VZCZCXRO8787
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0596/01 2012321
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 202321Z JUL 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2299
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1400
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY 1167
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0861
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0816
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0633
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0312
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000596 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CD PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: STILL NO CLEAR UN PLAN FOR CHAD/CAR PEACEKEEPING 
 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000596  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. At July 13 United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) consultations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) Under-Secretary-General Guehenno revealed a revised 
proposal for deployment of UN civilian police and Chadian 
gendarmes in eastern Chad/northeastern CAR, based around a 
French/European Union military deployment.  Details remained 
sketchy, particularly with regard to force numbers, and UN 
DPKO Military Chief COL Ian Sinclair told USUN privately that 
details of the operation were preliminary only and that the 
French/EU were awaiting authorization from the GAERC on July 
23 simply to proceed with planning.  French Permanent 
Representative (PR) de La Sabliere expressed hope that the 
Council would authorize the police component but noted that 
the plan still necessitated EU and Chadian buy-in, 
particularly on an exit strategy or transition to a more 
conventional security presence.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DPKO: CHAD/CAR DEPLOYMENT IS A "MOVING TARGET WITH CHANGING 
CIRCUMSTANCES" 
 
¶2. (SBU) At July 13 UNSC consultations, DPKO 
Under-Secretary-General (U/SYG) Guehenno revealed a revised 
proposal for deployment of UN civilian police in eastern 
Chad/northeastern CAR, based around a French/European Union 
military deployment, motivated by what Guehenno called six 
weeks of targeted violence resulting in a serious 
deterioration in humanitarian efforts.  Guehenno reported a 
June 10 agreement between French FM Kouchner and Chadian 
President Deby that resulted in Deby's acceptance of the need 
for a military force to provide wide-area security through 
French/EU military deployment and in the recognition at the 
June 25 Darfur Ministerial in Paris of this acceptance. 
 
¶3. (SBU) U/SYG Guehenno described the UN's revised proposal 
in line with the French/Chadian agreement, which was based on 
a 12-month EU military deployment of battalion size, after 
which a possible UN successor operation would be put in 
place.  An assessment would be conducted after six months, 
and Guehenno considered it important to evaluate "benchmarks 
and milestones," especially given events in Darfur, which he 
considered would have a material impact on regional security. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Acknowledging that the revised UN deployment plan 
was a "moving target with changing circumstances," U/SYG 
Guehenno described its principal objectives as deployment of: 
1) a multidimensional presence that would include UN police 
and liaison officers; 2) Chadian gendarmes and police 
screened, selected and trained by the UN to maintain law and 
order around refugee camps, IDP locations and sites of 
humanitarian activities; and 3) an EU force, with 
"significant" French participation, to protect civilians at 
risk and to facilitate provision of humanitarian assistance. 
Guehenno elaborated that the military component would seek to 
reduce tensions, defuse conflict and provide security 
coverage for the UN personnel deployed.  Cross-border 
activities, Guehenno stressed, would not be a focus of the 
force's activities.  U/SYG Guehenno explained that EU 
infantry battalions would conduct land and air patrols to 
expand the zone for humanitarian operations and recommended 
that they be mandated to use all necessary means to 
accomplish this goal.  Guehenno said that advance medical, 
engineering and logistics units would be necessary for 
deployment of the military force. 
 
¶5. (SBU) On the police side, the goal would be for a 
contingent of 300 UN police officers to enhance capabilities 
of approximately 850 Chadian police and gendarmes, to provide 
effective police services and to assist the GOC in 
establishing law enforcement activities.  Guehenno said an 
MOU would be signed between the UN and Chadian forces to 
delineate responsibilities, which on the UN side would 
include upgrading facilities, providing basic accommodations 
and equipment and paying a stipend based on local scales. 
Guehenno emphasized the importance of pre-deployment training 
for the UN police officers selected.  Guehenno said he would 
brief the EU in Brussels on July 17 and would present 
"concrete proposals" to the Council in the following weeks. 
 
FRANCE ADMITS NOT DONE DEAL 
 
¶6. (SBU) French PR de La Sabliere said President Deby 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000596  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
understood the need for a military presence around the 
refugee camps but was still reluctant to cede this 
responsibility to the UN.  He stated that Chadian and EU 
agreement on the plan was still outstanding and looked to 
U/SYG Guehenno's visit to Brussels as a good lobbying 
opportunity.  De La Sabliere expressed hope that the Council 
would authorize the police mission and recommended that the 
future resolution address the issue of a successor presence 
"since Deby is changing his mind so much."  De La Sabliere 
acknowledged that Libya was an obstacle to an international 
force on the eastern Chad border and urged the Council to be 
"innovative" in its thinking if the EU and/or the GOC failed 
to agree the proposed plan. 
 
¶7. (SBU) USUN Acting PolCouns pressed U/SYG Guehenno for 
military analysis of the plan, and Guehenno responded that 
French, EU and DPKO military planners were discussing the 
proposals, with differences emerging in force numbers due to 
details of respective troop-to-task breakdowns (NOTE: DPKO 
COL Ian Sinclair told USUN privately after consultations that 
planning and discussions were only preliminary and that the 
UN and France were awaiting a signal from the July 23 GAERC 
to authorize them to continue planning.  END NOTE). 
 
¶8. (SBU) Acting PolCouns inquired about funding for the 
proposed plan, especially given that the UN refused overall 
command and control of the operation (a detail Guehenno 
omitted from his council presentation but shared privately in 
advance of the meeting with Poloff).  Guehenno considered 
that using Chadian gendarmes was a way to alleviate the 
financial burden the expansion of UN peacekeeping operations 
was placing on Members.  He said that gendarmes were cheaper 
to deploy than international police ($1000s of monthly 
Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA) for UN personnel versus 
$100s of monthly MSA for non-UN personnel) and reported that 
this funding was envisioned through assessed contributions. 
On the issue of command and control, Guehenno advised a 
unified military approach, especially given the planned 
deployment around Birao in northeastern CAR. 
KHALILZAD