they come out -- 
just in case they are detained.  The questioning 
AmCits are subjected to can run the gamut from matters 
regarding religious affiliation (i.e. it is illegal to 
be a Jehovah's witness in Syria), to issues resulting 
from unserved military service.  Syrian citizenship is 
indelible and passes via the male line without regard 
to emigration or naturalization elsewhere.  At times, 
grandparents have registered their grandchildren as 
Syrian, unbeknownst to the grandchildren or their 
parents.  When a teenage male AmCit who is used to 
traveling in and out of Syria without incident enters 
Syria for the first time after age 18, he is stopped 
for having failed to complete the mandatory military 
service. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Much as in the Libyan model of children born 
in the U.S. who were afraid to claim their citizenship 
because of host country harassment, we are starting to 
see young men from Iraq and Iran making their first 
claims for US passports at our Post.  See Ref E. 
 
---------------------- 
Nonimmigrant Visa Unit 
---------------------- 
 
 
DAMASCUS 00000797  004.2 OF 009 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) In accordance with Section 306 of the 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002, 
the NIV unit sends Security Advisory Opinions (SAOs) 
for all adult citizens of Syria (both male and 
female), and most long-term residents of Syria of 
other nationalities.  As a result, the sole full-time 
NIV officer spends about two hours each day checking, 
processing, and following up on SAOs.  Likewise, the 
Consular Section as a whole must constantly review SAO 
procedures. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Another consequence of operations in a State 
Sponsor of Terrorism is the need to ensure applicants' 
compliance with National Security Entry and Exit 
Registration System (NSEERS) requirements, especially 
obtaining an exit stamp from CBP before leaving the 
US.  Testimony of applicants, consultations by ConOffs 
with DHS, and the experiences of several locally 
employed staff (LES) have shown that these stamps can 
be difficult to obtain, often because the offices that 
provide them have moved, have improper signage, are 
located in out-of-the-way parts of airports, or keep 
odd hours.  To improve compliance, the NIV unit 
researched the current locations of NSEERS offices in 
major airports, and created an English- and Arabic- 
language handout, which was distributed throughout 
NEA.  The English link is 
damascus.usembassy.gov/special-registration.h tml. 
(See ref F.)  Furthermore, the Consular Section, with 
the help of summer hires, has produced its own in- 
house video to explain fingerprinting, 214B and NSEERS 
to our captive waiting room audience in English and 
Arabic.  Both the script and the video are available 
by writing to nivdamascus@state.gov. 
 
¶16. (SBU) NIV, as the other units, is affected by the 
influx of Iraqis into Syria.  For July 2007, over ten 
percent of our NIV case load was Iraqi nationals, many 
of whom had to acquire new passports just to apply for 
NIVs.  The majority did not overcome 214B, as their 
status in Syria is only temporary. 
 
--------------- 
IMMIGRANT VISAS 
--------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) The Immigrant Visa Unit at Embassy Damascus 
is the only immigrant visa unit in a U.S. Embassy in a 
country designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism by 
the United States Department of State.  For calendar 
year 2006, the IV section issued more than 1700 
immigrant visas and expects that number to increase in 
2007 with the additional Iraqi caseload.  As it 
becomes increasingly difficult for Iraqi citizens to 
enter Jordan and Egypt, we are receiving more requests 
for IV file transfers from applicants with files at 
those posts. 
 
DAMASCUS 00000797  005.3 OF 009 
 
 
 
¶18. (SBU) Iraqi applicants find Syria in general a 
convenient place to process their visas.  The Syrian 
government is still recognizing the Iraqi S passport 
and Iraqis are not required to hold any Syrian visas 
prior to arrival.  Also, the cost of living in Syria 
is significantly cheaper than in any neighboring 
country. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The IV Unit also processes Visa 92 and Visa 
93 for Iraqis, Somalis and Sudanese, and has handled 
more than three hundred inquiries in the last six 
months in person, e-mail, and on the telephone from 
Iraqis interested in refugee status in the United 
States. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Processing immigrant visas in Syria for 
Syrian applicants can also be difficult.  The Syrian 
Government is often reluctant or completely 
uncooperative in verifying Syrian civil documents such 
as marriage, divorce and death certificates.  This 
lack of cooperation with civil authorities makes it 
very difficult for us to investigate one of the most 
popular types of immigrant visa fraud in Syria: the 
sham marriage a.k.a. the sham divorce.  It is quite 
common for a Syrian male never to divorce his Syrian 
wife, yet go to the United States, marry an American 
Citizen woman, obtain American citizenship through the 
marriage to the American citizen, divorce the American 
citizen and then petition for the Syrian wife and 
children in Syria to immigrate to the United States. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Additionally, because of Syria's designation 
as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, Syrian IV applicants 
receive more scrutiny in the SAO process.  All 
beneficiaries of K1 and K3 visa applications are 
required to have a Visas Condor and many Syrian 
applicants must clear additional SAOs prior to 
issuance.  This extra processing requires time and 
means that many families decide that the wife and 
children will travel to the United States and the 
husband or older sons will wait in Syria pending 
clearances.  Sometimes these clearances can take more 
than a year and in certain cases, the family never 
receives an approval or a firm denial. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Another quirk of Immigrant Visa processing 
in Syria is that there are very few Diversity Visas 
awarded to Syrians.  This is likely due to a 
reluctance of the average Syrian to apply for a 
Diversity Visa on the internet, which is closely 
monitored and controlled by the Syrian government. 
Internet penetration is also surprisingly low. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Due to the increasing difficulty that Iraqis 
are experiencing to enter Jordan, about 30 of the 
Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) for Iraqi Translators 
 
DAMASCUS 00000797  006.2 OF 009 
 
 
and Interpreters are scheduled to be sent from NVC to 
Damascus in FY-2007.  We anticipate that this number 
will increase as other applicants are unable to enter 
Jordan.  (Note: Approximately 480 SIV files are 
currently scheduled to be sent to Embassy Amman.) 
 
--------------------- 
FRAUD PREVENTION UNIT 
--------------------- 
 
¶24. (SBU) The SARG requires that all FPU Damascus 
inquiries for document verification go through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and since it can 
take months to receive responses, FPU is obliged to 
send multiple diplomatic notes for follow-up.  It is 
impossible to liaise directly with Immigration, the 
Police and other SARG entities with any regularity. 
Post has learned to rely heavily on local FPU meetings 
with consular colleagues from other foreign missions 
in Damascus and Amman to compare trends, share 
fraudulent documents and support each other while 
working in this inhospitable environment. 
 
¶25. (SBU) The majority of FPU's workload deals with IV 
cases, specifically Iraqi cases.  While Embassy 
Damascus is not an Iraqi processing post, the number 
of Iraqi cases has risen significantly due to transfer 
cases from Amman and Cairo.  FPU works closely with 
the IV unit to ensure that all Iraqi documents are 
reviewed by the FPU officer or LES.  Verification of 
Iraqi documents is extremely difficult.  (See ref G.) 
Over the last six months, the FPU unit has discovered 
several counterfeit/altered S series passports, one H 
series passport and one fake G series passport.  (See 
ref H.) 
 
¶26. (SBU) No one document, not even a G passport, 
stands alone but rather is compared with other 
documents received from the applicant.  One possible 
fraud indicator is when documents do not look their 
age when compared to other identity documents 
presented.  For example, when reviewing the case of a 
young girl and looking specifically at her passport, 
identity card and citizen certificate, the identity 
card looked perfect with no glaring errors except that 
it looked older than the passport and citizen 
certificate which were all issued five years before 
the identity documents. 
 
¶27. (SBU) FPU has had difficulty receiving reliable 
confirmation from the Iraqi Embassy in Damascus on 
fraudulent or altered documents.  It is not uncommon 
for the Consular section at the Iraqi Embassy to 
confirm that a document is fraudulent and then recant 
their decision after speaking with the applicant.  As 
a result, the FPU has had to develop a significant 
subspecialty in Iraqi documents. 
 
DAMASCUS 00000797  007.2 OF 009 
 
 
 
¶28. (SBU) Frequently, Iraqi IV beneficiaries cannot 
describe the most basic events surrounding his/her 
engagement or marriage.  The majority of Iraqi cases 
we see are not the traditionally arranged marriages 
that occur in Syrian cases - where the applicant knows 
about the petitioner's family, knows the dates of 
their first meeting, engagement and marriage; or is 
even from the same family - nor are they love matches 
which happened over a course of time.  This makes for 
a difficult interview because, when questioned, the 
applicant either answers "I don't know" or gives very 
vague answers. 
 
¶29. (SBU) Although ACS fraud is limited, we have had 
several cases in the past year of Iraqis filing for 
their own children with fraudulent Syrian birth 
certificates in order to be able to be processed 
quickly in Syria, instead of having the file sent to 
Embassy Baghdad, or for a child whom we believe is not 
theirs.  (See refs I and J.)  We have also had what 
clearly appeared to be an "informal adoption" of twins 
by a Syrian couple who could not agree on the babies' 
birth city. (See ref K.) (Note: Adoption is not legal 
under Shari'aa law.  The new Catholic Code of July 
2006 legalized the adoption of Catholic babies by 
Catholics, and quietly, but effectively opened the 
door for international adoption.  The irony is that 
the couple with the fraudulent CRBA claim appeared to 
be Catholic.  End Note.) 
 
¶30. (SBU) Hitting the open road to verify employment 
or relationships in Syria is impossible.  FPU is able 
to conduct investigations in Damascus on a very 
limited basis.  In the restrictive environment in 
which we work, our every move is of interest to Syrian 
security services.  Our LES are questioned regularly, 
making it unreasonable to put them more in danger by 
sending them out for field investigations. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
AMERICAN CITIZEN/LPR/REFUGEE WALK-IN HOUR 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶31. (SBU) Damascus holds American Citizen Walk-In Hour 
four days a week.  During Walk-In Hour, American 
citizens, Legal Permanent Residents of the United 
States, bearers of Department of Homeland Security 
Travel Documents, and Iraqi Immigrant Visa Applicants 
are allowed time to ask immigration questions, file 
petitions, and request file transfers.  On average, we 
provide services in this category to 60-80 people per 
week, accounting for at least 12 officer hours. 
 
¶32. (SBU) The most frequently asked questions during 
American Citizen Walk-In hour deal with petition 
filing and pending immigrant visa applications. 
 
DAMASCUS 00000797  008.3 OF 009 
 
 
However, in the number two spot are Iraqis requesting 
that their immigrant petition be transferred from 
Embassy Amman or Embassy Cairo to Embassy Damascus. 
 
¶33. (SBU) We also receive a substantial number of 
inquiries regarding expired green cards or green cards 
which are no longer valid because the bearer has been 
outside the United States for longer than a year.  We 
receive many of these inquiries from Iraqis with 
either refugee status in the United States or with LPR 
status who returned to Iraq in 2003 and 2004 and now 
want to return to the United States.  In most cases, 
their travel documents expired long ago and they have 
made no prior effort to renew them or address the 
issue.  The individuals generally present stories that 
are both vague and inconsistent as to the reason they 
did not return to the United States.  In certain 
limited cases, we can process the individual for a 
Returning Resident visa (SB-1).  However, to the 
frustration of both the Consular Officer and the 
Iraqi, in many other cases there is nothing that can 
be done to return them to the United States.  We are 
left only to give them directions to the already 
overburdened local office of the United National High 
Commission on Refugees. 
 
¶34. (SBU) During Walk-In Hour we also receive many 
questions from Iraqis inquiring about the possibility 
of obtaining a visa, any visa, to the United States. 
Unfortunately, most of these people are qualified 
neither for a nonimmigrant visa nor for an immigrant 
visa and our only option again is to refer them to the 
UNHCR. However, at this point there are 110,000 Iraqis 
registered with the UNHCR in Damascus and most Iraqis 
know obtaining refugee resettlement is unlikely for 
them.  If the applicant has worked for the U.S. 
government or a contractor of the US government in 
Iraq, we provide them with information on 
refquestions@wrapsnet.org and, if appropriate, the 
information on self-petitioning for a Special 
Immigrant Visa (SIV) as an Iraqi 
translator/interpreter.  We have this information 
linked on our website at: 
http://syria.usembassy.gov/refugee.html and 
http://syria.usembassy.gov/siv.html. 
 
 
---------- 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶35. (SBU) The operational realities of having severely 
limited contact with the host government impacts 
everything we do.  Even our ability to plan for 
emergencies is affected by the fact that official 
Americans must apply for their Syrian visas only in 
Washington and invariably face lengthy waits for 
 
DAMASCUS 00000797  009.3 OF 009 
 
 
issuance.  Our hurdles with the SARG and our 
difficulties with our growing Iraqi applicant pool 
make consular work in Damascus both challenging and 
rewarding. 
 
CORBIN