VZCZCXRO5917
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHRB #1160/01 1991221
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181221Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WSHDC 6941
INFO RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3227
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3331
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4679
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3520

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001160 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, ISN/ECC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM ETTC PREL KSTC MO
SUBJECT: EXBS: MOROCCO SEEKS ENHANCED BORDER ENFORCEMENT 
 
REF: RABAT 01145 
 
Sensitive but unclassified.  Please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  An interagency EXBS (Export Control and Related 
Border Security) team launched a broad program of cooperation in an 
initial round of meetings with Moroccan officials July 9-12.  The 
EXBS program is a multi-year assistance program and will begin 
delivering training to Morocco this fall using funding from FY06 and 
FY07.  The U.S. team stressed the legislative and enforcement 
aspects of an effective export control system and encouraged the 
Moroccans to adopt the European Union's (EU) export control list of 
dual-use items.  Despite some skepticism from the Moroccan side 
concerning the relevance of developing a strategic control list in a 
country that does not produce or import any dual-use items, they 
enthusiastically welcomed the opportunity to enhance their 
enforcement capability.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------- 
EXBS Relevance to Morocco 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) A USG interagency team visited Morocco 9-12 July to discuss 
and coordinate the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) 
assistance program with their Moroccan counterparts.  The Moroccan 
delegation was headed by Khalid Zerouali, Director of Migration and 
Border Protection, Ministry of Interior.  The Moroccan delegation 
also included senior representatives of Customs, Commerce, Royal 
Navy, and other security agencies. 
 
¶3. (U) EXBS is the USG's premier initiative to help other countries 
improve their export control systems.  Administered through the 
Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Office of 
Export Controls Cooperation (ISN/ECC), it is an interagency program 
designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), missile delivery systems, conventional weapons, and related 
items by assisting foreign governments in the establishment and 
implementation of effective export control systems.  While the EXBS 
program's original focus was on the WMD "source countries" in the 
former Soviet Union, the program was broadened to include countries 
with major transshipment hubs in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and 
Southeast Asia. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Morocco's drug and human smuggling problems are well known. 
 Reportedly, 50 percent of Europe's hashish is smuggled from 
Morocco, while thousands of sub-Saharan Africans migrate through 
Morocco each year.  According to the Commander of the Al Hoceima 
Naval Base, located on the Moroccan Mediterranean coast, the tempo 
of the base's primary mission - interdiction of illegal drugs and 
migrants - has soared, with over 3,500 arrests made in 2006 compared 
to 640 in 2003.  One member of the U.S. EXBS team summed the 
Moroccan situation best, "Smuggling is smuggling, whether its drugs 
or missile parts." 
 
¶5. (SBU) Morocco will become even more relevant in the control of 
WMD and dual-use items with the opening of the new Tangier Med 
Transshipment Port, scheduled for the end of July 2007.  According 
to Said Elhadi, Tangier Med Special Agency Chairman, the Tangier 
Port complex will be one of the largest and most complex 
transshipment facilities in the world, with an eventual transit of 
10 million containers a year.  Of note, the Moroccan Ministry of 
Interior and Customs officials at the EXBS conference unanimously 
acknowledged Morocco's responsibility for effective control of items 
transiting Tangier.  Unfortunately, however, Morocco has neither a 
strategic control list, nor a licensing system for the control and 
transshipment of dual-use items. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Enforcement - YES.  Control List - MAYBE. 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) During the EXBS conference, the U.S. team emphasized the 
training and equipment support available through the program to 
assist with legislative reforms required to incorporate a strategic 
control list into Moroccan national law and enhancement of Morocco's 
export control enforcement.  Of note, the team's visit came on the 
heels of an elevation of the security posture at all Moroccan ports 
of entry (reftel), which appeared to reinforce the relevance of the 
enforcement aspects of the EXBS program.  By contrast, the 
legislative aspect of the program, which includes incorporation of a 
control list and licensing for dual-use items, was received with 
less enthusiasm.  ISN/ECC Director, Paul van Son, encouraged the GOM 
 
RABAT 00001160  002 OF 002 
 
 
to work with the EU on adopting the EU Control List and adapting it 
to the Moroccan export control law.  Van Son also reiterated that if 
Morocco wants to work with the U.S. on these issues as well, the USG 
is ready to provide assistance and training. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Moroccan Ministry of Commerce's presentation at the 
conference captured the essence of the Moroccan position on the 
control of dual-use items.  From the beginning, the speaker made it 
clear that Morocco neither produces nor imports dual-use items, and 
that its customs officials have a "trade, vice security" agenda. 
Left unsaid, but nonetheless understood by the U.S. team, was that 
Morocco remained unconvinced of the need to modify its foreign-trade 
law in order to incorporate a control list or to develop a licensing 
system for the transit of dual-use items. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Through subsequent discussions, the U.S. team countered 
this perception with five primary arguments:  1)  Incorporation of a 
strategic dual-use control list, such as the EU's, would result in 
increased visibility over all commercial shipments, resulting in a 
decrease in smuggling and a corresponding increase in customs 
revenue.  2)  Although Morocco may not be a producer or importer of 
dual-use items today, a Moroccan decision (currently under 
discussion) to pursue nuclear energy in the future would change 
that.  3) Many of the techniques used to combat illegal human, drug, 
and contraband smuggling are the same as those used to enforce an 
international dual-use control list.  4) Jordan, in a similar 
situation as Morocco, recently incorporated the EU's control list. 
The GOM should ask the GOJ about its experience and the positive 
outcomes it has witnessed.  5) If Morocco truly intends to be a 
regional leader and establish Tangier Med as one of the world's 
leading transshipment hubs, it must meet its international 
responsibilities under UNSCR 1540. 
 
¶9. (U) The Moroccans closed the conference with a reaffirmation of 
the strong bilateral cooperation between Morocco and the U.S. in all 
security related fields, and presented their "wish-list" for customs 
and border enforcement training.  The U.S. team pledged to 
coordinate the request through the interagency process, and closed 
the conference by presenting Morocco with 50 personal radiation 
detectors, designed to be worn by customs officials as a first-line 
of defense against radiation hazards. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment:  A robust and effective Moroccan export control 
system is in both the Moroccan and U.S. interest.  By going through 
the process of incorporating a dual-use control list and licensing 
system for dual-use items, Morocco will not only comply with 
international export standards, but it will also improve its 
visibility and control over all commerce transiting Morocco - 
greatly enhancing its anti-smuggling capability.  Post will continue 
to encourage and facilitate Moroccan legislative and regulatory 
reform of its foreign trade law and enhancement of it export control 
system.  We will also work with the program to enhance border 
controls, a mutual priority for a range of target persons and goods. 
 Now is the time to put the systems in place that will prevent 
Morocco, and specifically the new port of Tangier Med, from becoming 
a transit point for WMD and dual-use items. 
 
RILEY