VZCZCXRO9246
OO RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHIHL RUEHJS RUEHKUK RUEHLH
RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHGB #2697/01 2260218
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140218Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2774
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC//NSC//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEPGAB/MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ
RUEPGAA/MNF-I HUMINT OPS BAGHDAD IZ

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002697 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PINS PTER PHUM MOPS PREL PINR PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: PLANNING FOR KADHIMIYA PILGRIMAGE SHOWS INCREASED 
ISF CAPACITY 
 
REF: 06 BAGHDAD 003014 
 
 ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: The absence of sectarian violence at the 
August 9 annual pilgrimage to the tomb of the 7th Imam Musa 
Kadhim in the Kadhimiya neighborhood of Baghdad provided 
evidence of increased coordination capacity of the Iraqi 
Security Forces (ISF), compared to last year, in which some 
20 pilgrims died.  The preparations were also noteworthy for 
the high level of coordination between the several Iraqi 
security agencies, ministries and the press.  While the 
Coalition Forces (CF) participated to a certain extent, this 
security effort was principally an Iraqi effort.  An Iraqi 
official noted that many of the lessons from this plan could 
be applied to future religious holidays, such as the upcoming 
Shabaniya 12th Imam celebration. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Increased and better coordinated preparations by an 
array of GOI security forces to counter any terrorist attacks 
during the Imam Musa Kadhim pilgrimage on August 9 paid off, 
as demonstrated by the absence of violence and loss of life. 
The ISF coordinated security preparations through the Iraqi 
Baghdad Operations Command (BOC), the unified command 
operationally responsible for all security forces in Baghdad. 
 Drawing on its forces of two Iraqi Army (IA) divisions, the 
BOC held extensive planning meetings that included reviews of 
past mistakes, and better measures to ensure the safety of 
the pilgrims, according to CF liaison officers to the BOC. 
Opining that the confidence of the Iraqi people in some areas 
regarding the ISF has increased, the BOC Commander pointed 
out that he believed the pilgrims demonstrated overt acts of 
"trusting the security forces" as a legitimate arm of the 
government. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The BOC used intelligence to identify potential 
threats and developed appropriate countermeasures to address 
those threats.  The BOC then coordinated those plans with all 
the appropriate entities of the ISF, Ministry of Interior 
(MOI), Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Transportation 
(MOT), local authorities, and the press.  According to COL 
Abd Al-Amir, BOC Plans Officer, this coordinated effort is 
the &first time in the history of Iraq8 that all the ISF 
elements have worked together to such a degree.  The 
execution of the operational plan was slightly impeded, 
however, below the brigade level due to an institutional 
absence of consultation with lower echelon officers prior to 
the execution phase.  The BOC decision to keep the security 
plans for the annual pilgrimage close-hold until relatively 
late in the game meant that leadership on the ground was not 
afforded maximum time to coordinate and implement the plan. 
MNF-I observers indicated that the After Action Review (AAR) 
was markedly candid and constructively critical of the 
operation.  Although AARs are often used within Armed Forces 
within the Middle East, this event was marked by the 
exceptionally unfamiliar concept to Iraq and, more or less, 
in the region of being constructively critical in an open 
forum to benefit and improve future planning and operations. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM PREVIOUS YEARS 
 
¶4. (U) Though the ISF planned extensively for the security of 
last year,s pilgrimage (reftel), planning was insufficient 
to prevent the tragic death of some 20 worshipers who were 
killed by snipers positioned along the pilgrimage routes. 
This year, the ISF took extensive precautions to secure those 
routes from sniper fire in advance by identifying likely 
sniper positions, and securing them in advance.  In addition, 
last year, many pilgrims were attacked when they strayed from 
the designated routes.  Accordingly, the ISF took care to 
demarcate and secure designated routes, and used the media to 
implore pilgrims to stay on the designated routes.  This year 
the ISF also took measures to brief pilgrims on safety 
procedures. 
 
¶5. (U) The National Police (NP) had control of the Khadimiyah 
Shrine middle cordon check points, and performed the vehicle 
and physical searches of people entering the Kadhimiya Shrine 
immediate-control area (40 female screeners were employed by 
NP to screen and assess female pilgrims entering the cordon). 
 The Iraqi Police (IP) augmented these efforts by having 
control over the interior cordon ) closest to the Kadimiyah 
Shrine while also assisting the NP in patrolling the streets 
 
BAGHDAD 00002697  002 OF 002 
 
 
immediate to the Shrine and within the confines of the 
district. The route was demarcated by the IA, based upon 
historical information obtained during past pilgrimages. 
Coordination between IA, NP and IP ensured security of the 
route with patrols augmented with multiple checkpoints. ISF 
preparations also included public service announcement 
warning of the possibility of tainted (possibly intentionally 
poisoned) food, which occurred in the past. 
 
¶6. (U) The greatest casualty-producing threat to the pilgrims 
was the potential for a mass casualty attack using a vehicle 
borne improvised explosive devices.  The ISF coordinated with 
the MOT to implement a complete vehicle ban in Baghdad.  This 
ban was publicized well in advance so that Iraqis and 
pilgrims could plan their schedules accordingly.  The most 
likely threat to the pilgrims was the potential for indirect 
fire (IDF) from mortars and rockets.  The ISF coordinated 
with CF to implement increased focused air weapons presence 
within the area of operation specifically monitoring 
historical point of origin sites for IDF.  In addition, the 
ISF worked with the MOH to ensure that sufficient ambulances 
were pre-positioned in strategic locations in the event of 
any attack. Further, ISF coordinated with CF to provide 
stand-by air ambulance in the event of a mass casualty 
incident. 
 
AN IRAQI SHOW 
 
¶7. (U) Iraqis led the security preparations for this event 
from start to finish.  The ISF coordinated with the CF on 
many levels, and CF personnel deployed to support the ISF, 
notably in using CF assets to protect against IDF, and with 
helicopter support. The ISF, nevertheless, carried out the 
planning and most of the execution of this operation.  On 
balance, the ISF, particularly the BOC, conducted effective 
planning for the operation, and continues to concentrate on 
coordination with its lower echelon commanders and senior 
ministerial officials in order to facilitate better 
execution. 
 
¶8. (U) COMMENT:  One key factor in the success of this 
security operation is that more ISF personnel than in 
previous years have become available with the appropriate 
training.  The ISF has begun to reap the fruit of CF training 
programs.  What remains to be seen is whether the successes 
of this pilgrimage can be leveraged into institutional 
standard operational procedures for similar events.  END 
COMMENT. 
CROCKER