VZCZCXRO3139
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDM #0796/01 2190646
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 070646Z AUG 07  ZFR ZFR
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3976
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 7009
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3352
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 4691
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0513
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0283
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 1249
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5249
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 0265
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1922
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1451
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0057
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0597
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1312
RUEHDI/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0126
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0425
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 2886
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0390
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0576
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0866
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0009
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 7820
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH 2668
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0289
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 6395
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUCNFB/DIR FBI WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 DAMASCUS 000796 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ATHENS FOR DHS 
DEPT FOR INL/HSTC 
DEPT PASS NPC PORTSMOUTH 
 
SENSITIVE, SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958 
TAGS: ASEC CVIS CPAS KFRD KCRM SY IZ IR
SUBJECT:  CONSULAR OPERATIONS IN A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM - 
EMBASSY DAMASCUS 
 
DAMASCUS 00000796  001.2 OF 007 
 
REFS: 
 
A) 06 DAMASCUS 5454 
B) DAMASCUS 001 
C) DAMASCUS 005 
D) DAMASCUS 012 
E) DAMASCUS 765 
F) DAMASCUS 306 
G) DAMASCUS 617 
H) DAMASCUS 773 
I) DAMASCUS 272 
J) 06 DAMASCUS 3193 
K) DAMASCUS 274 
 
ZFR ZFR TELEGRAM 
TELEGRAM TRANSMITTED WITH ERRORS 
TELEGRAM RETRANSMITTED CORRECTLY WITH NEW NUMBERS 
ZFR ZFR TELEGRAM 
 
 
DAMASCUS 00000796  002 OF 007 
 
 
blood relatives.  The control mechanism for this consent is the 
Immigration Service's exit stamp, which is obtained in advance at an 
Immigration Office. 
 
¶6. (SBU) For AmCit women married to Syrians who have only entered 
Syria within the previous two weeks, the exit stamp is not 
necessary.  However, the woman's husband can place a travel ban on 
her.  Sometimes we race the clock to get the woman out of Syria 
before the travel ban goes into effect. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In an interesting twist, we had three LPR wives, with or 
without status, abandoned by their AmCit husbands with their AmCit 
children last fall.  Feeling that they could use the border 
difficulties to their advantage, each husband had dropped off his 
wife and children and either made off with their documents or 
significantly mutilated them.  We were able to return two of the 
three women to the US with their AmCit children on repatriation 
loans (to accompany the minor), and even provided a returning 
residency visa (SB-1) for one who had lost her status because her 
husband told her he would kill her if she returned to the States. 
The third woman had funds and eventually returned on her own.  In 
each case, we found legal aid information on the internet so that 
they could get pro bono help upon arrival. (See ref D.) 
 
¶8. (SBU) In custody cases, the age at which a child must be returned 
from the mother's custody to the father's is notionally according to 
Shari'aa law, but in practice the ages applied in Syria actually 
favor the mother more than in neighboring countries.  Girls return 
to their father at age 15, boys at age 13.  The theory is that after 
those ages, children need the stronger discipline provided by their 
fathers.  Although a mother may have custody of her children, she 
cannot take them out of Syria, however, without the written consent 
of the father or of one of his male blood relatives.  In a case 
where the father is deceased, normal travel can be very complicated 
for children whose mother has little contact with her in-laws. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In exceptional circumstances, such as extreme abuse by the 
father, a 16-year old boy can be asked if he wants to go back to his 
mother.  However, a 16-year old girl would not be allowed to 
choose. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Fortunately, we have had relatively few death cases in 
recent years.  Under Islamic practice and Syrian law, burial must 
take place within three days of death, but customarily, it actually 
takes place within one day.  That means that no cremation facilities 
are available for non-Moslems and cold storage facilities are 
extremely limited. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Due to the number of AmCits of dual nationality who are 
"persons of interest," we have frequent "hits" in the ACS plus 
system for U.S. Marshall's warrants.  For each hit, we must 
coordinate with the RSO to contact U.S. law enforcement quickly to 
see if there is an active warrant that would prevent issuance of a 
service, or if we are only supposed to provide information on the 
AmCit's travel plans.  There is no extradition agreement between 
Syria and the US. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Having a ticket to travel is not enough to be able to 
leave Syria.  AmCits occasionally are stopped at Immigration on 
their way out of Syria and asked to visit a branch of police 
 
DAMASCUS 00000796  003 OF 007 
 
 
intelligence for questioning.  We tell AmCits to let us know before 
they go in to the office, and after they come out -- just in case 
they are detained.  The questioning AmCits are subjected to can run 
the gamut from matters regarding religious affiliation (i.e. it is 
illegal to be a Jehovah's witness in Syria), to issues resulting 
from unserved military service.  Syrian citizenship is indelible and 
passes via the male line without regard to emigration or 
naturalization elsewhere.  At times, grandparents have registered 
their grandchildren as Syrian, unbeknownst to the grandchildren or 
their parents.  When a teenage male AmCit who is used to traveling 
in and out of Syria without incident enters Syria for the first time 
after age 18, he is stopped for having failed to complete the 
mandatory military service. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Much as in the Libyan model of children born in the U.S. 
who were afraid to claim their citizenship because of host country 
harassment, we are starting to see young men from Iraq and Iran 
making their first claims for US passports at our Post.  See Ref E. 
 
---------------------- 
Nonimmigrant Visa Unit 
---------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) In accordance with Section 306 of the Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002, the NIV unit sends Security 
Advisory Opinions (SAOs) for all adult citizens of Syria (both male 
and female), and most long-term residents of Syria of other 
nationalities.  As a result, the sole full-time NIV officer spends 
about two hours each day checking, processing, and following up on 
SAOs.  Likewise, the Consular Section as a whole must constantly 
review SAO procedures. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Another consequence of operations in a State Sponsor of 
Terrorism is the need to ensure applicants' compliance with National 
Security Entry and Exit Registration System (NSEERS) requirements, 
especially obtaining an exit stamp from CBP before leaving the US. 
Testimony of applicants, consultations by ConOffs with DHS, and the 
experiences of several locally employed staff (LES) have shown that 
these stamps can be difficult to obtain, often because the offices 
that provide them have moved, have improper signage, are located in 
out-of-the-way parts of airports, or keep odd hours.  To improve 
compliance, the NIV unit researched the current locations of NSEERS 
offices in major airports, and created an English- and 
Arabic-language handout, which was distributed throughout NEA.  The 
English link is damascus.usembassy.gov/special-registration.h tml. 
(See ref F.)  Furthermore, the Consular Section, with the help of 
summer hires, has produced its own in-house video to explain 
fingerprinting, 214B and NSEERS to our captive waiting room audience 
in English and Arabic.  Both the script and the video are available 
by writing to nivdamascus@state.gov. 
 
¶16. (SBU) NIV, as the other units, is affected by the influx of 
Iraqis into Syria.  For July 2007, over ten percent of our NIV case 
load was Iraqi nationals, many of whom had to acquire new passports 
just to apply for NIVs.  The majority did not overcome 214B, as 
their status in Syria is only temporary. 
 
--------------- 
IMMIGRANT VISAS 
--------------- 
 
DAMASCUS 00000796  004 OF 007 
 
 
 
¶17. (SBU) The Immigrant Visa Unit at Embassy Damascus is the only 
immigrant visa unit in a U.S. Embassy in a country designated as a 
State Sponsor of Terrorism by the United States Department of State. 
 For calendar year 2006, the IV section issued more than 1700 
immigrant visas and expects that number to increase in 2007 with the 
additional Iraqi caseload.  As it becomes increasingly difficult for 
Iraqi citizens to enter Jordan and Egypt, we are receiving more 
requests for IV file transfers from applicants with files at those 
posts. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Iraqi applicants find Syria in general a convenient place 
to process their visas.  The Syrian government is still recognizing 
the Iraqi S passport and Iraqis are not required to hold any Syrian 
visas prior to arrival.  Also, the cost of living in Syria is 
significantly cheaper than in any neighboring country. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The IV Unit also processes Visa 92 and Visa 93 for Iraqis, 
Somalis and Sudanese, and has handled more than three hundred 
inquiries in the last six months in person, e-mail, and on the 
telephone from Iraqis interested in refugee status in the United 
States. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Processing immigrant visas in Syria for Syrian applicants 
can also be difficult.  The Syrian Government is often reluctant or 
completely uncooperative in verifying Syrian civil documents such as 
marriage, divorce and death certificates.  This lack of cooperation 
with civil authorities makes it very difficult for us to investigate 
one of the most popular types of immigrant visa fraud in Syria: the 
sham marriage a.k.a. the sham divorce.  It is quite common for a 
Syrian male never to divorce his Syrian wife, yet go to the United 
States, marry an American Citizen woman, obtain American citizenship 
through the marriage to the American citizen, divorce the American 
citizen and then petition for the Syrian wife and children in Syria 
to immigrate to the United States. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Additionally, because of Syria's designation as a State 
Sponsor of Terrorism, Syrian IV applicants receive more scrutiny in 
the SAO process.  All beneficiaries of K1 and K3 visa applications 
are required to have a Visas Condor and many Syrian applicants must 
clear additional SAOs prior to issuance.  This extra processing 
requires time and means that many families decide that the wife and 
children will travel to the United States and the husband or older 
sons will wait in Syria pending clearances.  Sometimes these 
clearances can take more than a year and in certain cases, the 
family never receives an approval or a firm denial. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Another quirk of Immigrant Visa processing in Syria is 
that there are very few Diversity Visas awarded to Syrians.  This is 
likely due to a reluctance of the average Syrian to apply for a 
Diversity Visa on the internet, which is closely monitored and 
controlled by the Syrian government.  Internet penetration is also 
surprisingly low. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Due to the increasing difficulty that Iraqis are 
experiencing to enter Jordan, about 30 of the Special Immigrant 
Visas (SIVs) for Iraqi Translators and Interpreters are scheduled to 
be sent from NVC to Damascus in FY-2007.  We anticipate that this 
number will increase as other applicants are unable to enter Jordan. 
 (Note: Approximately 480 SIV files are currently scheduled to be 
 
DAMASCUS 00000796  005 OF 007 
 
 
sent to Embassy Amman.) 
 
--------------------- 
FRAUD PREVENTION UNIT 
--------------------- 
 
¶24. (SBU) The SARG requires that all FPU Damascus inquiries for 
document verification go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) and since it can take months to receive responses, FPU is 
obliged to send multiple diplomatic notes for follow-up.  It is 
impossible to liaise directly with Immigration, the Police and other 
SARG entities with any regularity.  Post has learned to rely heavily 
on local FPU meetings with consular colleagues from other foreign 
missions in Damascus and Amman to compare trends, share fraudulent 
documents and support each other while working in this inhospitable 
environment. 
 
¶25. (SBU) The majority of FPU's workload deals with IV cases, 
specifically Iraqi cases.  While Embassy Damascus is not an Iraqi 
processing post, the number of Iraqi cases has risen significantly 
due to transfer cases from Amman and Cairo.  FPU works closely with 
the IV unit to ensure that all Iraqi documents are reviewed by the 
FPU officer or LES.  Verification of Iraqi documents is extremely 
difficult.  (See ref G.) Over the last six months, the FPU unit has 
discovered several counterfeit/altered S series passports, one H 
series passport and one fake G series passport.  (See ref H.) 
 
¶26. (SBU) No one document, not even a G passport, stands alone but 
rather is compared with other documents received from the applicant. 
 One possible fraud indicator is when documents do not look their 
age when compared to other identity documents presented.  For 
example, when reviewing the case of a young girl and looking 
specifically at her passport, identity card and citizen certificate, 
the identity card looked perfect with no glaring errors except that 
it looked older than the passport and citizen certificate which were 
all issued five years before the identity documents. 
 
¶27. (SBU) FPU has had difficulty receiving reliable confirmation 
from the Iraqi Embassy in Damascus on fraudulent or altered 
documents.  It is not uncommon for the Consular section at the Iraqi 
Embassy to confirm that a document is fraudulent and then recant 
their decision after speaking with the applicant.  As a result, the 
FPU has had to develop a significant subspecialty in Iraqi 
documents. 
 
¶28. (SBU) Frequently, Iraqi IV beneficiaries cannot describe the 
most basic events surrounding his/her engagement or marriage.  The 
majority of Iraqi cases we see are not the traditionally arranged 
marriages that occur in Syrian cases - where the applicant knows 
about the petitioner's family, knows the dates of their first 
meeting, engagement and marriage; or is even from the same family - 
nor are they love matches which happened over a course of time. 
This makes for a difficult interview because, when questioned, the 
applicant either answers "I don't know" or gives very vague answers. 
 
 
¶29. (SBU) Although ACS fraud is limited, we have had several cases 
in the past year of Iraqis filing for their own children with 
fraudulent Syrian birth certificates in order to be able to be 
processed quickly in Syria, instead of having the file sent to 
 
DAMASCUS 00000796  006 OF 007 
 
 
¶30. (SBU) Hitting the open road to verify employment or 
relationships in Syria is impossible.  FPU is able to conduct 
investigations in Damascus on a very limited basis.  In the 
restrictive environment in which we work, our every move is of 
interest to Syrian security services.  Our LES are questioned 
regularly, making it unreasonable to put them more in danger by 
sending them out for field investigations. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
AMERICAN CITIZEN/LPR/REFUGEE WALK-IN HOUR 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶31. (SBU) Damascus holds American Citizen Walk-In Hour four days a 
week.  During Walk-In Hour, American citizens, Legal Permanent 
Residents of the United States, bearers of Department of Homeland 
Security Travel Documents, and Iraqi Immigrant Visa Applicants are 
allowed time to ask immigration questions, file petitions, and 
request file transfers.  On average, we provide services in this 
category to 60-80 people per week, accounting for at least 12 
officer hours. 
 
¶32. (SBU) The most frequently asked questions during American 
Citizen Walk-In hour deal with petition filing and pending immigrant 
visa applications.  However, in the number two spot are Iraqis 
requesting that their immigrant petition be transferred from Embassy 
Amman or Embassy Cairo to Embassy Damascus. 
 
¶33. (SBU) We also receive a substantial number of inquiries 
regarding expired green cards or green cards which are no longer 
valid because the bearer has been outside the United States for 
longer than a year.  We receive many of these inquiries from Iraqis 
with either refugee status in the United States or with LPR status 
who returned to Iraq in 2003 and 2004 and now want to return to the 
United States.  In most cases, their travel documents expired long 
ago and they have made no prior effort to renew them or address the 
issue.  The individuals generally present stories that are both 
vague and inconsistent as to the reason they did not return to the 
United States.  In certain limited cases, we can process the 
individual for a Returning Resident visa (SB-1).  However, to the 
frustration of both the Consular Officer and the Iraqi, in many 
other cases there is nothing that can be done to return them to the 
United States.  We are left only to give them directions to the 
already overburdened local office of the United National High 
Commission on Refugees. 
 
¶34. (SBU) During Walk-In Hour we also receive many questions from 
Iraqis inquiring about the possibility of obtaining a visa, any 
visa, to the United States.  Unfortunately, most of these people are 
qualified neither for a nonimmigrant visa nor for an immigrant visa 
and our only option again is to refer them to the UNHCR. However, at 
 
DAMASCUS 00000796  007 OF 007 
 
 
this point there are 110,000 Iraqis registered with the UNHCR in 
Damascus and most Iraqis know obtaining refugee resettlement is 
unlikely for them.  If the applicant has worked for the U.S. 
government or a contractor of the US government in Iraq, we provide 
them with information on refquestions@wrapsnet.org and, if 
appropriate, the information on self-petitioning for a Special 
Immigrant Visa (SIV) as an Iraqi translator/interpreter.  We have 
this information linked on our website at: 
http://syria.usembassy.gov/refugee.html and 
http://syria.usembassy.gov/siv.html. 
 
 
---------- 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶35. (SBU) The operational realities of having severely limited 
contact with the host government impacts everything we do.  Even our 
ability to plan for emergencies is affected by the fact that 
official Americans must apply for their Syrian visas only in 
Washington and invariably face lengthy waits for issuance.  Our 
hurdles with the SARG and our difficulties with our growing Iraqi 
applicant pool make consular work in Damascus both challenging and 
rewarding. 
 
CORBIN