VZCZCXRO6033
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1119/01 1991350
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181350Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7919
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001119 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W 
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AFR/SP 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
NAIROBI FOR SFO 
NSC FOR PMARCHAM, MMAGAN, AND TSHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
USUN FOR TMALY 
BRUSSELS FOR PBROWN 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREL PGOV PHUM SOCI KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT:  SUDAN - S/E NATSIOS MEETS WITH NGOS 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001119  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶1. Summary: On July 12, Special Envoy Andrew Natsios, accompanied by 
Charge d'Affaires Alberto Fernandez and others, met with the 
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Steering Committee in Khartoum 
to discuss issues facing the humanitarian community in Sudan.  The 
NGOs noted that the Joint Communique has resulted in a reduction in 
processing time for Darfur entry visas and travel permits, but that 
staff working elsewhere in northern and eastern Sudan face growing 
bureaucratic impediments.  NGOs also expressed alarm over insecurity 
in Darfur and concern over the U.N./African Union (AU) hybrid force, 
requesting that the international community emphasize that the role 
of any peacekeeping force is separate from that of humanitarian 
organizations.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------- 
View from the Ground 
-------------------- 
 
¶2.  The NGOs began the meeting with a brief on northern Sudan. 
Tensions around oil fields had increased in advance of the July 9 
deadline for Sudanese Armed Forces and Sudan People's Liberation 
Army (SPLA) troop movements in accordance with the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), causing NGOs to reduce the number of staff 
working around these areas.  NGOs expressed concern that growing 
field-level tension between the parties could lead to a rapid 
outbreak of localized conflict, as happened in Malakal, Southern 
Sudan, in November 2006.  NGOs also reported that insecurity had 
reduced access to Southern Kordofan and Abyei.  The lack of 
functioning governments in these areas hinders NGO efforts to begin 
long-term development programs. 
 
¶3.  The NGO representatives reported that carjackings have risen 150 
percent since the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), and 
kidnappings are on the rise in Darfur as well.  NGOs believe that 
some assailants temporarily kidnap humanitarian staff in order to 
appear less suspicious and escape more quickly, assuming that no one 
will risk shooting at a vehicle transporting aid workers.  Although 
no kidnappers have demanded ransom to date, S/E Natsios observed 
that it was only a matter of time before this tactic was used.  The 
Zalingei area of West Darfur has been particularly unstable in 
recent months, with NGOs forced to rent cars to deter carjackings. 
Government police have just begun conducting more frequent patrols. 
It remains unknown whether this will help curb violence against 
humanitarians in Zalingei. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Joint Communique and Bureaucratic Impediments 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  The Joint Communique has improved bureaucratic processes for 
NGOs operating in Darfur, although some procedures remain 
problematic.  The NGOs requested that donor governments continue to 
ask questions about the progress of the communique.  The High-Level 
Committee overseeing the communique has been an especially useful 
mechanism for addressing concerns, the NGOs reported.  The committee 
expects to have a complete list of agreed-upon processing times for 
all procedures soon. 
 
¶5.  NGOs have observed that high-level Sudanese officials seem 
genuinely interested in cooperating to resolve issues, but 
working-level staff remain less helpful.  Despite this, entry visas 
are generally being issued within 48 hours as agreed to in the 
communique.  The government is taking less time to process travel 
permits, although it still surpasses the timeframe described in the 
communique.  NGOs attributed this to the government's over-optimism 
regarding the bureaucracy's abilities rather than a concerted effort 
to hinder the travel of humanitarian staff.  The NGOs reported that 
the government continues to deny many NGOs permission to bring in 
security officers, who are responsible for assessing local 
conditions and making decisions about where NGO staff can safely 
provide assistance.  The government remains critical of any NGO 
reporting on security information, even in the context of staff 
safety. 
 
¶6.  Elsewhere in northern Sudan, bureaucratic impediments have 
increased, the NGOs reported.  NGO staff must wait for months before 
receiving the necessary approvals to work in the Three Areas.  The 
process for obtaining permission to work in eastern Sudan can take 
years. 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
KHARTOUM 00001119  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Not the Right Time for Development 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  Although NGOs acknowledge that reconstruction and development 
are essential to sustainable peace in Darfur, all agree that the 
time is not right for full-scale development and reconstruction to 
begin.  NGOs stressed the importance of sequencing reconstruction 
assistance appropriately; otherwise, assistance risks being a 
conflict dividend rather than a peace dividend.  NGOs cautioned 
donors from starting reconstruction and development programs in 
areas that are relatively secure, because assistance may be 
rewarding people who are occupying the land of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) who have fled the area. 
 
¶8.  NGOs also cautioned donors against giving in to the Sudanese 
government pressure to support returns, noting that this could lead 
to forced returns from IDP camps.  NGOs stressed that conditions are 
not conducive for large-scale voluntary return, given continued 
insecurity.  NGOs are working to improve assistance by taking 
environmental effects into account, strengthening capacity-building, 
and implementing limited livelihoods interventions to help people 
cope more effectively. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Peacekeeping and the Peace Process 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  The NGOs stated that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) 
was generally useless in the face of increased militarization in IDP 
camps.  Linking AMIS to the DPA had removed any credibility the 
force once had with IDPs, according to the NGOs.  The NGOs believe 
that even the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) is now 
tainted and seen as part of an AU effort that has been too partial 
to DPA signatories.  With regard to working with the new AMIS force 
commander, S/E Natsios suggested that the NGOs might find it most 
effective to propose three or four realistic, immediate actions that 
the new commander could take to demonstrate leadership to the IDP 
community. 
 
¶10.  The NGOs requested that any U.N. peacekeeping resolution 
include language describing the "crystal clear separation" of 
humanitarian work from peacekeeping work.  The NGOs expressed 
concern that the proposed U.N. resolution contained language 
referencing the DPA, which could undermine the effectiveness of the 
hybrid force.  In response, S/E Natsios stated that one of the key 
mandates of the hybrid force would be to implement a peace 
agreement, likely to be the DPA and an annex.  NGOs accepted this, 
but stated that if the purpose of the hybrid force was publicized as 
implementing the DPA, the force wouQnever be credible in the eyes 
of Darfurians. 
 
¶11.  S/E Natsios and the NGOs agreed that IDP leaders are asking for 
different things than opposition leaders.  The NGOs stated that this 
was a sign that civil society must be included in the peace process. 
 S/E Natsios noted that it was difficult to identify a small number 
of participants who could represent all of civil society in Darfur. 
 
 
¶12.  S/E Natsios shared his observation that the opposition groups 
had fragmented, and that while Abdul Wahid enjoyed popular support 
in the IDP camps, he had been uncooperative in efforts to begin 
negotiations.  The NGOs then raised the issue of USG support for 
Minni Minawi, whose forces the humanitarian community accuses of the 
December 18 attack and rape of humanitarian staff in Gereida, South 
Darfur, in addition to numerous carjackings.  S/E Natsios clarified 
that the USG had not provided any support for Minawi's forces to 
date, and that the Government of National Unity had provided minimal 
assistance to the group. 
 
¶13. S/E Natsios did not have the opportunity to clear this message. 
 
 
FERNANDEZ