VZCZCXRO8455
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2687/01 2250737
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 130737Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2759
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002687 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM KJUS PGOV PINS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD'S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM -- OVERTAXED AND 
GETTING WORSE 
 
REF: 06 BAGHDAD 4572 
 
¶1. (U) This is a Baghdad PRT reporting cable. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary: Judicial investigators and investigative 
judges, and personnel at the Iraqi Bar Association (IBA), the 
Iraqi Jurists Union (IJU), local police stations, and 
provincial courthouses consistently tell the PRT Baghdad Rule 
(ROL) of Law Team that they are over-worked and under-paid, 
and lack protection, training and support.  In addition, 
judges and police officials assert that current GOI training 
and support is inadequate to handle the volume of criminal 
activity and detainees.  The lack of due process and 
procedural transparency further degrade security, detainee 
management, and legal adherence.  This failure by an 
overwhelmed criminal justice system is undermining efforts to 
establish credible rule of law in Baghdad.  End summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Background: The Iraqi Bar Association (IBA) and the 
Iraqi Jurists Union (IJU) are key non-governmental and 
governmental actors in Iraqi rule of law.  Founded in 1933, 
the IBA is a standout Iraqi legal association with its 
inclusive approach to ethnicity and Islamic sect.  Similarly, 
the IJU claims more than 504,000 members throughout Iraq, 
including Jews, Christians, Arabs, and Kurdish lawyers. 
Unlike the IBA, which is wholly comprised of lawyers in 
private practice, IJU membership has included governmental 
lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and judicial investigators 
since its founding in 1962.  The IJU is a member of the 
larger Arab Jurist Union, whose current President is an Iraqi 
citizen.  With offices and membership across Iraq, the IJU 
has access to resources nationwide resources, and sponsors 
two law schools in Basra and Balad.  The IBA and the IJU 
expressed admiration for the US judicial system and welcomed 
USG assistance in building the Iraqi legal system into a 
modern, transparent, and functional entity.  Leadership in 
both organizations, however, expressed ongoing frustration 
that such support is at best sporadic.  End background. 
 
Curriculum-Based Training Critical for Investigative Judges 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Iraqi ROL stakeholders reported that inadequately 
trained  investigative judges are not processing cases in 
accordance with Iraqi criminal law, or in a manner 
appropriate to the major crimes and terrorism-related 
offenses impacting Baghdad today.  The IJU claimed that 
inadequate training and experience--based largely on pre-2003 
models and compounded by de-Baathification and an antiquated 
court structure--has limited the mentorship of 
newly-appointed investigative judges from more experienced 
colleagues.  As a result, inexperienced investigative judges 
often defer decisions to release or move detainees to trial 
for fear of making the wrong choice.  Baghdad investigative 
judges and judicial investigators, alongside other ROL 
stakeholders, agreed that curriculum-based instruction, 
rather than ad hoc, on-the-job training, is critical to 
addressing the deficit in professional confidence and 
competence. 
 
Poor Logistical Support 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Judicial investigators across Baghdad reported that 
logistical constraints, overwhelming case loads, and poor 
security have dramatically reduced the number of 
investigations closed or moved forward for trial.  They lack 
basic investigative tools such as cameras and plastic 
evidence bags as well as other equipment necessary to support 
investigations.  For example, the four judicial investigators 
at Baghdad,s Bab al-Muatham police station in the al-Rusafa 
district carry an extraordinary caseload (approximately 500 
cases each) as compared to their colleagues in neighboring 
police stations.  The Iraqi Judicial Branch, known as the 
Higher Juridical Council (HJC), does not provide vehicles, 
fuel, phones or other basic operating tools, nor does the HJC 
fund job-related expenses.  As a result, judicial 
investigators often pay for work-related expenses out of 
their own pocket in order to do their job.  (Note: Judicial 
Investigators earn approximately 350,000 dinars (USD 235) per 
month.  End note.)  For example, some judicial investigators 
must personally pay for juveniles to undergo the Age 
Determination Process.  Iraqi Police no longer provide an 
escort to judicial investigators to crime scenes or to locate 
witnesses.  Judicial investigators asserted that these 
constraints preclude them from leaving their local police 
stations altogether. 
 
Inconsistent Backing from Iraqi Security Forces 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
BAGHDAD 00002687  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Further complicating the efficacy of the criminal 
justice system is a widely demonstrated lack of respect for 
the judiciary by Iraqi Security Forces.  At Bab al Muatham, 
co-located with a Joint Security Station (JSS), Iraqi Army 
units recently took over the judicial investigators, offices 
in the station without sufficient notice or cause.  Judicial 
investigators and investigative judges reported feeling 
marginalized at their police stations, blaming a lack of 
respect and understanding for their role.  Consistently, 
judicial investigators reported little direct contact with 
investigative judges located at other stations.  (Note: 
judicial investigators report to investigative judges.  End 
note.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) The experience at Bab al Muatham LPS stands in 
contrast to al-Sa,adoun LPS, also located in Baghdad,s 
al-Rusafa district, where judicial investigators reported a 
good working relationship with police investigators, 
investigative judges, and local prosecutors.  As a result, 
al- Sa,adoun,s judicial investigators, who labor under the 
same equipment and technical support deficits, only carry an 
average 75 cases each and generally complete their 
investigations within three months.  Such localized 
disparity, particularly within the same district, appears 
driven by the local police,s opinion of the Judiciary,s 
professional competence and enforcement capabilities, rather 
than sectarian differences. 
 
Overcrowding at Detention Facilities 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Inadequate training, logistical obstacles and a poor 
relationship with police has degraded the ability of 
investigative judges to issue orders for release or trial, 
which is adding to serious overcrowding in detention 
facilities across Baghdad.  (Note: this is helping to 
perpetuate a juvenile detention crisis reported SEPTEL.  End 
note.)  Baghdad ROL stakeholders claim that the myriad of 
problems facing judicial investigators and investigative 
judges is resulting in detainees being held without any 
action or disposition for time periods in excess of the 
limits of Iraqi law.  Both judges and police assessed that 
fair and timely case processing will greatly reduce the need 
for more detention facilities. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Implementing effective training programs and 
facilitating professional mentorship for Baghdad judicial 
investigators and investigative judges is essential to case 
quality and management.  While approximately 1,000 judges 
across Iraq receive Coalition training, nearly 
40,000--including judicial investigators and investigative 
judges--do not benefit from such programs.  Increased support 
from the HJC to district level investigative judges and 
judicial investigators can also increase broader 
understanding of their role among Iraqi security forces. 
These steps will work to provide relief to overcrowded 
detention facilities, and renew professional and popular 
confidence in the Baghdad criminal justice system.  End 
comment. 
CROCKER