Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 143912 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AORC AS AF AM AJ ASEC AU AMGT APER ACOA ASEAN AG AFFAIRS AR AFIN ABUD AO AEMR ADANA AMED AADP AINF ARF ADB ACS AE AID AL AC AGR ABLD AMCHAMS AECL AINT AND ASIG AUC APECO AFGHANISTAN AY ARABL ACAO ANET AFSN AZ AFLU ALOW ASSK AFSI ACABQ AMB APEC AIDS AA ATRN AMTC AVIATION AESC ASSEMBLY ADPM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG AGOA ASUP AFPREL ARNOLD ADCO AN ACOTA AODE AROC AMCHAM AT ACKM ASCH AORCUNGA AVIANFLU AVIAN AIT ASECPHUM ATRA AGENDA AIN AFINM APCS AGENGA ABDALLAH ALOWAR AFL AMBASSADOR ARSO AGMT ASPA AOREC AGAO ARR AOMS ASC ALIREZA AORD AORG ASECVE ABER ARABBL ADM AMER ALVAREZ AORCO ARM APERTH AINR AGRI ALZUGUREN ANGEL ACDA AEMED ARC AMGMT AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU ABMC AIAG ALJAZEERA ASR ASECARP ALAMI APRM ASECM AMPR AEGR AUSTRALIAGROUP ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AIDAC AOPC ANTITERRORISM ASEG AMIA ASEX AEMRBC AFOR ABT AMERICA AGENCIES AGS ADRC ASJA AEAID ANARCHISTS AME AEC ALNEA AMGE AMEDCASCKFLO AK ANTONIO ASO AFINIZ ASEDC AOWC ACCOUNT ACTION AMG AFPK AOCR AMEDI AGIT ASOC ACOAAMGT AMLB AZE AORCYM AORL AGRICULTURE ACEC AGUILAR ASCC AFSA ASES ADIP ASED ASCE ASFC ASECTH AFGHAN ANTXON APRC AFAF AFARI ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AX ALAB ASECAF ASA ASECAFIN ASIC AFZAL AMGTATK ALBE AMT AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN AGUIRRE AAA ABLG ARCH AGRIC AIHRC ADEL AMEX ALI AQ ATFN AORCD ARAS AINFCY AFDB ACBAQ AFDIN AOPR AREP ALEXANDER ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI ATRD AEIR AOIC ABLDG AFR ASEK AER ALOUNI AMCT AVERY ASECCASC ARG APR AMAT AEMRS AFU ATPDEA ALL ASECE ANDREW
EAIR ECON ETRD EAGR EAID EFIN ETTC ENRG EMIN ECPS EG EPET EINV ELAB EU ECONOMICS EC EZ EUN EN ECIN EWWT EXTERNAL ENIV ES ESA ELN EFIS EIND EPA ELTN EXIM ET EINT EI ER EAIDAF ETRO ETRDECONWTOCS ECTRD EUR ECOWAS ECUN EBRD ECONOMIC ENGR ECONOMY EFND ELECTIONS EPECO EUMEM ETMIN EXBS EAIRECONRP ERTD EAP ERGR EUREM EFI EIB ENGY ELNTECON EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ECOSOC EEB EINF ETRN ENGRD ESTH ENRC EXPORT EK ENRGMO ECO EGAD EXIMOPIC ETRDPGOV EURM ETRA ENERG ECLAC EINO ENVIRONMENT EFIC ECIP ETRDAORC ENRD EMED EIAR ECPN ELAP ETCC EAC ENEG ESCAP EWWC ELTD ELA EIVN ELF ETR EFTA EMAIL EL EMS EID ELNT ECPSN ERIN ETT EETC ELAN ECHEVARRIA EPWR EVIN ENVR ENRGJM ELBR EUC EARG EAPC EICN EEC EREL EAIS ELBA EPETUN EWWY ETRDGK EV EDU EFN EVN EAIDETRD ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ ETEX ESCI EAIDHO EENV ETRC ESOC EINDQTRD EINVA EFLU EGEN ECE EAGRBN EON EFINECONCS EIAD ECPC ENV ETDR EAGER ETRDKIPR EWT EDEV ECCP ECCT EARI EINVECON ED ETRDEC EMINETRD EADM ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ETAD ECOM ECONETRDEAGRJA EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS ESSO ETRG ELAM ECA EENG EITC ENG ERA EPSC ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EIPR ELABPGOVBN EURFOR ETRAD EUE EISNLN ECONETRDBESPAR ELAINE EGOVSY EAUD EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EINVETRD EPIN ECONENRG EDRC ESENV EB ENER ELTNSNAR EURN ECONPGOVBN ETTF ENVT EPIT ESOCI EFINOECD ERD EDUC EUM ETEL EUEAID ENRGY ETD EAGRE EAR EAIDMG EE EET ETER ERICKSON EIAID EX EAG EBEXP ESTN EAIDAORC EING EGOV EEOC EAGRRP EVENTS ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ETRDEMIN EPETEIND EAIDRW ENVI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC EDUARDO EGAR EPCS EPRT EAIDPHUMPRELUG EPTED ETRB EPETPGOV ECONQH EAIDS EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM EAIDAR EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN ESF EINR ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN EIDN ETRK ESTRADA EXEC EAIO EGHG ECN EDA ECOS EPREL EINVKSCA ENNP ELABV ETA EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EUCOM EAIDASEC ENR END EP ERNG ESPS EITI EINTECPS EAVI ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EADI ELDIN ELND ECRM EINVEFIN EAOD EFINTS EINDIR ENRGKNNP ETRDEIQ ETC EAIRASECCASCID EINN ETRP EAIDNI EFQ ECOQKPKO EGPHUM EBUD EAIT ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ EWWI ENERGY ELB EINDETRD EMI ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EHUM EFNI EOXC EISNAR ETRDEINVTINTCS EIN EFIM EMW ETIO ETRDGR EMN EXO EATO EWTR ELIN EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EINVETC ETTD EIQ ECONCS EPPD ESS EUEAGR ENRGIZ EISL EUNJ EIDE ENRGSD ELAD ESPINOSA ELEC EAIG ESLCO ENTG ETRDECD EINVECONSENVCSJA EEPET EUNCH ECINECONCS
KPKO KIPR KWBG KPAL KDEM KTFN KNNP KGIC KTIA KCRM KDRG KWMN KJUS KIDE KSUM KTIP KFRD KMCA KMDR KCIP KTDB KPAO KPWR KOMC KU KIRF KCOR KHLS KISL KSCA KGHG KS KSTH KSEP KE KPAI KWAC KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPRP KVPR KAWC KUNR KZ KPLS KN KSTC KMFO KID KNAR KCFE KRIM KFLO KCSA KG KFSC KSCI KFLU KMIG KRVC KV KVRP KMPI KNEI KAPO KOLY KGIT KSAF KIRC KNSD KBIO KHIV KHDP KBTR KHUM KSAC KACT KRAD KPRV KTEX KPIR KDMR KMPF KPFO KICA KWMM KICC KR KCOM KAID KINR KBCT KOCI KCRS KTER KSPR KDP KFIN KCMR KMOC KUWAIT KIPRZ KSEO KLIG KWIR KISM KLEG KTBD KCUM KMSG KMWN KREL KPREL KAWK KIMT KCSY KESS KWPA KNPT KTBT KCROM KPOW KFTN KPKP KICR KGHA KOMS KJUST KREC KOC KFPC KGLB KMRS KTFIN KCRCM KWNM KHGH KRFD KY KGCC KFEM KVIR KRCM KEMR KIIP KPOA KREF KJRE KRKO KOGL KSCS KGOV KCRIM KEM KCUL KRIF KCEM KITA KCRN KCIS KSEAO KWMEN KEANE KNNC KNAP KEDEM KNEP KHPD KPSC KIRP KUNC KALM KCCP KDEN KSEC KAYLA KIMMITT KO KNUC KSIA KLFU KLAB KTDD KIRCOEXC KECF KIPRETRDKCRM KNDP KIRCHOFF KJAN KFRDSOCIRO KWMNSMIG KEAI KKPO KPOL KRD KWMNPREL KATRINA KBWG KW KPPD KTIAEUN KDHS KRV KBTS KWCI KICT KPALAOIS KPMI KWN KTDM KWM KLHS KLBO KDEMK KT KIDS KWWW KLIP KPRM KSKN KTTB KTRD KNPP KOR KGKG KNN KTIAIC KSRE KDRL KVCORR KDEMGT KOMO KSTCC KMAC KSOC KMCC KCHG KSEPCVIS KGIV KPO KSEI KSTCPL KSI KRMS KFLOA KIND KPPAO KCM KRFR KICCPUR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNNB KFAM KWWMN KENV KGH KPOP KFCE KNAO KTIAPARM KWMNKDEM KDRM KNNNP KEVIN KEMPI KWIM KGCN KUM KMGT KKOR KSMT KISLSCUL KNRV KPRO KOMCSG KLPM KDTB KFGM KCRP KAUST KNNPPARM KUNH KWAWC KSPA KTSC KUS KSOCI KCMA KTFR KPAOPREL KNNPCH KWGB KSTT KNUP KPGOV KUK KMNP KPAS KHMN KPAD KSTS KCORR KI KLSO KWNN KNP KPTD KESO KMPP KEMS KPAONZ KPOV KTLA KPAOKMDRKE KNMP KWMNCI KWUN KRDP KWKN KPAOY KEIM KGICKS KIPT KREISLER KTAO KJU KLTN KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KEN KQ KWPR KSCT KGHGHIV KEDU KRCIM KFIU KWIC KNNO KILS KTIALG KNNA KMCAJO KINP KRM KLFLO KPA KOMCCO KKIV KHSA KDM KRCS KWBGSY KISLAO KNPPIS KNNPMNUC KCRI KX KWWT KPAM KVRC KERG KK KSUMPHUM KACP KSLG KIF KIVP KHOURY KNPR KUNRAORC KCOG KCFC KWMJN KFTFN KTFM KPDD KMPIO KCERS KDUM KDEMAF KMEPI KHSL KEPREL KAWX KIRL KNNR KOMH KMPT KISLPINR KADM KPER KTPN KSCAECON KA KJUSTH KPIN KDEV KCSI KNRG KAKA KFRP KTSD KINL KJUSKUNR KQM KQRDQ KWBC KMRD KVBL KOM KMPL KEDM KFLD KPRD KRGY KNNF KPROG KIFR KPOKO KM KWMNCS KAWS KLAP KPAK KHIB KOEM KDDG KCGC
PGOV PREL PK PTER PINR PO PHUM PARM PREF PINF PRL PM PINS PROP PALESTINIAN PE PBTS PNAT PHSA PL PA PSEPC POSTS POLITICS POLICY POL PU PAHO PHUMPGOV PGOG PARALYMPIC PGOC PNR PREFA PMIL POLITICAL PROV PRUM PBIO PAK POV POLG PAR POLM PHUMPREL PKO PUNE PROG PEL PROPERTY PKAO PRE PSOE PHAS PNUM PGOVE PY PIRF PRES POWELL PP PREM PCON PGOVPTER PGOVPREL PODC PTBS PTEL PGOVTI PHSAPREL PD PG PRC PVOV PLO PRELL PEPFAR PREK PEREZ PINT POLI PPOL PARTIES PT PRELUN PH PENA PIN PGPV PKST PROTESTS PHSAK PRM PROLIFERATION PGOVBL PAS PUM PMIG PGIC PTERPGOV PSHA PHM PHARM PRELHA PELOSI PGOVKCMABN PQM PETER PJUS PKK POUS PTE PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PERM PRELGOV PAO PNIR PARMP PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PHYTRP PHUML PFOV PDEM PUOS PN PRESIDENT PERURENA PRIVATIZATION PHUH PIF POG PERL PKPA PREI PTERKU PSEC PRELKSUMXABN PETROL PRIL POLUN PPD PRELUNSC PREZ PCUL PREO PGOVZI POLMIL PERSONS PREFL PASS PV PETERS PING PQL PETR PARMS PNUC PS PARLIAMENT PINSCE PROTECTION PLAB PGV PBS PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PKNP PSOCI PSI PTERM PLUM PF PVIP PARP PHUMQHA PRELNP PHIM PRELBR PUBLIC PHUMKPAL PHAM PUAS PBOV PRELTBIOBA PGOVU PHUMPINS PICES PGOVENRG PRELKPKO PHU PHUMKCRS POGV PATTY PSOC PRELSP PREC PSO PAIGH PKPO PARK PRELPLS PRELPK PHUS PPREL PTERPREL PROL PDA PRELPGOV PRELAF PAGE PGOVGM PGOVECON PHUMIZNL PMAR PGOVAF PMDL PKBL PARN PARMIR PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PDD PRELKPAO PKMN PRELEZ PHUMPRELPGOV PARTM PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPEL PGOVPRELPINRBN PGOVSOCI PWBG PGOVEAID PGOVPM PBST PKEAID PRAM PRELEVU PHUMA PGOR PPA PINSO PROVE PRELKPAOIZ PPAO PHUMPRELBN PGVO PHUMPTER PAGR PMIN PBTSEWWT PHUMR PDOV PINO PARAGRAPH PACE PINL PKPAL PTERE PGOVAU PGOF PBTSRU PRGOV PRHUM PCI PGO PRELEUN PAC PRESL PORG PKFK PEPR PRELP PMR PRTER PNG PGOVPHUMKPAO PRELECON PRELNL PINOCHET PAARM PKPAO PFOR PGOVLO PHUMBA POPDC PRELC PHUME PER PHJM POLINT PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PAUL PHALANAGE PARTY PPEF PECON PEACE PROCESS PPGOV PLN PRELSW PHUMS PRF PEDRO PHUMKDEM PUNR PVPR PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PGGV PSA PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PGIV PRFE POGOV PBT PAMQ

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07NICOSIA620, PRESIDENT PAPADOPOULOS OFFICIALLY ENTERS PRESIDENTIAL RACE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07NICOSIA620.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07NICOSIA620 2007-07-27 14:11 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nicosia
VZCZCXRO4426
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHNC #0620/01 2081411
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271411Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8019
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0911
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000620 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT PAPADOPOULOS OFFICIALLY ENTERS PRESIDENTIAL RACE 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On July 24, the last of the three main contenders 
for the presidency, incumbent Tassos Papadopoulos, officially 
confirmed that he will seek reelection.  The main themes of his 
televised announcement were the rejection of the Annan Plan and 
support of the subsequent July 8 process as a vehicle for finding a 
new basis for a solution.  Having lost leftist AKEL's support, 
however, Papadopoulos is no longer considered the clear favorite. 
Opinion polls record a gradual decline of his popularity and now 
show all three major candidates with roughly equal chances to make 
it to the second round in February. 
 
2. (SBU) Meanwhile, nationalist EVROKO joined DIKO and EDEK in 
supporting Papadopoulos's bid and in becoming an equal partner in 
any future Papadopoulos administration.  EVROKO's shrill 
nationalistic rhetoric and its poor relations with DISY, however, 
will scare away many AKEL and DISY voters who might otherwise have 
been tempted to support Papadopoulos.  For its part, AKEL is not 
only increasing the volume of its criticism of Papadopoulos, it is 
also making a greater effort to move the party away from its 
communist roots toward the center. 
 
Papadopoulos Appeals to "No" Voters to reelect him 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
3.  (SBU) In a July 24 televised address, President Tassos 
Papadopoulos officially launched his reelection campaign.  Flanked 
by a Cypriot and an EU flag and with an open window in the 
background, a calm and confident Papadopoulos revealed that he will 
seek to capitalize on what he considers the key accomplishments of 
his administration:  the rejection of the Annan Plan, the July 8 
process, a recently-announced increase in social benefits, and 
Cyprus's entry into the Euro-zone.  His speech was designed to 
appeal to the 76 percent that voted "no" to the UN-sponsored Annan 
Plan in April 2004.  He argued that the rejection of the Annan plan 
has opened up prospects for a better solution, provided he remained 
in charge to complete the work that he had started.  He placed blame 
for the Annan Plan on former (DISY) President Clerides and claimed 
that, despite his sincere efforts, he could not improve it to the 
point that it could form the blueprint for a viable and functional 
solution.  Aware of the electorate's growing uneasiness over the 
lack of any kind of forward movement on the Cyprus issue, 
Papadopoulos argued that the July 8 process could produce a new 
basis for a solution, provided that Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet 
Ali Talat responded to his call to enter into negotiations on the 
core aspects of the Cyprus problem. 
 
4.  (SBU) Papadopoulos made a special appeal in his speech to his 
"friends in AKEL" to renew their faith in him "in order to win more 
battles together" and prevent conservative DISY from climbing back 
into power.  His awkward pitch to AKEL voters infuriated AKEL's 
leadership, which launched a series of attacks on Papadopoulos, 
warning him to keep his hands off the party faithful since AKEL now 
has it own candidate.  However, recent opinion polls recording a 
gradual decline in Papadopoulos's popularity clearly indicate that 
he needs to attract votes from AKEL's and DISY's traditional 
electorate if he is to make it into the second round.  The first 
opinion poll carried out only two days after AKEL made its final 
decision on July 8 to back the candidacy of its own General 
Secretary Demetris Christofias, showed a seven percent decline in 
 
SIPDIS 
Papadopoulos's lead, down to 30.8 percent from 37.7 percent in April 
2007.  At the same time, Christofias improved his share to 26.3 
percent from 23.9 percent three months ago.  DISY-backed independent 
candidate Ioannis Kasoulides remained second in the race with 29.6 
percent, down from 32.4 percent in April.  Contrary to earlier 
predictions that Papadopoulos would win in a landslide in a second 
round run-off with either one of his main rivals, this poll showed 
Christofias leading with 41.1 percent against Papadopoulos's 39.5 
percent. 
 
Papadopoulos Loses the Aura of Inevitability 
----------------------------------- 
5.  (SBU) Pundits believe that Papadopoulos has valid reasons to 
worry about his prospects for reelection as the two major parties 
AKEL and DISY appear to have solidified party support for their own 
candidates.  An independent election specialist, with a proven 
record prognosticating in Cypriot elections, told EmbOff that, 
traditionally, the parties that support Papadopoulos, centrist DIKO 
and socialist EDEK, are incapable of delivering one hundred percent 
of the votes they poll in parliamentary elections to the 
presidential candidate they endorse, primarily because of their weak 
party organization but also due to internal rivalries and 
disagreements.  DIKO and EDEK polled 17.9 percent and 8.8 percent in 
the May 2006 parliamentary elections, while AKEL and DISY polled 
31.13 percent and 30.34 percent, respectively.  AKEL is regarded as 
having the best party organization and being able to deliver its 
electorate to the polls.  To date, all Cypriot presidents have been 
elected with either the support of DISY or AKEL. 
 
6.  (SBU) A July 25 decision by nationalist European Party (EVROKO 
-- which was formed by defectors from DISY in 2005), to endorse 
 
NICOSIA 00000620  002 OF 002 
 
 
Papadopoulos's candidacy, may prove a double-edged sword.  While the 
addition of EVROKO's 5.75 percent share in the May 2006 
parliamentary elections may seemingly appear sufficient to safely 
land Papadopoulos in the second round of the elections, EVROKO's 
nationalist, anti-federation views and its history of bad blood with 
DISY may scare away any AKEL and DISY voters who are attracted to 
Papadopoulos's candidacy but are appalled by the idea of joining 
forces with EVROKO. 
 
7. (SBU) A Papadopoulos campaign insider disagrees.  He believes 
that Papadopoulos's image as the leader of the "no" camp at the 2004 
referendum is stronger than AKEL's legendary discipline and party 
allegiance.  He is convinced that Papadopoulos will easily draw 
votes from the huge 76 percent "no" vote pool, especially now that 
he is free of the constraints placed on his Cyprus-problem policy by 
AKEL.  He argued that AKEL's irresolute stance on the Annan Plan has 
driven many AKEL voters to Papadopoulos's camp and was certain that 
Christofias will "fall on his face" in the February elections. 
 
8.  (SBU) Meanwhile, in Kasoulides's camp hopes and fears are riding 
high.  While Christofias's candidacy has suddenly made Kasoulides a 
serious contender, it simultaneously exposed his most damaging 
weaknesses: his lack of proven leadership qualities.   A Kasoulides 
campaign insider and senior DISY official confessed to EmbOff that 
"most bets are on Christofias" to be the next president.  Should 
Kasoulides fail to significantly improve his image and thus create a 
momentum for his candidacy, his chances will collapse, he said.  He 
disclosed that private media outlets and many influential 
businesspeople are waiting for the September poll results in order 
to decide on which side to jump.  He feared that Kasoulides's 
failure to enter the second round would cause a serious and possibly 
irreparable rift in DISY.  He revealed that a DISY-commissioned poll 
showed that half of the DISY supporters would never vote for 
Christofias and the other half are dead set against Papadopoulos. 
 
9. (SBU) Another Kasoulides campaign insider, however, was 
optimistic about Kasoulides's chances to win the elections.  He was 
certain that the election will result in a second round runoff 
between Kasoulides and Christofias.  Since most DIKO and EVROKO 
voters will never agree to back the Communist Christofias, 
Kasoulides will be the victor. 
 
AKEL Shifting to the Center 
--------------------------- 
10.  (SBU) AKEL spokesman Andros Kyprianou told EmbOff that the 
party's decision to go it alone rather than throwing its support 
behind other parties' candidates as it has in the past was part of a 
longer-term strategy to establish AKEL as a party with a direct 
claim to power.   More revealing of AKEL's future plans was AKEL's 
decision to hire the services of mainland Greek communications and 
policy advisor, Yiannis Loullis, who also serves as an advisor to 
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis.  Loullis is best known for his 
motto that "the future is in the center."   According to an AKEL 
insider, in his speech to the closed session of the July 8 AKEL 
Congress, Christofias talked about transforming AKEL into an urban 
political party, while in public appearances AKEL officials have 
dropped references to communism in favor of socialism.   DISY Deputy 
Leader Averof Neophytou worried to us that by moving toward the 
center, AKEL will be able to attract middle and upper middle-class 
voters and donors, making it an even more formidable rival.  A 
possible AKEL success in the upcoming elections, he said, would 
speed up this process. 
 
Comment 
------- 
11.  (SBU) While Papadopoulos's reelection seemed a near certainty a 
few months ago, it is now anybody's game.    Christofias' candidacy 
has deprived him of the support of AKEL that was critical to his 
election in 2003 and has made this a tight race.  With no clear 
favorite, many key opinion makers who appeared poised to jump on the 
Papadopoulos band-wagon are now waiting to see the poll results this 
fall before tying their fates to any of the three main contenders. 
A three-candidate race will also make it much more difficult for 
Papadopoulos to turn the campaign into a "second referendum" on the 
Annan plan.  To get to the second round, Papadopoulos now needs the 
support of all of DIKO's, EDEK's and EVROKO's parliamentary voters 
or significant defections from the AKEL and DISY electorates.  This 
will not be easy.  The parties in his coalition lack the political 
organization and internal discipline of the two larger parties.  In 
the months leading up to the February 17 presidential election, 
Papadopoulos will seek to satisfy hardliners and moderates alike in 
order to convince them to renew their trust in him.  Papadopoulos is 
also likely to try to improve his relations with the international 
community, and particularly the U.S., in an attempt to fend off AKEL 
criticisms that his reputation abroad has tipped the international 
balance in favor of the Turkish Cypriot side. 
 
SCHLICHER