VZCZCXYZ0035
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #1348/01 1971536
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 161536Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9824
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001348 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR LEDDY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): STATUS OF U.S. 
PRIORITIES FOR 2007 
 
This is CWC-65-07. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (U) At mid-year, a number of U.S. priorities at the OPCW 
for 2007 have been achieved.  An Executive Council chairman 
very supportive of the U.S. was selected.  The Director 
General proposed a 2008 budget with zero nominal growth and 
increased funding for inspector training.  The Technical 
Secretariat is quietly continuing to work on its ability to 
 
SIPDIS 
investigate allegations of CW use.  Preparations for the 
Second Review Conference have advanced at a steady pace, and 
without problems. 
 
¶2.  (U) Some priorities will require extensive work if they 
are to be achieved by the end of the year.  The proposed 2008 
budget has no increase in OCPF inspections, and China will 
strongly oppose any substantial increase.  Article VII 
implementation is moving ahead smartly, but specific progress 
toward achievement of "20 in 10" has been disappointing.  Due 
to objections from South Africa, New Zealand and Iran, an 
agreement on nil declarations is just not in the cards. 
Finally, the issue of whether Russia has completed 
destruction of 20 per cent of its stockpile is still 
unresolved (which may not be the worst outcome for either the 
U.S. or Russia), although it is difficult to predict whether 
this may change in the autumn, based on a number of factors, 
including whether or not the second stage at Maradykovsky is 
operational before the November Conference of States Parties. 
 End Summary. 
 
-------- 
EC CHAIR 
-------- 
 
¶3.  (U) Iranian interest in becoming the EC Chair was firmly 
but quietly deflected.  Philippine Ambassador Arguelles, who 
has worked well and closely with the U.S. delegation, was the 
Asian Group candidate who was elected EC Chairman. 
 
----------- 
2008 BUDGET 
----------- 
 
¶4.  (U) The recently released proposed 2008 budget from the 
Director General has a number of elements which are critical 
to the U.S.  Most important, it proposes a third straight ZNG 
budget.  In addition, it provides an increase in funding for 
inspector training.  Budget co-facilitators Diana Gosens 
(Netherlands) and Donggy Lee (South Korea) held an initial 
consultation on July 4, and will resume meetings on August 
¶29.  In the intervening weeks, they and the TS fully expect a 
series of detailed questions from the U.S. (and other 
delegations) for which the TS can prepare answers so that the 
autumn consultations can start up quickly and efficiently. 
 
¶5.  (U) The co-facilitators have publicly stated that their 
goal is to reach agreement on the budget by EC-50 in 
September.  While commendable, there is reason for skepticism 
that this can be achieved.  While most of the budget does not 
appear contentious, there always seems to be some topic which 
provides last-minute complications.  And at this time, there 
already appears to be a dispute on the number of proposed 
OCPF inspections.  The proposed budget keeps the same overall 
ceiling on industry inspections (200) as well as specific 
numbers for Schedule 1, 2 and 3 and OCPF inspections.  The 
DG's rationale is that with the recently announced 
modification of the OCPF site selection methodology, it would 
be best to have a "pause" and see how the TS change will 
affect these inspections. 
 
¶6.  (U) Del rep has already expressed in budget consultations 
the U.S. desire for a continuation of the increase in OCPF 
inspections, which was seconded by a number of WEOG 
delegations and Japan.  China has strongly opposed any 
increase, with support from Iran and some NAM delegations. 
 
Iran in particular has argued that there should be no 
increase in OCPF inspections until the discussions on "risk 
assessment" led by CSP Chairman Dastis (Spain) have 
concluded.  Many delegations and the Deputy DG have made 
clear they do not accept such a linkage, and have firmly 
asserted that the inspection numbers are decided in the 
budget negotiations.  While Dastis intends to have more 
meetings in the autumn, there is no chance they will generate 
consensus on the OCPF issue.  And at this time, China seems 
very firm in its opposition to any increase in OCPF 
inspections.  In short, at this point, agreement on the 
budget on the margins of the November CSP would seem the most 
likely outcome. 
 
------------------------ 
SECOND REVIEW CONFERENCE 
------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (U) The Chairman of the working group for the Second 
RevCon (Amb. Lyn Parker, UK) has pursued an appropriately 
measured pace of work.  An excessive number of meetings and 
drafting would only have resulted in documents to be 
re-hashed and re-written this autumn or next year.  However, 
we share Parker's view that work in general will need to 
intensify in the fall, and need to resume in mid-January 
¶2008.  The Chair certainly would welcome U.S. views on the 
most efficient pace and program of work for the remainder of 
¶2007. 
 
----------------- 
ALLEGED USE OF CW 
----------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) The TS has continued to steadily pursue an increased 
capability to investigate instances of alleged use of CW.  As 
the TS is already open to developing these capabilities, the 
delegation strongly recommends a continuation of this 
approach, rather than a more "political" effort, such as an 
EC decision or high-profile item in the proposed budget, 
which would generate questions and resistance from some 
delegations. 
 
----------- 
ARTICLE VII 
----------- 
 
¶9.  (U) The TS has also continued to maintain a steady, 
efficient pace in promoting full national implementation of 
Article VII obligations.  Much work remains to be done, and 
the delegation will continue to work with the TS and 
interested delegations to do more.  With regard to the 
specific benchmark of "20 in 10" put forth by Commerce A/S 
Padilla at the 2006 CSP, Japan and Australia have taken steps 
in pursuit of this goal.  However, there really has been 
little work from others on this specific initiative. 
Substantial achievement of this goal will require a major 
effort in the second half of the year, and will require a 
strong leadership effort by the U.S. and our allies.  Absent 
that kind of energetic activity, there will be minimal 
progress to report on "20 in 10" at the November CSP. 
 
---------------- 
NIL DECLARATIONS 
---------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) South Africa, New Zealand and Iran have made clear 
they will not accept a decision to adopt nil declarations. 
Del rep will continue to meet with key delegations to see if 
there is any way forward.  However, there is little reason to 
expect that a decision implementing "nil declarations" can be 
achieved.  It is still the goal of the facilitator, however, 
to achieve some manner of CSP decision on "late declarations" 
to serve as a sign of life within the Industry Cluster, and 
to show some progress on the long list of outstanding 
industry issues from the First RevCon.  The unresolved 
aspects (like "nil declarations") would be referred to the 
Second RevCon for consideration. 
 
------------------- 
RUSSIAN DESTRUCTION 
------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) It appears there is a stand-off on the specific 
issue of whether Russia has completed destruction of 20 per 
cent of its stockpile, and the larger issue of end-point of 
destruction.  The U.S. has made clear it is not ready to 
approve the Maradykovsky facility agreement and verification 
plan, particularly when the incinerator for second stage 
destruction is not yet operational.  (Note: Dominique Anelli 
of the chem demil branch at the TS recently said that he 
agreed the incinerator would not be operational before the 
September EC, so he personally expects another deferral of 
those documents.  However, he thought it would be operational 
before the November CSP.)  In return, the Russians made clear 
at EC-49 that they intend to hold all U.S. documents hostage. 
 
 
¶12.  (U) This is not a particularly pleasant situation, but 
probably better than any alternative.  The DG's statement at 
EC-49 will remain the OPCW public line on Russian 
destruction, and in view of the extensive caveats and 
explanations, is not wholly unsatisfactory.  U.S. objections 
to giving Russia credit at this point have been made clear to 
all, and most other delegations seem disinclined to take a 
stand on the issue.  Of the small group that ordinarily takes 
a strong interest in CW destruction, France and Germany seem 
to most closely share U.S. concerns.  Bilateral discussions 
with Russia during EC-49 made it quite clear that, despite 
the DG's "understanding" with Russia, Russia itself does not 
view second stage destruction as a treaty obligation, a fact 
the U.S. has shared with WEOG. 
 
¶13.  (U) While the Russians will continue to try to get 
"credit," it is not apparent they will make a big push on 
this issue before EC-50 and again, it is doubtful that 
delegations are ready to take definitive positions on this 
question.  However, should the incinerator become operational 
before the CSP, del anticipates that this will again become a 
key topic for discussion.  It was also noteworthy during 
EC-49 that Iran chose not to press the issue of whether or 
not Russia had met its 20 per cent deadline; it is still 
possible that even in the absence of an operational 
incinerator, a simple legal question from one or more 
delegations could easily spark further discussion.  Based on 
the fact that the second stage will be under TS verification, 
the TS and most delegations are supportive of giving Russia 
credit for destruction after first stage processing.  Any 
U.S. effort to deny that outcome would have to be backed up 
by very cogent argumentation. 
 
------------------- 
OCPF SITE SELECTION 
------------------- 
 
¶14.  (U) The DG's issuance of a TS note modifying certain 
technical aspects of the OCPF site selection methodology 
could have been handled more smoothly.  While it provide an 
improvement over the existing system, the way in which it was 
announced generated questions from delegations and a 
substantial amount of ill-will.  And the way in which the 
note was presented makes it very unlikely that someone will 
step forward to serve as facilitator, to address the 
outstanding issue of political nominations. 
 
¶15.  (U) In this case, such a "pause" would be the best 
option, and the delegation strongly recommends not returning 
to this issue until early 2008.  This would allow memories to 
fade somewhat regarding the manner in which the DG announced 
this change, and humiliated the previous facilitator.  In 
addition, it would provide more time for the delegation to 
get the views of other SPs and also have more extensive 
discussions with the TS about the change, which will only 
become operational in January.  The U.S. urged the DG to take 
this step, and while neither the timing of the announcement 
nor the substance were what was anticipated, it would be best 
for the U.S. to request a reconsideration of the change only 
 
when it can argue that it is necessary to address the 
concerns of a number of key delegations. 
 
--------------------- 
CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS 
--------------------- 
 
¶16.  (U) The TS continues to make steady progress on 
increasing its capabilities to conduct a CI.  As with alleged 
use, the more attention given to CI increases the likelihood 
that certain delegations will try to slow or derail the 
process, so it is probably advantageous that there remains no 
CI facilitator.  Instead, the TS is working the specific 
technical issues, and individual States Parties are hosting 
CI exercises.  Indeed, the Dutch-hosted event in September is 
an example of what happens when a CI-related issue shows up 
on the radar screen of delegations.  While the U.S. supported 
what should have been the non-contentious idea of exercising 
the EC role in a CI, concerns and objections raised by some 
delegations killed this part of the exercise. 
 
------------- 
TENURE POLICY 
------------- 
 
¶17.  (U) It will be important to continue monitoring the 
number of departures (especially more experienced officials) 
from the TS for the second-half of the year.  The adoption in 
2006 of the DG's modification of the tenure policy has not 
had a major impact on the TS departures.  Indeed, the 2008 
budget requests additional funding for HR due to the 
unexpectedly high personnel turnover.  While it is not 
politically feasible for the DG to propose another 
modification of tenure this year, it may become a key 
priority early in 2008 if the loss of personnel and expertise 
is not staunched. 
 
---------- 
ARTICLE XI 
---------- 
 
¶18.  (U) Newly-appointed facilitator Li Hong (PRC) held his 
first set of consultations on July 12, and they were rather 
predictable.  The expected calls from Iran and some other NAM 
delegations for an Article XI action plan were more rote than 
heart-felt, and del rep merely needed to reiterate U.S. 
objections to end the discussion.  The bulk of Li's 
facilitation focused on TS activity in the Article XI area, 
which was not contentious.  Should the consultations continue 
in this manner, they may produce constructive results.  And 
if the NAM is satisfied with merely going through the motions 
on pushing for an action plan, this will be a low-profile 
issue that will heat up again in the run-up to the RevCon. 
 
¶19.  (U) Ito sends. 
GALLAGHER