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FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7516
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000534 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR DREW 
SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK UNSC YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BEAN 
 
¶1.  (U) Your visit to Kosovo comes at the final phase of a 
prolonged period of negotiation over Kosovo's status, a 
process led by UN Special Envoy and former Finnish President 
Martti Ahtisaari.  The status negotiation process began in 
January 2006 with the articulation of basic principles by the 
Contact Group, a group of countries prominently involved in 
the Balkans region (U.S., UK, Germany, Italy, and Russia), 
and has continued for over fifteen months, culminating in 
Ahtisaari's presentation of a comprehensive settlement plan 
to the UN Security Council for its consideration this past 
March.  Since that time, the UNSC has discussed various draft 
resolutions on Kosovo, but has been unable to reach consensus 
due to persistent Russian opposition; efforts continue to 
find a formulation acceptable to all Security Council 
members, including Russia. 
 
¶2.  (U) For the purposes of these status-related 
negotiations, Kosovo Albanian governing and opposition 
parties managed to come together in a single "Unity Team," 
engaging seriously and constructively with Ahtisaari and his 
team over the entire course of the lengthy discusssions, and 
offering substantial legal guarantees for the Serb community 
in Kosovo as well as other minority ethnic communities.  Key 
to these guarantees was the concept, embodied in the 
Ahtisaari plan, of decentralization, giving robust and broad 
authority to municipal leaderships on issues as diverse as 
security, education, health and welfare.  Albanians also 
agreed to the formation of new, Serb-majority municipalities 
encompassing close to 90 percent of all Serbs in Kosovo, thus 
affording them rights unprecedented elsewhere for minority 
populations in Europe.  Ahtisaari provided for international 
supervision of the implementation of his plan, strong 
protections for the Serbian Orthodox church and other Serb 
cultural sites, and a continuing NATO military presence in 
Kosovo with a mandate to provide a safe and secure 
environment. 
 
¶3.  (U) The Unity Team accepted Ahtisaari's plan in its 
entirety, as did the Kosovo Assembly, which voted 
overwhelmingly in favor.  Kosovars remain committed to 
implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, and efforts are ongoing 
in a variety of working groups to draft legislation that 
would codify the protections for minorities envisaged in the 
settlement package.  Kosovars have also demonstrated 
remarkable patience and maturity in accepting successive 
delays of the status process, which have postponed the 
prospect of a final status resolution well beyond the 
initially anticipated timeframe of end-2006.  While they are 
firm in their resolve to realize Kosovo's independence, they 
have accepted that the internationally-led process is the 
only way to accomplish this and to ensure full support for 
their objectives.  Ethnically-motivated crime remains at an 
all-time low since the destructive and tragic riots of March 
2004, when Albanian anger led to attacks on international and 
Serb targets in Kosovo.  Anti-Ahtisaari demonstrations by the 
so-called "Self-Determination Movement" peaked at a few 
hundred activists in February 2007 and have declined 
dramatically since then. 
 
¶4.  (U) Protection of Kosovo's Serb population remains a 
priority for the international community in Kosovo, and for 
the U.S. Office in Pristina in particular.  The largest 
population of Serbs in Kosovo lives south of the Ibar River 
in eastern Kosovo, where U.S. KFOR troops have 
responsibility, and they are widely credited with maintaining 
peace and stability as well as earning the respect of Serbs 
and Albanians alike.  U.S. assistance has aided Serb 
communities throughout Kosovo with road, water, school, and 
other infrastructure projects, with one million dollars being 
spent in the last year alone in Kosovo's three overwhelmingly 
Serb majority municipalities in the north.  The U.S. Office 
has become an advocate for Serb causes large and small, 
including preservation of the interests of Decani monastery, 
a highly symbolic historical and religious site for Serbs the 
world over.  The U.S. is also a strong supporter of the 
efforts of the Reconstruction Implementation Commission, a 
Council of Europe-led process that has brought together the 
 
PRISTINA 00000534  002 OF 002 
 
 
Serbian and Kosovo Ministries of Culture in a successful bid 
to restore and rebuild Orthodox churches damaged through 
violence. 
 
¶5.  (U) Serb returns to Kosovo have been less encouraging, 
for a variety of reasons.  Lack of economic opportunity, 
fears about security and freedom of movement, dwindling donor 
resources, and political sparring over the returns issue have 
prevented many Serbs from coming back to their pre-conflict 
homes.  Kosovo's government is the largest contributor of 
funds to reconstruct homes (over $40 million spent in under 
five years), but many of these homes stand empty waiting for 
their Serb occupants to return.  In a small but positive 
sign, however, over 100 Serbs recently returned to the 
village of Srpski Babush in the Albanian-majority 
Ferizaj/Urosevac municipality; U.S. KFOR has been deeply 
involved in both safeguarding this community and providing 
for basic needs.  Other similar returns have been noted in 
central Kosovo and western Kosovo. 
 
¶6.  (U) U.S. policy remains supportive of supervised 
independence for Kosovo, not least because Kosovo's economic 
development can no longer be sustained through small-scale 
enterprise and donor largesse.  Kosovo will need support from 
international financial institutions that can be provided 
only to sovereign states, and it will need a level of serious 
private investment that is now deterred by the unresolved 
question of status.  Kosovo's economic prospects hinge 
largely on development of its energy sector, as its lignite 
deposits are some of the most significant in Europe.  It has 
one of the youngest populations in Europe, as well, making 
employment as a condition for social stability a key issue 
for the future. 
 
¶7.  (U) We look forward to your visit and the chance to 
answer further questions about Kosovo and its prospects. 
 
 
KAIDANOW