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Viewing cable 07KABUL2149, PRT CHAGHCHARAN: SEMI-ANNUAL GHOR REVIEW

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KABUL2149 2007-07-09 06:05 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO6242
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #2149/01 1900605
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 090605Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8994
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002149 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR HARRIMAN 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-82 POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PREL PGOV PTER PHUM AF
SUBJECT: PRT CHAGHCHARAN: SEMI-ANNUAL GHOR REVIEW 
 
1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: Ghor enjoys a stable security 
situation overall; most current issues stem from local 
land and tribal disputes.  Pasaband and Taywara 
Districts remain vulnerable to Taliban elements based 
in Helmand, evidenced by several incursions this 
spring.  A shortage of ANA and ANP contributes to the 
problem.  The lack of infrastructure development, 
primarily roads, hampers economic growth and isolates 
the province for most of the winter.  The slow pace of 
development has angered many Ghor residents and 
threatens the long term stability of the province. 
Former Governor Afzali had worked closely with the PRT 
and NGOs to improve security, governance, and 
development, but his replacement by General Baz 
Muhammad Ahmady has raised concerns in the Ghor 
development community.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
SECURITY: STABLE, BUT OPEN TO TB INFILTRATION 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2.  (SBU) The security situation in Ghor is stable, 
but recent Taliban incursions into Pasaband and 
Taywara Districts highlight the vulnerability and 
limits of the provincial government.  There are no ANA 
troops in Ghor and only 900 ANP, most of whom are 
still being trained, need more weapons, and only 
recently received vehicles.  General Shaah Jahan 
Noori, Ghor's ANP Chief, works closely with the PRT 
CIVPOL and Police Mentoring Program (PMT) trainers and 
has expanded the police training programs offered in 
Ghor. The PMT, with Norri's support, created an ANP 
training team qualified to instruct ANP staff in basic 
police operations.  The team now deploys with selected 
Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) and PMT 
staff to train ANP personnel at the district level. 
The district police chiefs and PMT report that the ANP 
training team performed well in recent missions to 
Dowlat Yar and Dolina.  After prompting from PRT 
police advisors, Noori moved more equipment and fuel 
to the districts, a move that has increased the 
district chief's law enforcement capabilities.  Noori 
continues to complain about police pay and pace of 
reform, telling the PMT that his officers may strike 
if reforms are not enacted soon. He believes too many 
ANP personnel are being excluded and will not be 
retained, and he wants some control over which 
officers should be kept in Ghor. 
 
3.  (SBU) There have been no attacks on the PRT or 
personnel (which operate throughout the province), but 
low-scale local conflicts over tribal and land issues 
remain a problem.  These incidents create 
opportunities for Taliban influence and permit 
provincial power brokers to exert their muscle. 
General Ahmad Khan Morghabi in the north and Dr. 
Ibrahim Malekzada in the south are the strongest power 
brokers.  Their continued influence highlights the 
limits of provincial authority.  Ghor authorities lack 
the means to move against their drug trafficking 
activity or illegal weapons stockpiles. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
POLITICAL - NEW GOVERNOR NEEDS TO EXTEND REACH 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
4.  (SBU) The replacement of Governor Shah Abdul Ahad 
Afzali with General Baz Muhammad Ahmady in June raised 
concerns among an already anxious development 
community in Ghor.  Afzali was concerned about the 
slow rate of development in the province and welcomed 
greater NGO and PRT involvement.  Residents of 
Chaghcharan supported Afzali but pressed his office to 
secure more assistance for the province.  The line 
ministries, which have few small staff, have limited 
development funds, and were reluctant to request 
additional support from Kabul.  The Provincial Council 
meets and has worked closely with the PRT and USAID to 
formulate an initial draft of its Provincial 
 
KABUL 00002149  002 OF 002 
 
 
Development Plan.  Ahmady's major challenge will be to 
extend his authority over the province, increase the 
population's support for the provincial government, 
and secure more development assistance. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
ECONOMY - LACK OF ROADS, SKILLED LABOR SLOWS 
DEVELOPMENT 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5.  (SBU) Ghor is one of Afghanistan's poorest 
provinces and is in desperate need of development. 
The challenges are enormous.  Poor road infrastructure 
isolates the province for most of the winter.  Most 
residents have no access to electricity and the 
majority work subsistence level agriculture.  Few NGOs 
work in Ghor, and the lack of skilled labor restricts 
even small-scale NGO development plans.  NGOs recruit 
Herat or Kabul residents to fill skilled positions, 
resulting in high staff turnover.  Several NGOs are 
trying to build Ghor's human capacity, but this is a 
slow process.  There are no large scale development 
projects at this point and many residents are 
frustrated with the central government and 
international community for seemingly neglecting their 
province. 
 
6.  (SBU) Ghor's stable security situation works to 
its advantage by allowing the smaller projects, which 
may be most appropriate given the small dispersed 
population, to be implemented.  PRT, NGO, and USAID 
projects have created hundreds of jobs in Ghor, and 
modest economic growth is visible in the province and 
district centers.  In Chaghcharan, dozens of new 
houses are under construction.  Shop owners report 
that business is very good, with construction supplies 
selling fast, but complain about the lack of 
electricity and the need for more kamaz cargo trucks 
to haul supplies from Herat or Kabul.  The large 
livestock bazaar in Chaghcharan is busy, and the 
supply of livestock has increased after a harsh 
winter.  Farmers expect a good year. 
 
7.  (SBU) Ghor's stable security situation is also 
reflected in a growing school population and increased 
the demand for school tents, buildings, and teachers. 
The Department of Education (DOE) reports Ghor needs 
at least 240 school tents and 1000 teachers, but it 
recognized the challenge of attracting qualified 
teachers to the province.  The DOE has hired hundreds 
of temporary teachers to fill the void, but most lack 
higher education and training.  The DOE claims that 
only 50 new schools have been built in Ghor and wants 
NGOs and the PRT to make school construction a higher 
priority.  Two schools in the Saghar District were 
reportedly burned in June - DOE and ANP say these 
events, even if confirmed, are rare in the province 
and they work closely to protect the schools. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
8.  (SBU) The lack of infrastructure development and a 
skilled workforce are the greatest challenges facing 
Ghor.  Increased USAID and NGO funding will be in 
place in 2007-08 but implementation will remain 
difficult and slow.  Sustained PRT- and NGO-initiated 
development will continue to expand the moderate 
economic bump in the population centers.  The change 
in governor could create political challenges but the 
new administration inherits a functioning Provisional 
Council and excellent PRT-government working 
relationship.  If Governor Ahmady is prepared to 
support PRT and NGO development programs and works to 
strengthen provisional authority the security, Ghor's 
slow but steady progress will continue. 
WOOD