VZCZCXRO9245
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1083/01 1921439
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 111439Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7847
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001083 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU
 
SUBJECT: FACILITATING SPLM DARFUR INITIATIVE: GAME PLAN 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Confusion over the UN/AU roadmap and SPLM 
initiative persists despite face-to-face meetings between SPLM and 
UN/AU officials.  Both the UN/AU and the SPLM have not communicated 
their plans clearly enough to each other to eliminate 
misunderstandings.  As a result, the SPLM plans to hold its 
conference for Darfur factions and civil society beginning on/about 
August 6.  The SPLM said that the UN/AU pushed for an earlier start 
date for the SPLM meeting because the UN/AU-led negotiations would 
begin in August.  We will continue to find ways to reinforce the 
complementarity of the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, SPLM, and 
Eritrean efforts with the UN/AU roadmap.  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
UN/AU VISIT TO JUBA 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶2. (SBU) On July 2, Pekka Haavisto, Senior Advisor to UN Envoy Jan 
Eliasson, and Sam Ibok, AU head of Darfur Peace Agreement 
implementation, met with First Vice President Salva Kiir.  Dr. 
Achier Deng Akol, a member of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) Taskforce on Darfur was present in the meeting.  In a later 
conversation with Poloff, Achier reported that Kiir had told Ibok 
and Haavisto that the UN/AU should continue with its plans.  Achier, 
concerned that Ibok and Haavisto misinterpreted Kiir's remark, told 
them that the SPLM was still planning on hosting the Darfur rebel 
leaders and civil society some time in August.  The UN/AU envoys 
pushed back and requested that the SPLM hold its meeting in July. 
Achier explained that this was not possible given the Center for 
Humanitarian Dialogue meeting beginning on/about July 16 and the 
anniversary of the death of John Garang.  Ibok expressed concern 
about the timing of the meeting because the UN/AU wanted to begin 
negotiations in August. 
 
¶3. (SBU) According to Achier, the UN/AU team wanted to clarify 
several other points.  First, the UN/AU team members wanted to know 
if the inclusion of Lazarus Sumbeiyo was an attempt by the SPLM to 
replicate CPA negotiations.  Achier explained that the Moi Institute 
was selected to facilitate the SPLM conference and Sumbeiyo was the 
head of the institute.  Second, the UN/AU expressed concern about 
bringing in civil society because it is a mixed group containing 
Khartoum-backers.  The SPLM explained that it is important for civil 
society leaders to have some buy-in to the process and for that they 
need to be heard in order to keep pressure on the rebel movements to 
negotiate in good faith.  Third, the UN/AU wanted to know why the 
SPLM wanted to involve signatories and non-signatories.  The SPLM 
said that the difference between signatories and non-signatories is 
not as clear as it once was.  Achier said that a fourth issue the 
SPLM clarified was over the timing of the three phases.  Ibok 
reportedly thought the phases would be held at different times.  The 
SPLM explained that all three phases were part of one meeting. 
Fifth, the UN/AU said that the level of coordination with the SPLM 
was poor.  The SPLM said that it was coordinating its efforts 
through regular contact with the AU and UN representatives in Juba. 
(Note: The AU does not have representatives in Juba.  UN staff in 
Juba report to the UN Mission in Sudan, which does not fall under 
the leadership of UN Envoy Jan Eliasson or AU Envoy Salim Ahmed 
Salim, who are responsible for the UN/AU political process on 
Darfur.  End note.) 
 
- - - - - - 
UN/AU VIEWS 
- - - - - - 
 
¶4. (SBU) In a meeting with donors on July 4 in Khartoum, the UN/AU 
understood Kiir's comments to mean that the UN/AU and SPLM should 
proceed on separate paths.  Haavisto and Ibok had thus concluded 
that the SPLM's current plan was outside the 
internationally-endorsed UN/AU roadmap.  The UN/AU and the donors 
expressed concern that the SPLM's proposed meeting remained too 
broad and unrealistic.  The UN/AU representative said that the SPLM 
had done little to reach non-signatory field commanders in Darfur, 
despite UN/AU efforts to facilitate contact.  Fearing that the SPLM 
initiative would fail, the UN/AU had proposed to Kiir that the SPLM 
host a smaller meeting of the faction leaders of the Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM): Abdulwahid al-Nur, Ahmed Abdulshafi, 
Ahmed Diraij, Khamis Abdullah, Sharif Harir, and Abdullah Yehia. 
Haavisto and Ibok had said that the meeting would give the SPLM a 
prominent yet effective role.  They had offered UN/AU financial 
assistance and political support to ensure the attendance of the SLM 
leaders.  Kiir had declined the offer, according to the UN/AU 
representative. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The UN/AU pointed out that it was important for donors to 
consider whether support for the SPLM initiative was important 
enough to delay progress on the UN/AU roadmap as the SPLM did not 
seem interested in coordination with the UN/AU and was supportive of 
 
KHARTOUM 00001083  002 OF 002 
 
 
Eritrean versus UN/AU mediation in the negotiations.  (Note: Achier 
denied that the SPLM was supportive of Eritrean mediation and said 
the SPLM planned to send the rebel movements to UN/AU-led 
negotiations.  In previous conversations with U.S. officials, other 
SPLM leaders, including Kiir, have favored Eritrean-led 
negotiations.  End note.)  The UN/AU planned to announce the end of 
the "convergence phase" of the UN/AU roadmap during the upcoming 
summit in Tripoli and would then begin preparations for 
negotiations.  The first step would be the meeting of six SLM 
leaders at the end of July. 
 
- - - - - - - - 
U.S. GAME PLAN 
- - - - - - - - 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The two read-outs from the UN/AU-Kiir meeting indicate 
that differences between the UN/AU and the SPLM initiative continue. 
 Our primary focus is to reinforce what appears to be "forced 
harmony" between the SPLM and the UN/AU for now.  We will continue 
to urge the SPLM to recognize the UN/AU lead on the roadmap and the 
Darfur negotiations.  In addition, we will stress the 
complementarity of the various efforts, including the Center for 
Humanitarian Dialogue, the SPLM, and Eritrea. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) This strategy is particularly important in light of the 
need to give the rebel movements consistent messages to keep them on 
the road to UN/AU-led negotiations.  It is essential that potential 
spoilers, such as Abdelwahid and Khalil Ibrahim, cannot shop around 
for venues or patrons. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Finally, we need greater specificity on the UN/AU roadmap. 
This clarity is essential for closing the potential loopholes that 
the Khartoum Government, which while not necessarily opposed to the 
negotiating process, can exploit to subvert it. 
 
FERNANDEZ