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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9720
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 001274 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR LEDDY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): WRAP-UP FOR 
OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL SESSION 49 
 
This is CWC-62-07. 
 
-------- 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (U) The June 26-29 Executive Council session was an 
exercise in punting.  Only 13 of some 50 items for EC action 
were actually decided and everything else was deferred to 
EC-50.  On the most important issue of all, the Council 
deferred consideration of the verification plan and facility 
agreement for Maradykovsky, side-stepping a decision on 
whether Russia had indeed completed destruction of 22% of its 
CW stockpile.  Ultimately, the key issue at EC-49 was the 
report language regarding Albania, which kept delegates busy 
until 22:30 of the final day of the EC. 
 
¶2.  (U) This accumulation of unfinished business is somewhat 
troubling.  This is not because these items entail a lot of 
work, but precisely because they are stalled until underlying 
political problems are resolved.  The U.S. and Russian 
documents are now hostages until some type of resolution can 
be found on counting and Russian destruction.  And Iran, 
often supported by other NAM delegations, is quite happy to 
continue requesting deferrals of documents which could be of 
some "use" to them.  One other development from EC-49 was a 
much more energized role by the NAM.  While sometimes 
troubling, the NAM's inability to act in unison ultimately 
helped the U.S. and put Russia under intense pressure, to 
which Russia finally succumbed.  End Summary. 
 
--- 
NAM 
--- 
 
¶3.  (U) In the end-game discussions on Albanian report 
language, the NAM wound up taking a more active role than 
anticipated.  Ultimately, this was to the advantage of the 
U.S., as the NAM was opposed to language sought by Russia 
regarding assistance on CW destruction.  Beyond that general 
concern, however, they fragmented badly and were not able to 
speak with one voice.  That general disapproval of Russian 
language was enough to put the Russian Ambassador under siege 
by some 15-20 delegations, and ultimately Russia backed off 
from its hard-line insistence on certain text. 
 
¶4.  (U) In post-EC WEOG discussions, there has been general 
agreement that while the role of the NAM is not a positive 
factor, attempting to cut off or challenge the NAM would 
merely aggravate the problem.  Instead, it would be prudent 
to remind the Chair that the NAM is not a recognized body and 
there are limitations on NAM activity within the EC schedule. 
 The Russian Ambassador has noted that the Chair should not 
call for a recess just so the NAM can meet.  There also 
appears to be support in WEOG for generating a broader range 
of support for WEOG positions, by returning to an informal 
gathering of WEOG, Eastern European group delegations in the 
EU, Japan and South Korea before EC-50. 
 
¶5.  (U) Other agenda items are covered below using the 
numbering from the annotated agenda for EC-49.  A bilateral 
held on the margins of the EC will be reported separately. 
 
------------ 
DG STATEMENT 
------------ 
 
¶6.  (U) Item 3: Director-General Pfirter spoke on a number of 
topics at length.  The full text can be found on the OPCW 
external server under document number EC-49/DG.17.  The DG 
noted as of June 21, the U.S. had destroyed 45% of its 
Category 1 CW.  He informed delegations that as of June 1, 
Russia had destroyed 22% of its Category 1 stockpiles. 
Pfirter further said this destruction was followed by an 
agreement with the Technical Secretariat on draft texts of 
the Facility Agreement and Verification Plan at Maradykovsky; 
the reporting took place after a TS inspection team confirmed 
that residual content of agent in the drained reaction mass 
was less than 0.1% by weight and the emptied munitions had 
 
been mutilated.  He further said reporting was done on 
condition that the subsequent thermal treatment on both 
reaction mass and emptied munitions would be subject to 
Article IV verification.  Pfirter emphasized  and was 
particularly pleased the two steps of destruction would take 
place at the same site, unlike other CWDFs.  He further urged 
the approval of the facility agreement and verification plan 
for Maradykovsky. 
 
¶7.  (U) The DG noted Albania has kept the TS regularly 
informed of progress and that as of June 20 they have 
destroyed 93% of Category 1 and 76% of Category 2 CW; he 
further informed delegations Albania expects to complete all 
destruction by July 23.  Finally, he urged delegations to 
bear in mind the technical difficulties that prevented 
Albania from completing destruction by April 29. 
 
¶8.  (U) Pfirter looked forward to the challenge inspection 
exercise to be held in Delft on September 10-14 and 
reiterated an offer for all interested EC members to observe 
and participate.  On OCPFs, Pfirter referred to his note of 
May 25 introducing an adjustment to OCPF site-selection 
methodology to become effective January 1, 2008.  He hopes 
this adjustment will restore some balance and effectiveness 
to the system.  The DG appointed the Director of 
International and Cooperation Assistance as coordinator to 
develop a program within the TS to assist African nations. 
He said they have drawn up some concrete proposals and are 
discussing them with the Africa Group, however the Africa 
Group does not see these proposals as a substitute for an 
OPCW office in Africa.  On universality, he noted the lack of 
progress in the Middle East, and regretted that Bahamas, 
Dominican Republic and Myanmar have not yet joined the CWC, 
though they have expressed a willingness to join. 
 
¶9.  (U) The DG stated that at the end of May, only 48% of 
assessed contributions have been collected for 2007.  He 
noted the work of the TS remains dependent on receipt of 
States Parties' contributions in full and on time.  On the 
2008 budget, which he presented on June 25, the DG noted this 
is the third straight zero nominal growth budget, and 
actually allows a reduction in assessed contributions by 
1.4%.  The DG spoke about the plans for a High-Level Session 
at the UN hosted by the Netherlands and Poland.  He noted 
UNGA and the First Committee regularly address issues related 
to the CWC as a normal part of business. Finally, during his 
discussion of the Second Review Conference, Pfirter suggested 
SPs may wish to consider the possibility of a rotating 
chairmanship and thus opened a way for a change to the 
current arrangement by which Africa always has the RevCon 
chairmanship. 
 
-------------- 
GENERAL DEBATE 
-------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) Item 4: Nearly all delegations called for adherence 
to destruction deadlines extended at CSP-11.  Statements on 
Albania were largely supportive, however, Russian comments on 
Albania not meeting its deadline included language that "the 
violation of destruction deadlines is a cause for concern." 
Russia also wanted an analysis of the role which countries 
offering assistance to Albania played in the destruction 
delays.  Albania's statement focused on their continued 
efforts to complete destruction of their Category 1 and 2 CW. 
The EU discussed Maradykovsky and encouraged completion of 
the phase 2 destruction process (incineration of reaction 
mass) as soon as possible.  The EU spokesman noted that the 
EU is still examining documents, and said that end point of 
destruction can only be reached after the second phase of 
destruction.  They reminded the EC of the obligation to visit 
possessor states.  Russia said it had destroyed 22% of its 
stockpile, and emphasized that the primary financial burden 
of destruction is borne by Russia and their burden is 
growing. 
 
¶11.  (U) Most delegations referred to the progress of the 
Action Plan on Article VII and many noted the assistance 
offered under the action plan has been invaluable.  Tunisia 
 
and Mexico stated they have almost completed legislation 
which will make them fully compliant.  Many statements 
mentioned the value they receive from Article X assistance 
and protection workshops and urged this work to continue. 
 
¶12.  (U) Nearly all statements referred to site selection 
methodology and the DG's note, and requested more work on 
this issue.  China commented on how they are the most 
inspected SP with over 100 inspections, which segued into a 
discussion for the need for a better OCPF site selection 
methodology.  The usual suspects (Iran, etc.) championed an 
action plan to implement Article XI, and recited the argument 
of undue national export control restrictions on SPs as 
contravening the CWC.  They were pleased by the naming of an 
Article XI facilitator, Mr. Li Hong of China, and expressed 
hope work on this would move forward.  Statements noted 
continued work needed to be done on an OPCW office in Africa, 
and the African Group and Tunisia welcomed the DG's increased 
efforts on Africa. 
 
¶13.  (U) Most delegations noted that work continues on the 
second RevCon, in particular, Russia encouraged work on 
drafts of final documents.  Japan reviewed progress on 
destruction of abandoned CW in China.  They said they have 
established a joint implementing organization which clears 
the way for commencement of work, and expect approval from 
China soon.  Further, they plan to procure a mobile 
destruction system in 2008. 
 
¶14.  (U) Switzerland encouraged the use of technology in 
submitting declarations, referring to the Spietz model.  Cuba 
(on behalf of the NAM), India and Iran all expressed concern 
that meetings such as the proposed High-Level OPCW-UN meeting 
should be made in consultation with the EC.  The Netherlands 
made a joint statement with Poland on the status of 
preparation for that meeting, informing the EC that 
invitations will be passed to UN members, relevant IOs and 
NGOs, and that the meeting will be devoted to expressing the 
commitment to multilateralism.  Another information meeting 
will be held at the OPCW in early September.  Copies of 
written statements were pouched to ISN-CB. 
 
------------------ 
OTHER AGENDA ITEMS 
------------------ 
 
Item 5.1: Newport Verification Plan: Deferred to EC-50 by 
Russia. 
 
Item 5.2: Maradykovsky Verification Plan: Deferred to EC-50 
by the U.S. 
 
Item 5.3: Pine Bluff VP amendments: Deferred to EC-50 by 
Russia. 
 
Item 5.4: TS Note on Progress made in converting former CW 
Production Facilities: Noted by the EC. 
 
Item 5.5: Russian national paper on Khimprom, 
Novocheboksarsk: Deferred to EC-50 by the U.S. 
 
Item 5.6: DG's Note on 90-day reporting modalities during 
extension period: Noted by the EC. 
 
Item 5.7: DG's Note on Albanian destruction: Noted by EC. 
 
Item 5.8: TS Note on destruction of Austrian OCW: Noted by 
the EC. 
 
Item 5.9: Article VII.  Further to a decision of CSP-11 on 
sustaining follow-up to the plan of action regarding Article 
VII obligations, the EC noted a DG's Note providing a summary 
of developments in the implementation of Article VII. 
 
Item 5.10: Article X: The DG's report was noted, after which 
Iran made a statement on paragraph 7, Offers of Assistance. 
They said the current offers under this are not adequate. 
They said there is a need to do more to increase the TS 
ability to provide assistance in the event of use of chemical 
 
weapons.  They noted they are the only country to have a 
completed bilateral agreement with the TS and that voluntary 
contributions under Article X have decreased.  They 
encouraged SPs to increase and diversify their offers under 
Paragraph 7 of Article X. 
 
Item 5.11: Article XI.  The Council deferred consideration of 
the DG's Note on the status of implementation of Article XI. 
Cuba and Iran noted that as a facilitator had just been 
appointed, delegations had not had time to discuss the 
document.  Iran further noted that Article XI is a 
fundamental pillar of the CWC, and that it is not enough to 
simply progress.  Full implementation of Article XI is 
required, including free trade among all SPs. 
 
Items 5.12 and 5.13: UK SSSF.  The EC approved the amendments 
to the facility agreement of the UK SSSF without comment. 
 
Items 5.14, 5.15, and 5.16.  UK Facility Agreements.  The EC 
deferred consideration to EC-50 of a UK facility arrangement 
for the Randle Island Landfill Site converted CWPF, the 
Valley Site former CWPF, and the CRP Porthreath converted 
CWPF, at UK request. 
 
Item 5.17: Italian Facility Agreement.  The EC approved the 
Italian facility agreement for the Clariant LSM Schedule 2 
site.  Del met with the Italian delegation regarding our 
comments, many of which they agreed with, however this did 
not result in any changes to the document.  Del deployed 
guidance from the floor regarding our position on site tours 
and the inspection period, in reference to this and other 
facility agreements.  Of interest, during the discussion on 
this agenda item, the Iranian delegation seemed not to be 
paying attention, and asked for more time to allow their 
experts to consult with the Italian delegation after the 
Chair had gaveled this item through.  The Chair reminded the 
Iranians that this item had been approved, and Italy held 
firm as well, but did suggest a 10 minute recess to allow the 
requested Iran/Italy discussion to occur.  After the break, 
Iran said their issues had been resolved and there was no 
need to consider reopening this item. 
 
Item 5.18: Italian facility agreement for the Sandoz 
Industrial Products Schedule 2 site.  The EC approved the FA. 
 
Items 5.19, 5.20, 5.22, and 5.23: U.S. FAs.  The EC deferred 
to EC-50 the Newport facility agreement amendments and the 
Pine Bluff Chemical Agent Disposal Facility and Binary 
Destruction Facility FA modifications, at the request of 
Russia, who said they needed more time to review the 
documents.  (Del comment: Russia later made clear that its 
concerns were not specific in nature, but stemmed from the 
fundamental difference in U.S. and Russian approaches to 
two-stage destruction and verification.  End comment.) 
 
Item 5.21:  Maradykovsky CWDF FA.  Deferred to EC-50, at the 
request of the U.S. 
 
Item 5.24 and 5.25:  UK FAs.  The EC approved a UK facility 
arrangement for the AGC Chemicals Schedule 2 site, with the 
inclusion of a corrigendum (EC-49/DEC/CRP.10/Corr. 1, dated 
28 June 2007).  The EC approved a facility agreement for the 
Albemarle Chemicals Schedule 2 site, with the inclusion of a 
corrigendum.  These corrigenda were a result of U.S. comments 
on these documents, adding in part that (1) the PIB will not 
exceed 3 hours, and (2) that the Inspection Team Leader will 
provide a "tentative inspection plan" to the host team. 
 
Item 5.26:  Iranian Schedule 1 FA: The EC noted the 
modifications to an Iranian Schedule 1 protective purposes 
FA.  Earlier in the week, Germany had asked that this be 
deferred but later said their further review allowed this 
item to be reopened.  Del deployed guidance on this item 
(i.e., reservation of rights to return to this issue in the 
future). 
 
Item 5.27:  Ciba Schedule 2 facility agreement.  Deferred to 
EC-50, at the request of Russia. 
 
Item 5.28: DG Report on TS Readiness to conduct a Challenge 
Inspection.  The EC noted the report. India and France both 
intervened to note that this report, and the details outlined 
in it, should be discussed further at the RevCon.  India said 
that the report showed that the TS needs more preparation 
before it is ready to conduct a challenge inspection. The 
Netherlands updated the EC on the status of the mock 
challenge inspection to be held in September at an industrial 
site in Delft, and noted that all EC members are invited to 
visit before and during the exercise, as well as to attend 
the debriefing session after the exercise. 
 
Item 5.29: Revisions to specifications for three items of 
approved inspection equipment.  The EC approved the revisions 
proposed in the DG's note. 
 
Item 5.30: 2006 Verification Implementation Report.  Per 
reftel guidance, the U.S. requested that this item be 
deferred to EC-50, as the corrigendum was released just 
before EC-49. 
 
Item 6: Draft Report of the OPCW for 2006.  The Council 
forwarded the draft report to the CSP, without any 
interventions.  After the decision had been taken, Germany 
requested that it be posted on the OPCW website with clear 
indications that the report will be considered and approved 
by the CSP. 
 
Item 7.1: Lists of new validated data.  At the request of 
India, the EC only approved the data in Table 1, which 
contains mass-spectrometry (MS) data from Schedules 1 and 2. 
India said that they were awaiting a TS paper proposed during 
EC-44 about data for analytical derivatives of scheduled 
chemicals, etc.  The TS reported that publication of this 
paper has been delayed because of "internal disagreements." 
The TS said that the decision language would be modified to 
capture this partial approval of this validated data. 
Consideration of the remaining tables was deferred to EC-50. 
 
Item 7.2: Newer lists of validated data.  The Council 
deferred consideration to EC-50, at the request of Russia. 
 
Item 8.1 and 8.2:  Reports on implementation in 2006 of the 
recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight and the 
External Auditor.  Iran requested, and the EC agreed, on 
deferral to EC-50 as there had been no consultations to 
discuss these documents. 
 
Item 9: Report of OIO for 2006:  Similarly, Iran requested, 
and the EC agreed, to deferral of this item to EC-50 so 
consultations could be held on this document. 
 
Item 10.1 and 10.2: Africa Office.  There was no discussion 
under this item as the EC agreed to consider it further at 
EC-50. 
 
Item 11.1: Draft Budget for 2008:  The draft budget and 
medium-term plan, released on June 25, were received by the 
EC without discussion.  Informal consultations will take 
place in the run-up to EC-50, which will make a budget 
recommendation to the CSP.  The draft budget is ZNG and 
maintains the current level and distribution of industry 
inspections.  The halt in the trend toward more inspections 
of OCPFs was welcomed by a number of developing countries in 
their national statements, several of which laid markers 
relating to the "hierarchy of risk" argument -- that 
facilities handling scheduled chemicals are considered more 
dangerous by the CWC than OCPFs.  The UK delegation 
approached the U.S. to urge that the U.S. press hard to gain 
a "symbolic" increase in OCPF inspections in the 2008 budget. 
 They argued that while they could settle for a token 
increase, it was politically important to maintain the trend 
of the last several years. 
 
Item 11.2: Moldovan Arrears repayment plan.  The plan was 
approved without discussion. 
 
Item 11.3: OPCW Income and expenditure for the first quarter 
of 2007.  The EC noted the DG's report without discussion. 
 
 
Item 11.4: Audited Financial Statements.  Per guidance, this 
item was deferred to EC-50 to permit review in capitals. 
 
Item 11.5: Proposed alignment of OPCW Staff Regulation 3.2(a) 
with the corresponding UN regulation.  The item was deferred 
to EC-50 at the request of Russia, which requested an opinion 
from the Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial 
Matters on the proposal. 
 
Item 11.6: Paternity Leave.  The DG's note was approved 
following a statement on behalf of the DG explicitly stating 
that this proposal is aligned with the UN staff regulations 
and not with the UN common system.  The statement also made 
clear that this would be absorbed within the existing budget. 
 
Item 11.7: Report on tenure: The EC noted the DG's report on 
implementation of tenure. 
 
Item 12.1, 12.2 and 12.3: ABAF.  The EC noted the report of 
the 22nd session of the ABAF, approved the appointment of 
John Fox to the ABAF and approved the appointment of Gao 
Huijun to the ABAF. 
 
Item 13: Report of the Scientific Advisory Report.  At the 
request of India, the EC deferred the reports of the Ninth 
and Tenth Sessions of the SAB and the Note by the DG until 
EC-50.  India also expressed concerns about the handling of 
biomedical sampling. 
 
Item 14: Credentials.  The EC approved the DG's report on the 
credentials of EC members. 
 
Item 15: Provisional Agenda for CSP-12.  The EC drew up the 
provisional agenda for CSP-12. 
 
Item 16:  Dates for Regular Sessions of the Executive Council 
in 2008.  The EC agreed to option A for the dates of the 
regular sessions in 2008: EC-52 from 4-7 March, EC-53 from 
24-27 June and EC-54 from 14-17 October due to the Second 
Review Conference to be held in April 2008.  The EC report 
language reflects that this is an exceptional measure and 
that the Council will revert to the establish practice of 
four sessions in 2009. 
 
Item 17: Any Other Business.  The EC noted the DG's note of 
the overview of deadlines for the circulation of 
official-series documents.  In addition, Pakistan on behalf 
of the Asia Group and Cuba on behalf of the Non-Aligned 
Movement asked to include the issue of the September UN-OPCW 
High-Level Event in connection with the tenth anniversary of 
the CWC.  After lengthy deliberations, Pakistan on behalf of 
the Asian group simply made a statement from the floor that 
was responded by the co-sponsor from The Netherlands.  And in 
a similar manner, China read a statement concerning the DG's 
note on OCPF site selection, simply calling for further 
consultations on the issue. 
 
--------------------- 
DESTRUCTION INFORMALS 
--------------------- 
 
¶15.  (U) During the 25 June destruction informals, Albania, 
Austria, China, India, Japan, Libya, the Russian Federation, 
a State Party, and U.S. presented updates on their current 
destruction activities.  Additionally, the TS presented the 
progress of CW destruction and verification activities.  Of 
note, the TS highlighted that the U.S. achieved 45 percent 
destruction and that Russia had reached 22 percent 
destruction.  Since EIF, there have been 2,951 inspections 
(59 percent CW related and 41 percent Article 6 related) and 
158,000 inspection days (85 percent CW related and 15 percent 
Article 6 related).  To date, there have been no inspection 
related accidents. 
 
¶16.  (U) Albania provided a briefing on its destruction 
efforts and reported that due to unforeseen technical issues, 
it was unable to meet its treaty deadline for destruction. 
However, over the weekend, Albania reached 97 percent 
 
destruction of category 1 CW.  At this rate, they anticipate 
reaching complete destruction of category 1 CW by 3 July and 
all CW by 16 July.  Austria briefed on the joint effort that 
they completed with Germany to destroy two shells containing 
CW agents (originating between 1925 and 1946) and one 
deteriorating gas bomb (from pre-1925).  These CW were 
transported to Germany and destroyed at Austria's expense. 
 
¶17.  (U) China and Japan briefed on their joint efforts to 
address the issue of abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) left in 
China by Japan.  The two countries estimate that between 
300,000 and 400,000 are still in China; however, 38,000 have 
been recovered to date.  China informed delegations that it 
had held seven rounds of bilateral discussions with Japan so 
far this year.  India provided a detailed briefing on their 
adherence to CWC and their current destruction efforts.  They 
reported achieving 79.8 percent destruction of all of CW 
stockpiles.  Libya provided an update on their destruction 
efforts that have been on hold since December 2006 awaiting a 
new contract.  Libya thanked the U.S. for its assistance, but 
explained to delegations its decision to terminate its 
contract with the U.S. government, and that it intends to 
bear the remainder of the costs.  The Libyan del rep noted 
that Libya is now working with a "European contractor," and 
indicated Libya's intention to provide a draft copy of the 
Detailed F 
acility Information (presumably for the equipment offered by 
the new contractor) to the TS the first week of July. 
 
¶18. (U) Russia's briefing announced its milestone of reaching 
20 percent destruction and provided an update on the 
completion of the incinerator (anticipated to be completed by 
August and up and running by October).  The building of 101A, 
supported by the UK, was delayed by the lack of funds and 
supplies for its completion.  A State Party reported that it 
had destroyed 90 percent of its stockpile and anticipates 
completion by May 2008.   The U.S. provided an update of 
activities at the U.S. facilities as well as reaching the 45 
percent milestone six months ahead of schedule. 
 
¶19. (U) Javits sends. 
ARNALL