VZCZCXRO4015
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHC #8670/01 1972127
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 162115Z JUL 07
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 7798
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 4176
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 2876
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 6408
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1879
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 6109
RUEHPA/AMEMBASSY PRAIA PRIORITY 2128
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 3449
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 2528
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1873
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 7959
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 6707
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 4038
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 4934
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 8348
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 8014
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 6812

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 098670 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PREL PHUM UNGA
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: CONVEYING USG PRIORITIES FOR 
THE PREPARATORY MEETING FOR THE COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES 
MINISTERIAL 
 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraphs 5 - 
¶16. 
 
¶2.  (U) This year's Community of Democracies (CD) Ministerial 
is scheduled for November 2007 in Bamako, Mali.  Based upon a 
set of participation criteria, countries will be invited to 
the ministerial as full participants, as observers, or are 
not invited at all.  The decision on which countries will be 
invited to the CD Ministerial is made by the CD Convening 
Group (CG), a coordinating body of 16 countries to which the 
United States is a member.  The CG members are Cape Verde, 
Chile, Czech Republic, El Salvador, India, Italy, Mali, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, 
Republic of Korea, South Africa, and the United States. 
 
¶3.  (U) Over the past several months, the CG has met three 
times to deliberate on the list of invitees. The CG 
traditionally determines the invitees by consensus.  The 
final meeting on the invitation process is slated for July 
27th in Washington, although another meeting in early August 
is possible, after which CD chair Mali will extend the 
official invitations. 
 
STATE OF PLAY 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Most USG priorities were achieved during the last 
CG meeting in June.  However, we expect some countries will 
challenge the conclusions reached.  At that meeting, Chile 
proposed that Venezuela be invited as a full participant 
while the U.S., the Czech Republic, and El Salvador opposed 
any invitation at all.  The European group - represented by 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Portugal - reversed 
their original position in favor of inviting Russia as a full 
participant and supported Russia as an observer to facilitate 
consensus.  This group's change of heart prompted others 
including Mexico, Chile, Mongolia, India and South Africa to 
formally support Russian full participation. The Portuguese 
suggested that consideration of Egypt as an observer be 
placed on hold and joined with India in opposing Bangladeshi 
participation.  Observing the rule of consensus, the Malian 
chair placed Bangladesh and Venezuela in the 'not invited' 
column and Russia as observer.  We expect that there will be 
further discussions on Bangladesh, Russia, Egypt, Singapore, 
Nigeria, and Venezuela.  Moreover, the Department wishes to 
have Taiwan invited as a guest to the CD ministerial. 
 
DEMARCHE OBJECTIVES FOR ALL POSTS 
 
¶5.  (SBU) All posts are requested to pursue the following two 
major objectives.  Supporting points on Russia are in para 
¶10. Points on Venezuela are in para 11. Supporting points on 
Nigeria are in para 13. 
 
-- Urge host government, member of the Convening Group, to 
refrain from breaking the hard fought agreement and consensus 
reached in the June CD Convening Group meeting. 
 
-- Urge host government, member of the Convening Group, to 
refrain from supporting full Participant status for Russia, 
Nigeria, and Venezuela for the November 2007 Bamako CD 
Ministerial. 
 
ADDITIONAL OBJECTIVES FOR SAN SALVADOR, PRAGUE, and WARSAW 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Urge host governments to remain steadfast in 
support of vigorous CD invitation criteria.  Ask that they 
participate at the level of Ambassador or higher in the July 
meeting. Express appreciation for their vocal support in the 
Convening Group meetings. Inviting Venezuela and Russia as 
full participants, amid growing threats to democracy in both 
 
STATE 00098670  002 OF 005 
 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: CONVEYING USG PRIORITIES FOR 
THE PREPARATORY MEETING FOR THE COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES 
MINISTERI 
countries, would signal indifference to legitimate concerns 
about democratic governance and respect for human rights and 
undermine the credibility of the Community of Democracies. 
 
ADDITIONAL OBJECTIVES FOR LISBON 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Urge Portugal as a Convening Group member, to 
support observer status for Bangladesh. 
 
-- Urge Portugal to support Egypt as an observer to the 
Ministerial meeting. 
 
-- Inform Portugal that per their request the U.S. is ready 
to accept Guinea Bissau as an observer. 
 
ADDITIONAL OBJECTIVES FOR NEW DELHI 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Urge India to support observer status for 
Bangladesh. 
 
(if asked only) Singapore -- The International Advisory 
Committee for the Community of Democracies recommended not 
inviting Singapore either as participant or observer, a 
decision we agree with. 
 
ADDITIONAL OBJECTIVES FOR BAMAKO, CAPE VERDE, and PRETORIA 
 
¶9.  (SBU) We understand that African countries are in a 
difficult position. We urge these countries to remain 
committed to maintaining the integrity of the invitation 
process. 
 
-- If the invitation status holds, more African nations will 
attend the Ministerial meeting as both observers and 
participants than ever before. In particular, ten additional 
countries from Africa will participate as observers and 
countries that have never attended a CD Ministerial meeting 
will be present as an observer or participant.  These 
include: Cameroon, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, 
Rwanda, and Uganda.  This will be an important accomplishment 
for Mali's tenure and for democracy on the continent. 
 
RUSSIA AS OBSERVER: SUPPORTING POINTS 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Convey to host government, member of the Convening 
Group, the concern that Russian democracy continues to 
deteriorate, particularly in the areas of freedom of the 
press, assembly, unchecked executive power, and NGO 
harassment. Cite the following examples: 
 
-- There has been continuing centralization of power in the 
executive branch with amendments to election laws and new 
legislation for political parties that grant Russian 
government broad powers to regulate, investigate, and close 
down parties. 
 
-- For example in July 2006, President Putin signed into law 
legislation "On Countering Extremism," despite concerns that 
the law may restrict activities of political parties, the 
media, and NGOs and legitimate criticism of the government. 
Further amendments to law expanded circumstances under which 
a candidate may be removed from the ballot (including for 
vaguely-defined "extremist" behavior); and prohibited what is 
deemed to be "negative" campaigning in television ad spots. 
 
-- U.S. human rights reports document that Russian 
authorities restrict freedom of movement and exhibit negative 
attitudes toward, and sometimes harass, NGOs involved in 
human rights monitoring. Also notable is the passage and 
entry into force of a new law on NGOs, which has already had 
some adverse effects on their operations. 
 
-- U.S. human rights reports conclude that freedom of 
expression and media independence have declined due to 
restrictions and GOR pressure, as well as harassment and 
killings of at least 12 journalists. Investigative journalist 
 
STATE 00098670  003 OF 005 
 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: CONVEYING USG PRIORITIES FOR 
THE PREPARATORY MEETING FOR THE COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES 
MINISTERI 
Anna Politkovskaya was assassinated in October 2006. She was 
highly critical of the government's policy toward Chechnya 
and uncovered various human rights abuses there. No suspects 
have been arrested. 
 
-- Freedom of assembly has been violently repressed for 
opposition demonstrations. The U.S. State Department and the 
EU publicly protested the recent police brutality employed to 
break up opposition marches in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Nizhny 
Novgorod, and Voronezh over the past months. Russian 
authorities sought to prevent the marches from taking place 
at all: they denied permission to stage the events or tried 
to marginalize them by changing their venues. They also 
harassed and detained Russians traveling to participate in 
these peaceful rallies; on the day of the events, a 
disproportionate police presence wielded undue force against 
the protesters as well as journalists reporting on the 
events.  At the EU-Russia Summit May 18, similar efforts were 
directed against members of the Russian opposition seeking to 
express their opinions in Samara.  Although some subsequent 
marches have been allowed to go forward peacefully, the 
events are troubling. 
 
VENEZUELA NOT INVITED:  SUPPORTING POINTS 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Convey to host government, member of the Convening 
Group, the significant deterioration of Venezuelan democracy, 
particularly in the areas of freedom of the press, assembly, 
unchecked executive power, and NGO harassment. Post should 
note that unlike the current Russian political system, 
Venezuela has a history of democracy going back to the 1950's 
that makes its slide into authoritarianism more worrisome. 
Examples to cite include: 
 
-- President Chavez's centralization of vast powers in the 
executive.  In January, the Chavez-controlled National 
Assembly approved an 'Enabling Law' to allow Chavez to rule 
by decree in a number of areas for the eighteen months. 
Chavez controls the entire National Assembly and virtually 
all other government institutions, including the judiciary, 
the electoral council, and the attorney general's office. 
 
-- In recent months, the GOV has accelerated its efforts to 
dominate main media channels.  In late May, the GOV denied 
renewal of the broadcast license for Radio Caracas Television 
(RCTV), Venezuela's leading and oldest and most widely viewed 
independent television station for having a critical 
editorial line.  This decision was carried out despite its 
widespread unpopularity, universal international condemnation 
and widespread demonstrations in the country.  Following the 
closure of RCTV, President Chavez announced that Globovision, 
the only network that continues to have an independent 
editorial line, would be next. 
 
-- U.S. human rights reports documented widespread arbitrary 
detention and torture of suspects, as well as extrajudicial 
killings by the often-corrupt military and the police. 
 
-- Judicial independence has been severely eroded in 
Venezuela under Chavez. International human rights monitors 
report that political influence, particularly from the 
Attorney General's Office is common, which in turn is 
pressured by the executive branch. Civil courts are also 
subjected to strong executive influence. 
 
-- In their reports, international observers noted use of 
public resources for partisan and campaign purposes in 
December 2006 re-election of President Chavez.  Two million 
public-sector workers received their holiday bonuses over a 
month early, which bolstered popular support before the 
election. Media and other reports noted systematic GOV 
intimidation of public employees.  Energy Minister and PDVSA 
President Rafael Ramirez announced that workers at PDVSA, the 
state oil company, 'had to campaign in favor of the 
president.' 
 
 
STATE 00098670  004 OF 005 
 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: CONVEYING USG PRIORITIES FOR 
THE PREPARATORY MEETING FOR THE COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRACIES 
MINISTERI 
-- The Venezuelan government has developed additional 
mechanisms for control such as the infamous governmental list 
of 'Tascon' used to identify and punish opponents to the 
Chavez regime. The Tascon List includes the names and 
identification numbers of all persons who signed petitions to 
recall President Chavez. 
 
-- La Lista de Tascon, in combination with lists of members 
of social missions and Venezuelan voting records, constitute 
El Programa Maisanta. The government program not only 
identifies the political orientation of individuals but also 
attempts to characterize the degree of their revolutionary 
dedication. 
 
-- The GOV is using the judiciary to persecute political 
opponents, journalists, and independent NGOs.  Targets 
include the leaders of the civic NGO Sumate, the opposition 
mayor of two Caracas suburbs, and opposition governor and 
former presidential candidate Manuel Rosales. 
 
-- The National Assembly is considering (and almost certain 
to pass) legislation restricting the ability of NGOs to 
receive foreign assistance. 
 
-- GOV officials (and President Chavez, in particular) 
routinely insult and verbally attach, the Catholic Church and 
Church leaders. 
 
ONLY FOR SANTIAGO 
 
¶12. As the previous host of the CD we would expect you to 
uphold the criteria of the CD. We hope you will not continue 
to insist on Venezuela and Russia's full participant status. 
 
NIGERIA AS OBSERVER 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Convey to host governments that the U.S. opposes 
Nigeria's full participation. 
 
-- The recent elections of April 14 and 21 were seriously 
flawed and a great disappointment. There were credible 
reports of malfeasance, such as vote rigging, ballot box 
stuffing, and non-transparent counting. The scope and scale 
of reported problems with the polling have exposed serious 
weaknesses in the electoral system and now pose risks to the 
country's fragile democracy. The IAC notes that widespread 
irregularities and fraud were consistently reported to have 
characterized the conduct and management of the elections, as 
well as the lead-up to the elections. 
 
-- We support Nigeria's participation as an observer in view 
of the democratic progress they have made since 1999 
especially with respect to civil and political rights and we 
are engaged in a dialogue with the Nigerians urging them to 
restore democratic institutions. 
 
TAIWAN AS A 'SPECIAL GUEST' 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Convey to host government, member of the Convening 
Group our belief that Taiwan should be invited as a 'guest' 
to the CD Ministerial meeting in November.  In our view it is 
essential to recognize the admirable successful transition 
Taiwan has undergone to a fully-fledged democracy. By 
inviting Taiwan as a guest, the CD can recognize this major 
achievement. 
 
-- Our support for guest status for Taiwan in no way changes 
our one-China policy that recognizes the Peoples Republic of 
China as the sole legal government of China. 
 
-- Inviting Taiwan as a 'guest' to an international event 
would not set a precedent for future or similar events 
because Taiwan is already extensively involved in a variety 
of organizations and processes (e.g. APEC and WTO) for which 
statehood is not a prerequisite, through diverse arrangements 
and under different names. 
 
STATE 00098670  005 OF 005 
 
 
ADDITIONAL OBJECTIVE ON TAIWAN FOR PRAGUE AND SAN SALVADOR 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Ask host governments to formally commit to a joint 
proposal to invite Taiwan as a special guest to the Bamako 
Ministerial meeting. 
 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
¶16.  (U) Posts should report results by cable to G - Joaquin 
Ferrao, DRL/MLGA - Lynn Sicade, and IO/RHS - Rachel Leatham 
on or before July 23. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶17.  (U) The Community of Democracies includes over 120 
countries with (nascent or developed) democratic governments 
that are committed to promoting democracy around the world 
and to sharing their unique experiences and lessons learned 
with others.  The U.S. has been an active supporter of CD 
because we view it as a unique forum where democracies can 
act together to address issues of democracy and human rights. 
 More information about the Community can be found at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/c10790.htm. 
 
¶18.  (U) The Criteria for Participation and Procedures set 
out the basis upon which countries are to be judged for 
Observer or Participant status.  The Criteria for 
Participation and Procedures are available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/26085.htm. 
 
¶19.  (U) Although the selection is made by CG participants, 
it is informed by the non-governmental International Advisory 
Committee (IAC), organized by several NGOs affiliated with 
the CD process.  The IAC issued recommendations to the CG on 
which countries to invite to the ministerial based on an 
agreed upon criteria. The recommendations are not binding on 
CG members. 
 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶20.  (U) Please contact G staff Joaquin Ferrao at 
202-647-4096 or via email for any  further background 
information or argumentation to meet our objectives. 
RICE