VZCZCXRO8798
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0598/01 2012355
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 202355Z JUL 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2303
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 1404
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0818
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000598 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
ADDIS FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE REQUEST ON U.S. SUPPORT FOR 
DARFUR PEACEKEEPING 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 098138 
     ¶B. USUN NEW YORK 00580 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. On July 19, USUN delivered ref A demarche 
and Note Verbale to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) Office of Mission Support 
Assistant-Secretary-General Jane Holl Lute.  Holl Lute shared 
USG impatience over stalled deployment of the two AMIS 
infantry battalions but firmly reiterated DPKO's stance that 
funding for these battalions would be a donor, vice UN, 
responsibility.  Holl Lute nevertheless promised Ambassador 
Sanders she would request an urgent meeting with the UN 
Comptroller to explore the possibility of UN funding for the 
battalions.  In that meeting on July 20, the Comptroller 
determined that the Secretary-General (SYG) could request a 
standard pre-mandate commitment authority of $50 million for 
partial AMIS funding, on the basis of the December 19 PRST 
and subsequent SYG Reports to the Security Council on Darfur 
peacekeeping.  DPKO was emphatic that UN funding beyond troop 
costs, including paying for AMIS equipment and sustainment, 
would be an "absolute deal-breaker," as it would require the 
UN to assume responsibility for every existing African Union 
sustainment contract, as well as to defend this action to the 
UN Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions (ACABQ), resulting in a lag of four to six months. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Participants in the July 19 demarche included: USUN 
Ambassador Jackie Sanders, Acting PolCouns, Poloff, MSC LTC 
Glenn Sadowski, PM Officer Mike Smith, DPKO A/SYG Jane Holl 
Lute, DPKO Africa Division Director Dmitry Titov, DPKO Senior 
Political Officer Mike Gaouette, DPKO Military Planning 
Service Chief COL Ian Sinclair, and DPKO Logistics Support 
Division Director Max Kerley. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Ambassador Sanders called for immediate deployment 
of the two additional infantry battalions (one from Rwanda, 
one from Nigeria) required as force protection for AMIS in 
Darfur.  A/SYG Holl Lute shared Ambassador Sanders' 
impatience over this stalled deployment, which, according to 
what she was told by the AMIS Deputy Force Commander when 
visiting Darfur earlier this month, was on account of lack of 
accommodations.  Holl Lute remarked that this excuse did not 
seem valid, given the relative obscurity of the need for 
hard-wall accommodations for infantry battalions.  She added 
that she would be willing to push the Rwandan and Nigerian 
Missions in New York to accept tented accommodations to 
expedite the process. 
 
¶4. (SBU) COL Sinclair noted that the lack of APCs impacted 
the battalions' deployment, since Egypt's one-time offer to 
provide these assets was no longer tenable.  Sinclair said 
that in June DPKO had asked Rwanda and Nigeria to source 
their own APCs when their battalions deployed; Rwanda could 
provide 18, reimbursable by the UN, but Sinclair said Nigeria 
seemed to be "less forward-leaning" on the proposal.  Smith 
concurred, adding that Nigeria's overall equipment posture 
presented considerable problems.  With these constraints in 
mind, A/SYG Holl Lute asked for an update on the state of 
training and preparing of these two battalions. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ambassador Sanders inquired about Joint Special 
Representative Adada's and Force Commander Agwai's readiness 
to utilize the additional battalions.  A/SYG Holl Lute cited 
helicopter mobility as a major challenge to Adada's work but 
hoped the issue would be resolved during the week of July 23. 
 Director Titov said that DPKO was encouraging Adada to spend 
as much time as possible in El Fasher, noting concerns Adada 
had raised about the "aloofness" of the humanitarian 
community in Darfur (ref B); non-payment of AMIS troop 
salaries, which made the incoming battalions reluctant to 
provide reinforcement; and lack of a communications 
framework.  In response to Poloff's inquiry about Adada's 
staffing needs, Titov said that the pool of applicants was 
over 90 personnel, and he expressed hope that they could 
deploy quickly, adding that money was available and that 
recruitment was ongoing. 
 
¶6. (SBU) DPKO Officer Gaouette reported an upcoming African 
Union (AU) leadership seminar in Khartoum in August to 
discuss technical issues associated with hybrid staffing and 
maintenance (e.g. Mission Subsistence Allowance).  A/SYG Holl 
Lute reported a level of uncertainty among UN staff about the 
uniformity of rules governing UN and AU personnel to serve in 
Darfur.  She mentioned that a team from the UN Logistics Base 
in Brindisi would be conducting a week-long induction 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000598  002 OF 003 
 
 
training for incoming AU staff. 
 
¶7. (SBU) On the issue of an October 1 transition date, 
Director Titov agreed with Ambassador Sanders on the need for 
an early transfer of authority from AMIS to the hybrid, not 
least for troop reimbursement reasons.  However, Titov warned 
that any transfer was predicated on the presence of a support 
system to provide a minimum of assistance to incoming 
personnel.  A/SYG Holl Lute thought an October 1 transition 
date would only switch AMIS to UN control without creating 
noticeable changes on the ground, thus damaging UN 
credibility from the outset and deflecting UN civilian staff 
attention from creating a foundation for hybrid support to 
absorption of AMIS shortfalls.  She further elaborated that 
Heavy Support Package (HSP) assets still remained held up at 
Port Sudan and that contracts with PA&E were still being 
costed, thus delaying the process. 
 
¶8. (SBU) On funding the additional battalions, A/SYG Holl 
Lute stressed this was a donor responsibility, since the HSP 
ceiling was already fixed as part of the deal struck with 
Khartoum to assure UN assistance to AMIS.  To re-open this 
agreement would require both Sudanese and AU input, making 
it, as LSD Chief Kerley pointed out, a political question. 
Holl Lute also added that the battalions were not covered in 
UN-approved funding for the HSP, necessitating a 
re-initiation of funding processes if the issue were to be 
re-opened. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ambassador Sanders pushed DPKO to identify a way 
forward on this UN funding issue, and Director Titov 
speculated a request could be made by the SYG to the Council 
explaining the urgency of deploying the battalions and of 
using UN funding to do so.  Titov cautioned that such a 
procedure would require prior consultations with Sudan, 
Rwanda, Nigeria, and the AU, which could result in a 
considerable time lag, especially if Khartoum opposed the 
deployment.  A/SYG Holl Lute committed to requesting an 
urgent meeting with the UN Comptroller to explore the 
possibility of UN funding for the battalions and to discuss 
possible complications such an arrangement could present, 
particularly in putting new UN-funded AMIS troops 
side-by-side with existing unpaid AMIS troops. 
 
10 (SBU) That meeting took place on July 20, and the 
Comptroller determined that the SYG could request a standard 
pre-mandate commitment authority (PMCA) of $50 million for 
partial AMIS funding, on the basis of the December 19 PRST 
(S/PRST/2006/55) and subsequent SYG Reports to the Security 
Council on Darfur peacekeeping.  The SYG would then request 
the Council President via an exchange of letters for the 
PMCA, which the President could then authorize; DPKO will 
provide necessary language for this authorization.  From 
there the Comptroller would approach the ACABQ with details 
of areas to be funded by the UN. 
 
¶11. (SBU) This "wishlist," according to DPKO, would cover all 
troop reimbursement costs for the two battalions and the 
7,700 AMIS troops.  However, DPKO was emphatic that UN 
funding beyond troop costs (which amounts to $1028 per 
soldier per month), including paying for AMIS equipment and 
sustainment, would be an "absolute deal-breaker," as it would 
require the UN to assume responsibility for every existing 
African Union sustainment contract.  Assuming this 
responsibility would also require DPKO to defend this action 
to the ACABQ, resulting in a lag of four to six months.  DPKO 
stressed that without the necessary command and control 
structures in place, as well as the support system Titov 
described in the July 19 meeting, UN assumption of all AMIS 
costs would have "massive negative material impact" and would 
result only in retaining the same (poor) quality force for 
the next four to six months. 
 
¶12. (SBU) COMMENT. Ambassador Sanders appealed to A/SYG Holl 
Lute to view the deployment of the two battalions as a 
problem requiring the attention of all involved parties, 
rather than as a purely donor community issue.  Holl Lute's 
insistence that DPKO has presumed donors would pay these 
troops reflects an unfortunate DPKO versus donor mentality, 
especially, as Director Titov admitted, when a donor 
community arrearage of four months in paying existing AMIS 
troops should have put DPKO on notice that donor funds were 
running out.  Evidencing DPKO understanding of the limits of 
donor support, Holl Lute called Ambassador Sanders on July 20 
informing that DPKO was actively revisiting the financing of 
the battalions.  END COMMENT. 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000598  003 OF 003 
 
 
KHALILZAD