VZCZCXRO2444
RR RUEHGI RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0594/01 1941806
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 131806Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5535
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1424
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0955
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1405
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0381
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0476
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1718
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0728
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2982
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2215
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0422
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1582

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000594 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV CD LY SU
SUBJECT: CHAD:  TWO UNEASY TRACKS OF DIALOGUE 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 544 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  Strains within the opposition coalition 
have not yet led to an open rupture, but the internal 
political dialogue is blocked over the issue of a government 
of consensus.  Meanwhile, there is apparent progress in the 
parallel dialogue in Tripoli between the government and 
rebels.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The opposition coalition CPDC (Coordination des 
Parties politiques pour la Defense de la Constitution) has so 
far weathered a fundamental disagreement that seemed (reftel) 
on the verge of breaking the coalition apart.  Opposition 
heavyweights Jean Bawoyeu Alingue, Wadal Abdelkader Kamougue, 
and Saleh Kebzabo are ranged on one side, leaning toward 
signing an agreement on improved electoral modalities, and 
Lol Mahamat Choua and Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh are on the 
other side, insisting on not signing without broader 
guarantees, including formation of a government of consensus 
empowered to enforce a new road map on electoral reform. 
However, General Kamougue convened the CPDC leaders last week 
and they emerged with an uneasy understanding to maintain 
opposition unity for the time being. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Meanwhile, the talks between the government and 
armed opposition continue in Tripoli, concluding their third 
week.  We do not have a direct read-out but it is clear, from 
opposition press accounts and ministerial comings and goings 
from Ndjamena to Tripoli, that the talks are active.  The 
European Union here informs us that the negotiations in 
Tripoli are "advanced."  The rebels -- apparently even 
including Deby's relatives the Erdimi twins -- appear to 
willing to sign a ceasefire and, according to the EU, are 
negotiating their participation in the government.  The EU 
surmises that the rebel groups' poor fighting record since 
Mahamat Nour (now Minister of Defense) defected at the end of 
2006, compounded by some withdrawal of Sudanese support in 
the wake of the Riyadh/Tripoli entente with Chad, have made 
the rebels amenable to a deal. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Charge d'affaires called on Alingue July 12 and 
Ibni Oumar Mahamat Saleh July 13 to get an updated view on 
the incipient split in the CPDC and on linkage between the 
external (Tripoli) and internal dialogues.  Both were very 
careful to avoid casting aspersions on each other or 
admitting any linkage to Tripoli, while both expressed hope 
that Tripoli could produce a ceasefire.  (Comment:  We 
understand that at least some of the opposition leaders are 
in continual telephonic contact with some of the rebels, and 
we know that privately some have given vent to bitter mutual 
criticisms.  End Comment.) 
 
Alingue's View 
-------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Alingue, who chairs the internal dialogue, 
acknowledged that the dialogue, since it commenced in 
December 2006, had made considerable progress in elaborating 
electoral reforms -- a significant achievement considering 
the complete lack of trust that had prevailed in Chad ever 
since Deby had announced that he would change the 
constitution and run for a third term.  By April both sides, 
with significant technical advice from the European Union, 
had largely come to agreement on these electoral reforms. 
They began then to turn to the even more difficult issue of 
creating a general environment in which fair elections would 
be feasible.  Alingue emphasized that the most important 
obstacle to fair elections and, indeed, economic development 
and good governance, was Chad's state of insecurity, and thus 
the CPDC had insisted on negotiations that included the armed 
rebels.  If the negotiations now underway in Tripoli brought 
a lessening of insecurity, then the government would have 
gone some way toward meeting this requirement.  There was no 
direct link between the internal dialogue and Tripoli, 
Alingue said, but an agreement between the government and 
rebels would be essential to organizing elections.  However, 
if Tripoli dragged on, it might nonetheless be possible to 
sign the internal agreement. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The other dimension to the discussion on the 
"general environment," according to Alingue, was the 
 
NDJAMENA 00000594  002 OF 003 
 
 
necessity for modalities to ensure that the electoral reforms 
agreed upon would be fulfilled in practice.  Much debate had 
focused on the formation of a watch-dog committee with 
international membership, which the government (as 
represented by the ruling party MPS in this dialogue) had at 
first opposed but now accepted.  For the past two weeks, the 
dialogue had foundered on the last remaining major issue: 
participation of the opposition in the government, a 
"government of consensus."   The government/MPS said it was 
willing to consider the opposition's representation in the 
government, but it insisted that Deby reserve the right to 
say who was to be named to what ministerial portfolio. 
Alingue admitted that there were some CPDC leaders who 
objected to the idea of participating in the government at 
all, even one in which the CPDC had a determinitive role, 
since they would lose the clarity of their status as 
opposition leaders.  (Comment:  We believe Saleh Kebzabo is 
one of these, preferring to put reliance on the watch-dog 
committee as the guarantor of the agreement.  End Comment.) 
Alingue acknowledged that this fundamental disagreement might 
lead to the break-up of the CPDC. 
 
Ibni Oumar's View 
----------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Ibni Oumar did not appear to attach much importance 
to the talks in Tripoli, saying that, while it was important 
that they succeed, the CPDC's requirements for guarantees to 
ensure the effective conduct of elections would remain the 
same.  The electoral reforms that had been agreed would be 
worth little without those guarantees.  The CPDC had set 
forth a "road map" in May that included a thorough reform of 
territorial administration (to include removal of military 
interference in elections), a watch-dog committee with 
international observers, and a "consensual team" that would 
have complete power to oversee and enforce the road map.  The 
MPS appeared to agree to this road map on May 8, and it was 
an MPS member who had suggested a "government of consensus" 
rather than "consensual team."  The MPS had appeared to agree 
that the President would delegate some of his power under the 
present constitution.  However, the MPS had walked back its 
apparent agreement and now, according to Ibni Oumar, wanted 
to use the CPDC's insistence on guarantees as a way to break 
up the CPDC.  However, Ibni Oumar said, in its recent 
meetings the CPDC agreed to remain unified and to continue to 
insist on these guarantees.  The watch-dog committee was one 
important guarantee but not adequate without a government of 
consensus.  To the Charge's question about the role of the 
European Union, Ibni Oumar said the EU had from the beginning 
of the dialogue seen its role as restricted to offering 
technical advice on electoral issues.  He said that the EU 
did not appear to be interested in the larger issue of 
guarantees for electoral reforms. 
 
European Union View 
------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Poloff called on EU Counsellor Martin Klaucke 
(German) July 11 for his read-out on the dialogue.  Klaucke 
said that the government had made significant concessions on 
the reform of the electoral system.  It was a big step 
forward for Chad.  The reforms would hopefully allow Chad to 
have legislative elections that were much less manipulated 
than past elections had been.  Legislative elections were 
admittedly not so important as presidential elections, due to 
the weakness of Chad's National Assembly, but successful 
legislative elections could bode well for the presidential 
election in 2011. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Klaucke said that at the June 21 plenary the 
government/MPS had agreed on all the electoral reforms and 
two out of three of the wider demands of the CPDC:  watch-dog 
committee with EU and AU, and who would be allowed to sign 
(CPDC insisted only MPS and CPDC, and a compromise had been 
worked out by which other political parties -- mostly small 
and allied to the government -- would "initial but not 
sign").  It was the third issue, the CPDC's insistence on a 
government of consensus, that had blocked agreement.  In 
fact, Klaucke said, some of the CPDC did not want to be in 
the government at all, and Klaucke suspected that the CPDC 
was now using its demand for a government of consensus as an 
 
NDJAMENA 00000594  003 OF 003 
 
 
excuse to delay agreement pending developments in Tripoli. 
Klaucke speculated that the 
CPDC feared that the armed opposition would extract a better 
deal from the government than the moderate opposition, one 
from which the latter might benefit if they were patient. 
 
¶10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
TAMLYN