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OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR
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DE RUCNDT #0579/01 1972217
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 162217Z JUL 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2269
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 1388
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE 1155
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0856
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0802
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0630
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0307
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 000579 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM TIGHTENS GRIP ON AU AND UNSC OVER HYBRID 
 
REF: USUN NEW YORK 000340 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000579  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The extent of the influence of Sudan's 
Government of National Unity (GNU) over the hybrid draft 
resolution was apparent during July 13 meetings at the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) in which African Union (AU) 
Commission Chairperson Konare participated.  In a private 
meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad prior to the UNSC session, 
Konare urged the USG to recognize GNU efforts on Darfur and 
to create a new environment of trust.  He said compromise was 
needed on the draft text to allay GNU "apprehensions" about 
mentioning Chapter VII and UNSCR 1706.  Konare warned that 
these references in any draft would result in an impasse on 
adopting the text.  In the follow-on "informal dialogue" 
between Konare and the full Council, South Africa, Congo, 
Russia, Indonesia, Qatar and China all railed against the 
draft text against the draft text, insisting that it focus 
only on mandating the hybrid; Qatari Permanent Representative 
(PR) al-Nasser went so far as to say the draft should be 
"completely re-worked," a statement suggesting Qatar might 
repeat the tactic it employed during April negotiations on 
the UNMIS mandate renewal resolution of floating a competing 
text (reftel).  This intense pressure proved too much for 
Ghana, which announced it would no longer co-sponsor the 
resolution.  No further Experts Meetings on the draft text 
have been scheduled.  Ambassador Khalilzad will have separate 
meetings on July 16 with Joint Special Representative 
Rodolphe Adada and Sudanese PR Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
KONARE ARTICULATES KHARTOUM'S DEMANDS ON DRAFT RESOLUTION 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad met on July 13 with AU 
Commission Chairperson Konare, who was accompanied by AU 
Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit, AU Mission PR 
Lila Ratsfandrihamanana and Special Assistant Abdoul Kader 
Toure.  Ambassador Khalilzad pushed Konare for his support on 
the hybrid draft resolution, specifically asking him to agree 
to proceed as quickly as possible, to specify a single UN 
chain of command (with strategic directives coming from the 
AU and the UN but operational instructions coming only from 
the UN) and to mandate the force under Chapter VII. 
Ambassador Khalilzad sought clarification from Konare on the 
deployment of two additional battalions for Heavy Support 
Package force protection and on African troop generation for 
the hybrid.  Ambassador Khalilzad emphasized that the USG 
harbored no ill will toward the GNU and wanted to work 
constructively on the problem of Darfur, which both the USG 
and the GNU had a mutual interest in solving. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Konare expressed appreciation for Ambassador 
Khalilzad's message, as well as for the reception he had 
received in Washington on July 11.  On timelines, Konare 
stressed the need for all to move quickly on the hybrid, 
especially the UN which he commented "was not easy to work 
with" (NOTE: The UN levels the same charge against the AU. 
END NOTE).  Konare agreed with Ambassador Khalilzad on the 
necessity for unity of command and control for the hybrid and 
said that specifying this in the resolution would not be a 
problem.  In agreeing with these two points, however, Konare 
urged the USG to recognize GNU efforts on Darfur without 
writing the GNU a "blank check" absolving it from any 
responsibility for the security situation on the ground, and 
to create a new environment of trust with Khartoum. 
 
¶4. (SBU) To achieve this trust, Konare said the UNSC must 
consider Sudan's "apprehensions" on the draft resolution, 
which, according to Konare, were three-fold. First, the 
resolution should take into account the "clarifications" made 
on the hybrid during June 11-12 AU-UN-GNU technical 
discussions in Addis Ababa (NOTE: Konare did not specify what 
these clarifications were when asked by Ambassador Khalilzad. 
 END NOTE).  Second, the resolution should avoid reference to 
Chapter VII, which Konare called politically important for 
the USG but just as sensitive for the GNU.  Ambassador 
Khalilzad pointed out the philosophical divide among Members 
on this issue and stressed that the debate was not 
Sudan-specific.  Ambassador Khalilzad warned that it would be 
difficult for us to be flexible on this point, given the need 
to justify to Congress a peacekeeping operation of the 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000579  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
hybrid's size and cost.  UKUN later reported to Poloff that 
Djinnit told the UK he did not expect Chapter VII to 
ultimately be a show-stopper on the draft.  Finally, the GNU 
wanted deleted mention of resolutions not accepted by 
Khartoum; i.e., UNSCR 1706.  Konare emphasized that both the 
AU and the GNU were anxious for the UNSC to adopt the hybrid 
resolution as soon as possible and warned that failing to 
consider Khartoum's concerns would result in an impasse on 
adoption of the text. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad solicited Konare's assistance 
in maintaining African ownership of the draft resolution, 
mentioning the fact that Ghana was under pressure from 
unknown sources to abandon its co-sponsorship (NOTE: Ghana 
announced in subsequent Council consultations that on 
instructions from Accra, it could no longer co-sponsor the 
draft.  END NOTE).  Konare agreed that AU leadership was 
"fundamental" and said he would meet with African UNSC 
Members to try to reach agreement on a position.  Konare said 
Ghana would be perceived as being controlled by the UK if it 
maintained its co-sponsorship while divisions in positions 
with other African Council Members persisted.  "If the 
Africans aren't united," Konare warned, "then it's good for 
Sudan." 
 
KHARTOUM'S COUNCIL ALLIES DID ITS BIDDING 
----------------------------------------- 
¶6. (SBU) In a subsequent meeting with the full Council, 
Chairperson Konare called for the speedy adoption of the 
hybrid draft resolution, for the acceleration of hybrid 
deadlines and for the consolidation of "burgeoning trust" 
with the GNU, reiterating the need to assure the GNU the 
Council had no hidden agenda and that the Addis Ababa 
"clarifications" must be incorporated into the text.  He 
expressed hope that the resolution would be adopted by 
consensus.  Khartoum's Council allies (South Africa, Congo, 
Russia, Indonesia, Qatar and China) then took turns railing 
against the draft text, insisting that it focus solely on 
mandating the hybrid.  South African PR Kumalo charged that 
the draft should reflect the mandate provided by the AU PSC 
in its June 22 communiqu and not try to be an "omnibus 
resolution" as he said the current draft attempts.  He warned 
against refining issues like command and control in the text, 
debate which would serve only to bog down Experts' 
discussions, delay adoption until August and risk a 
non-consensus decision. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The representatives of Congo, Russia and Indonesia 
agreed with Kumalo that the draft resolution should avoid 
addressing issues other than simply authorizing the hybrid 
operation, which Congolese PR Gayama added should be under 
Chapter VIII and based on the June 11-12 agreements and the 
November 16 Addis Ababa conclusions.  Russian Deputy PR 
Dolgov advised that the resolution focus on providing a 
"reasonable, feasible and effective" mandate and on sending a 
positive signal to Darfur parties to support the political 
process and implement the AU-UN roadmap.  Dolgov warned 
against the Council's creating "complexities we might 
regret."  The Indonesian delegate suggested deferring other 
Darfur concerns to a subsequent resolution and to focus in 
this one on empowering the GNU to deal with its Darfur 
problem. 
 
¶8. (SBU) More ominous comments came from Qatari PR al-Nasser, 
who went so far as to say the draft needed to be "completely 
re-worked" in line with the AU PSC June 22 communiqu and 
under Chapter VIII (COMMENT: This statement suggested Qatar 
might repeat the tactic it employed during April negotiations 
on the UNMIS mandate renewal resolution of floating its own 
competing text to mandate this force, as it did during reftel 
negotiations.  END COMMENT).  Al-Nasser also said the draft 
should not put Darfur rebels on the same level as the GNU, 
"humiliate Sudan" by threatening sanctions without a 
recommendation from the Panel of Experts or in any way 
discredit the GNU with which it should instead be seeking to 
build confidence.  He thought a Chapter VIII reference would 
be the appropriate vehicle for launching a regional solution 
to the Darfur issue.  Chinese PR and current UNSC President 
Wang called the draft resolution "a big disappointment" that 
failed to reflect the current momentum generated with the GNU 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000579  003 OF 003 
 
 
on resolving the Darfur issue.  He warned Members against 
behaving like "spoilers." 
 
STRONG EUROPEAN INTERVENTIONS 
----------------------------- 
¶9. (SBU) Belgian PR Verbeke and Slovakian PR Burian made 
strong interventions in support of the draft resolution, 
stressing the need for unity of command and control and the 
need for sufficient mandate clarity to allow the hybrid to 
adequately address the situation on the ground.  Burian 
called on the GNU to contribute to this climate of 
confidence-building by removing obstacles to hybrid 
deployment.  French PR de La Sabliere agreed with the point 
that the hybrid force must be effective in protecting 
civilians and argued that the resolution must consider the 
"comprehensive policy" regarding Sudan.  He spoke to the need 
for a consensus text.  Arguing in favor of retaining the 
Chapter VII reference and language on clear command and 
control, UK Deputy PR Pierce stressed that the hybrid must be 
based on "sound peacekeeping principles" to avoid failure on 
the ground, and she shared de La Sabliere's view that the 
resolution take into account all aspects of the Darfur 
situation. 
 
SOMALIA 
------- 
¶10. (SBU) Belgium, France and Italy pressed Konare for 
details on how the AU PSC would likely proceed when AMISOM,s 
mandate expired at the end of August.  Italian PR Spatafora 
criticized the AU for failing to full deploy AMISOM forces, 
commenting, "A lot was promised, but so far all we see are 
two battalions of Ugandans.  Before the Council takes up this 
issue again, we need to start looking at what has gone wrong 
and how we can get AMISOM to stand up."  Konare did not 
comment on whether the AU PSC would renew AMISOM,s mandate, 
but said that AMISOM had been prevented from fully deploying 
by the lack of logistical and technical support from UN 
Member States.  (COMMENT: While Konare clearly did not want 
to speculate on the whether the AU PSC would renew AMISOM,s 
mandate, Ghanaian and South African colleagues have told 
Poloff that the AU PSC may decide to give AMISOM a 
three-month renewal as a means of pressuring the UNSC to take 
stronger action on Somalia.  END COMMENT.) 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
¶11. (SBU) Khartoum has clearly been doing its legwork in 
rallying support against the hybrid draft resolution.  As of 
now, UKUN has not proposed a new date for Experts Meetings on 
the text to resume.  Ambassador Khalilzad will meet with the 
Sudanese PR on July 16 to address GNU problems with the text, 
and this type of outreach will undoubtedly be required on a 
sustained basis to counter the Council bloc Khartoum has 
built in support of its position.  It will also require 
significant outreach with African Council Members to get 
Ghana back on board as a co-sponsor.  Without the AU 
President endorsing the AU-UN hybrid resolution, we face a 
real credibility crisis that could be easily exploited by one 
of Khartoum's friends on the Council only too eager to step 
in; at this point, Qatar seems the likely candidate.  END 
COMMENT. 
KHALILZAD