Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1094, S/E NATSIOS VISIT TO NORTH DARFUR (CORRECTED COPY OF

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #07KHARTOUM1094.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1094 2007-07-13 15:03 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2207
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1094/01 1941503
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131503Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7877
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001094 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND S/CRS 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI UN SU AU
SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS VISIT TO NORTH DARFUR (CORRECTED COPY OF 
KHARTOUM 1091) 
 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In a July 9-10 visit to El Fasher, North Darfur, 
Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios, accompanied by CDA Alberto 
Fernandez and others, met with representatives from the AU and UN, 
IDP camps, civil society groups and the local branch of the Umma 
Party.  He learned of the challenges facing AMIS in maintaining the 
ceasefire, potential challenges facing the deployment of the Hybrid, 
efforts to undermine international efforts toward peace, and some of 
the major concerns Darfurians hope will be addressed in future peace 
talks.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) During a July 9 informal dinner with international 
Ceasefire Commission members including Deputy Force Commander 
Rurangwa (Acting Chairman), CFC 2nd Vice Chair BG Roques (EU), 
CivPol Commissioner Tsiloane, AU observer Col. Waswa, and UN 
observer LTC Vindheim, Natsios discussed of some of the 
bureaucratic, financial and logistical challenges facing the CFC and 
the ceasefire itself. 
 
-------------------------------- 
POLITICAL VOID IN DARFUR, 
DELAY IN CONSTRUCTION FOR HYBRID 
-------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) On July 10, S/E met with Acting UNMIS Head of Office Miguel 
Martin and UNDSS Willie Harrison.  Martin said that population 
displacement in Darfur remains a big problem and that while NGOs 
would like to open new camps, the GOS refuses and instead claims 
that there are no problems and that people are ready to return.  He 
said the top problems the camps face are lack of water, the 
omnipresence of weapons, increasing alcoholism and petty crime. 
 
4. (SBU) Regarding progress toward the Hybrid, Martin lamented that 
DOS contractor PAE had still not finished the necessary 
infrastructure and it would cause a delay.  He said that the 
100-tent UN area near PAE's LOB in El Fasher had taken months and 
was still not ready.  Until it is, he said the remaining light 
support package (LSP) soldiers would not deploy from Khartoum. 
Martin also mentioned that he believed Joint Special Representative 
Adada would live in Khartoum, although they were preparing a 
residence for him in El Fasher.  He mentioned that the "joint" part 
of Adada's title was potentially confusing, as his duty of care 
could fall under the AU's or the UN's responsibility. 
 
5. (SBU) Speaking to the political situation, Harrison said there 
appeared to be a political void in Darfur.  There are a lot of field 
commanders, he said, but they hadn't been able to unite.  JEM 
appeared ready to talk peace, but also has a well-developed 
propaganda machine.  Harrison welcomed the CHD effort to reunify 
SLA/M, but said the GOS was still very actively engineering groups 
to withdraw from the DPA (i.e. either paying them off or creating 
new supposed groups) and bombing non-signatory areas.  The Hilif 
bombing two weeks ago, for example, targeted no military but rather 
destroyed livestock, displaced people and thereby reduced support to 
rebel groups there. 
 
6. (SBU) Harrison noted that many non-signatories are actually 
non-factors on the ground as real military forces since they command 
few soldiers or resources. He believed that, despite defections, 
Minni Minawi still has the largest single "rebel" force, with about 
fifty vehicles under his control. 
 
------------------------------------ 
CIVIL SOCIETY STRESSES POWER SHARING 
------------------------------------ 
 
7. (SBU) S/E then met with Mohamed El Sadig Adam Abdalla, the Darfur 
Forum's Outreach and Information Officer and a Popular Congress 
Party leader in North Darfur, as well as Omar Hamid the Darfur 
Forum Officer responsible for Native Administration Affairs and a 
Umma Party member.  Both said they felt that the GOS' arming of 
different tribes has "destroyed the social fabric of Darfur," and 
said that only by "fixing" Khartoum (politically) could Darfur be 
solved.  They stressed that true power sharing, in which Darfurians 
had an increased role in governance was a key to the solution, and 
said they had high hopes that the UN would be able to stop the GOS' 
aggression. They lauded former governor and general Ibrahim Suleiman 
(currently in Cairo) as an important figure that could be helpful in 
the political process. 
 
8. (SBU) The two men also lamented that the conflict has 
fundamentally changed the livelihoods of many tribesmen (i.e. from 
pastoral to armed partisan) that could prove impossible for them to 
turn back from.  At the same time, they expressed some hope that 
they saw signs of Arab tribes turning away from the government, even 
though they have now come to depend on government jobs for their 
economic survival. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001094  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------- 
NAFIE RESETTLING NIGER/CHAD ARABS IN DARFUR 
------------------------------------------- 
 
9. (SBU) In a subsequent meeting, Zahra Abdulnaim, also an Umma 
Party member and an attendee of the DPA negotiations, said that the 
NCP regime in Khartoum has manipulated the ignorance and illiteracy 
of Arab tribes, given them arms and ammunition, and tempted them 
with more land if they manage to defeat rebel factions.  Now many of 
these former "Janjaweed" have been recruited under the name "Border 
Guard" or "Camel Rider Police".  Also, within the last 3-4 weeks, 
she alleged that Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie resettled 
17-27,000 members of the Arab Mahameed tribe originally from 
Niger/Chad to Wadi Salih in South Darfur State.  Nafie supposedly 
led a team who stayed over one week in Wadi Salih to issue these 
Arabs official papers and documents. The land they are supposed to 
have been resettled on was originally Fur land. 
 
----------------------------- 
IDPS REITERATE SECURITY FEARS 
----------------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) In his final meeting, the S/E met IDP representatives of 
the three camps surrounding El Fasher: Abdulbasit Mohamed Adam, a 
Fur Umda from Al Salaam camp, Hawa Abdulla Adam Mohamed, a Fur 
female from Abu Shouk, and Hassan Assad Rasheed Kanan, a Zaghawa 
Umda from Zam Zam.  All three agreed that security was the main 
problem they faced.  In many cases, government or government-backed 
forces were responsible for assaults and rape against IDPs. 
Meanwhile, AMIS has no authority to arrest anyone guilty of such 
crimes. 
 
11. (SBU) As for peace prospects, the leaders said ninety percent of 
the IDPs in the camps support SLA/AW because he was the one at the 
Abuja talks who insisted on individual compensation.  They said 
Minni's popularity now is not more than two percent in the camps. 
For that reason, they recommend negotiations with JEM and SLA/AW and 
stress that it is not essential to include all the factions' leaders 
because some of them have no clout in the field.  The leaders 
stressed three priorities to restore peace and fix the DPA: 1) 
Security; 2) Recovery and Rehabilitation; and 3) Compensation. Like 
many IDPs in Darfur, they seem to have dangerously inflated 
expectations from the coming of the Hybrid and from a political 
process yet to be fully defined. 
 
12. (U) S/E Natsios' staff has cleared this cable. 
 
FERNANDEZ