VZCZCXYZ0012
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNE #3321/01 2040841
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230841Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RUEAHLC/HQ ICE IAO WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7016

UNCLAS NEW DELHI 003321 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 532/OEA/M. NICKSON-D/KGAINES/JAY HATFIELD 
USDOC FOR 3131/USFCS/OIO/ANESA/KREISSL 
USDOC FOR 4530/MAC/ANESA/OSA 
ICE HQ FOR STRATEGIC INVESTIGATIONS 
STATE FOR EB/ESP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC ETRD BEXP IN
SUBJECT: EXTRANCHECK: POST-SHIPMENT VERIFICATION: SCHLUMBERGER ASIA 
SERVICES LTD., MUMBAI, LICENSE D355904 
 
REF: USDOC 05731 
 
¶1. Unauthorized disclosure of the information provided below is 
prohibited by Section 12(c) of the Export Administration Act. 
 
¶2. Export Control Officer (ECO) Paul Cushman and BIS FSN Prem 
Narayan conducted a Post-shipment Verification (PSV) at Schlumberger 
Asia Services Ltd. (SAS), Mumbai, on July 11, 2007. 
 
¶3. BIS requested a PSV at SAS, a private sector company located at: 
N.S.E. Estate, W.E. Highway, Goregaon (East), Mumbai 400063, Tel: 
91-22-2685-4547, Fax: 91-22-2685-4222, Email: 
dhiraj@bombay.oilfield.slb.com. SAS was listed as the Ultimate 
Consignee and Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Inc., Dubai, 
U.A.E. as the Foreign Purchaser for 20-detonator assemblies and 10 
secure igniter assemblies controlled under ECCN 3A232. The license 
applicant was Schlumberger Technology Corp. (STC), Sugar Land, TX. 
 
¶4. ECO along with FSN Narayan met with Rajesh Puri, Manager, 
Oilfield Services, Mumbai; Dhiraj Dudeja (Dudeja), Operations 
Manager-Wireline, India; V.S. Raman (Raman), INM Logistics Manager, 
and Vikas Kumar Sahu, INM Explosives Officer, SAS. 
 
¶5. SAS representatives were aware of certain BIS regulations. 
However, they did not recall a previous visit by USG or BIS 
officials to conduct an end-use check (EUC).  Raman provided a copy 
of the SAS profile, SAS Purchase Order, STC Invoice, Air Waybill, 
Form BXA-711, STC Shipper's Declaration for Dangerous Goods, and the 
BIS license conditions.  SAS representatives also provided a 
disposition log reflecting a list of explosives imported under this 
license and their disposition.  In addition, Raman provided a copy 
of documentation that was sent to BIS Headquarters by STC containing 
Automated Export System (AES) information, Direct Shipment Record, 
Air Waybill, Schlumberger Invoice and a letter to the Department of 
Commerce documenting the first shipment against the subject 
license. 
 
¶6. Dudeja stated the items on check were imported in February 2007 
to be used at the Panna, Mukta, and Tapti oil and gas fields.  Panna 
and Mukta are located approximately 95 kilometers northwest of 
Mumbai and Tapti is located approximately 160 kilometers northwest 
of Mumbai.  British Gas Exploration and Production India Ltd. (BG) 
is a British company and is one of the license holders in the Panna, 
Mukta, and Tapti oilfields.  He stated that SAS is one of the 
world's leading oilfield service providers and has a sizeable 
presence in India.  BG subcontracted SAS for well logging at the 
Panna and Mukta oilfields.  Well logging, also known as borehole 
logging, is the practice of making a detailed record of the geologic 
formations penetrated by a borehole. 
 
¶7. Raman stated that the importation of explosives (to include the 
subject of this EUC) is tightly controlled by the Government of 
India (GOI).  The process involves securing prior approval from four 
separate GOI agencies and usually requires 12-16 weeks to complete. 
Raman went on to describe in great detail the importation process 
and provided copies of all four GOI agency approvals obtained for 
this transaction. 
 
¶8. Raman stated that igniters, detonators and explosives are 
imported for use under specific oilfield service contracts for 
logging and perforation.  Schlumberger Technology Center (STC) 
supplies all the explosive requirements of SAS operations in India. 
Explosives orders are placed using STC Web Procurement System (SWPS) 
and approval from the Operations Manager is required.  All 
explosives are identified by uniform part numbers and standard 
descriptions used by STC. 
 
¶9. Upon delivery, all explosives are stored in a GOI-approved bunker 
until they are needed on the oil-drilling platform.  These bunkers 
are duly licensed and built in accordance with Petroleum and 
Explosives Safety Organization (PESO) guidelines as laid out in the 
Indian Explosives Rules of 1983.  The items on check have not yet 
been employed and are stored in such an approved bunker, which is 
located approximately 60 kilometers northwest of Mumbai. 
 
¶10. Inventory management (including explosives) is done using 
LAWSON, A system that tracks the financial and physical movement of 
SAS inventory.  All explosives are transported to the well site in 
the presence of a SAS representative.  Inventory logs are maintained 
and reconciled monthly by the SAS Field Service Managers.  An 
Explosives Safety Officer audits all storage facilities periodically 
for safety and compliance as per STC Worldwide Oilfield Service 
Standards.  The SAS Explosives Safety Officer maintains separate 
inventory logs.  These logs cover all importations of explosives 
covered under EAR, their disposition, and their current location. 
 
SAS shared a copy of a log reflecting the STC part number, BG 
contract number, location of both listed items, and their quantity. 
 
 
¶11. Dudeja confirmed the stated end-use.  He stated that the secure 
detonator and secure igniter assemblies are used in wire-line 
logging and in oilfield service operations to detonate an explosive 
charge down-hole, which perforates the oil well casting, allowing 
fluids to flow in. 
 
¶12. He stated that the secure detonator is superior to a 
conventional detonator because radio transmitters need not be 
switched off while arming the assembly.  The exploding foil 
initiator (EFI) technology makes the secure detonator the safest and 
most reliable detonator because specific high-voltage, high-current 
pulses are required for detonation. 
 
¶13. SAS started its operation in India in 1929.  It is the leading 
oilfield services and solution provider firm in India.  In addition 
to the Oilfield Services Division, SAS has two more divisions: Water 
Management and Energy Management.  SAS renders its services to 
Indian and foreign companies engaged in exploration and production 
and offers cost-effective, state-of-the-art technology and solutions 
for superior results.  SAS services include drilling and 
measurement, wire-line, well services, completion, artificial lift, 
well testing, data and consulting services, integrated project 
management, information solutions, land and marine seismic, seismic 
data processing and multi-client data library.  SAS has operating 
bases and offices in the vicinity of all the major oilfields in 
India.  The Indian headquarters of SAS is located in Delhi.  Major 
clients of SAS include Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), Oil 
India Limited (OIL), GAIL India Ltd., Indian Oil Corporation (IOL), 
Ministry of Petroleum, Reliance, BG, Cairn Energy PLC, Gujarat State 
Petroleum Corp., Niko Resources Ltd., Selan Exploration Ltd., 
Hindustan Oil Exploration Ltd. and Essar Group.  In FY-2006 and 
FY-2007, SAS capital expenditure has exceeded 100 million USD.  SAS 
employs approximately 1,500 personnel including 1,200 in Oilfield 
Services. 
 
¶14. ECO was unable to conduct an on-site inspection since the listed 
items were warehoused in a GOI-approved bunker where visitors are 
not permitted. 
 
¶15. Based upon the interview with company representatives and the 
documentation provided, the legitimacy of SAS was clearly 
established.  Despite the lack of a physical verification, all 
indications were that the listed commodities will be used in 
accordance with export license conditions and that Schlumberger Asia 
Services Ltd. is a reliable recipient of the sensitive U.S.-origin 
technology in question.  (PSCUSHMAN/PNARAYAN) White