VZCZCXRO4587
PP RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1030/01 1870726
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 060726Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0614
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2173
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2142
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2183
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0038
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1466
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2412

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001030 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID SNAR TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN A DECADE AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 
 
 
DUSHANBE 00001030  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Ten years after peace accords ended the 1992-1997 
civil war, President Emomali Rahmon has taken a great deal of 
credit for pulling Tajikistan out of conflict and setting it on 
a path which he claims could be a model for other post-conflict 
societies.  At a June 25-26 conference commemorating the Moscow 
signing of the peace agreements (reftel), government officials 
and visiting diplomats praised the progress made over the last 
decade and focused on Tajikistan's future, while a few lone 
voices cautioned that the peace could not be sustained without 
allowing all Tajik citizens freedom of political expression. 
The anniversary of the end of the civil war provides an 
important moment to evaluate Tajikistan's present, understand 
how far Tajikistan has come, and what remains to be done to 
ensure stability and prosperity. 
 
THE BLEAK BASELINE 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Peace and stability did not come with the stroke of a 
pen.  In June 1997, Tajikistan was exhausted after fighting 
between regional factions had left 50,000-70,000 dead (the 
government estimate is even higher) and hundreds of thousands 
displaced, afraid to go back to communities riddled with 
landmines.   Food was scarce-staples such as flour and oil 
sometimes had to be smuggled over the border from Uzbekistan. 
Militias and bandits roamed the streets, which were empty after 
five in the afternoon.   The school system barely functioned and 
some families sent their children abroad for education and 
safety.   President Rahmon's supporters, including the Popular 
Front and others largely from Kulyob, and the United Tajik 
Opposition, a coalition of the Islamic Renaissance Party and 
separatists generally from Khorog and Khujand, reached a truce, 
but mistrust and skepticism existed on both sides. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The "General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace 
and National Accord in Tajikistan" promised a new era of 
reconciliation and national unity, but ten years later, the 
agreement has a mixed legacy, one of security at the price of 
democracy, and economic consolidation rather than overall 
prosperity.  We outline achievements and disappointments below. 
 
 
THE GOOD THINGS 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Peace:  Tajikistan enjoys true internal security and 
calm.   Gone are the curfews, the bandits roaming the streets 
and holding people at gunpoint, or kidnapping young women - 
practices which lasted well after the peace accords were signed. 
 For years, "stability" has been the priority for the government 
and Tajik citizens alike, loathing anything resembling unrest. 
Even staunch oppositionists in Rasht shudder at the idea of 
criticizing Rahmon or doing anything to rock the boat.  The 
memories of the war still serve as a powerful deterrent to 
conflict. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Economic growth:  Although it still only functions at 
60% of its 1991 indicators, Tajikistan's economy has indeed 
grown by a healthy 8-10 percent every year.   Dushanbe boasts 
more cars on the street, more shops open, more goods available 
in the shops and bazaars -- all signs of normalcy.  The cell 
phone industry is one of Tajikistan's most lucrative new 
sectors.  Heavily influenced by migrant workers returning from 
Russia, Tajiks are slowly becoming consumers, buying cell 
phones, internet services, and name brand clothes.  Several 
coffee shops serving high-quality coffee have sprung up in the 
last year, as have trade centers and a chain of grocery stores 
with imported products from Europe. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Regional Stability:  Tajikistan has gone from being 
the region's war-torn problem child to one of Central Asia's 
more stable countries.  Since September 11, 2001, Tajikistan has 
provided unfailing support for U.S. NATO operations in 
Afghanistan and proven itself a committed partner in the global 
war on terror.  Rahmon is cultivating a role as Central Asian 
statesman, offering to work with Iran behind the scenes and to 
play a more active role in Afghanistan's reconstruction.  Since 
his re-election last November, he has traveled extensively in 
the Arab world, including to Syria where he showed off the Tajik 
model for peace-building. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Border control:  In late 2005, Tajikistan took 
complete control of it borders when Russian troops acceded to a 
Tajik request and withdrew all but a few officers in an advisory 
capacity.  Since then, and contrary to Russian claims that the 
 
DUSHANBE 00001030  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
situation has deteriorated, the Tajik border and military forces 
have maintained or exceeded Russian levels of security and drug 
interdictions, although arrests and convictions have not kept 
pace with the increased confiscations. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Limited religious freedom:  The Islamic Renaissance 
Party of Tajikistan is Central Asia's only legal Islamic 
political party.  Although many government officials still 
distrust any public role for religion, recalling that the 
opposition came from Tajikistan's more conservative and 
religiously observant areas, Rahmon's government has allowed 
religious activity, and permitted the Islamic Renaissance Party 
to operate and participate in the parliament.  Given the issues 
with Islamic extremists in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, and the 
memory of Iranian support for the opposition, Islamic groups in 
Tajikistan enjoy more freedom than might be expected. 
 
THE DISAPPOINTMENTS: 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Consolidated political power:  The peace agreement 
called for 30 percent of all appointed government positions, 
ranging for cabinet members to deputy ministers and local 
government,  to be given to the United Tajik Opposition.  With 
his cabinet reshuffle following the November 2006 presidential 
election, Rahmon removed the remaining "opposition" ministers 
from the cabinet, and the number of opposition in other 
positions is dwindling.  Instead, the government now consists of 
relatives and insiders from Rahmon's home region of Kulyob, with 
only a few exceptions.  The consequences of this consolidation 
include a government paralyzed and unable to make decisions at a 
working level (and sometimes ministerial level), for fear of 
losing one's job, and the perception among the populace that 
Rahmon is a one-man government. Interestingly, there does not 
seem to be an heir apparent, nor has Rahmon taken steps to 
ensure a presidency for life. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Shrinking political pluralism:  Under the motto 
"Economics before politics," Rahmon's government has carefully 
restricted political parties' activities and orchestrated 
elections to the governments' advantage (possibly being the only 
post-Soviet leaders to fudge the numbers downward for his most 
recent presidential victory) by prohibiting political party 
training and preventing access to independent media.  With the 
exception of the Islamic Renaissance Party, Tajikistan's few 
opposition political parties limp along, without much 
opportunity or inspiration to build their platforms and 
membership.  The Islamic Renaissance Party walks a fine line 
with the government, careful not to seem too powerful in order 
not to incur a crackdown.  U.S. assistance projects that touch 
on democratic institution building, civil society reform, or 
media freedom, face extraordinary bureaucratic hurdles, and 
occasional run-ins with the security apparatus. 
Non-governmental organizations have come more under scrutiny, 
and a restrictive new law on public associations gives the 
government more oversight over NGO activity. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Economic consolidation:  To the victors go the 
spoils, and to Rahmon's family and friends, go the state-owned 
enterprises and lucrative government positions.   Tajikistan did 
not have much at the fall of the Soviet Union, but what it did 
have ended up largely under the control of trusted Kulyobis. 
Although not as egregious as the presidential family businesses 
in the other Central Asian republics, Rahmon's extended family 
has the lock on most industries in most sectors, and continues 
to enjoy privileges and advantages not open to others. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Fear of public demonstrations and dissent:  A 
surprisingly large number of Tajiks blame political protests in 
Dushanbe in 1992 for sparking the fighting that led to the civil 
war.  Thus, even the most committed opponents resist any sort of 
public demonstration that could dredge up memories of the war. 
The press is largely self-censoring, afraid to tackle tough 
topics or mild criticism of the government.  Authorities fined 
and imprisoned a newspaper publisher for stealing electricity in 
2005 after he published a letter criticizing government policy; 
the unusually severe penalties sent a chilling message to the 
media about the price of free speech. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Crumbling infrastructure:  Peace has not improved 
public utilities.  Tajik citizens lament the fact that they had 
more electricity and cleaner water during the war years than 
they do now, and last winter's electricity shortage brought 
unusually public complaints against the government.  Tajik Air 
 
DUSHANBE 00001030  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
is barely surviving off the remnants of its meager inheritance 
from Aeroflot.  Although the Chinese and other donors are 
refurbishing several main transportation arteries, the 
bone-jarring roads to smaller communities worsen after every 
winter. 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Lack of social spending:  The miserly amount 
Tajikistan spends on basic education and health care is yielding 
a generation unprepared to lead the country towards democracy 
and further economic growth.  Tajiks now grow up not learning 
Russian or any second language, further isolating them from the 
developed world, and leaving youth susceptible to threats from 
HIV/AIDS, narcotics trafficking, Islamic extremism, and 
anti-Western media messages.  Tajikistan's hospitals do not have 
enough medications or equipment to diagnose and treat basic 
ailments.  (Note: The Embassy health practitioner visited one 
hospital that was sterilizing gauze for re-use on surgery 
patients. End Note.) 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Limited religious freedom:  Despite allowing Muslims 
to practice, the government keeps a close watch on mosques, and 
has proposed a number of changes to further limit religious 
activities.  Further, the government has threatened a number of 
Christian organizations and groups, including missionary 
non-governmental organizations and the Jehovah's witnesses. 
 
WITHER TAJIKISTAN: 
 
¶16. (SBU) No one in Tajikistan wishes to return to the days of 
the civil war.  The achievements of the last decade have been 
less about Rahmon's leadership, and more about a desire to avoid 
conflict at any cost.  However, a new generation of Tajiks with 
no direct recollection of the war years, are coming of age.  If 
they remain shut out of the political process and cannot find 
jobs in an economy controlled by the president's inner circle, 
they may not give Rahmon a pass for having established security, 
as their parents do.  In the longer term, Rahmon will need to 
change his ways and style of governance if he hopes to maintain 
the peace he worked to achieve. 
JACOBSON