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RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SEOUL 002014 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KN KS PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY OUTLOOK FOR SOUTH KOREAN 
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  South Korea's presidential candidates have 
focused much of their campaign efforts on domestic and 
economic issues.  On foreign policy, from what we can glean 
from public statements, debates, and meetings with foreign 
policy advisors, one thing is certain: all of the candidates, 
if elected, would uphold some level of engagement with North 
Korea.  The GNP contenders maintain the party's hard-line 
stance towards North Korea in varying degrees and are strong 
supporters of the U.S.-ROK alliance, but appear to be less 
clear on other foreign policy issues.  As President, GNP 
front-runners Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye would both seek 
a renegotiation of the transition of Wartime Operational 
Control (OPCON), according to their advisors.  The liberal 
contenders, mostly from the ruling camp, have not clearly 
articulated how to deal with the U.S.-ROK alliance and other 
foreign powers such as China and Japan.  Progressive Sohn 
Hak-kyu would expand the Kaesong Industrial Complex across 
the DMZ into South Korea.   END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------- 
GNP CANDIDATES STILL IN THE LEAD 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) The GNP candidates have consistently maintained a 
strong lead over the progressive candidates, but the numbers 
within the party have begun to fluctuate.  The two 
frontrunners, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, differ from 
the underdogs in that they adhere closely to the GNP's 
conservative stance on the DPRK and making the provision of 
aid conditional to denuclearization.  Two of the GNP 
underdogs, lawmakers Won Hee-ryong and Go Jin-hwa, advocate 
continuation of the engagement policy.  All the GNP 
candidates except lawmaker Hong Jun-pyo follow the GNP line 
of fostering a stronger U.S.-ROK alliance; Hong argues for 
strengthening the ROK's independence from the United States. 
Former Seoul mayor and current frontrunner Lee's lead over 
former GNP chair Park is now just under 8 percent, with 33.6 
percent backing Lee and 25.9 percent backing Park, according 
to a June 30 Joongang Ilbo poll, a mainstream South Korean 
daily. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
LEE MYUNG-BAK: IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Although both Lee and Park follow the official GNP 
line on the DPRK, Lee has tried to differentiate himself from 
Park by emphasizing economic solutions to resolve the nuclear 
situation. During the GNP policy debate on June 19, he argued 
that the ROK should help the DPRK achieve USD 3,000 per 
capita GDP within 10 years in order to induce the DPRK to 
denuclearize and open its doors.  Lee called such an approach 
the "Initiative of Denuclearization, Opening and USD 3000," 
also one of his seven-point campaign pledges on foreign 
policy, dubbed the "MB Doctrine."  Emphasizing that "economic 
unification is the first step to eventual unification," he 
called for "a principled North Korean policy that induces it 
to open up." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Lee also highlights that delivering food, fertilizer 
and other types of aid cannot be a fundamental solution; 
North Korea must be taught to be self-reliant.  On June 18, 
he announced another pledge for his North Korean policy -- to 
build another 29.7 square-kilometer inter-Korean industrial 
complex, coined Nadeul Island, near the Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ), in the Han river that bisects Seoul.  During a June 25 
meeting with Poloffs, Lee's Senior International Affairs 
Officer Yim Sung-bin emphasized that the project would 
combine the ROK's technology and the DPRK's labor, echoing 
the rationale for the existing Kaesong Industrial Complex. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Lee's International Affairs Officers Chris Yoo and 
Yim Sung-bin asserted during the meeting that economic aid 
and cooperation would be contingent upon North Korea taking 
steps towards denuclearization.  Although he is skeptical of 
the engagement policy toward the North Korean regime, Lee 
argues for the continuation of inter-Korean exchanges. 
Visiting the Joint Security Area in the DMZ on June 11, Lee 
proposed his plan for building a "Permanent Center for Family 
Reunions" in Panmunjom.  He maintained that his permanent 
center would be more cost effective than the current family 
reunions which are hosted in different places each time. 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) Lee's main foreign policy pledge, the "MB Doctrine," 
also includes his goal to restore what he calls the "soured" 
U.S.-ROK alliance and ties with neighboring and strategically 
important Asian nations, Japan, China, Russia and India in 
particular.  Lee has stated in public multiple times that he 
values the alliance and will build on the alliance as a 
"backbone of the ROK security."  However, as President, he 
would seek a comprehensive renegotiation of the transition of 
Wartime Operational Control (OPCON).  He sees the timeline of 
the transfer problematic, in particular.  Meanwhile, Lee 
would continue to pursue good relations with Japan and China 
for business interests of Korean companies, according to Yim 
and Yoo. 
 
----------------------------- 
PARK GEUN-HYE: BACK TO BASICS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Park Geun-hye's foreign policy pledges are more 
conservative and hawkish toward the DPRK.  Park has proposed 
a reciprocal, action-for-action approach to denuclearization 
and a three-phase unification blueprint: (1) "establishment 
of peace and trust between two Koreas"; (2) "economic 
reunification;" followed by (3) "political reunification." 
Her plan, however, would not be implemented unless the DPRK 
"dismantles and disables" all the nuclear weapons and 
programs.  She has continuously emphasized that a nuclear 
North Korea will not be accepted and that the ROK should not 
provide aid without the DPRK's reciprocity.  She is skeptical 
of the current regime's projects such as Kumgang Mountain 
tourism and the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and sees 
them as "cash cows" for propping up the regime, according to 
Walter Paik, a close aide to Park.  Meanwhile, she also lists 
"dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and programs," 
"carrot-and-stick approach," and "multilateral approach by 
cooperation among the Six-Party Talks members" in her "Three 
Guiding Principles for Resolving the North Korean Nuclear 
Issue." 
 
¶8. (SBU) Regarding the U.S.-ROK alliance, Park has called for 
a "New Security Declaration" between the two countries to 
reinforce the relationship.  So far, the alliance has been 
based on the two countries' military and security needs. 
Through the "New Security Declaration," she hopes to 
transform the alliance to "a relationship based on common 
value, such as the democracy and market economy," Paik said 
during a June 25 meeting with Poloffs. She would also 
consider upgrading the ROK's participation in the missile 
defense and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).  Like 
Lee, Park would seek renegotiation of the transition of 
Wartime Operational Control (OPCON), however.  In addition to 
the U.S.-ROK alliance, Park also sees the ROK-Japan 
relationship crucial to peace on the Korean peninsula and 
hopes to enhance it, notes Park's advisor Paik. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
LIBERAL CANDIDATES BASKING IN THE "SUNSHINE" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) The liberal contenders are united in their advocacy of 
the "Sunshine" policy of pro-North Korean engagement dating 
back to the Kim Dae-jung administration.  They also appear to 
be more concerned with the historical "bad blood" between 
South Korea and China and Japan.  In the Munhwa Ilbo surveys 
conducted in late June, former Gyeonggi Province governor 
Sohn Hak-kyu enjoys the lead among the progressive candidates 
at 24.1 percent, followed by former Prime Minister Lee 
Hae-chan with 10.9 percent and former Unification Minister 
Chung Dong-young at 8.2 percent.  June 30 Joongang Ilbo polls 
looking at all of the candidates put Sohn's popularity at 
about 6.8 percent, Chung at 3.5 percent, and former Prime 
Ministers Han Myeong-sook and Lee Hae-chan at 2.1 and 2 
percent, respectively. 
 
------------------------------------- 
SOHN HAK-KYU: PROGRESSIVE FRONTRUNNER 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) An independent candidate, former Gyeonggi Province 
Governor Sohn Hak-kyu is still struggling to shed the stigma 
of being a "traitor" for leaving the GNP, the party that had 
 
nurtured him for fifteen years.  He is also trying to make a 
smooth transition from being a conservative candidate to a 
progressive one.  He announced in late June his intention to 
officially join hands with members of a "pan-progressive" 
circle.  While his popularity ratings are still only hovering 
around six percent, he is seen as the frontrunner relative to 
other candidates from the liberal/progressive side of the 
South Korean politics, most of whom are from the ruling camp. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Sohn has created what he calls the "Peace 
Management" policy towards North Korea that is based on the 
Sunshine policy and is founded on three principles: (1) the 
"universal" values of democracy, freedom, and market economy; 
(2) improving the quality of peace on the peninsula 
substantively through achievable and sustained programs; and 
(3) expanding institutional networks across the Northeast 
Asia region.  The ultimate goal of "Peace Management" is to 
reach regional integration through the "peaceful evolution" 
of domestic and foreign policies in the region.  Sohn also 
proposed the creation of an "Integrated Special Economic Zone 
between South and North Korea" by extending the Kaesong 
Industrial Complex to the southern side of the demilitarized 
zone (DMZ).  In a June 26 discussion with Poloffs, Sohn's 
foreign policy advisors Dr. Min Byung-oh and Lee Yoon-saeng 
noted that while Sohn's pro-engagement stance is firm, the 
pace and methods involved in the "Peace Management" policy 
are flexible, and can be adjusted according to circumstances; 
he specifically pointed to a possible collapse of the regime 
in the event of Kim Jong-Il's death as an event that the 
foreign policy team was considering, and that would 
significantly alter Sohn's "rules of engagement."  Min also 
tangentially noted that North Korea is aware that it has 
"lost" to the South, and that its awareness of the gap that 
exists between the two countries would prompt a desire for 
engagement. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Like his former GNP compatriots, Sohn is seen as a 
strong proponent of South Korea's alliance with the United 
States.  Sohn in his public speeches invites the United 
States to play an even more active role as mediator in 
dialogue among the regional players in East Asia 
(specifically Korea, China, and Japan).  Sohn is also a 
strong advocate of an open market system, and has repeatedly 
expressed his hope that a successful FTA with the U.S. would 
serve as a catalyst in forming a multiple layer of FTAs in 
the region.  Since leaving the GNP, however, he has begun to 
recommend that the U.S. take a closer look at the changing 
dynamics in the region rather than rely on "conventional 
understanding" of interrelations.  By way of an example, Min 
said that one could not treat a grown man the same way the 
man was treated when he was a boy, hinting that the U.S. was 
not recognizing South Korea's growing power in the region. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Min also said that Sohn's camp is uncomfortable 
with what they perceive to be an ever-deepening relationship 
between the United States and Japan.  Min said that in 
comparison to Germany, Japan is unrepentant in making amends 
for its historical wrongdoings, making it difficult for 
regional countries to establish close relations with Japan 
(he pointed specifically to China and North Korea, noting 
that North Koreans "hate" Japan).  Due to this difficulty in 
forming partnerships and maintaining good relations with its 
neighboring countries, Min purported that Japan's role in the 
world would inevitably decrease.  He emphasized that a rise 
in anti-Japanese sentiment would be linked to 
anti-Americanism if South Koreans began to view the 
U.S.-Japanese alliance as being too close; therefore, he 
advised that the US take a more careful approach in handling 
relationships within the region.  While Sohn's foreign policy 
team did not expect ROK-Japan relations to change any time 
soon due to Japan's refusal to change, they did point to the 
growing popularity of Korean pop culture in Japan as a 
positive indication of happy coexistence. 
 
------------------------------ 
CHUNG DONG-YOUNG: THE ANTI-ROH 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (SBU) Former Unification Minister Chung Dong-young 
defected from the Uri party to distance himself from the 
unpopular Roh administration.  His recognition factor is 
high, due to his former career as a news anchor and 
 
Unification Minister, but his efforts to secure the 
presidential vote have largely been in vain: his popularity 
ratings still hover at only 3.5 percent.  Chung's foreign 
policy platform is in line with the general liberal line of 
pro-North Korean engagement.  In a June 22 meeting with 
Poloffs, Chung's foreign policy advisor Kim Yeon-chul claimed 
that Chung has the most expertise in handling foreign policy 
matters -- particularly North Korea -- pointing to his 
experience as Unification Minister, as well as his numerous 
visits to the United States, Europe, and Japan.  Kim also 
alleged that while all of the other candidates' campaign 
pledges were purely for political gain, Chung has established 
feasible policy plans that can actually be implemented. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Chung's main campaign focus is on North Korea. 
Unlike all of the other candidates who emphasize a North 
Korean engagement policy after or in conjunction with 
denuclearization, Chung maintains an engagement-first policy, 
asserting that North Korea cannot be moved to action without 
appropriately engaging it from the beginning.  Chung 
maintains that President Roh is not handling North Korean 
engagement appropriately, and is apparently stunned that Roh 
does not appear interested in holding a summit with North 
Korean leader Kim Jong-Il.  In his discussion with Poloffs, 
Kim tied every foreign policy issue back to North Korea, and 
this was especially true in his discussion of Chung's 
approach towards the U.S.  Chung has been known to be 
critical of the U.S. alliance in the past, and the only 
mention of the alliance during the discussion was for its 
role in North Korean denuclearization.  Kim hinted that Chung 
perceives the U.S. to be slighting South Korea's role in the 
international community, going so far as to point to 
historical examples of international meetings during which 
South Korea did not do anything but "pay and watch." 
 
¶16. (U) Chung's approach to China and Japan is two-fold: he 
views both with distaste for being unapologetic about 
historical wrongdoings against South Korea, but also 
acknowledges the significance of their roles in Six-Party 
Talks and North Korean denuclearization.  Chung hopes to see 
China take advantage of its relationship with North Korea to 
aid progress in the Six-Party Talks, as well as to increase 
its role in aiding South Korea in managing North Korean 
refugees.  As for Japan, Chung believes that Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe is ruining the already volatile nature of 
the South Korea-Japan relationship, and that the Liancourt 
Rocks (which Koreans call Dokdo) and Yasukuni issues need to 
be dealt with very soon.  Chung also assesses that Japan 
needs to take a more proactive role in the Six-Party Talks, 
rather than getting bogged down with the abductions issue. 
 
--------------------- 
DARK HORSE CANDIDATES 
--------------------- 
 
¶17. (U) Two of the three GNP underdog candidates, Won 
Hee-ryong and Go Jin-hwa, explicitly advocate engagement 
policy.  Won Hee-ryong stated during the GNP foreign policy 
debate that, as President, he would "maintain and develop the 
engagement policy toward the North."  Won also has a 
"Three-Stage Reunification Plan" like Park Geun-hye, but it 
is different from Park's in that the first "stage" is 
transforming the cease-fire agreement with the DPRK into a 
peace accord.  Go Jin-hwa also called for a peace accord 
between two Koreas.  Both Won and Go argue that two Koreas 
should hold South-North summits or parliamentary meetings 
regularly.  While these two candidates do not discuss the 
U.S.-ROK alliance in depth, Hong Joon-pyo's main foreign 
policy agenda is "independent diplomacy toward the U.S." 
During his opening statement, Hong said, "(t)o befit the 
nation's status (as the world's 11th largest economy), Korea 
should strengthen its independent policy line on the United 
States."  While Hong Joon-pyo's position on the OPCON issue 
is not clear, Won and Go both welcome the transition of OPCON 
and oppose renegotiation. 
 
¶18. (U) Many in President Roh's circle have expressed 
interest in running for President: former Prime Ministers Han 
Myeong-sook and Lee Hae-chan, former governor of South 
Gyeongsang Province and economic aide to Roh Kim Hyuk-kyu, 
former Uri party chairman Shin Ki-nam, former Minister of 
Health and Welfare Rhyu Si-min, and former Presidential Chief 
 
of Staff Lee Byung-wan.  These underdogs have yet to declare 
their foreign policy plans, but we expect that they would run 
parallel to that of the current Roh administration. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Barring any significant breakthroughs or crises 
with North Korea in the months before the election, the real 
driving force behind this election will be each candidate's 
domestic policies, especially due to the public perception 
that the current administration has mismanaged the economy. 
Foreign policy is therefore likely to be a secondary concern, 
and North Korean engagement will be the only foreign policy 
issue that really matters.  Relations with the North on some 
level are bound to continue regardless of the elected 
candidate or party.  The only substantive differences will 
lie in the pace and methods of engagement. 
VERSHBOW