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Viewing cable 07ANKARA1992, TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION: WHAT IT MEANS AND WHAT WE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07ANKARA1992 2007-08-03 06:06 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO0105
PP RUEHDA
DE RUEHAK #1992/01 2150606
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 030606Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3257
INFO RUEHDA/AMCONSUL ADANA PRIORITY 2187
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 3106
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001992 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
SECSTATE FOR EUR/PPD, EUR/SE, R, INFO EUR DAS GRAFFY, EUR 
DAS BRYZA, IIP, ECA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL KPAO TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION: WHAT IT MEANS AND WHAT WE 
CAN DO ABOUT IT 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: This year's Pew poll confirmed what many 
already knew -- Turks are angry about US policies.  Negative 
opinion has increased over the past four years, exacerbated 
by the situation in Iraq and perceived US inaction toward the 
PKK. Negative Turkish public opinion has gone beyond policy 
to criticism of American intentions and society, but it is 
not yet endemic anti-Americanism.  Reversing this trend will 
not be easy or quick. We will pursue a three-pronged effort 
combining policy advocacy, broader engagement, and practical 
projects that build on the continued draw of US strengths in 
science, business and education.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) A LITANY OF NEGATIVE VIEWS:  The Pew poll reported 
that only nine percent of Turks had favorable views of the 
U.S., three percent less than in 2006 and a 43 percent drop 
from 2000.  This placed Turkey last among the 47 nations 
surveyed, below even the most critical European nation 
(Germany, with 30 percent) and Muslim-majority communities 
(the Palestinian Territories with 13 percent, and Pakistan 
and Morocco at 15 percent).  Eighty-nine percent of the 
polled Turks said they had little or no confidence in 
President Bush to do what is right in foreign affairs. 
Seventy-seven percent worried that the US could become a 
military threat to Turkey, and 64 percent named the US as the 
country that poses the greatest threat to Turkey in the 
future. 
 
3.  (SBU) Turkish anger toward the US is fuelled by a belief 
that the United States is at best indifferent or ineffective 
-- and at worst, working deliberately against Turkey's 
interests -- on the top two issues of concern to Turkey right 
now: the PKK and Iraq.  Long-standing Turkish hostility to 
the PKK has been exacerbated this year by renewed PKK 
violence resulting in further Turkish civilian and military 
casualties.  Turkish contacts across the spectrum of opinion 
are united in their strong desire for immediate and visible 
measures against the PKK.  They firmly believe that the 
United States is able but unwilling to take direct action 
against the PKK, but simultaneously refuses to allow Turkey 
to take action on its own through a cross-border military 
operation into northern Iraq. 
 
4.  (SBU) On Iraq, Turkish public opinion leaders argue that 
the United States failed to listen to Turkey's advice before 
2003 and has now created a serious situation in Iraq which 
has a direct and negative impact on neighboring Turkey.  They 
believe that the US strategy in Iraq has resulted in greater 
suffering for the Iraqi people, greater instability in Iraq, 
and greater potential for a breakup which could lead to the 
creation of an independent Kurdish nation (something feared 
by most Turks). 
 
5. (SBU) While Turks are particularly critical of the United 
States, they have little love for any foreign leader, nation, 
or entity.  In the Pew poll, Turks voiced little or no 
confidence in leaders ranging from Putin and Merkel (ten 
percent confidence rating for each) to Osama bin Laden (five 
percent rating) and Ahmedinejad (21 percent),  Only 
twenty-seven percent of the Turks polled were favorable 
toward the EU (a 31 percent decrease from 2004) and 23 
percent were favorable toward the UN (a 28 percent drop from 
three years ago).  When asked to name Turkey's top three 
allies, the number one choice (Pakistan) only received 11 
percent of the "vote" -- but the US was nowhere on the list. 
 
6.  (SBU) Negative Turkish public opinion has also expanded 
beyond policy issues to more critical opinions of Americans 
and American society.  Only 13 percent of Turks polled by Pew 
are now favorable toward "Americans," and they expressed 
negative views of "American Ideas About Democracy" (81 
percent against) and "American Ways of Doing Business" (83 
percent). Eighty-six percent agreed with the statement, "It's 
bad that American ideas and customs are spreading here." 
Current Turkish public opinion is not yet equal to endemic, 
long-lasting anti-Americanism -- many Turkish citizens are 
voicing their opinions while simultaneously purchasing 
American products, applying to American universities, and 
seeking visas to visit the United States. It is also worth 
noting that U.S.-Turkish relations have recovered from 
similar low points in past decades. However, if the current 
trend continues, it could result in a generation of Turks who 
find it much easier to assume the worst about American 
policies, priorities and actions. 
 
7. (SBU) In response, Mission Turkey proposes the following 
focus for its FY-08 public diplomacy efforts: 
 
 
ANKARA 00001992  002 OF 003 
 
 
A.  (SBU) POLICY ADVOCACY:  Policy explication and advocacy 
will remain an essential component of our public diplomacy 
efforts, primarily through Turkey-based officers but also 
involving senior USG officials in Washington and other 
locations.  We will conduct advocacy through a sustained mix 
of public appearances and statements; television and print 
media interviews; private group discussions and digital video 
conferences (DVCs); and outreach efforts to institutions and 
communities beyond our Mission locations in Ankara, Istanbul, 
and Adana. 
 
(SBU) PRIORITY REQUEST:  Embassy Ankara will launch a monthly 
series of "Ambassador's Forum" policy-focused DVCs, to bring 
together State Department officials with Turkish opinion 
leaders on key topics including U.S policy in Iraq, Europe, 
South and Central Asia (particularly Afghanistan and regional 
energy cooperation issues), the Middle East Peace Process, 
and Iran.  We will seek the support and assistance of EUR, R 
and other geographic bureaus and posts to ensure USG 
participation at the appropriate level in these programs. 
 
B. (SBU) BROADER ENGAGEMENT:  Policy advocacy is critical -- 
but we cannot succeed only through policy advocacy.  In the 
current environment, programs that strengthen US-Turkish 
cultural and social ties will be of even greater importance 
for countering general negative perceptions of America.  We 
will therefore work with our colleagues in Washington and 
non-governmental partners across the United States to 
increase our cultural events, youth activities, and programs 
on economic and social issues of interest to both nations. 
We will also want to further expand the reach and capacity of 
US-Turkish academic, professional, and youth exchange 
programs, including projects designed to bring newly elected 
Turkish parliamentarians to the United States.  Our Consulate 
General in Istanbul plans to broaden its successful 
engagement with public schools on the subject of Internet 
literacy, while Mission outreach programs will include more 
events involving youth audiences. 
 
(SBU) PRIORITY REQUESTS:  We are eager to implement R's 
"Pilot Country" initiative in Turkey, as soon as anticipated 
supplemental funds are made available.  We also ask that R 
expand its valuable summer YEP (Youth Enrichment Program) 
initiative into a year-round effort in Turkey, that includes 
programs involving music and other cultural/artistic fields 
as well as sports and English-language activities. 
Furthermore, we strongly support initial efforts by R and PD 
bureaus in Washington to create new USG public diplomacy 
products and programs which reach out -- directly and 
effectively -- to the important youth audience in Turkey and 
other nations, and ask that these efforts be accelerated. 
Finally, we note the special value of American cultural 
performers in the current environment, and would welcome 
enhanced opportunities to program American cultural 
performances in Turkey. 
 
C. (SBU) BUILD ON OUR STRENGTHS: Despite the generally 
negative poll numbers, many Turkish scientists, business 
entrepreneurs, and students are eager for further engagement 
with their American counterparts.  Mission Turkey will seek 
to build on this interest in FY-08 through a series of 
targeted activities in partnership with appropriate American 
and Turkish private-sector organizations, NGOs, and 
government departments.  These could include a 
science/innovation fair initiative for Turkish students, in 
partnership with one or more American hi-tech firms; a 
program to encourage entrepreneurship in Turkey, developed 
with American innovation/investment companies; and increased 
school-to-school partnerships between Turkish and American 
high schools. 
 
(SBU)  PRIORITY REQUESTS:  We will discuss these program 
ideas with American business leaders and organizations in 
Turkey, but would also appreciate guidance from R and EUR/PPD 
on US-based public diplomacy partnerships with such groups in 
these fields. 
 
D.  (SBU) QUICK ACTION FOLLOWING POSITIVE POLICY 
DEVELOPMENTS:  Public diplomacy is a vital component of our 
diplomatic strategy in Turkey -- but it works best when 
paired with concrete policy achievements.  We will position 
our public diplomacy staff and capabilities to take immediate 
advantage of any positive developments related to the issues 
of primary concern in Turkey -- countering the PKK and 
improving the situation in Iraq.  At the same time, we will 
stay prepared for the unpleasant alternative -- that the 
bilateral relationship could get even more challenging in the 
 
ANKARA 00001992  003 OF 003 
 
 
near future due to negative developments related to the PKK, 
Iraq, or the possible passage of an Armenian Genocide 
Resolution by the House of Representatives.  In that 
situation, our public diplomacy efforts will focus on 
minimizing the immediate damage while preserving contacts and 
activities for future progress. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
MCELDOWNEY