VZCZCXRO5132
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1172/01 2100737
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 290737Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8015
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001172 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA AND USAID/REDSO 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI UN SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR - ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1085, B) KHARTOUM 1094, C) KHARTOUM 1102, D) 
 
KHARTOUM 1119, E) KHARTOUM 1132, F) TRIPOLI 618 
 
KHARTOUM 00001172  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Between July 12 and 19, USAID staff met with key 
civil society representatives in South and West Darfur to follow up 
on issues raised during the U.S. Special Envoy's visit to Nyala, 
gauge the views of civil society representatives in El Geneina, and 
assess possible areas of USG intervention to connect local-level 
peacebuilding efforts to the U.N./African Union (AU)-led negotiation 
process.  Darfur's civil society representatives are eager to engage 
in and support the negotiations, and their participation will lend 
important credibility to any new agreements.  However, they do not 
have adequate access to key decision-makers in the international 
community and their efforts are largely disconnected from the 
higher-level political process.  End summary. 
 
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SOUTH DARFUR: WHO WILL ORGANIZE IDPS AND CIVIL SOCIETY? 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Ahali Group for Darfur Salvation, led by Ahmoud Rijal, 
Magdoom of the Fur Tribe, has begun efforts to build consensus about 
the peace process among civil society stakeholders in Darfur (reftel 
A).  The group described their plan to build on these efforts by 
organizing a representative process for internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) in all three states.  The proposed process would involve 
elections in each IDP camp in Darfur based on proportional 
representation by population; training for the 200-300 individuals 
elected; and the formation of a 25-member steering committee to 
represent IDPs in future negotiations.  The group is coordinating 
with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and believes that 
the SPLM will provide security and protection during this process. 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Darfur Forum, a civil society group with 
representatives in Darfur and Khartoum, has also organized 
preliminary consensus-building workshops in Darfur (reftel A).  The 
group would like to organize a consultative process for civil 
society including conferences, negotiations, and true 
reconciliations throughout Darfur.  The proposed process would 
include 500 participants from the target groups in previous 
workshops (IDPs, women, youth, lawyers, and unions, among others, 
who they refer to as the "silent majority") and broader 
representation than is called for in the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and 
Consultations (DDDC).  The group said that during recent DDDC 
consultations in Nyala, participants concluded that the DDDC process 
was not authentic and expressed this concern to DDDC facilitator 
Abdul Mohammed (reftel D).  Darfur Forum members believe that the 
international community will be able to provide protection to them 
if they organize such a process. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Comment: Although civil society groups in South Darfur 
have significant organizational capacity, strong commitment to 
peace, and represent many key stakeholders in the peace process, 
they seem to be disconnected from political developments at the 
national and international level, other than the brief consultations 
held by the DDDC committee (reftel C).  Additionally, although some 
sort of representational process must be organized to lend 
authenticity to any future negotiations, it is not clear that 
Darfurians will perceive any of these groups, regardless of how 
representative, as possessing the legitimacy to organize such a 
process.  End comment. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
WEST DARFUR: WHO WILL REPRESENT ARAB COMMUNITIES? 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In West Darfur, there are far fewer civil society groups 
active in peacebuilding and political activities, and those that 
exist are weak or government-affiliated.  In a recent meeting in El 
Geneina, the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) Head of Office told USAID 
staff that DDDC facilitator Abdul Mohammed was in El Geneina for 
four days in early July.  Mohammed held DDDC consultative meetings 
with elites, civil society, and IDPs, in addition to meeting with 
native administration officials.  UNMIS felt that the workshops were 
well attended and participants were happy with them.  UNMIS 
speculated that, in contrast to South Darfur, there are fewer 
players in West Darfur and therefore it would be easier to get the 
right people around the table. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001172  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) During the DDDC consultations, security was identified as 
the number one concern, primarily in the northern corridor from El 
Geneina to Kulbus.  The second concern was land occupation, and 
third was the role of the hybrid force.  UNMIS stated that land 
occupation emerged as a major impediment to dialogue, but that 
occupation of land by Arabs from outside Sudan (reftels B and E) 
cannot appropriately be dealt with in the context of the DDDC. 
After the consultations, Mohammed met with the U.N. Country Team, 
which stressed the importance of consulting Arab communities, and 
recommended that he return for a week solely to consult Arab groups 
in their localities.  UNMIS indicated that it is particularly 
important to consult Arab communities where they live, as opposed to 
speaking with leaders in El Geneina, as the discussions will be more 
authentic. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The importance of including Arab communities in the 
consultation process and determining how they will be represented in 
negotiations was confirmed in another meeting between USAID staff 
and representatives of an Arab group in El Geneina.  The group, 
which calls itself "The Reformers", comprises moderate West 
Darfurians of Arab background.  One of the main leaders is an Arab 
who previously supported the government but has since joined Sudan 
Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/Minawi) faction, and is also a 
state parliamentarian.  Other group members are teachers or 
broadcast media workers.  They estimate that there are 450 
individuals of Arab background who have joined the SLA, including 
three in the group's executive committee.  Ninety percent of the 
members are youth, which includes ages 18-35 in Sudan. The group is 
trying to create a common vision among Arab communities that 
provides an alternative to the government and National Congress 
Party. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The group said that the government and the international 
community have marginalized Arab communities in Darfur, politically 
and in terms of service provision.  They said that Arab communities, 
especially those that have not participated in the conflict, feel 
isolated and angry as a result.  The group would like to conduct 
outreach to the local and international community on the role of 
Arab communities in peacebuilding, drawing on influential leaders, 
youth, and neutral groups.  The group also emphasized the need for 
tangible service provision in Arab communities.  Comment:  The views 
expressed by this group underline the fact that, although the 
Sudanese government was presumed to serve as a proxy for all Arab 
groups at the Abuja negotiations, this can no longer be assumed. 
End comment. 
 
 
FERNANDEZ