VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSA #2649 2111459
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301459Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0999
INFO RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0580
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0448
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0194

UNCLAS PRETORIA 002649 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR P, T, ISN, SCA/INS AF/S 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG PREL KNNP KTIA SF
SUBJECT: U.S.-INDIA 123 AGREEMENT: SOUTH AFRICAN REACTIONS 
 
REF: SECSTATE 104171 
 
(U) This is an action request -- see para 4. 
 
¶1.  (U) DepPolCouns presented reftel non-paper, a copy of the 
White House press release, and the full transcript of U/S 
Burns' 27 July press briefing to DFA Deputy Director for 
Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Michiel Combrink on 
30 July.  Combrink had not heard Friday's announcement and 
was astonished by the news.  Admitting he had not thought it 
would be possible for the two sides to bridge their remaining 
differences, he heaped praise on lead negotiator Dick 
Stratford. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Upon reviewing reftel non-paper Combrink commented 
that it appeared the U.S. had "caved on reprocessing."  He 
expressed strong interest in seeing the full text of the 
agreement, if/when that became possible.  Combrink 
anticipated that the SAG would have many questions about the 
details of the agreement and welcomed the prospect of 
consultations on the way forward in the NSG.  He noted that 
some NSG outreach activities were planned for the margins of 
the September IAEA General Conference in Vienna and suggested 
that as a possible venue for initial USG-SAG bilateral 
consultations.  (NOTE:  DDG Abdul Minty does not plan to 
travel to New York for UNGA 1st Committee sessions.  END 
NOTE.)  Combrink wryly noted that NAM, NSG, and AU countries 
would likely "have a lot to say" about the agreement and its 
implications.  Within the NSG he predicted that Ireland and 
Sweden would have comments/reactions but he did not expect 
significant substantive reactions from most other 
Participating Governments. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Combrink volunteered that he did not forsee the NSG 
holding a special plenary session on this issue, "because an 
India/IAEA safeguards agreement must come first."  However, a 
Consultative Group meeting could happen at any time.  Current 
SAG thinking was to schedule the next CG meeting in November, 
to coincide with other international meetings (as a 
cost-saving measure).  While this is a bit later than the 
traditional early October timeframe, Combrink commented that 
it would give India time to engage with the IAEA and to 
demonstrate sincerity about concluding its safeguards 
agreement. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Stressing that this was not an "official demarche" 
but merely an "expert query" Combrink requested an 
explanation of how the U.S.-India agreement fits with USG 
obligations under the Pelindaba Treaty, specifically Article 
9 and Protocol I, Article 2.  Combrink commented there could 
be some potentially serious problems, as there was "no way" 
India could conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement 
with the IAEA as specified in Art. 9(c) because India "would 
never agree" to open all its nuclear facilities to 
inspection.  Combrink said he was interested in the USG 
interpretation because the SAG currently is engaged in a 
strong effort to gain the six additional ratifications 
required for the Pelindaba Treaty to enter into force and he 
wanted to be prepared to "manage any outfall" unintentionally 
caused by the U.S.-India agreement.  He expressed hope that 
we would be able "to put our heads together" on this and 
hinted he was willing to consider a draft amendment to the 
treaty text if required.  (ACTION REQUEST:  Please advise how 
Mission should respond to Combrink's legal query.  Although 
it was not couched as an official demarche, the SAG is likely 
to start voicing this concern to other interested parties if 
they do not receive a timely response.  END ACTION REQUEST.) 
Combrink also made the inevitable reference to potential 
conflicts with NPT commitments, but acknowledged this was "a 
manageable thing." 
Bost