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Viewing cable 07DAKAR1557, The Cost of Immunity

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07DAKAR1557 2007-07-26 17:01 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dakar
VZCZCXRO3458
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #1557 2071701
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261701Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8875
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS DAKAR 001557 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL AND INR/AA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PINS KDEM SG
SUBJECT: The Cost of Immunity 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1.  (SBU) On July 17, President Wade asserted his authority when he 
instructed the Prime Minister to deliver a message to the National 
Assembly in which he promised to purchase a vehicle for each one of 
the 150 Deputies, detailed reforms the Deputies needed to undertake, 
and instructed them how to formulate their oral questions to members 
of the cabinet.  With the major organs of government docile, Wade is 
in position to pave the way for a successor who can guarantee him 
immunity and continue his vision.  The resurrection of the Senate is 
another nail in the coffin of the Assembly.  The opposition, labor 
unions and Judiciary remain weak.  End Summary. 
 
AN ASSEMBLY WITHOUT CREDIBILITY 
------------------------------- 
2.  (SBU) In early June, a historically low 36 percent of Senegalese 
elected a new National Assembly.  The low turnout is being 
interpreted as a rejection of the Assembly by voters who see the 
Deputies as puppets of the Executive.  A lack of checks and 
balances, a phenomenon not new in Senegalese politics, has been 
reinforced during Wade's tenure, wherein powers are concentrated in 
the Presidency.  In the eyes of many Senegalese, the current 
National Assembly lacks legitimacy and relevancy.  While one-third 
of registered voters voted, this overall figure cloaks much lower 
rates of turnout in many areas.  Lacking a true popular mandate, the 
Assembly risks becoming a mere annex of the ruling party and tool in 
the battle between those who may want to eventually succeed Wade. 
 
 
A SENATE OF YES-MEN 
------------------- 
3.  (SBU)  On August 19, members of the National Assembly and local 
government officials will elect 35 members of the new 100 person 
Senate (Note: the remainder will be appointed by Wade).  The main 
opposition parties have boycotted these elections as well, labeling 
them an electoral farce.  In reality, the election has become a PDS 
affair and the nomination process within the ruling party has 
already ignited a fierce battle among local PDS leaders.  For 
example, for one seat in the Department of Pikine there are 90 
candidates.  This pattern is being repeated around the country and 
will force Wade to arbitrate the selection process.  Although the 
Senate will be wholly composed of PDS members, it is important to 
note that in the event of a vacancy in the Presidency, it is the 
President of the Senate who, for 90 days, will become President ad 
interim; this means that Wade can, in effect, pre-position his 
successor should he step down before the next Presidential election. 
 
 
CONTAINING THE OPPOSITION 
------------------------- 
4.  (SBU) In this new paradigm of a discredited legislature, the 
question of his succession, and amidst a turbulent social and 
economic climate, Wade is showing signs of flexibility.  While he 
has so far refused to dialogue with opposition leaders, who continue 
their boycott and threaten to resort to aggressive measures, the 
fact that the people heeded their call for a boycott of legislative 
elections shows that they may be in a position to exploit the 
current frustrations surrounding the high cost of living and the 
energy crisis.  To be able to govern peacefully, Wade seems to have 
realized that a change of strategy is needed.  On July 25 he held 
talks with Senegal's largest opposition party, Rewmi of former Prime 
Minister Idrissa Seck.  He blamed Seck's entourage for the 
misunderstanding between the two and indicated his willingness to 
reunite with Seck.  In the same vein, he held discussions with 
Landing Savane, who recently wrote Wade a letter underlining his 
desire to have his party resume its coalition with the PDS. 
 
Comment 
------- 
5. (SBU) With a malleable legislature and a judiciary under his 
tutelage, Wade controls Senegal's political future.  His goal seems 
to be to organize a legal succession (not necessarily via elections) 
that will be accepted as a fait accompli by the two other branches 
of government.  A carefully chosen successor would presumably 
guarantee him and his family immunity and maintain his liberal 
followers in power.  However, manipulating institutions and laws may 
well have implications for political stability.  The President will 
also have to placate the key players within his own extended 
political family.  This may require additional cabinet changes and a 
redistribution of power, further discrediting political actors and 
deepening the distrust between the population and their political 
leaders.  End Comment. 
 
SMITH