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DE RUEHLP #1981/01 1991409
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P 181409Z JUL 07
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RHMFIUU/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

UNCLAS LA PAZ 001981 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIA'S CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY: WHAT'S AT STAKE 
 
REF: LA PAZ 1877 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (U)  On July 13, twenty of the Constituent Assembly's (CA) 
twenty-one commissions issued their reports, most issuing a 
majority and minority version.  The reports in total contain 
708 articles. The majority Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) 
and the opposition (led by PODEMOS) only agree on 255.  In 
contrast, the current constitution consists of 234 articles. 
While at present there are 453 articles of disagreement, this 
cable looks at the top ten general differences between the 
MAS and the opposition.  These differences include: 
 
¶I. Vision for the Country - Plurinational vs. Intercultural 
II. Autonomy ) Indigenous vs. Departmental 
III. Justice ) Traditional vs. Communitarian 
IV. The Economy ) Social Communitarian vs. Traditional 
¶V. Resource Rights ) Indigenous vs. State Control 
VI. The Presidency ) One vs. Unlimited Terms 
VII. The Legislature ) One Chamber vs. Two 
VIII. The Branches of Government ) Four vs. Three 
IX. The Capital ) La Paz vs. Sucre 
¶X.  Security ) The Police vs. the Armed Forces 
 
All these areas of disagreement need to be ironed out, in 
theory, by August 6.  Within the CA the MAS and opposition 
have agreed to extend their mandate until December, but 
Congress has yet to approve the extension.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
¶I. Vision for the Country - Plurinational vs. Intercultural 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶2. (U) One of the most fundamental disagreements between the 
MAS and PODEMOS is their different "vision for the country." 
The MAS proposes creating a "plurinational" state, whereas 
the opposition argues for an "intercultural" state.  The 
opposition states that recognizing and promoting the 
country's diversity, its interculturalism, should serve as 
the basis for unifying and integrating Bolivia.  The MAS 
generally describes plurinationalism as the recognition and 
self-determination of Bolivia's 36 indigenous groups 
(including Bolivians of African descent).  Jubenal Quispe, a 
lawyer and MAS-sympathetic academic, describes the 
plurinational model as the only viable option to replace the 
failed "single nation society theory" since, in his opinion, 
in Bolivia multiple nations coexist within the same space. 
Quispe and the MAS frequently link plurinationalism to the 
"decolonization" of Bolivia.  According to the MAS, efforts 
to "integrate" the indigenous -- via western education, 
military service, and other reforms -- failed because the 
"criollo and mestizo elites" could never (and will never) 
overcome the indigenous peoples' resistance.  Proponents of 
plurinationalism claim their theory is the only one that can 
unify a country like Bolivia.  The opposition decries 
plurinationalism, stating it will "Balkanize" rather than 
unite the country. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
II. Autonomy ) Indigenous vs. Departmental 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (U) Autonomy, or the decentralization of state power, is 
perhaps the most polemical and core issue facing the CA.  On 
July 16, "indigenous" CA members from the MAS and affiliated 
parties threatened to pull out of the CA if the plurinational 
model and indigenous autonomy are not incorporated in the new 
constitution.  The opposition is primarily interested in 
codifying the concept of departmental autonomy (reftel). 
Meanwhile, the MAS wants to grant Bolivia's 36 indigenous 
groups autonomy. The four eastern department (Beni, Pando, 
Santa Cruz, and Tarija) prefects and civic committees are the 
spearhead of the departmental autonomy movement.  Indigenous 
groups such as the CIDOB and CONAMAQ are the base (and at 
times the shock troops) for the MAS' proposal.  The two 
visions are difficult to reconcile as the indigenous 
territories that the MAS proposes would overlap with the 
existing nine departments.  Furthermore, the MAS has yet to 
clearly define its vision of autonomy.  (Note: The eastern 
departments only fully articulated their vision on July 2, 
reftel.  End Note). The MAS has not expressly stated what 
government responsibilities indigenous autonomous units would 
exercise and in which manner these competencies would be 
exclusive or shared with other levels of government within 
Bolivia.  Recognizing the power of the other's constituency, 
both PODEMOS and MAS have offered proposals that recognize on 
paper the other's "autonomy" demands.  However, neither party 
has yielded enough (yet) to satisfy the other's base. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
III. Justice ) Traditional vs. Communitarian 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Linked to indigenous autonomy is the concept of 
"communitarian justice," which the MAS supports.  The 
simplest definition for communitarian justice is that justice 
which was practiced by indigenous peoples before the Spanish 
conquest. Communitarian justice already exists as an 
alternative form of justice for small claims under the 
Bolivia Criminal Justice Code.  The MAS wants to see 
communitarian justice achieve the same status as the formal 
justice system and has even proposed that a group of 
"indigenous judges" sit on the constitutional tribunal.  A 
driving factor supporting communitarian justice is the 
failure of the formal justice system to reach all areas of 
Bolivia, especially rural areas.  Proponents of communitarian 
justice tout its speed and efficiency.  Opponents argue that 
these benefits stem from the fact that traditional legal 
protections such as habeas corpus, the right to an adequate 
defense, the right to appeal, and many others do not exist 
under communitarian justice.  Opponents also argue that 
Bolivia's 36 indigenous groups' lack of a written judicial 
code will result in arbitrary justice and will encourage more 
lynchings. Lynchings are not infrequent in Bolivia (though 
they are said to be prohibited by traditional, communitarian 
justice.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
IV. The Economy ) Social Communitarian vs. Traditional 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5. (U) The MAS has proposed a vaguely defined "social 
communitarian" economic model, while the opposition prefers a 
mixed capitalist model where the state has control over 
certain limited sectors of the economy (generally 
hydrocarbons and mining) but market economics would prevail. 
Under the MAS vision, private enterprise would still be 
allowed as long it had a "social purpose."  However, who 
determines "social purpose" remains undefined. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶V. Resource Rights ) Indigenous vs. State Control 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6. (U) Also, linked closely to the issue of indigenous 
autonomy is the issue of land and resource rights.  The MAS 
favors giving indigenous groups full rights over the natural 
resources within their autonomous territories. The opposition 
argues for the current model where the state is the final 
arbiter of all land and natural resources, although the 
opposition favors devolving some of this power to the 
departments.  MAS CA members argue that indigenous peoples 
can and would use the resources in an eco-friendly manner. 
The opposition argues that the MAS proposal would negate 
current concessions and that there is no guarantee that 
indigenous peoples would exploit resources sustainably. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
VI. The Presidency ) One Term vs. Unlimited Terms 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
¶7. (U) The MAS has proposed that a president may serve an 
indefinite number of terms, arguing that the "people" via 
elections, not established term limits, should decide the 
number of mandates a president may enjoy.  The opposition 
wants to retain the current system in which a president 
cannot serve consecutive terms.  The MAS wants President 
Morales to enjoy multiple terms in office, while the 
opposition fears that Morales will use this new privilege to 
consolidate power and gradually eliminate existing democratic 
institutions.  Both parties have introduced proposals for 
removing a president from office. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
VII. The Legislature ) One Chamber vs. Two 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The MAS has proposed a directly elected 157 member 
unicameral legislature, while the opposition supports the 
current bicameral model.  Under the MAS model, 27 of the 
members would be indigenous representatives, three from each 
of Bolivia's nine departments.  Comment: The MAS proposal is 
a rather transparent attempt to control congress by 
abolishing the senate, which it currently does not control, 
and replacing the 27 senators with indigenous 
representatives, which MAS insiders believe will 
overwhelmingly be sympathetic to the party. End Comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
VIII. The Branches of Government ) Four vs. Three 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶9. (U) The MAS favors adding a forth branch of government, 
sometimes called the "Social Control Branch (Power)", which 
would be equal in power to the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branch.  According to some proposals, this new 
branch would control, supervise, and evaluate the management 
of the national economy, especially the national treasury and 
the central bank.  It would also issue reports and would be 
the channel for complaints regarding the three other powers. 
Members of this fourth power would be leaders from social 
sector organizations whose election to the body would be 
decided by the "uses and customs" of the organization.  The 
opposition rejects the creation of this fourth power. 
 
---------------------------------- 
IX. The Capital ) La Paz vs. Sucre 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (U) The opposition generally supports moving the 
executive and legislative branches from La Paz to Sucre. 
(Note: The judiciary is already based in Sucre. End Note). 
The MAS generally supports keeping the capital in La Paz, 
presumably largely because its base is focused in the 
highland Altiplano, where in some parts such as El Alto 
Morales enjoys ninety percent approval.  El Alto residents 
often march on congress to support Morales' policies forcing 
non-MAS congressional members to think twice before voting 
against MAS proposals.  The four eastern departments want to 
see the capital moved to reduce El Alto's hold over the GOB. 
It is worth noting, this issue does not totally follow 
ideological lines.  Delegates from Sucre regardless of party 
tend to support the move while delegates from La Paz 
regardless of party tend to oppose it. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
¶X. Security ) The Police vs. the Armed Forces 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (U)  On the issue of security and defense, the MAS and 
PODEMOS are not pitted against each other, but the police and 
armed forces are.  The police and armed forces are historical 
rivals in Bolivia; in February 2003 they shot at each other 
in La Paz's main square the Plaza Murillo leaving one soldier 
dead.  Both the police and armed forces have submitted their 
own proposals to the CA.  Early drafts of the Commission on 
Security and Defense report had the military only serving an 
external function and losing to the police its function as 
guarantor of the constitution.  Senior military officials 
balked at the proposals, making the commission rethink its 
position towards increasing the police's role.  The police, 
in turn, responded by protesting in front of the commission. 
Security Commission delegates (in an apparent attempt to 
minimize the potential for conflict between the two 
institutions) submitted their report in draft form on July 
13, without fully defining the roles of the two institutions. 
 On July 17, the CA Directive (the committee of party leaders 
that manages the CA's affairs) rejected the report, 
essentially telling the commission to get back to work. 
 
---------------------- 
Comment -- What's Next 
---------------------- 
 
¶12.  (U) Many of the CA commissions' reports overlap the work 
of other commissions.  For example, six of the twenty-one 
commissions issued reports touching on the issue of 
moving/retaining the capital.  Delegates from the different 
commissions will soon form "mixed" commissions to eliminate 
these redundancies and try to reach consensus on issues where 
the MAS and the opposition disagree.  If the mixed 
commissions cannot iron out all the areas of discord (a 
likely outcome), a special "Consensus Commission" will meet 
to try to hammer out the remaining problems.  All this in 
theory must happen by August 6, the deadline for ending the 
 
CA.  Within the CA the MAS and opposition have agreed to 
extend their mandate until December, but Congress has yet to 
approve the extension.  End Comment. 
GOLDBERG