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O 162218Z JUL 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
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INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000580 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ET PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: HYBRID JOINT SPECIAL REP SEEMS SHAKY 
ON TASKS AHEAD 
 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000580  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a July 16 discussion with Ambassador 
Khalilzad, Joint Special Representative (JSR) Rodolphe Adada 
offered no assurance that he would be able to reconcile 
competing strategic directives from the United Nations (UN) 
and the African Union (AU) over administration of the hybrid 
operation in Darfur were such a situation to arise.  Adada's 
Special Assistant told Poloff privately that Adada had "big 
concerns" over hybrid management.  UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Poloff separately 
characterized Adada's concerns as involving his desire to 
bring all humanitarian activities in Darfur under the hybrid 
umbrella, despite the traditional reluctance on the part of 
the humanitarian community there to affiliate itself with an 
operation of a military nature.  Adada will be in Washington 
on July 17 and is seeking meetings with A/S Frazer and others 
as appropriate.  Adada will then travel to London, Lisbon, 
Brussels and Cairo before returning to Sudan o/a July 27. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Participants in this meeting were JSR Adada, Adada's 
Special Assistant Omar Kane (Mauritania), Ambassador 
Khalilzad, Ambassador Sanders and Poloff. 
 
¶3. (SBU) In a July 16 discussion with Ambassador Khalilzad, 
JSR Adada emphasized the importance of including in the 
hybrid draft resolution a reference to the June 12 Addis 
Ababa high-level technical discussion between the AU, UN and 
the Sudanese Government of National Unity (GNU).  When asked 
by Ambassador Khalilzad whether these discussions reflected a 
substantive change in focus with regard to the AU-UN June 5 
report on the hybrid, Adada said firmly no.  Adada mentioned 
he had met with African members of the Security Council with 
AU Commission Chairperson Konare on July 13 but offered no 
read-out, other than to say the participants were still 
trying to sell key aspects of the draft resolution to Sudan. 
 
¶4. (SBU) JSR Adada made clear that Chapter VII and command 
and control language should be included in the draft 
resolution text.  When asked by Ambassador Sanders about how 
he would respond in the event he received conflicting 
strategic directives from AU and UN leadership with regard to 
hybrid operations, Adada offered no concrete assurance he 
could reconcile the two, saying, "But they (the AU and the 
UN) have to agree.  If not . . . This could not happen. 
There is no solution."  Adada agreed with Ambassador 
Khalilzad that this possibility spoke to the need for a 
single chain of command to the Force Commander. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Adada's assistant Kane emphasized two main points 
important to the JSR.  First was the need to support the 
AU-UN roadmap for the Darfur political process and to take 
into account new IDP movements and emerging Arab community 
leadership.  Second, Kane stressed that development 
activities, particularly in the realms of medical, economic, 
education, health and water assistance must occur in parallel 
with this peace effort.  Kane acknowledged USG efforts in the 
field in Darfur in this regard and called for their 
continuation.  When asked how reported GNU allocation of 
Darfur lands to non-Darfuri Arabs could affect these 
development goals, Adada claimed to know nothing about such 
activities, although Kane admitted this type of activity was 
a problem. 
 
¶6. (SBU) JSR Adada told USUN he planned to return to Sudan 
o/a July 27, with stops on the way in London, Lisbon, 
Brussels and Cairo (NOTE: DPKO Poloff told Poloff privately 
that it was difficult to convince Adada, a former FM of the 
Republic of Congo, of the need for him to be in El Fasher, 
rather than in some other more comfortable locale. 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT. Adada's Special Assistant told Poloff 
privately that Adada had "big concerns" over hybrid 
management, which DPKO Poloff separately clarified to be 
Adada's desire to bring all humanitarian activities in Darfur 
under the hybrid umbrella, despite the traditional reluctance 
on the part of the humanitarian community there to affiliate 
itself with an operation of a military nature.  DPKO noted 
that this insistence was not where Adada would be facing his 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000580  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
most daunting challenges in Darfur, citing his 
responsibilities for the day-to-day management of an over 
20,000-troop force once the hybrid was stood up.  Adada 
indeed has his work cut out for him, and it was not clear to 
USUN that he fully grasps the nuances of the road ahead in 
Darfur.  His meetings in Washington could be very useful in 
ensuring that he is more completely aware of and prepared for 
the task of managing the hybrid.  END COMMENT. 
KHALILZAD