VZCZCXRO8752
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P 110252Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1965
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003379 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR G/AIG 
STATE ALSO FOR EUR/RUS, EB/TPP/ATP, EB/TPP/BTA, OES/STC 
USDA FOR OSEC/DAN CAINE, FAS FOR OSTA/MACKE, 
-  WRIGHT, LEIER, ROSENBLUM; OCRA/THOMAS, 
-  FLEMINGS; OA/PATRICK CLERKIN 
HHS FOR SAWYER, STEIGER 
FAS PASS FSIS AND APHIS 
SECDEF FOR OSD 
VIENNA PASS APHIS/TANAKA, BRUSSELS PASS 
- APHIS/FERNANDEZ 
USDOC 3150/DAVID FULTON/MOLLY COSTA/ITA/CS/OIO/EUR 
GENEVA PASS HEALTH ATTACHE 
DEPARTMENT PASS USAID FOR GH/RCS/EE/ROSENBERG 
CDC ATLANTA PASS SEPRL FOR DAVID SUAREZ 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO KFLU KSTH KPAO SENV RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN LAB MOVES AHEAD TO BECOME REGIONAL AND WHO FLU 
CENTER 
 
REFS:  A. 06 Moscow 12876 (G8 Infectious Diseases) 
        ¶B. Moscow 1318 (Russian AI Preparedness) 
        ¶C. 06 Moscow 10955 (Human AI Vaccine) 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED.  PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Russia pledged to transform the Vector State 
Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology near Novosibirsk into 
a regional influenza center and ultimately a WHO Collaborating 
Center for avian influenza as part of its 2006 G8 Presidential focus 
on infectious diseases.  Although Vector has formally applied to 
become a WHO reference laboratory and collaborating center and has 
hosted a WHO assessment team, the process could take as long as two 
years to complete.  Vector has been actively developing its 
diagnostic and surveillance capacity in the meantime, and training 
flu specialists from the CIS and Central Asia.  The question of how 
willingly Vector will share avian influenza samples with institutes 
outside Russia is still unresolved.  END SUMMARY. 
 
WHO Begins Assessing Vector as an AI Center 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) During the Soviet era, Vector was part of Biopreparat, 
which produced biological compounds for both civilian and military 
applications.  Although Russia has consistently denied that the 
Soviet Union had an offensive biological weapons program, it is 
widely believed that Vector was specifically established in the 
1970s to develop viral agents for military uses. In 2004, 
jurisdiction over Vector was transferred to the Health and Social 
Development Ministry, and it is now a leading virology and biotech 
research center.  Vector was involved in virus isolation and 
characterization and AI surveillance during a 2005 AI outbreak which 
occurred in the Novosibirsk region (a crossroads for migratory 
birds). 
 
¶3. (SBU) As pledged during its 2006 G8 Presidency (Ref A), Russia is 
spending $45 million to establish Vector as a regional collaborating 
center for Avian Influenza and to equip a network of 26 other labs. 
Vector falls under the jurisdiction of Gennadiy Onishchenko, 
Russia's Chief Medical Officer and the head of the Federal Service 
for the Protection of Consumer Rights and Human Well-Being 
(Rospotrebnadzor).  Media savvy and probably Russia's most vocal and 
influential public health figure, Onishchenko effectively used 
Russia's G8 presidency to garner additional funding for Vector to 
conduct research on both HIV/AIDS and AI (Ref A). 
 
¶4. (SBU) Vector submitted an application to the WHO to become a 
collaborating center for avian influenza in 2006, and a WHO 
assessment team visited the institute in April 2007.  The WHO team 
found that Vector had a strong background in AI virus isolation and 
research, but no expertise in handling human cases of AI or 
conducting human influenza surveillance.  There is currently no 
laboratory for human influenza at Vector, and Vector is in the 
process of remodeling one of its Biosafety Level Three facilities to 
turn it into the AI lab.  The WHO team concluded that Vector could 
eventually become a WHO collaborating center for AI research, but 
that this process could take as long as two years.  Another WHO 
inspection team will visit Vector within that period to make a final 
 
MOSCOW 00003379  002 OF 003 
 
 
designation. 
 
Vector Takes Regional Lead on AI Conferences and Training 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Vector has begun a robust program to enhance the AI skills 
of its own experts, and to train other specialists from CIS 
countries and Central Asia.  Four leading Russian influenza experts 
visited the WHO collaborating Center at CDC Atlanta in January 2007, 
and six flu scientists will visit the WHO Collaborating Center in 
London this month.  Vector has conducted training sessions for 
specialists from Mongolia and Kazakhstan, and some 157 experts from 
Russian regional offices of Rospotrebnadzor will be trained at 
Vector in the coming months.  Vector's training programs have 
covered the issues of AI biosafety precautions and diagnostic 
practices. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Rospotrebnadzor and Vector have also been working to 
establish formal cooperative agreements on AI with other CIS 
countries.  In addition to framework bilateral agreements on AI 
cooperation between Rospotrebnadzor and several of the CIS 
countries' health ministries, Vector itself has recently inked 
collaboration agreements with influenza institutes in Ukraine, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan on material and information 
exchange, joint expeditions and field epidemiology work, and joint 
training.  Rospotrebnadzor and Vector are also working to sign 
similar agreements with flu centers in the other CIS countries. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Vector hosted a two-day Conference on Joint AI Prevention 
for senior health officials from CIS countries in November 2006. 
All of the CIS countries except Georgia attended and adopted a joint 
action plan on pandemic preparedness for 2006-2009.  The delegates 
endorsed establishing Vector as a WHO influenza collaborating 
center, noting that it would increase efficiency and reduce the cost 
of regional anti-epidemic activities.  Vector hosted a second 
conference in May 2007 for working-level heads of CIS diagnostic 
labs which over 50 experts attended. 
 
Full Sample Sharing Still a Touchy Question 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Sharing of flu virus samples with the outside world remains 
a thorny issue for Vector in particular and for Russia in general. 
While Russia accepts samples from abroad and even developed a human 
AI vaccine at the Research Institute of Influenza (RII) in St. 
Petersburg using samples from the WHO Collaborating Center in Great 
Britain (Ref C), it is less eager to share samples from Russia 
outside its borders.  For routine human influenza cases, Russia has 
historically exchanged information and provided virus samples to the 
CDC and other WHO Collaborating Centers.  For AI samples, Vector 
recently provided the CDC with some DNA material and sera from 
humans who had contact with sick birds during the 2005 AI outbreak 
in the Novosibirsk region.  Vector is also now considering whether 
to share virus isolates with St. Jude Children's Research Hospital 
in Memphis, Tennessee, but this would require special government 
permission.  In 2006, Russia dropped its legal objections to sharing 
AI samples, but we are not aware of any cases in which AI samples 
have actually been shared outside of Russia since then.  Health 
 
MOSCOW 00003379  003 OF 003 
 
 
officials had maintained from 2004-2006 that Russian law absolutely 
prohibited the sharing of AI samples, because they were included in 
a list of dangerous pathogens that cannot be exported. 
 
Vector's Relations With Other Russian Institutes 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The spending of lavish amounts of money (by Russian 
standards) on Vector's AI capacity has created tensions with the 
Research Institute of Influenza (RII) in St. Petersburg, one of 
Russia's other two existing WHO national influenza centers.  RII 
Director Oleg Kiselyov was offended and took umbrage with 
Onishchenko's initial desire to embrace all influenza research at 
Vector, not just AI, which would have clearly usurped the St. 
Petersburg Institute's traditional role as Russia's leading human 
influenza center.  This has spoiled somewhat the relationship 
between the two institutes. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Vector also has a spotty reputation for cooperating with 
Russia's premier veterinary diagnostic and testing lab, the Federal 
Center for Animal Health (ARRIAH) in Vladimir.  Although ARRIAH is 
supposed to take the lead role in AI outbreaks among birds, Vector 
has in some cases conducted preliminary testing of specimens from 
birds and then not shared those samples with ARRIAH. 
 
¶11. (SBU) COMMENT: There is no doubt that Chief Medical Officer 
Onishchenko has the political backing and sufficient funding to see 
the WHO collaborating project through over the next two years at 
Vector.  However, Vector, Rospotrebnadzor, and the Health and Social 
Development Ministry, will ultimately have to overcome the secretive 
culture at Vector and the historical reluctance to share virus 
samples with the outside world. 
 
BURNS