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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1102, DARFUR: S/E NATSIOS DISCUSSES POLITICAL PROCESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1102 2007-07-15 13:58 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO3010
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1102 1961358
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151358Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7892
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001102 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU SU UK FR CH
SUBJECT: DARFUR: S/E NATSIOS DISCUSSES POLITICAL PROCESS 
WITH P-5 AMBASSADORS 
 
1. (SBU) In a July 13 meeting in Khartoum with ambassadors 
representing the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, Special Envoy Natsios provided a concise analysis of 
the challenges facing the Darfur political process and 
exchanged views on the role of the African Union (AU), civil 
society, and traditional leaders in peace negotiations.  S/E 
Natsios voiced his fear of the potential "Somaliazation of 
Northern Sudan" as "centrifugal forces pulling the country 
apart began to accelerate" if Darfur is not solved in the 
near future.  While the National Congress Party (NCP) 
preferred a "certain level" of conflict to maintain its 
control over the country in the absence of popular support, 
localized violence could explode.  He cited recent "revolts" 
and unrest in Nubian, Masseriya, and Beja areas as examples 
of this trend. 
 
2. (SBU) S/E Natsios described five points that the UN/AU-led 
political process would need to address in the coming months: 
1) The chaos caused by the proliferation of armed movements 
lacking incentives to maintain loyalty and the determination 
of which movements should be included in the process; 2) The 
radicalization of internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, 
IDPs' increasing alienation from the rebels' political 
leadership, and the "risk of explosion" in the camps where 
armed elements backed by the rebels and the Sudanese 
Government operated; 3) The inclusion of civil society and 
traditional leaders, which are disconnected from the rebel 
political leaders and field commanders and disdained by 
Khartoum, in the political process; 4) The rift between the 
political leaders and the field commanders in Darfur; and 5) 
The timeframe to find a political solution to the Darfur 
conflict before the 2009 national elections, which could 
destabilize the country in the absence of a peace settlement 
for Darfur. 
 
3. (SBU) Following S/E Natsios' analysis, the UK Ambassador 
highlighted the importance of involving "genuinely 
representative" elements of Darfur civil society and 
traditional leaders, including Arab groups, in the political 
process.  She underscored the importance of balancing the 
timeframe for an agreement to ensure that the Darfur conflict 
did not disrupt the elections with the necessity that the 
agreement be "sustainable."  The French Ambassador concurred 
that such a role for traditional leaders was important but 
noted that the rebellion in Darfur, led largely by youth, had 
broken out in 2003 as a reaction not only to policies 
originating from Khartoum but out of a frustration toward 
Darfur's local elite.  She said that the Eastern Sudan Peace 
Agreement (ESPA), which had been reached between the NCP and 
the traditional authorities in Eastern Sudan, was failing in 
part because the youth did not support it. 
 
4. (SBU) The Chinese Ambassador asked for S/E Natsios' views 
on the role of the AU in the political process and questioned 
whether it had the ability to have a positive impact.  The AU 
suffered from a lack of capacity in its political operation 
and a distrust of key players, such as AU Envoy Salim Ahmed 
Salim and AU Head of Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
Implementation Sam Ibok, among the rebel groups that dated 
from the Abuja talks, according to S/E Natsios.  The AU was 
making progress in addressing the political sensitivities, 
however, and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader 
Khalil Ibrahim had met Salim recently in a gesture of 
goodwill. 
 
5. (U) S/E Natsios did not have the opportunity to clear this 
message before his departure from Sudan. 
FERNANDEZ