VZCZCXRO3086
RR RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0555/01 1851032
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041032Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5479
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000555 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD:  PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR YOUNOUSMI ON SUDAN, 
REFORM 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  President Deby's close advisor Adoum 
Younousmi told the Ambassador July 3 that, during his trip to 
Khartoum the previous week, he had found the Sudanese leaders 
"lacking in vision" in their objectives in Darfur, but 
"evolving."  They had asked for Chadian mediation with the 
Darfur rebels.  Younousmi claimed that the death of Majzub 
al-Khalifa was not the reason Deby delayed his trip to 
Khartoum (he did not give the reason) but he believed Deby 
might go next week.  Younousmi disparaged the Chadian rebels 
with whom he had conducted talks in Tripoli, but he exuded 
confidence that an accord with the internal opposition would 
be signed soon (albeit one that would fail to meet the 
opposition's wider demands).  He acknowledged that Deby would 
be voted out in a transparent electoral system and that Chad 
needed such a system, but he said that Chad was too immature 
to move toward it rapidly.  He did not accept the 
Ambassador's analysis that such reform was key to long-term 
stability in Chad but insisted, instead, that Sudan and 
Darfur were the source of Chad's problems.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In his farewell call July 3 on Minister of 
State/Minister of Infrastructure Adoum Younousmi, the 
Ambassador presented his condolences on the death of 
President Idriss Deby's oldest son Brahim (murdered in France 
July 2) and asked that he pass on his condolences to Deby, in 
the event that he would not have an occasion to see him 
before his departure from Chad July 5.  Younousmi noted that 
Deby had not cut short his attendance at the African Union 
summit in Accra and would return to Chad July 3.  There would 
be no public funeral.  (Note:  Brahim, renowned for his 
violence and arrogance, had fallen from favor.  End Note.) 
 
To Tripoli and Khartoum 
----------------------- 
 
3,  (SBU) The Ambassador noted that Younousmi had been doing 
much travel in the past week, starting with leading a 
delegation to meet Chadian rebels in Tripoli, followed by his 
trip to Khartoum to pave the way for President Deby's trip to 
Khartoum, canceled due to the death of senior Sudanese 
official Majzub al-Khalifa.  Younousmi said that, indeed, he 
had not had much time to attend to the needs of his own 
ministry.  He would be traveling to Libreville on July 4.  He 
had met President Bashir in Khartoum.  In fact, it was not 
Majzub's death that prompted Deby's failure to travel to 
Khartoum; rather, Deby had been "too occupied" and the 
"timing was not right."  Younousmi said that Deby might go to 
Khartoum "after a week." 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Younousmi said that some progress had been made in 
Tripoli.  He characterized the Chadian rebels as "controlled 
by Sudan" and said that progress with Sudan would mean 
progress with the rebels.  As for the rebels themselves, he 
said he was "disappointed" in what they had to say.  He knew 
them well -- they had all been ministers or advisors of the 
president.  They talked much about transparent elections and 
good governance but had done nothing to promote those aims 
while in government.  They had no cause or ideology other 
than self-promotion. 
 
Dialogue -- Mostly Agreed 
------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Younousmi said, meanwhile, the democratic 
opposition in Chad had engaged the regime in a dialogue that 
was making serious progress toward effecting the aims that 
the armed opposition talked about but undermined through 
their resort to violence.  The dialogue had produced 
agreement on a substantial reform of electoral processes, 
something that had been unthinkable over the preceding 
decade.  The next elections (legislative) would be 
transparent.  It was natural for a people to want a change of 
leadership, and this regime knew that it would have to lose 
an election some day.  Chad was not mature enough for full 
democracy yet, but the dialogue was moving Chad in that 
direction. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) To the Ambassador's question whether the government 
had come to agreement with the opposition on all points, 
Younousmi acknowledged that there remained areas of 
disagreement, in particular a government of consensus and 
deferral of the legislative elections (in order to give time 
for a census).  Younousmi complained that these points "were 
not supposed to be" on the agenda of the dialogue.  The 
dialogue, as originally conceived (i.e., by Deby), was meant 
to have addressed "purely electoral issues," such as 
reconstitution of the electoral commission.  On electoral 
issues, he said, there was complete agreement.  It was 
important to understand that this was a "huge step." 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The Ambassador said that it was a pity that such 
 
NDJAMENA 00000555  002 OF 003 
 
 
reform had not been effected prior to the 2006 presidential 
election.  Younousmi bristled, commenting that the democratic 
opposition had discredited itself by having contact with the 
armed rebels.  He painted a cataclysmic picture of what Chad 
could have become if the rebels had succeeded -- "worse than 
Somalia."  The Ambassador pointed out that Younousmi had, 
effectively, just made the case for democratic institutions. 
Younousmi conceded that stability would "require many 
reforms" and repeated that "we are prepared to lose an 
election."  Indeed, he said, "we (the regime) could be proud 
to lose an election."  The Ambassador seconded this sentiment. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) However, Younousmi said, the ground had to be 
prepared patiently.  In much of Africa, he said, loss of an 
election was loss of everything, loss of all privileges, loss 
of all supporters.  The opposition parties (being in the 
opposition) were very weak, both in ideology and resources, 
built around individuals with narrow regional bases.  They 
had no capacity to put election observers all over the vast 
country, in which Ndjamena had only ten percent of the 
population.  The Ambassador said that, if Chad made real 
reforms, the United States might be prepared to bring 
electoral expertise and assistance to bear -- would Chad be 
amenable to such assistance?  Younousmi said that Chad would 
not only welcome assistance -- the United States could 
organize the elections entirely.  What Chad (read: Deby) 
could not accept was public condemnation.  Even if criticism 
were just, it was unacceptable when splashed on the front 
pages of newspapers. 
 
Sudan as the Source of All Ills 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Younousmi said that Chad was unfortunate in its 
neighbors.  It had had good relations with Sudan until 
recently.  Formerly, it had had poor relations with Libya, 
and rebels in those days had found support from and refuge in 
Libya.  Now it was Sudan.  The previous week, Younousmi had 
met President Bashir and other senior leaders.  "I could not 
see their vision.  They do not know what they want.  But 
their views are evolving."  They had told him that continued 
unrest in Darfur was severely undermining them, and Younousmi 
told them Darfur was equally serious for Chad.  But they had 
said that if Sudan did what the international community 
demanded, "ten other Darfurs" would emerge in Sudan, just as 
Darfur had emerged after they had met international demands 
on southern Sudan. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Younousmi said that his Sudanese interlocutors 
told him that Chad's support for Khalil Ibrahim had harmed 
prospects for peace.  Younousmi responded that Chad was no 
friend of Khalil's.  In fact, he told them he had urged 
Khalil to sign the Darfur peace agreement.  The important 
thing was that Khalil and the other Darfur rebels did not ask 
for independence.  At most, they wanted a federation.  A 
federal system was what had helped Nigeria stay together as a 
nation.  Chad itself was moving toward greater 
decentralization.  Sudan needed to "make the big decision" to 
"give them their region," to share power and to share oil 
revenues.  A "small minority" could not continue to hold 
total power in a country as vast and diverse as Sudan. 
Chinese help would not suffice, and turning to Chavez and 
Iran only showed Sudanese desperation.  Younousmi said they 
had accused the United States of wanting to gain control of 
Sudan's oil, an idea he said he dismissed out of hand. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Younousmi said that he feared that sanctions 
against individuals was not the correct strategy.  He had 
felt in Khartoum that Bashir was backed in a corner.  The 
effect was to "radicalize him," make him more obdurate and 
desperate.  It would be more useful, Younousmi said, to put 
pressure on China. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Younousmi emphasized that if Darfur were resolved, 
Chad's rebellion would be resolved.  The Ambassador said that 
the United States was sparing no effort in working for peace 
in Darfur, but this effort needed Chad's commitment to 
democratic reform, which would also be essential to quelling 
the Chadian rebels and promoting Chad's stability.  Younousmi 
said that he was certain that an accord with the democratic 
opposition would soon be signed.  But he insisted that the 
Chadian rebellion was a function of the Darfur conflict and 
Sudan's support.  He had stressed to the Sudanese that not 
only Sudan and Chad would be ultimately destroyed by 
continued conflict in Darfur, but conflict would spread 
further and even engulf Nigeria.  He said that the Sudanese 
had asked Chad to be a mediator in the conflict.  Younousmi 
said that he had responded that Chad had "no problem" being a 
mediator, but it was essential that Sudan make concessions on 
Darfurian autonomy and sharing oil wealth. 
 
 
NDJAMENA 00000555  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Younousmi said he did not underestimate the 
difficulty of sharing oil wealth.  Chad had devoted five 
percent of its oil revenues to the regional governments in 
the south where the oil was located and it ought, in his 
opinion, to be increased to ten percent.  However, the local 
committees overseeing the disbursement of that five percent 
had mismanaged the money, so much so that the villages most 
impacted by the oil operation had seen scarcely any benefit. 
On his recent swing through the south, Deby had fired many 
officials and demanded an overhaul of the committees. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Comment:  Younousmi is one of Deby's suavest and 
closest advisors, whom he uses for sensitive negotiations and 
as regime paymaster.  He talks a good game on democracy as 
being important to Chad's long-term stability, but his 
remarks on Chad's immaturity (i.e., unreadiness for 
democracy) are a truer reflection of how he sees the reality 
of Chad.  Chadian counsel to the Sudanese about sharing power 
and oil revenue was surely unconvincing to them, coming from 
a country that has a poor record in both areas. 
WALL